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SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

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INTRODUCTION TO SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

by Smarlo Ma

Lin Piao has been formally designated, as was specifically stated in the new Chinese Communist Party Constitution, as Mao Tse-tung's successor. In view of this development, the China Problems Research Center has objectively and in good faith compiled and published "Quotations From Marshal Lin Piao" and the present volume of "Selected Works of Lin Piao." It is the belief of the editors that these two books will contribute substantially to the understanding of this new leader of Communist China, of his personal background, his personality, his behaviour and his thoughts and beliefs.

Back in the Yen-an days, Lin Piao was the president of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College, formerly the Red Army College, where I saw him for about 10 times. In the first Communist-Kuomintang civil war period, Lin was branded by the Kuomintang propagandists as a bandit, but I have always remembered him as a solid general with a refined and even gentle appearance.

Not only gentle and refined in appearance, Lin has also a weak constitution and has never enjoyed robust health, looking in fact every inch a frail scholar. But under this thin veneer of infirmity, as available data on the man has shown, Lin is by nature stubborn, cold and intransigently rigid. Lin has spent the greater part of his life with the Chinese Communist army, and the battles he has fought are mostly pitched battles. Ever

SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

since he joined the communist revolution in his youthful days, seldom has he been detached from army life. His experience with the so-called armed struggle forms, therefore, an important basis for his political philosophy.

As a common and ordinary man, Lin Piao has also his own partialities and idiosyncrasies. It is said that when engaged in military operations he has a weakness for fried beans. Chinese Communist publications have recorded that Lin has taken to fried beans because Chinese medicine considers it a prevention against common cold, to which Lin is particularly susceptible due to his feeble health. Because of his partiality for beans, which have become indispensable to him, he has named his favorite daughter Dou Dou, which is the Chinese equivalent for beans.

Personally, I believe that his partialities and his idiosyncrasies are something good about him. However, given the political environment of Communist China today, in which particular emphasis is laid on demands for "fight self and repudiate revisionism," these personal whims will be assessed by other standards.

As an able military commander, Lin likes to see practical results and a high degree of efficiency, and he thinks that everyone should submit himself to army discipline. His catch phrases are "live toughly," "put into full effect," "fight fiercely," and "shatter to pieces," phrases that are often used by martinets in the drilling of new army recruits. It is these terse and precise words and the ideas behind them that he wants to introduce into China's political life. The entire structure of Lin's political thinking is based on his military ideas.

Ostensibly an apt pupil of Mao Tse-tung, emphasizing forever the importance of the thought of Mao Tse-tung as the guiding principle of all communist activities, Lin is actually only using the Mao thought as a means to clinch the success of his seizure of political power.

INTRODUCTION

Lin Piao is by no means a dogmatist. Like P'eng Te-huai, he is never flamboyant. He is as practical as he is cautious, careful and prudent. In addressing his subordinates, he likes to use such words as "practical," "put into full effect," "concrete," "realistic," "tangible results" and "get quick results." He used to say:

"We cannot apply the same cure to all diseases." (*Work Correspondence*, known as the PLA Papers, Issue No. 20, May 22, 1961)

"We should not bind ourselves and restrict our thinking by a set of fixed ideas." (*Torch Correspondence*, Issue No. 1 July 1968)

In his handling of the Yang Ch'eng-wu case, when General Yang was dismissed as China's Acting Chief of Staff for his "wildly ambitious attempts to oust regional army commanders," Lin was said to have made a distinction in the application of the "absolute authority of the thought of Mao Tse-tung": While that absolute authority can be advantageously applied to literature, it cannot be applied to philosophy, science and politics. Lin is therefore opposed to the assertion that the thought of Mao Tse-tung rules supreme.

He was also quoted as having made the following remarks in the same connection:

"If you regard everything, even truth, as absolute, you are stopping the movement of things and petrifying the development of ideas. In the end your thought may become stagnant. . . . Every knowledge of ours is at once absolute and relative. Thus our knowledge can only be of dual character, and cannot be monistic." (*Talk at a Reception for Army Officers*, March 24, 1968)

One is liable, however, to get lost on the vital problem

SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

of the immutability of ideas when one has attained absolute power. Whether Lin Piao will repeat the same mistake made by others by establishing the absolute supremacy of his own ideas only history can tell.

Lin Piao has stressed on several occasions the importance of man. "Machines", he said, "are man-made and man-operated. Without man, there will be no machines; and even if there are, they will be entirely useless." (*Speech at the Central Organs Work Conference, October 25, 1966*)

In other words, without man, the theory of "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" will become null and avoid.

Our national reconstruction will start with the day when our political leaders wake up to the truth that man is first and foremost, recognizing the dignity of the individual and placing human rights before the right of the gun.

October 1, 1969.

QUOTATIONS FROM LIN PIAO

Viewed from their essence, from a long-term standpoint and from their totality, we must see imperialism and all reactionaries for what they really are, as paper tigers, and must have the courage to struggle against them and be bold to seize victory. But in every concrete struggle, we should also see the other side of the enemy, that is, see him as a living, iron and real tiger which can eat people up. Therefore, in each particular phase, in each military action, we must exercise caution, pay serious attention to the art of the struggle, and adopt suitable forms of struggle and methods of fighting according to the time, place and conditions, so that we can isolate the enemy and wipe him out step by step.

“The Victory of the Chinese People’s Revolutionary War is the Victory of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung”
(*Red Flag*, No. 19, October 1 1960)

The policy of our Party at that time was to strive for the best possible situation, namely, to strive for national peace. At the same time, it was prepared for the worst possible situation . . . and to place all our work on the basis of building up our own strength to cope with the worst possible situation.

Ibid.

Fighting is the pivot of all our strategy and tactics. It is because of the necessity of fighting that we admit the the necessity of moving away.

SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

"Long Live the Victory of
People's War" in Commemoration of
the 20th Anniversary of Victory in the
Chinese People's War of Resistance
Against Japan (September 3, 1965)

In the final analysis, the seizure and the consolidation
of political power remains the most fundamental problem.

"Speech at the Peking Mass Rally
in Celebration of the 50th Anniver-
sary of the October Revolution"
(November 6, 1967)

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LIN PIAO

by Feng Tsu-yu

Lin Piao was born in Huangkang, Hupeh, in 1907. Lin's father, the proprietor of a small dyeing factory, was a man of modest means.

In 1925 when he was a student at the Kung Chin Middle School in Wuchang, Lin joined a Communist front organization in Wuhan under the influence of the then prevailing new trend of thought. In the anti-British explosion precipitated by the shooting of May 30 in Shanghai, he was active in local student circles in staging demonstrations and protest marches. Consequently he was chosen a deputy to attend the National Student Conference in Shanghai.

In October 1925, through arrangements of the Chinese Communist Party, Lin went south to Canton to attend the 4th Class of the Whampoa Military Academy, where he was enrolled in the 5th Company, 2nd Battalion, First Regiment as a cadet. Then he joined the Communist Youth Corps on the recommendation of Yun Tai-ying, then an instructor at the military academy.

The Northern Expedition, organized by the Kuomintang to overthrow the warlords deeply entrenched in the North, was launched in the following year. Graduated from the academy earlier than the scheduled time, Lin was made a squad leader in the Independent Regiment commanded by Yeh T'ing. Yeh's regiment was a component part of Chang Fa-kuei's 12th Division, which in turn belonged to the Fourth Army commanded by Li Chi-shen.

Lin Piao was formally admitted to the Chinese Communist

SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

Party in 1927 upon the recommendation of Yun Tai-ying and Hsiao Chu-nu.

Following the KMT-Communist schism in 1926, Lin Piao was promoted commander of a special service company under Yeh T'ing, and took part in the Nanchang Uprising. Defeated in the coup, Lin followed Chu Teh to flee southward to give themselves up to troops under Fan Shih-sheng, commander of the 16th Army of the National Revolutionary Forces. Lin was made a company commander and Chu, who had at this time taken on the assumed name of Wang Kai, was given the command of a regiment. They didn't stay long with Fan's army though. When December came around, Lin and Chu absconded, and took their troops with them.

It was in May 1928 that Chu Teh joined forces with Mao Tse-tung in ChingKangshan, where they reorganized their troops into the Fourth Workers and Peasants Red Army with Chu Teh as commander, Mao Tse-tung as political commissar and Lin Piao as commander of the second company of the 28th regiment. He was promoted regimental commander in October.

In 1930, the Red Army was expanded into the First Army Group, and Lin was appointed Commander of its Fourth Army.

Lin succeeded Chu Teh as the Commander of the First Army Group with Nieh Jung-chen as political commissar, and served concurrently as the Commander-in-Chief of the East Route Army.

After breaking through the Nationalist encirclement in 1934, Lin led his First Army Group as advance force on the Long March, until they reached Tsunyi in southeast Kweichow in 1935.

At the historically significant Tsunyi Conference of the

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LIN PIAO

CCP Politburo, Lin Piao, together with P'eng Te-huai, supported Mao Tse-tung in his bid for the chairmanship of the powerful CCP Military Committee, and they won.

Following Chu Teh's espousal of the Chang Kuo-tao line and his break with Mao Tse-tung, Mao reorganized, with the assistance of Chou En-lai, the First Army Group and troops directly commanded by the CCP Central Organs into the Shensi-Kansu Red Army with Peng Te-huai as its commander. Lin was appointed deputy commander and commander of its First Detachment. They followed Mao Tse-tung into Northern Shensi.

The Red Army College was revived in June 1936 in Wayaopao in Northern Shensi, and Lin Piao was made the president of the college. The college was moved to Yen-an and renamed Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in 1937. Lin Piao continued to serve as president and political commissar of the college, with Lo Jui-ching as vice-president.

Following the Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident, the Red Army was reorganized into the 8th Route Army by the order of the Nationalist Government, and Lin Piao was appointed Commander of the 115th Division, and ordered to lead his troops into Northeast Shansi. Lin made a name for himself after waylaying and putting to rout at Pinghsingkuan the Japanese 5th Division under the command of Itagaki.

In fall 1939, Lin was seriously wounded in clashes with Yen Hsi-shan's troops in Western Shansi. After his return to Yen-an, Lin went to Moscow for medical treatment, and acted at the same time as CCP representative. During his sojourn in the Soviet Union, Lin was given a chance to learn at first hand how to direct an operation in modern warfare on the Soviet front in the German-Soviet War.

Lin Piao returned to Yen-an by way of Sinkiang in

SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

1942. In the ensuing rectification campaign, he supported Mao Tse-tung in the latter's struggle against the Wang Ming (Chen Shao-yu) line. Later, Lin accompanied Chou En-lai to Chungking as Mao Tse-tung's representatives on account of the fact that Lin once studied at the Whampoa Military Academy, of which Chiang Kai-shek was the president. Upon his return to Yen-an, Lin became a vice-president of the Party School, the president being Mao Tse-tung himself.

Lin was elected member of the CCP Seventh Central Committee in April 1945. After V-J Day, more than 100,000 Communist troops poured into the Northeast from Kiangsu, Shantung, Hopei and Shensi. All these troops were put under the command of Lin Piao. Li Li-san, the deposed Communist boss, hurried back from Moscow to help Lin. With Soviet backing, Lin Piao became Commander-in-Chief of the Northeast Democratic Joint Army, with Peng Chen as political commissar.

In the following year, the Northeast Democratic Joint Army was renamed Northeast Liberation Army, and Lin Piao was both its commander and political commissar. At the same time, he served as Secretary of the CCP Northeast Bureau and President of the Northeast Military and Political Academy.

The Northeast Liberation Army was reorganized into the Northeast Field Army in 1948. Lin Piao remained its Commander-in-Chief.

With the inauguration of the Northeast People's Government under Kao Kang, the Northeast Field Army became the Fourth Field Army, retaining Lin as its commander. Then Lin took his army to the interior of China, capturing in rapid succession such important Nationalist strongholds as Wuhan, Changsha, Hengyang, Canton, Kweilin and Nanning and pushing on toward the Leichow Peninsula.

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LIN PIAO

When the Chinese Communist regime was inaugurated in October 1949 in Peking, Lin Piao was given a number of prestigious jobs including member of the Central People's Government Council, member of the CCP Military Committee, member, and member of the standing committee, of the First Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

In 1950, Lin Piao was appointed Chairman of the Central-South Military and Administrative Committee, Commander of the Central-South Military District and the First Secretary of the CCP Central-South Bureau.

It was in June 1950 that Lin Piao was first elected member of the powerful CCP Politburo at the Third Plenum of the CCP Seventh Central Committee.

In October 1950 when China joined the Korean War, Lin Piao was the first Commander-in-Chief of the Resist-U.S.-Aid-Korea Voluntary Army. Lin was sent to the Soviet Union for a second time for medical treatment after he was wounded. Then the commandership of the volunteers was taken over by Peng Te-huai.

Lin Piao returned from the Soviet Union in September 1953. Soon afterwards, there took place within the Communist top leadership the Kao Kang-Jao Su-shih anti-Party case.

In 1954, Lin Piao became a Vice-Premier of the State Council, as well as a Vice-Chairman of the National Defence Council. In the following year, Mao Tse-tung conferred on Lin Piao the military rank of marshal and Orders of August First, Independence and Freedom, and Liberation, all First Class.

Lin Piao was elected, in 1956, member of the CCP 8th Central Committee, and member of the CCP Politburo. Two years later, at the 5th Plenum of the CCP 8th Central Committee, Lin was elected Vice-Chairman of the CCP Central

Committee and member of the Politburo Standing Committee.

Lin took over from P'eng Te-huai the portfolio of National Defence, as well as the vice-chairmanship of the CCP Military Committee, as a result of the Lushan Conference held in 1959.

Lin's power grew by leaps and bounds following the launching, in 1966 by Mao Tse-tung, of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In August, at the 11th Plenum of the CCP 8th Central Committee Lin Piao superceded Liu Shao-chi as the First Vice-Chairman of the CCP Central Committee.

When the CCP 9th National Congress convened in April 1969, it was formally written into the Chinese Communist Party Constitution that Lin Piao was designated as Mao Tse-tung's successor.

Selected Works of Lin Piao

Part I

REPORTS AND SPEECHES

1941

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



REPORT TO THE NINTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

(Delivered on April 1 and adopted on April 14, 1969)

by Lin Piao

Comrades!

The Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China will be a congress with a far-reaching influence in the history of our Party.

Our present congress is convened at a time when great victory has been won in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution personally initiated and led by Chairman Mao. This great revolutionary storm has shattered the bourgeois headquarters headed by the renegade, hidden traitor and scab Liu Shao-chi, exposed the handful of renegades, enemy agents and absolutely unrepentant persons in power taking the capitalist road within the Party, with Liu Shao-chi as their arch-representative, and smashed their plot to restore capitalism; it has tremendously strengthened our Party and thus prepared ample conditions for this congress politically, ideologically and organizationally.

I. ON THE PREPARATION FOR THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a genuine proletarian revolution on an immense scale.

Chairman Mao has explained the necessity of the current great revolution in concise terms:

The current great proletarian cultural revolution is absolutely necessary and most timely for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration and building socialism.

In order to comprehend this scientific thesis of Chairman Mao's fully, we should have a deep understanding of his theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In 1957, shortly after the conclusion of the Party's Eighth National Congress, Chairman Mao made public his great work "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," in which, following his "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," he comprehensively set forth the existence of contradictions, classes and class struggle under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, set forth the thesis of the existence of two different types of contradictions in socialist society, those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people, and set forth the great theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. This great work, like a radiant beacon, illuminates the course of China's socialist revolution and socialist construction and it has laid the theoretical foundation for the current Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

In order to have a deeper understanding of Chairman Mao's great historic contribution, it is necessary briefly to review the historical experience of the international communist movement.

In 1852, Marx said:

Long before me bourgeois historians had described

the historical development of this class struggle and bourgeois economists the economic anatomy of the classes. What I did that was new was to prove: 1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production, 2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, 3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes, and to a classless society. (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Chinese edition, p.63)

Marx's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat clearly distinguished scientific socialism from utopian socialism and sham socialism of every kind. Marx and Engels fought all their lives for this theory and for its realization.

After the death of Marx and Engels, almost all the parties of the Second International betrayed Marxism, with the exception of the Bolshevik Party led by Lenin. Lenin inherited, defended and developed Marxism in the struggle against the revisionism of the Second International. The struggle focused on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In denouncing the old revisionists, Lenin time and again stated:

"Those who recognize only the class struggle are not yet Marxists," . . . "Only he is a Marxist who extends the recognition of the class struggle to the recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat." (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Chinese edition, Vol. 25, p.399.)

Lenin led the proletariat of Russia in winning the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and founding the first socialist state. Through his great revolutionary practice in leading the dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin perceived the danger of the restoration of capitalism and the protracted nature of class struggle.

The transition from capitalism to communism represents an entire historical epoch. Until this epoch has terminated, the exploiters inevitably cherish the hope of restoration, and this hope is converted into attempts at restoration. (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Chinese edition, Vol 28, p.235)

Lenin stated:

...the bourgeoisie, whose resistance is increased tenfold by its overthrow (even if only in one country), and whose power lies not only in the strength of international capital, in the strength and durability of the international connections of the bourgeoisie, but also in the force of habit, in the strength of small production. For, unfortunately, small production is still very, very widespread in the world, and small production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale. (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Chinese edition, Vol 31, p.6.)

His conclusion was: "For all these reasons the dictatorship of the proletariat is essential". (*Ibid.*)

Lenin also stated that "the new bourgeoisie" was "arising from among our Soviet government employees" (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Chinese edition, Vol. 29, p.162.)

He pointed out that the danger of restoration also came from capitalist encirclement: The imperialist countries "will never miss an opportunity for military intervention, as they put it, i.e., to strangle Soviet power." (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Chinese edition, Vol. 31, p.423.)

The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has completely betrayed these brilliant teachings of Lenin's. From Khrushchov to Brezhnev and company, they are all persons in power taking the capitalist road who had long concealed themselves in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As soon as they came to power, they turned the bourgeoisie's "hope of

PART I: REPORTS AND SPEECHES

restoration" into "attempts at restoration", usurped the leadership of the Party of Lenin and Stalin and, through "peaceful evolution", turned the world's first state under the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dark fascist state under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

Chairman Mao has waged a tit-for-tat struggle against modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique as its centre and has inherited, defended and developed the Marxist-Leninist theory of proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Chairman Mao has comprehensively summed up the historical experience, both positive and negative, of the dictatorship of the proletariat and, in order to prevent the restoration of capitalism, has put forward the theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

As early as March 1949, on the eve of the transition of the Chinese revolution from the new democratic revolution to the socialist revolution, Chairman Mao explicitly pointed out in his report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party: After the country-wide seizure of power by the proletariat, the principal internal contradiction is "the contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie". The heart of the struggle is still the question of state power. Chairman Mao especially reminded us:

After the enemies with guns have been wiped out, there will still be enemies without guns; they are bound to struggle desperately against us, and we must never regard these enemies lightly. If we do not now raise and understand the problem in this way, we shall commit the gravest mistakes.

Having foreseen the protracted and complex nature of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie after the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat,

Chairman Mao set the whole Party the militant task of fighting imperialism, the Kuomintang and the bourgeoisie in the political, ideological, economic, cultural and diplomatic spheres.

Our Party waged intense battles in accordance with the resolution of the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee and the Party's general line for the transition period formulated by Chairman Mao. By 1956, the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production in agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce had been in the main completed. That was the crucial moment for deciding whether the socialist revolution could continue to advance. In view of the rampancy of revisionism in the international communist movement and the new trends of class struggle in our country, Chairman Mao, in his great work "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", called the attention of the whole Party to the following fact:

In China, although in the main socialist transformation has been completed with respect to the system of ownership. . .there are still remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador classes, there is still a bourgeoisie, and the remoulding of the petty bourgeoisie has only just started.

Countering the fallacy put forward by Liu Shao-chi in 1956 that "in China, the question of which wins out, socialism or capitalism, is already solved", Chairman Mao specifically pointed out:

The question of which will win out, socialism or capitalism, is still not really settled.

The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the different political forces, and the class struggle in the ideo-

logical field between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will continue to be long and tortuous and at times will even become very acute.

Thus, for the first time in the theory and practice of the international communist movement, it was pointed out explicitly that classes and class struggle still exist after the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production has been in the main completed, and that the proletariat must continue the revolution.

The proletarian headquarters headed by Chairman Mao led the broad masses in carrying on the great struggle in the direction he indicated. From the struggle against the bourgeois Rightists in 1957 to the struggle to uncover Peng Teh-huai's anti-Party clique at the Lushan Meeting in 1959, from the great debate on the general line of the Party in building socialism to the struggle between the two lines in the socialist education movement — the focus of the struggle was the question of whether to take the socialist road or to take the capitalist road, whether to uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat or to restore the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

Every single victory of Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, every victory in every major campaign launched by the Party against the bourgeoisie, was gained only after smashing the revisionist line represented by Liu Shao-chi, which either was Right or was "Left" in form but Right in essence.

Now it has been proved through investigation that Liu Shao-chi betrayed the Party, capitulated to the enemy and became a hidden traitor and scab as far back as the First Revolutionary Civil War period, that he was a crime-steeped lackey of the imperialists, modern revisionists and Kuomintang reactionaries and that he was the arch-representative of the persons in power taking the

capitalist road. He had a political line by which he vainly attempted to restore capitalism in China and turn her into an imperialist and revisionist colony. In addition, he had an organizational line to serve his counter-revolutionary political line. For many years, recruiting deserters and turncoats, Liu Shao-chi gathered together a gang of renegades, enemy agents and capitalist-roaders in power. They covered up their counter-revolutionary political records, shielded each other, colluded in doing evil, usurped important Party and government posts and controlled the leadership in many central and local units, thus forming an underground bourgeois headquarters in opposition to the proletarian headquarters headed by Chairman Mao. They collaborated with the imperialists, modern revisionists and Kuomintang reactionaries and played the kind of disruptive role that the U.S. imperialists, the Soviet revisionists and the reactionaries of various countries were unable to do.

In 1939, when the War of Resistance Against Japan and for National Liberation led by Chairman Mao was vigorously surging forward, Liu Shao-chi came up with his sinister book "Self-Cultivation". The core of that book was the betrayal of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It did not touch at all upon the questions of defeating Japanese imperialism and of waging the struggle against the Kuomintang reactionaries, nor did it touch upon the fundamental Marxist-Leninist principle of seizing state power by armed force; on the contrary, it urged Communist Party members to depart from the great practice of revolution and indulge in idealistic "self-cultivation", which actually meant that Communists should "cultivate" themselves into willing slaves going down on their knees before the counter-revolutionary dictatorship of the imperialists and the Kuomintang reactionaries.

After the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan, when the U.S. imperialists were arming Chiang

Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary troops in preparation for launching an all-out offensive against the liberated areas, Liu Shao-chi, catering to the needs of the U.S.-Chiang reactionaries, dished up the capitulationist line, alleging that "China has entered the new stage of peace and democracy". It was designed to oppose Chairman Mao's general line of "go all-out to mobilize the masses, expand the people's forces and, under the leadership of our Party, defeat the aggressor and build a new China", and to oppose Chairman Mao's policy of "give tit for tat and fight for every inch of land", which was adopted to counter the offensive of the U.S.-Chiang reactionaries. Liu Shao-chi preached that "at present the main form of the struggle of the Chinese revolution has changed from armed struggle to non-armed and mass parliamentary struggle". He tried to abolish the Party's leadership over the people's armed forces and to "unify" the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, into Chiang Kai-shek's "national army" and to demobilize large numbers of worker and peasant soldiers led by the Party in a vain attempt to eradicate the people's armed forces, strangle the Chinese revolution and obeisantly hand over to the Kuomintang the fruits of victory which the Chinese people had won in blood.

In April 1949, on the eve of the country-wide victory of China's new-democratic revolution when the Chinese People's Liberation Army was preparing to cross the Yangtze River, Liu Shao-chi hurried to Tientsin and threw himself into the arms of the capitalists. He fiercely opposed the policy of utilizing, restricting and transforming private capitalist industry, a policy decided upon by the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party which had just concluded. He clamoured that "capitalism in China today is still in its youth", that it needed an unlimited "big expansion" and that "capitalist exploitation today is no crime, it is a merit". He shamelessly praised the capitalist class, saying that "the more

they exploit, the greater their merit", and feverishly advertised the revisionist theory of productive forces. He did all this in his futile attempt to lead China onto the capitalist road.

In short, at the many important historical junctures of the new-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, Liu Shao-chi and his gang always wantonly opposed Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line and engaged in counter-revolutionary conspiratorial and disruptive activities. However, since they were counter-revolutionaries, their plots were bound to come to light eventually. When Khrushchov came to power, and especially when the Soviet revisionists ganged up with the U.S. imperialists and the reactionaries of India and other countries in whipping up a large-scale anti-China campaign, Liu Shao-chi and his gang became all the more rabid.

Chairman Mao was the first to perceive the danger of the counter-revolutionary plots of Liu Shao-chi and his gang. At the working conference of the Central Committee in January 1962, Chairman Mao pointed out the necessity of guarding against the emergence of revisionism. At the working conference of the Central Committee at Peitaiho in August 1962 and at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party in September of the same year, Chairman Mao put forward more comprehensively the basic line of our Party for the whole historical period of socialism. Chairman Mao pointed out:

Socialist society covers a considerably long historical period. In the historical period of socialism, there are still classes, class contradictions and class struggle, there is the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road, and there is the danger of capitalist restoration. We must recognize the protracted and complex nature of this struggle. We must heighten our vigilance. We must conduct socialist education. We

must correctly understand and handle class contradictions and class struggle, distinguish the contradictions between ourselves and the enemy from those among the people and handle them correctly. Otherwise a socialist country like ours will turn into its opposite and degenerate, and a capitalist restoration will take place. From now on we must remind ourselves of this every year, every month and every day so that we can retain a rather sober understanding of this problem and have a Marxist-Leninist line.

This Marxist-Leninist line advanced by Chairman Mao is the lifeline of our Party.

Following this, in May 1963, under the direction of Chairman Mao, the "Draft Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Certain Problems in Our Present Rural Work" (i.e., the 10-Point Decision) was worked out, which laid down the line, principles, and policies of the Party for the socialist education movement. Chairman Mao again warned the whole Party: If classes and class struggle were forgotten and if the dictatorship of the proletariat were forgotten,

then it would not be long, perhaps only several years or a decade, or several decades at most, before a counter-revolutionary restoration on a national scale would inevitably occur, the Marxist-Leninist party would undoubtedly become a revisionist party, a fascist party, and the whole of China would change its colour. Comrades, please think it over. What a dangerous situation this would be !

Thus Chairman Mao still more sharply showed the whole Party and the people of the whole country the danger of the restoration of capitalism.

All these warnings and struggles did not and could

not in the least change the reactionary class nature of Liu Shao-chi and his gang. In 1964, in the great socialist education movement, Liu Shao-chi came out and repressed the masses, shielded the capitalist-roaders in power and openly attacked the Marxist scientific method of investigating and studying social conditions initiated by Chairman Mao, branding it as "outdated". He raved that whoever refused to carry out his line was "not qualified to hold a leading post". He and his gang were working against time to restore capitalism. At the end of 1964, Chairman Mao convened a working conference of the Central Committee and, under his direction, the document "Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialist Education Movement in the Rural Areas" (i.e., the 23-Point Document) was drawn up. He denounced Liu Shao-chi's bourgeois reactionary line which was "Left" in form but Right in essence and repudiated Liu Shao-chi's absurdities, such as "the intertwining of the contradictions inside and outside the Party" and "the contradiction between the 'four cleans' and the 'four uncleans'." And for the first time Chairman Mao specifically indicated: "The main target of the present movement is those Party persons in power taking the capitalist road." This new conclusion drawn by Chairman Mao after summing up the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat, domestic and international, set right the course of the socialist education movement and clearly showed the orientation for the approaching Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

Reviewing the history of this period, we can see that the current Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution with the participation of hundreds of millions of revolutionary people has occurred by no means accidentally. It is the inevitable result of the protracted and sharp struggle between the two classes, the two roads and the two lines in socialist society. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is

a great political revolution carried out by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and all other

exploiting classes; it is a continuation of the prolonged struggle waged by the Chinese Communist Party and the masses of revolutionary people under its leadership against the Kuomintang reactionaries, a continuation of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

The heroic Chinese proletariat, poor and lower-middle peasants, People's Liberation Army, revolutionary cadres and revolutionary intellectuals, who were all determined to follow the great leader Chairman Mao closely in taking the socialist road, could no longer tolerate the restoration activities of Liu Shao-chi and his gang, and so a great class battle was unavoidable.

As Chairman Mao pointed out in his talk in February 1967:

In the past we waged struggles in rural areas, in factories, in the cultural field, and we carried out the socialist education movement. But all this failed to solve the problem because we did not find a form, a method, to arouse the broad masses to expose our dark aspect openly, in an all-round way and from below.

Now we have found this form — it is the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It is only by arousing the masses in their hundreds of millions to air their views freely, write big-character posters and hold great debates that the renegades, enemy agents and capitalist roaders in power who have wormed their way into the Party can be exposed and their plots to restore capitalism smashed. It was precisely with the participation of the broad masses in the examination of Liu Shao-chi's case that his true features as an old-line counter-revolutionary, renegade, hidden traitor and scab were brought to light. The Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party decided to dismiss Liu Shao-chi from all posts both inside and outside the Party and to expel him from the Party once

and for all. This was a great victory for the hundreds of millions of the people. On the basis of the theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, our great teacher Chairman Mao has personally initiated and led the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This is indeed "absolutely necessary and most timely" and it is a new and great contribution to the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism.

II. ON THE COURSE OF THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a great political revolution personally initiated and led by our great leader Chairman Mao under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a great revolution in the realm of the superstructure. Our aim is to smash revisionism, seize back that portion of power usurped by the bourgeoisie, exercise all-round dictatorship of the proletariat in the superstructure, including all spheres of culture, and strengthen and consolidate the economic base of socialism so as to ensure that our country continues to advance in giant strides along the road of socialism.

Back in 1962, at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party, Chairman Mao pointed out:

To overthrow a political power, it is always necessary first of all to create public opinion, to do work in the ideological sphere. This is true for the revolutionary class as well as for the counter-revolutionary class.

This statement of Chairman Mao's dealt the Liu Shao-chi counter-revolutionary revisionist clique a blow at the heart. It was for the sole purpose of creating public opinion to

prepare for the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat that they spared no effort in seizing upon the field of ideology and the superstructure, violently exercising counter-revolutionary dictatorship over the proletariat in the various departments they controlled and wildly spreading poisonous weeds. To overthrow them politically, we must likewise first vanquish their counter-revolutionary public opinion by revolutionary public opinion.

Chairman Mao has always attached major importance to the struggle in ideology. After the liberation of our country, he initiated many criticisms including those of the film "The Life of Wu Hsun", the Hu Feng counter-revolutionary clique and the "Studies of 'The Dream of the Red Chamber'." And this time it was Chairman Mao again who led the whole Party in launching the offensive on the positions occupied by Liu Shao-chi and his gang for the bourgeoisie. Chairman Mao wrote the celebrated essay "Where Do Correct Ideas Come From?" and other documents, in which he criticized Liu Shao-chi's bourgeois idealism and metaphysics, criticized the departments of literature and art under Liu Shao-chi's control as being "still dominated by 'the dead'," criticized the Ministry of Culture by saying that "if it refuses to change, it should be renamed the Ministry of Emperors, Kings, Generals and Ministers, the Ministry of Talents and Beauties or the Ministry of Foreign Mummies," and said that the Ministry of Health should likewise be renamed the "Ministry of Health for Urban Overlords". At the call of Chairman Mao, the proletariat first launched a revolution in the fields of Peking Opera, the ballet and symphonic music, fields that had been regarded as sacred and inviolable by the landlord and capitalist classes. It was a fight at close quarters. Despite every possible kind of resistance and sabotage by Liu Shao-chi and his gang, the proletariat finally scored important successes after arduous struggles. A number of splendid model revolutionary theatrical works appeared and the heroic figures of workers, peasants and soldiers finally took the centre of the stage.

After that, Chairman Mao initiated the criticism of "Hai Jui Dismissed from Office" and other poisonous weeds, focusing the attack right on the den of revisionist clique—that impenetrable and watertight "independent kingdom" under Liu Shao-chi's control, the old Peking Municipal Party Committee.

The "Circular of May 16" worked out under Chairman Mao's personal guidance laid down the theory, line, principles and policies for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and constituted the great programme for the whole movement. The Circular thoroughly criticized the "February Outline" turned out by Liu Shao-chi's bourgeois headquarters for the purpose of suppressing this great revolution. It called upon the whole Party and the people of the whole country to direct the spearhead of struggle against the representatives of the bourgeoisie who had sneaked into the Party and to pay special attention to unmasking "persons like Khrushchov...who are still nestling beside us". This was a great call mobilizing the people of the whole country to unfold a great political revolution. The Cultural Revolution Group Under the Central Committee, which was set up by decision of the Circular, has firmly carried out Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line.

Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, the broad revolutionary masses plunged into the fight. In Peking University a big-character poster was written in response to the call of the Central Committee. And soon big-character posters criticizing reactionary bourgeois ideas mushroomed all over the country. Then Red Guards rose and came forward in large numbers and revolutionary young people became courageous and daring pathbreakers. Thrown into a panic, the Liu Shao-chi clique rushed out with the bourgeois reactionary line, cruelly suppressing the revolutionary movement of the student youth. However, this did not win them much time in their death-bed struggle. Chairman Mao called and presided

over the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party. The Plenary Session adopted the programmatic document, "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution" (i.e., the 16-Point Decision). Chairman Mao put up his big-character poster "Bombard the Headquarters", thus taking the lid off Liu Shao-chi's bourgeois headquarters. In his letter to the Red Guards, Chairman Mao said that the revolutionary actions of the Red Guards

express your wrath against and your denunciation of the landlord class, the bourgeoisie, the imperialists, the revisionists and their running dogs, all of whom exploit and oppress the workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and revolutionary parties and groups. They show that it is right to rebel against reactionaries. I warmly support you.

Afterwards, Chairman Mao received 13 million Red Guards and other revolutionary masses from all parts of the country on eight occasions at Tien An Men in the capital, which heightened the revolutionary fighting will of the people of the whole country. The revolutionary movements of the workers, peasants and revolutionary functionaries developed rapidly. Increasing numbers of big-character posters spread like a raging prairie fire and roared like guns; the slogan "It is right to rebel against reactionaries" resounded throughout the land. And the battle of the people in their hundreds of millions to bombard Liu Shao-chi's bourgeois headquarters developed vigorously.

No reactionary class will ever step down from the stage of history of its own accord. When the revolution touched that portion of power usurped by the bourgeoisie, the class struggle became all the more acute. After Liu Shao-chi's downfall, his revisionist clique and his agents in various places changed their tactics time and again, putting forward slogans

which were "Left" in form but Right in essence such as "suspecting all" and "overthrowing all", in a futile attempt to go on hitting hard at the many and protecting their own handful. Moreover, they created splits among the revolutionary masses and manipulated and hoodwinked a section of the masses so as to protect themselves. When these schemes were shattered by the proletarian revolutionaries, they launched another frenzied counter-attack, that is, the adverse current lasting from the winter of 1966 to the spring of 1967.

This adverse current was directed against the proletarian headquarters headed by Chairman Mao. Its general programme boiled down to this: to overthrow the decisions adopted by the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party, reversing the verdict on the overthrown bourgeois headquarters headed by Liu Shao-chi, reversing the verdict on the bourgeois reactionary line, which had already been thoroughly repudiated and discredited by the broad masses, and repressing and retaliating on the revolutionary mass movement. However, this adverse current was seriously criticized by Chairman Mao and resisted by the broad revolutionary masses; it could not prevent the main current of the revolutionary mass movement from surging forward.

The twists and reversals in the revolutionary movement further brought home to the broad masses the importance of political power: The main reason why Liu Shao-chi and his gang could do evil was that they had usurped the power of the proletariat in many units and localities, and the main reason why the revolutionary masses were repressed was that power was not in the hands of the proletariat in those places. In some units, the socialist system of ownership existed only in form, but in reality the leadership had been usurped by a handful of renegades, enemy agents and capitalist roaders in power, or it remained in the hands of former capitalists. Especially when the capitalist-roaders in

power failed in their scheme to suppress the revolution on the pretext of "grasping production" and whipped up the evil counter-revolutionary wind of economism, the broad masses came to understand still better that only by recapturing the lost power was it possible for them to defeat the capitalist-roaders in power completely. Under the leadership and with the support of Chairman Mao and the proletarian headquarters headed by him, the working class in Shanghai with its revolutionary tradition came forward courageously and, uniting with the broad revolutionary masses and revolutionary cadres, seized power from below in January 1967 from the capitalist-roaders in power in the former Municipal Party Committee and Municipal People's Council.

Chairman Mao summed up in good time the experience of the January storm of revolution in Shanghai and issued his call to the whole country: "Proletarian revolutionaries, unite and seize power from the handful of Party persons in power taking the capitalist road!" Following that, Chairman Mao gave the instruction: "The People's Liberation Army should support the broad masses of the Left." He went on to sum up the experience of Heilungkiang Province and other provinces and municipalities, laid down the principles and policies for the establishment of revolutionary committees which embrace representatives of the revolutionary cadres, representatives of the People's Liberation Army and representatives of the revolutionary masses, constituting a revolutionary three-in-one combination, and thus pushed forward the nation-wide struggle for the seizure of power.

The struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie for the seizure and counter-seizure of power was a life-and-death struggle. During the year and nine months from Shanghai's January storm of revolution in 1967 to the establishment of the revolutionary committees of Tibet and Sinkiang in September 1968, repeated trials of political strength took place between the two classes and the two lines, fierce struggles went on between proletarian and

non-proletarian ideas and an extremely complicated situation emerged. As Chairman Mao has said:

In the past, we fought north and south; it was easy to fight such wars. For the enemy was obvious. The present Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is much more difficult than that kind of war.

The problem is that those who commit ideological errors are mixed up with those whose contradiction with us is one between ourselves and the enemy, and for a time it is hard to sort them out.

Nevertheless, relying on the wise leadership of Chairman Mao, we finally overcame this difficulty. In the summer of 1967, Chairman Mao made an inspection tour north and south of the Yangtze River and issued the most important instructions, guiding the broad revolutionary masses to distinguish gradually the contradictions between ourselves and the enemy from those among the people and to further promote the revolutionary great alliance and the revolutionary three-in-one combination, and guiding people with petty-bourgeois ideas onto the path of the proletarian revolution. Consequently, it was only the enemy who was thrown into disorder while the broad masses were steeled in the course of the struggle.

The handful of renegades, enemy agents, unreformed landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and Rightists, active counter-revolutionaries, bourgeois careerists and double-dealers who had hidden themselves among the masses would not reveal their colours until the climate suited them. In the summer of 1967 and the spring of 1968, they again fanned up a reactionary evil wind both from the Right and the extreme "Left" to reverse correct verdicts. They directed their spearhead against the proletarian headquarters headed by Chairman Mao, against the People's Liberation Army and against the new-born revolutionary committees. In the meantime, they incited the masses to struggle against each other and organized counter-

revolutionary conspiratorial cliques in a vain attempt to stage a counter-seizure of power from the proletariat. However, like their chieftain Liu Shao-chi, this handful of bad people was finally exposed. This was an important victory for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

III. ON CARRYING OUT THE TASKS OF STRUGGLE-CRITICISM-TRANSFORMATION CONSCIENTIOUSLY

As in all other revolutions, the fundamental question in the current great revolution in the realm of the super-structure is the question of political power, the question of which class holds leadership. The establishment of revolutionary committees in all provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions throughout the country (with the exception of Taiwan Province) marks the great, decisive victory achieved by this revolution. However, the revolution is not yet over. The proletariat must continue to advance, "carry out the tasks of struggle-criticism-transformation conscientiously" and carry the socialist revolution in the realm of the superstructure through to the end.

Chairman Mao says:

Struggle-criticism-transformation in a factory, on the whole, goes through the following stages: Establishing a three-in-one revolutionary committee; carrying out mass criticism and repudiation; purifying the class ranks; consolidating the Party organization; and simplifying the administrative structure, changing irrational rules and regulations and sending office workers to the workshops.

We must act on Chairman Mao's instruction and fulfil these tasks in every single factory, every single school, every single commune and every single unit in a deep-going, meticulous, down-to-earth and appropriate way.

Confronted with a thousand and one tasks, a revolut-

ionary committee must grasp the fundamental: It must put the living study and application of Mao Tse-tung Thought above all work and place Mao Tse-tung Thought in command of everything. For decades, Mao Tse-tung Thought has been showing the orientation of the revolution to the whole Party and the people of the whole country. However, as Liu Shao-chi and his gang of counter-revolutionary revisionists blocked Chairman Mao's instructions, the broad revolutionary masses could hardly hear Chairman Mao's voice directly. The storm of the present great revolution has destroyed the big and little "palaces of hell-rulers" and has made it possible for Mao Tse-tung Thought to reach the broad revolutionary masses directly. This is a great victory. This wide dissemination of Mao Tse-tung Thought in a big country with a population of 700 million is the most significant achievement of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In this revolution, hundreds of millions of people always carry with them *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, which they study and apply conscientiously. As soon as a new instruction of Chairman Mao's is issued, they propagate it and go into action. This most valuable practice must be maintained and persevered in. We should carry on in a deep-going way the mass movement for the living study and application of Mao Tse-tung Thought, continue to run well the Mao Tse-tung Thought study classes of all types and, in the light of Chairman Mao's May 7 Directive of 1966, truly turn the whole country into a great school of Mao Tse-tung Thought.

All revolutionary comrades must be clearly aware that class struggle will by no means cease in the ideological and political spheres. The struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie by no means dies out with our seizure of power. We must continue to hold high the banner of revolutionary mass criticism and use Mao Tse-tung Thought to criticize the bourgeoisie, to criticize revisionism and all kinds of Right or extreme "Left" erroneous ideas which run counter to Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line and to criticize bourgeois individualism and the theory of "many centres",

that is, the theory of "no centre". We must continue to criticize thoroughly and discredit completely the stuff of the renegade, hidden traitor and scab Liu Shao-chi such as the slavish comprador philosophy and the doctrine of trailing behind at a snail's pace, and must firmly establish among the cadres and the masses of the people Chairman Mao's concept of "maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands and relying on our own efforts", so as to ensure that our cause will continue to advance in the direction indicated by Chairman Mao.

Chairman Mao points out:

The revolutionary committee should exercise unified leadership, eliminate duplication in the administrative structure, follow the policy of "better troops and simpler administration" and organize itself into a revolutionized leading group which maintains close ties with the masses.

This is a basic principle which enables the superstructure to serve its socialist economic base still better. A duplicate administrative structure divorced from the masses, scholasticism which suppresses and binds their revolutionary initiative, and a landlord and bourgeois style of going in for formality and ostentation — all these are destructive to the socialist economic base, advantageous to capitalism and harmful to socialism. In accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions, organs of state power at all levels and other organizations must keep close ties with the masses, first of all with the basic masses — the working class and the poor and lower-middle peasants. Cadres, old and new, must constantly sweep away the dust of bureaucracy and must not fall into the bad habit of "acting as bureaucrats and overlords". They must keep on practising frugality in carrying out revolution, run all socialist undertakings industriously and thriftily, oppose extravagance and waste and guard against bourgeois attacks with sugar-coated bullets. They must maintain the system of cadre participation in collective productive labour. They must be concerned with the well-being of the masses. They must

themselves make investigation and study in accordance with Chairman Mao's teachings, "dissect" one or several "sparrows" and constantly sum up experience. They must make criticism and self-criticism regularly and, in line with the five requirements for the successors to the revolution as set forth by Chairman Mao, "fight self, criticize revisionism" and conscientiously remould their world outlook.

The People's Liberation Army is the mighty pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Chairman Mao has pointed out many times: From the Marxist point of view the main component of the state is the army. The Chinese People's Liberation Army personally founded and led by Chairman Mao is the army of the workers and peasants, the army of the proletariat. It has performed great historic feats in the struggle for overthrowing the three big mountains of imperialism, feudalism and bucreaucrat-capitalism, and in the struggles for defending the motherland, for resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea and for smashing aggression by imperialism, revisionism and the reactionaries. In the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, large numbers of commanders and fighters have taken part in the work of "three supports and two militaries" (i.e., support industry, support agriculture, support the broad masses of the Left, military control, political and military training) and representatives of the army have taken part in the three-in-one combination; they have tempered themselves in the class struggle, strengthened their ties with the masses, promoted the ideological revolutionization of the army, and made new contributions to the people. And this is also the best preparation against war. We must carry forward the glorious tradition of "supporting the government and cherishing the people", "supporting the army and cherishing the people", strengthen the unity between the army and the people, strengthen the building of the militia and of national defence and do a still better job in all our work. For the past three years, it is precisely because the people have supported the army and the army has protected the people that renegades, enemy agents, absolutely un-

repentant persons in power taking the capitalist road and counter-revolutionaries have failed in their attempts to undermine this great people's army of ours.

Departments of culture, art, education, the press, health, etc., occupy an extremely important position in the realm of superstructure. The line "We must whole-heartedly rely on the working class" was decided upon at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee. And now, at Chairman Mao's call that "That working class must exercise leadership in everything," the working class, which is the main force in the proletarian revolution, and its staunch ally the poor and lower-middle peasants, have mounted the political stage of struggle-criticism-transformation in the superstructure. From July 27, 1968, mighty contingents of the working class marched to places long dominated by the persons in power taking the capitalist road and to all places where intellectuals were predominant in number. It was a great revolutionary action. Whether the proletariat is able to take firm root in the positions of culture and education and transform them with Mao Tse-tung Thought is the key question in carrying the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the end. Chairman Mao has attached profound importance to our work in this connection and personally grasped typical cases, thus setting us a brilliant example. We must overcome the wrong tendency of some comrades to slight the ideological, cultural and educational front; we must closely follow Chairman Mao and consistently do hard and careful work. "On its part, the working class should always raise its political consciousness in the course of struggle", sum up experience in leading the struggle-criticism-transformation in the superstructure and win the battle on this front.

IV. ON THE POLICIES OF THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

In order to continue the revolution in the realm of the

superstructure, it is imperative to carry out conscientiously all Chairman Mao's proletarian policies.

Policies for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution were early stipulated explicitly in the Circular of May 16, 1966 and the 16-Point Decision of August 1966. The series of Chairman Mao's latest instructions including "Serious attention must be paid to policy in the stage of struggle-criticism-transformation in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" have further specified the various policies.

The main question at present is to carry them out to the letter.

The Party's policies, including those towards the intellectuals, the cadres, "the sons and daughters that can be educated" (the sons and daughters of those who have committed crimes or mistakes. — translator), the mass organizations, the struggle against the enemy and economic policy — all these policies come under the general heading of the correct handling of the two different types of contradictions, those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people.

The majority or the vast majority of the intellectuals trained in the old type of schools and colleges are able or willing to integrate themselves with the workers, peasants and soldiers. They should be "re-educated" by the workers, peasants and soldiers under the guidance of Chairman Mao's correct line, and encouragement should be given to those who do well in such integration and to the Red Guards and educated young people who are active in going to the countryside or mountainous areas.

Chairman Mao has taught us many times: "Help more people by educating them and narrow the target of attack" and "carry out Marx's teaching that only by emancipating all mankind can the proletariat achieve its own final emancipation."

ion". With regard to people who have made mistakes, stress must be laid on giving them education and re-education, doing patient and careful ideological and political work and truly acting "on the principle of 'learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones' and 'curing the sickness to save the patient'. in order to achieve the twofold objective of clarity in ideology and unity among comrades." With regard to good people who committed the errors characteristic of the capitalist-roader in power but have now raised their political consciousness and gained the understanding of the masses, they should be promptly "liberated", assigned to suitable work and encouraged to go among the masses of the workers and peasants to remould their world outlook. As for those who have made a little progress and become awakened to some extent, we should continue to help them, proceeding from the viewpoint of unity. Chairman Mao has recently pointed out:

The proletariat is the greatest class in the history of mankind. It is the most powerful revolutionary class ideologically, politically and in strength. It can and must unite the overwhelming majority of people around itself so as to isolate the handful of enemies to the maximum and attack them.

In the struggle against the enemy, we must carry out the policy of "make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one" which Chairman Mao has always advocated. "Stress should be laid on the weight of evidence and on investigation and study, and it is strictly forbidden to obtain confessions by compulsion and to give them credence." We must implement Chairman Mao's policies of "leniency towards those who confess their crimes and severe punishment of those who refuse to do so" and of "giving a way out" We rely mainly on the broad masses of the people in exercising dictatorship over the enemy. As for bad people or suspects ferreted out through investigation in the movement for purifying the class

ranks, the policy of "killing none and not arresting most" should be applied to all except the active counter-revolutionaries against whom there is conclusive evidence of crimes such as murder, arson or poisoning, and who should be dealt with in accordance with the law.

As for the bourgeois reactionary academic authorities, we should either criticize them and see, or criticize them and give them work to do, or criticize them and provide them with a proper livelihood. In short, we should criticize their ideology and at the same time give them a way out. To handle this part of the contradictions between ourselves and the enemy in the manner of handling contradictions among the people is beneficial to the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and to the disintegration of the enemy ranks.

In carrying out the policies of the Party, all units must study their specific conditions. In places where the revolutionary great alliance has not yet been sufficiently consolidated, it is necessary to help the revolutionary masses bring about the revolutionary great alliance in accordance with revolutionary principles and on the basis of different fields of work, trades and school classes so that they will become united against the enemy. In units where the work of purifying the class ranks has not yet started or has only just started, it is imperative to grasp the work firmly and do it well in accordance with the Party's policies. In units where the purification of the class ranks is by and large completed, it is necessary to take firm hold of other tasks in keeping with Chairman Mao's instructions concerning the various stages of struggle-criticism-transformation. At the same time, it is necessary to pay close attention to new trends in the class struggle. What if the bad people get unruly again? Chairman Mao has a well-known saying: "Thorough-going materialists are fearless". If the class enemies stir up trouble again, just arouse the masses and strike them down again.

As the 16-Point Decision indicates, "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a powerful motive force for the development of the social productive forces in our country." Our country has seen good harvests in agricultural production for years running and there is also a thriving situation in industrial production and science and technology. The enthusiasm of the broad masses of the working people both in revolution and production has soared to unprecedented heights. Many factories, mines and other enterprises have time and again topped their production records, creating all-time highs in production. The technical revolution is making constant progress. The market is flourishing and prices are stable. By the end of 1968 we had redeemed all the national bonds. Our country is now a socialist country with neither internal nor external debts.

"Grasp revolution, promote production" — this principle is absolutely correct. It correctly explains the relationship between revolution and production, between consciousness and matter, between the superstructure and the economic base and between the relations of production and the productive forces. Chairman Mao always teaches us: "Political work is the life-blood of all economic work." Lenin denounced the opportunists who were opposed to approaching problems politically: "Politics cannot but have precedence over economics. To argue differently means forgetting the A B C of Marxism." (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 32, p. 72.) Lenin again stated: To put politics on a par with economics also means "forgetting the A B C of Marxism". (*Ibid.*) Politics is the concentrated expression of economics. If we fail to make revolution in the superstructure, fail to arouse the broad masses of the workers and peasants, fail to criticize the revisionist line, fail to expose the handful of renegades, enemy agents, capitalist-roaders in power and counter-revolutionaries and fail to consolidate the leadership of the proletariat, how can we further consolidate the socialist economic base and further develop the socialist productive forces? This is not to replace production by revolution but to

use revolution to command production, promote it and lead it forward. We must make investigation and study, and actively and properly solve the many problems of policy in struggle-criticism-transformation on the economic front in accordance with Chairman Mao's general line of "Going all-out, aiming high and achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism", in accordance with his great strategic concept "Be prepared against war, be prepared against natural disasters, and do everything for the people" and with the series of principles such as "take agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading creativeness of the people of all nationalities into full play, firmly grasp revolution and energetically promote production and fulfil and overfulfil our plans for developing the national economy. It is certain that the great victory in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution will continue to bring about new leaps forward on the economic front and in our cause of socialist construction as a whole.

V. ON THE FINAL VICTORY OF THE REVOLUTION IN OUR COUNTRY

The victory in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in our country is indeed a very great one. But we must in no way think that we may sit back and relax. Chairman Mao pointed out in his talk in October 1968:

We have won great victory. But the defeated class will still struggle. These people are still around and this class still exists. Therefore, we cannot speak of final victory. Not even for decades. We must not lose our vigilance. According to the Leninist viewpoint, the final victory of a socialist country not only requires the efforts of the proletariat and the broad masses of the people at home, but also involves the victory of the world revolution and the abolition of the system of exploitation of man by man over the whole globe, upon

which all mankind will be emancipated. Therefore, it is wrong to speak lightly of the final victory of the revolution in our country; it runs counter to Leninism and does not conform to facts.

There will still be reversals in the class struggle. We must never forget class struggle and never forget the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the course of carrying out our policies at present, there still exists the struggle between the two lines and there is interference from the "Left" or the Right. Much effort is still required to accomplish the tasks for all the stages of struggle-criticism-transformation. We must closely follow Chairman Mao and steadfastly rely on the broad revolutionary masses to surmount the difficulties and twists and turns on our way forward and seize still greater victories in the cause of socialism.

VI. ON THE CONSOLIDATION AND BUILDING OF THE PARTY

The victory in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has provided us with valuable experience on how we should build the Party under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. As Chairman Mao has indicated to the whole Party,

The Party organization should be composed of the advanced elements of the proletariat; it should be a vigorous vanguard organization capable of leading the proletariat and the revolutionary masses in the fight against the class enemy.

Chairman Mao's instruction has determined our political orientation for consolidating and building the Party.

The Communist Party of China has been nurtured and built up by our great leader Chairman Mao. Since its birth in

1921, our Party has gone through long years of struggle for the seizure of state power and the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat by armed force. Led by Chairman Mao, our Party has always stood in the forefront of revolutionary wars and struggles. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's correct line, our Party has, in the face of extremely strong domestic and foreign enemies and in the most complex circumstances, led the proletariat and the broad masses of the people of China in adhering to the principle of maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands and relying on our own efforts, in upholding proletarian internationalism and in waging heroic struggles with one stepping into the breach as another fell, and it is only thus that our Party has grown from Communist groups with only a few dozen members at the outset into the great, glorious and correct Party leading the powerful People's Republic of China today. We deeply understand that without the armed struggle of the people, there would not be the Communist Party of China today and there would not be the People's Republic of China today. We must forever bear in mind Chairman Mao's teaching: "Comrades throughout the Party must never forget this experience for which we have paid in blood."

The Communist Party of China owes all its achievements to the wise leadership of Chairman Mao and these achievements constitute victories for Mao Tse-tung Thought. For half a century now, in leading the great struggle of the people of all the nationalities of China for accomplishing the new-democratic revolution, in leading China's great struggle for socialist revolution and socialist construction and in the great struggle of the contemporary international communist movement against imperialism, modern revisionism and the reactionaries of various countries, Chairman Mao has integrated the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution, has inherited, defended and developed Marxism-Leninism in the political, military, economic, cultural, philosophical and other spheres, and has

brought Marxism-Leninism to a higher and completely new stage. Mao Tse-tung Thought is Marxism-Leninism of the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to world-wide victory. The entire history of our Party has borne out this truth: Departing from the leadership of Chairman Mao and Mao Tse-tung Thought, our Party will suffer setbacks and defeats; following Chairman Mao closely and acting on Mao Tse-tung Thought, our Party will advance and triumph. We must forever remember this lesson. Whoever opposes Chairman Mao, whoever opposes Mao Tse-tung Thought, at any time or under any circumstances, will be condemned and punished by the whole Party and the whole country.

Discussing the consolidation and building of the Party, Chairman Mao has said:

A human being has arteries and veins through which the heart makes the blood circulate, and he breathes with his lungs, exhaling carbon dioxide and inhaling fresh oxygen, that is, getting rid of the stale and taking in the fresh. A proletarian party must also get rid of the stale and take in the fresh, for only thus can it be full of vitality. Without eliminating waste matter and absorbing fresh blood the Party has no vigour.

With this vivid analogy, Chairman Mao has expounded the dialectics of inner-Party contradiction. "The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics." Opposition and struggle between the two lines within the Party are the reflection inside the Party of contradictions between classes and between the new and the old in society. If there were no contradictions in the Party and no struggles to resolve them, and if the Party did not get rid of the stale and take in the fresh, the Party's life would come to an end. Chairman Mao's theory on inner-Party contradiction is and will be the fundamental guiding thinking for the consolidation and

building of the Party.

The history of the Communist Party of China is one in which Chairman Mao's Marxist-Leninist line combats the Right and "Left" opportunist lines in the Party. Under the leadership of Chairman Mao, our Party defeated Chen Tu-hsiu's Right opportunist line, defeated the "Left" opportunist lines of Chu Chiu-pai and Li Li-san, defeated Wang Ming's first "Left" and then Right opportunist lines, defeated Chang Kuo-tao's line of splitting the Red Army, defeated the Right opportunist anti-Party bloc of Peng Teh-huai, Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih and others and, after long years of struggle, has shattered Liu Shao-chi's counter-revolutionary revisionist line. Our Party has consolidated itself, developed and grown in strength precisely in the struggle between the two lines, especially in the struggles to defeat the three renegade cliques of Chen Tu-hsiu, Wang Ming and Liu Shao-chi which did the gravest harm to the Party.

In the historical period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the proletariat enforces its dictatorship and exercises its leadership in every field of work through its vanguard the Communist Party. Departing from the dictatorship of the proletariat and from continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is impossible to solve correctly the question of Party building, the question of building what kind of Party and how to build it.

Liu Shao-chi's revisionist line on Party building betrayed the very essence of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the Marxist-Leninist theory on Party building. At the crucial moment when China's socialist revolution was deepening and the class struggle was extraordinarily acute, Liu Shao-chi had his sinister book "Self-Cultivation" re-published and it was precisely his aim to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country and restore the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. When he copied the passage from Lenin on the

necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which we quoted earlier in this report, Liu Shao-chi once again deliberately omitted the most important conclusion that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is essential", thereby clearly revealing his own counter-revolutionary features as a renegade to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Moreover, Liu Shao-chi went on spreading such reactionary fallacies as the theory of "the dying out of class struggle", the theory of "docile tools", the theory that "the masses are backward", the theory of "joining the Party in order to climb up", the theory of "inner-Party peace" and the theory of "merging private with public interests" (i.e., "losing a little to gain much"), in a vain attempt to corrupt and disintegrate our Party, so that the more the Party members "cultivated" themselves, the more revisionist they would become and so that the Marxist-Leninist Party would "evolve peacefully" into a revisionist party and the dictatorship of the proletariat into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. We should carry on revolutionary mass criticism and repudiation and thoroughly eliminate the pernicious influence of Liu Shao-chi's reactionary fallacies.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is the broadest and most deep-going movement for Party consolidation in the history of our Party. The Party organizations at various levels and the broad masses of Communists have experienced the acute struggle between the two lines, gone through the test in the large-scale class struggle and undergone examination by the revolutionary masses both inside and outside the Party. In this way, the Party members and cadres have faced the world and braved the storm and have raised their class consciousness and their consciousness of the struggle between the two lines. This great revolution teaches us: Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, we must educate the masses of Party members on classes, on class struggle, on the struggle between the two lines and on continuing the revolution. We must fight revisionism both inside and outside the Party, clear the Party of renegades, enemy agents and other elements representing the interests of the exploiting classes, and admit into the Party

the genuine advanced elements of the proletariat who have been tested in the great storm. We must strive to ensure that the leadership of Party organizations at all levels is truly in the hands of Marxists. We must see to it that the Party members really integrate theory with practice, maintain close ties with the masses and are bold in making criticism and self-criticism. We must see to it that the Party members will always keep to the style of being modest, prudent and free from arrogance and rashness and to the style of arduous struggle and plain living. Only thus will the Party be able to lead the proletariat and the revolutionary masses in carrying the socialist revolution through to the end.

Chairman Mao teaches us:

Historical experience merits attention. A line or a viewpoint must be explained constantly and repeatedly. It won't do to explain them only to a few people; they must be made known to the broad revolutionary masses.

The study and spread of the basic experience of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the study and spread of the history of the struggle between the two lines and the study and spread of Chairman Mao's theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat must be conducted not just once but should be repeated every year, every month, every day. Only thus will it be possible for the masses of Party members and the people to criticize erroneous lines and tendencies the moment they emerge, and will it be possible to guarantee that our Party will always forge ahead victoriously along the correct course charted by Chairman Mao.

The revision of the Party Constitution is an important item on the agenda of the Ninth National Congress of the Party. The Central Committee has submitted the draft Party Constitution to the congress for discussion. This draft was worked out jointly by the whole Party and the revolutionary masses throughout the country. Since November 1967 when

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Chairman Mao proposed that primary Party organizations take part in the revision of the Party Constitution, the Central Committee has received several thousand drafts. On this basis the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party drew up the draft Party Constitution, upon which the whole Party, the whole army and the revolutionary masses throughout the country once again held enthusiastic and earnest discussions. It may be said that the draft of the new Party Constitution is the product of the integration of the great leader Chairman Mao's wise leadership with the broad masses; it reflects the will of the whole Party, the whole army and the revolutionary masses throughout the country and gives a vivid demonstration of the democratic centralism and the mass line to which the Party has always adhered. Especially important is the fact that the draft Party Constitution has clearly reaffirmed that Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought is the theoretical basis guiding the Party's thinking. This is a great victory for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in smashing Liu Shao-chi's revisionist line on Party building, a great victory for Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought. The Central Committee is convinced that, after the discussion and adoption of the new Party Constitution by the congress, our Party will, in accordance with its provisions, surely be built into a still greater, still more glorious and still more correct Party.

VII. ON CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Now we shall go on specifically to discuss China's relations with foreign countries.

The revolutionary struggles of the proletariat and the oppressed people and nations of the world always support each other. The Albanian Party of Labour and all other genuine fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties and organizations, the broad masses of the proletariat and revolutionary people

throughout the world as well as many friendly countries, organizations and personages have all warmly acclaimed and supported the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in our country. On behalf of the great leader Chairman Mao and the Ninth National Congress of the Party, I hereby express our heartfelt thanks to them. We firmly pledge that we the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people are determined to fulfil our proletarian internationalist duty and, together with them, carry through to the end the great struggle against imperialism, modern revisionism and the reactionaries of various countries.

The general trend of the world today is still as Chairman Mao described it: "The enemy rots with every passing day, while for us things are getting better daily." On the one hand, the revolutionary movement of the proletariat of the world and of the people of various countries is vigorously surging forward. The armed struggles of the people of southern Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, India, Palestine and other countries and regions in Asia, Africa and Latin America are steadily growing in strength. The truth that "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" is being grasped by ever broader masses of the oppressed people and nations. An unprecedentedly gigantic revolutionary mass movement has broken out in Japan, Western Europe and North America, the "heartlands" of capitalism. More and more people are awakening. The genuine fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties and organizations are growing steadily in the course of integrating Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution in their own countries. On the other hand, U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionist social-imperialism are bogged down in political and economic crises and beset with difficulties both at home and abroad and find themselves in an impasse. They collude and at the same time contend with each other in a vain attempt to re-divide the world. They act in co-ordination and work hand in glove in opposing China, opposing communism and opposing the people, in suppressing the national liberation movement and

in launching wars of aggression. They scheme against each other and get locked in strife for raw materials, markets, dependencies, important strategic points and spheres of influence. They are both stepping up arms expansion and war preparations, each trying to realize its own ambitions.

Lenin pointed out: Imperialism means war...“imperialist wars are absolutely inevitable under such an economic system, as long as private property in the means of production exists.” (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 22, p.182) Lenin further pointed out: “Imperialist war is the eve of socialist revolution.” (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 25, p.349) These scientific theses of Lenin's are by no means out of date.

Chairman Mao has recently pointed out, “With regard to the question of world war, there are but two possibilities: One is that the war will give rise to revolution and the other is that revolution will prevent the war.” This is because there are four major contradictions in the world today: The contradiction between the oppressed nations on the one hand and imperialism and social-imperialism on the other; the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist and revisionist countries; the contradiction between imperialist and social-imperialist countries and among the imperialist countries; and the contradiction between socialist countries on the one hand and imperialism and social-imperialism on the other. The existence and development of these contradictions are bound to give rise to revolution. According to the historical experience of World War I and World War II, it can be said with certainty that if the imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries should impose a third world war on the people of the world, it would only greatly accelerate the development of these contradictions and help arouse the people of the world to rise in revolution and send the whole pack of imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries to their graves.

Chairman Mao teaches us: "All reactionaries are paper tigers." "Strategically we should despise all our enemies, but tactically we should take them all seriously." This great truth enunciated by Chairman Mao heightens the revolutionary militancy of the people of the whole world and guides us from victory to victory in the struggle against imperialism, revisionism and all reaction.

The paper-tiger nature of U.S. imperialism has long since been laid bare by the people throughout the world. U.S. imperialism, the most ferocious enemy of the people of the whole world, is going downhill more and more. Since he took office, Nixon has been confronted with a hopeless mess and insoluble economic crisis, with the strong resistance of the masses of the people at home and throughout the world and with the predicament in which the imperialist countries are disintegrating and the baton of U.S. imperialism is getting ever less effective. Unable to produce any solution to these problems, Nixon, like his predecessors, cannot but continue to play the counter-revolutionary dual tactics, ostensibly assuming a "peace-loving" appearance while in fact engaging in arms expansion and war preparations on a still larger scale. The military expenditures of the United States have been increasing year by year. To date the U.S. imperialists still forcibly occupy our territory Taiwan. They have dispatched aggressor troops to many countries and have also set up hundreds upon hundreds of military bases and military installations in different parts of the world. They have made so many airplanes and guns, so many nuclear bombs and guided missiles. What is all this for? To frighten, suppress and slaughter the people and dominate the world. By doing so they make themselves the enemy of the people everywhere and find themselves besieged and battered by the broad masses of the proletariat and the people all over the world, and this will definitely lead to revolutions throughout the world on a still larger scale.

The Soviet revisionist renegade clique is a paper tiger,

too. It has revealed its social-imperialist features ever more clearly. When Khrushchov revisionism was just beginning to emerge, our great leader Chairman Mao foresaw what serious harm modern revisionism would do to the cause of world revolution. Chairman Mao led the whole Party in waging resolute struggles in the ideological, theoretical and political spheres, together with the Albanian Party of Labour headed by the great Marxist-Leninist Comrade Enver Hoxha and with the genuine Marxist-Leninists of the world, against modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism as its centre. This has enabled the people all over the world to learn gradually in struggle how to distinguish genuine from sham Marxism-Leninism and genuine from sham socialism and brought about the bankruptcy of Khrushchov revisionism. At the same time, Chairman Mao led our Party in resolutely criticizing Liu Shao-chi's revisionist line of capitulation to imperialism, revisionism and reaction and of suppression of revolutionary movements in various countries and in destroying Liu Shao-chi's counter-revolutionary revisionist clique. All this has been done in the fulfilment of our Party's proletarian internationalist duty.

Since Brezhnev came to power, with its baton becoming less and less effective and its difficulties at home and abroad growing more and more serious, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has been practising social-imperialism and social-fascism more frantically than ever. Internally, it has intensified its suppression of the Soviet people and speeded up the all-round restoration of capitalism. Externally, it has stepped up its collusion with U.S. imperialism and its suppression of the revolutionary struggles of the people of various countries, intensified its control over and its exploitation of various East European countries and the People's Republic of Mongolia, intensified its contention with U.S. imperialism over the Middle East and other regions and intensified its threat of aggression against China. Its dispatch of hundreds of thousands of troops to occupy Czechoslovakia and its armed provocations against China on our territory Chenpao Island

are two foul performances staged recently by Soviet revisionism. In order to justify its aggression and plunder, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique trumpets the so-called theory of "limited sovereignty", the theory of "international dictatorship" and the theory of "socialist community". What does all this stuff mean? It means that your sovereignty is "limited", while his is unlimited. You won't obey him? He will exercise "international dictatorship" over you — dictatorship over the people of other countries, in order to form the "socialist community" ruled by the new tsars, that is, colonies of social-imperialism, just like the "New Order of Europe" of Hitler, the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" of Japanese militarism and the "Free World Community" of the United States. Lenin denounced the renegades of the Second International: "Socialism in words, imperialism in deeds, the growth of opportunism into imperialism." (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 29, p.458.) This applies perfectly to the Soviet revisionist renegade clique of today which is composed of a handful of capitalist-roaders in power. We firmly believe that the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in the Soviet Union with their glorious revolutionary tradition will surely rise and overthrow this clique consisting of a handful of renegades. As Chairman Mao points out:

The Soviet Union was the first socialist state and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was created by Lenin. Although the leadership of the Soviet Party and state has now been usurped by revisionists, I would advise comrades to remain firm in the conviction that the masses of the Soviet people and of Party members and cadres are good, that they desire revolution and that revisionist rule will not last long.

Now that the Soviet government has created the incident of armed encroachment on the Chinese territory Chenpao Island, the Sino-Soviet boundary question has caught the attention of the whole world. Like the boundary questions between China and other countries, the Sino-Soviet boundary

question is also one left over by history. As regards these questions, our Party and government have consistently stood for negotiations through diplomatic channels to reach a fair and reasonable settlement. Pending a settlement, the status quo of the boundary should be maintained and conflicts avoided. Proceeding from this stand, China has satisfactorily and successfully settled boundary questions with neighbouring countries such as Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, the People's Republic of Mongolia and Afghanistan. Only the boundary questions between the Soviet Union and China and between India and China remain unsettled to this day.

The Chinese government held repeated negotiations with the Indian government on the Sino-Indian boundary question. As the reactionary Indian government had taken over the British imperialist policy of aggression, it insisted that we recognize the illegal "McMahon line" which even the reactionary governments of different periods in old China had not recognized, and moreover, it went a step further and vainly attempted to occupy the Aksai Chin area, which has always been under Chinese jurisdiction, thereby disrupting the Sino-Indian boundary negotiations. This is known to all.

The Sino-Soviet boundary question is the product of tsarist Russian imperialist aggression against China. In the latter half of the 19th century when power was in the hands neither of the Chinese people nor of the Russian people, the tsarist government perpetrated imperialist acts of aggression to carve up China, imposed a series of unequal treaties on her, annexed vast expanses of her territory and, moreover, crossed in many places the boundary line stipulated by the unequal treaties and occupied still more Chinese territory. This gangster behaviour was indignantly condemned by Marx, Engels and Lenin. On September 27, 1920, the Government of Soviets led by the great Lenin solemnly proclaimed: It "declares null and void all the treaties concluded with China by the former Governments of Russia, renounces all seizure of Chinese territory and all Russian concessions in China and

restores to China, without any compensation and for ever, all that had been predatorily seized from her by the Tsar's Government and the Russian bourgeoisie." (See "Declaration of the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic to the Chinese Government.") Owing to the historical conditions of the time, this proletarian policy of Lenin's was not realized.

As early as August 22 and September 21, 1960, the Chinese government, proceeding from its consistent stand on boundary questions, twice took the initiative in proposing to the Soviet government that negotiations be held to settle the Sino-Soviet boundary question. In 1964, negotiations between the two sides started in Peking. The treaties relating to the present Sino-Soviet boundary are unequal treaties imposed on the Chinese people by the tsars, but proceeding from the desire to safeguard the revolutionary friendship between the Chinese and Soviet people, we will maintained that these treaties be taken as the basis for the settlement of the boundary question. However, betraying Lenin's proletarian policy and clinging to its new-tsarist social-imperialist stand, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique refused to recognize these treaties as unequal and, moreover, it insisted that China recognize as belonging to the Soviet Union all the Chinese territory which they had occupied or attempted to occupy in violaton of the treaties. This big-power chauvinist and social-imperialist stand of the Soviet government led to the disruption of the negotiations.

Since Brezhnev came to power, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has frenziedly stepped up its disruption of the status quo of the boundary and repeatedly provoked border incidents, shooting and killing our unarmed fishermen and peasants and encroaching upon China's sovereignty. Recently it has gone further and made successive armed intrusions into our territory Chenpao Island. Driven beyond the limits of forbearance, our frontier guards have fought back in self-defence, dealing the aggressors well-deserved blows and

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triumphantly safeguarding our sacred territory. In an effort to extricate the Soviet revisionist renegade clique from its predicament, Kosygin asked on March 21 to communicate with our leaders by telephone. Immediately on March 22, our government replied with a memorandum, in which it was made clear that, "In view of the present relations between China and the Soviet Union, it is unsuitable to communicate by telephone. If the Soviet government has anything to say, it is asked to put it forward officially to the Chinese government through diplomatic channels." On March 29, the Soviet government issued a statement still clinging to its obstinate aggressor stand, while expressing willingness to resume "consultations". Our government is considering its reply to this.

The foreign policy of our Party and government is consistent. It is: To develop relations of friendship, mutual assistance and co-operation with socialist countries on the principle of proletarian internationalism; to support and assist the revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed people and nations; and to strive for peaceful coexistence with countries having different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, and to oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war. Our proletarian foreign policy is not based on temporary expediency; it is a policy in which we have long persisted. This is what we did in the past and we will persist in doing the same in the future.

We have always held that the internal affairs of each country should be settled by its own people. The relations between all countries and between all parties, big or small, must be built on the principles of equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. To safeguard these Marxist-Leninist principles, the Communist Party of China has waged a long struggle against the sinister big-power chauvinism

of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique. This is a fact known to all. The Soviet revisionist renegade clique glibly talk of "fraternal parties" and "fraternal countries", but in fact they regard themselves as the patriarchal party and as the new tsars who are free to invade and occupy the territory of other countries. They conduct sabotage and subversion against the Chinese Communist Party, the Albanian Party of Labour and other genuine Marxist-Leninist parties. Moreover, when any party, or any country in their so-called "socialist community", holds a slightly different view, they act ferociously and stop at nothing in suppression, sabotage and subversion and even in sending troops to invade and occupy their so-called "fraternal countries" and kidnapping members of their so-called "fraternal parties". These fascist piratical acts have sealed their doom.

U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism are always trying to "isolate" China; this is China's honour. Their rabid opposition to China cannot do us the slightest harm. On the contrary, it serves to further arouse our people's determination to maintain independence and keep the initiative in our own hands, rely on our own efforts and work hard to make our country prosperous and powerful; it serves to prove to the whole world that China has drawn a clear line between herself on the one hand and U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism on the other. Today, it is not imperialism, revisionism and reaction but the proletariat and the revolutionary people of all countries that determine the destiny of the world. The genuine Marxist-Leninist Parties and organizations of various countries, which are composed of the advanced elements of the proletariat, are a new rising force with infinitely broad prospects. The Communist Party of China is determined to unite and fight together with them. We firmly support the Albanian people in their struggle against imperialism and revisionism; we firmly support the Vietnamese people in carrying their war of resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation through to the end; we firmly support the revolutionary struggles of the people of

Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, India, Palestine and other countries and regions in Asia, Africa and Latin America; we firmly support the proletariat, the students and youth and the masses of the Black people of the United States in their just struggle against the U.S. ruling clique; we firmly support the proletariat and the labouring people of the Soviet Union in their just struggle to overthrow the Soviet revisionist renegade clique; we firmly support the people of Czechoslovakia and other countries in their just struggle against Soviet revisionist social-imperialism; we firmly support the revolutionary struggles of the people of Japan and the West European and Oceanian countries; we firmly support the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries; and we firmly support all the just struggles of resistance against aggression and oppression by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. All countries and people subjected to aggression, control, intervention or bullying by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, let us unite and form the broadest possible united front and overthrow our common enemies !

On no account must we relax our revolutionary vigilance because of victory or ignore the danger of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism launching a large-scale war of aggression. We must make full preparations, preparations against their launching a big war and against their launching a war at an early date, preparations against their launching a conventional war and against their launching a large-scale nuclear war. In short, we must be prepared. Chairman Mao said long ago: We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack. If they insist on fighting, we will keep them company and fight to the finish. The Chinese revolution won out on the battlefield. Armed with Mao Tse-tung Thought and tempered in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the Chinese people in their hundreds of millions and the Chinese People's Liberation Army, with full confidence in victory, are determined to liberate their sacred territory Taiwan and resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely wipe out all aggressors who dare to come !

Our great leader Chairman Mao points out:

Working hand in glove, Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism have done so many foul and evil things that the revolutionary people the world over will not let them go unpunished. The people of all countries are rising. A new historical period of struggle against U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism has begun.

Whether the war gives rise to revolution or revolution prevents the war, U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism will not last long! Workers of all countries, unite! Proletarians and oppressed people and nations of the world, unite! Bury U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism and their lackeys!

VIII. LET THE WHOLE PARTY, LET THE PEOPLE OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY UNITE TO WIN STILL GREATER VICTORIES

The Ninth National Congress of the Party is convened at an important moment in the historical development of our Party, at an important moment in the consolidation and development of the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country and at an important moment in the development of the international communist movement and world revolution. Among the delegates to the congress are proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation and also a great deal of fresh blood. In previous congresses of our Party there have never been such great numbers of delegates from the Party membership among the industrial workers, poor and lower-middle peasants, and of women delegates. Among the delegates from the Party membership in the People's Liberation Army are veteran Red Army fighters as well as new fighters. The delegates of Party members from among the Red Guards are attending a national congress of the Party for the first time. The fact that so many delegates have come to Peking from all corners of the country and gathered around the great leader Chairman Mao to discuss and decide on the affairs of the

Party and state signifies that our congress is a congress full of vitality, a congress of unity and a congress of victory.

Chairman Mao teaches us:

The unification of our country, the unity of our people and the unity of our various nationalities – these are the basic guarantees of the sure triumph of our cause.

Through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution our motherland has become unprecedentedly united and our people have achieved a great revolutionary unity on the broadest scale under the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung Thought. This great unity is under the leadership of the proletariat and is based on the worker-peasant alliance; it embraces all the fraternal nationalities, the patriotic democrats who for a long time have done useful work for the cause of the revolution and construction in our motherland, the vast numbers of patriotic overseas Chinese and our patriotic fellow-countrymen in Hongkong and Macao, our patriotic fellow-countrymen in Taiwan who are oppressed and exploited by the U.S.-Chiang reactionaries, and all those who support socialism and love our socialist motherland. We are convinced that after the present national congress of our Party, the people of all nationalities in our country will certainly unite still more closely under the leadership of the great leader Chairman Mao and win still greater victories in the struggle against our common enemy and in the cause of building our powerful socialist motherland.

Chairman Mao said in 1962:

The next 50 to 100 years or so, beginning from now, will be a great era of radical change in the social system throughout the world, an earth-shaking era without equal in any previous historical period. Living in such an era, we must be prepared to engage in great struggles which will have many features different in form from those in the past.

SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

This magnificent prospect far-sightedly envisioned by Chairman Mao illuminates our future path of advance and inspires all genuine Marxist-Leninists to fight valiantly for the realization of the grand ideal of communism.

Let the whole Party unite, let the people of the whole country unite, hold high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung Thought, be resolute, fear no sacrifice and surmount every difficulty to win victory!

Long live the great victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution!

Long live the dictatorship of the proletariat!

Long live the Ninth National Congress of the Party!

Long live the great, glorious and correct Communist Party of China!

Long live great Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought!

Long live our great leader Chairman Mao! A long, long life to Chairman Mao!

(*"Jen-min Jih-pao," Peking, April 28, 1969*)

SPEECH AT THE ENLARGED MEETING OF THE CENTRAL POLITICAL BUREAU

(May 18, 1966)

by Lin Piao

It would have been better if other comrades of the Standing Committee spoke first. Since I am asked to speak first, let me do so right now. I don't have a prepared text, I shall speak without it. At times, I may have to read out certain reference materials.

This is the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau. At the last enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee convened by Chairman Mao, attention was mainly directed at solving the case concerning Peng Chen, and the initial step was taken. We will go on with this issue at the present meeting. The Lo Jui-ching case has already been solved. The problem of Lu Ting-yi and Yang Shang-kun was exposed during an investigation of underground activities and it has been under discussion for quite sometime. Now we are going to solve it together with the other problems. The problems involving the four persons are connected with each other and they bear certain similarities. The principal character is Peng Chen with Lo Jui-ching, Lu Ting-yi and Yang Shang-kun following in that order. The exposure and settling of these problems are of paramount importance to the whole Party, to the continuous development of the revolution, consolidation of proletarian dictatorship, prevention of capitalist restoration and revisionist usurpation of political power, prevention of a counterrevolutionary coup d'etat and subversion. It is an important measure for China's advancement, and it is Chairman Mao's wise and resolute decision.

The greatest problem to be dealt with is the prevention of a counterrevolutionary political plot, the prevention of subversion and a coup d'etat.

The fundamental problem of revolution is the problem of political power. With political power, the proletariat and the labouring people will have everything. Without it, they will lose all they have. Relations of production are naturally the basis, but it is the seizure of political power that will change, consolidate and develop such relations. Otherwise, production will become economism, beggarism and importuning favours. When the proletarian class obtains political power, the millionaires, multi-millionaires and multi-billionaires can be overthrown at one stroke, and the proletariat will have everything. Therefore, no matter how complicated things are, never forget orientation and lose one's bearing; never forget political power but always keep it in mind. To forget political power is to forget politics and the fundamental views of Marxism. This will eventually lead one to economism, anarchism and nihilism. It would be like such a big fool that when he lost his head he didn't even know how he lost it.

Among the areas of the superstructure, ideology, religion, arts, law and political power, the last named is the centre. What is political power? Sun Yat-sen said it is the "management of public affairs." What he did not understand was that political power is an instrument for one class to oppress the other. It is so with both counterrevolution and revolution. Using my own words of habit, political power is a power of suppression. Of course, suppression is not the only function of political power. The political power of the proletariat should also be used to reform the peasants, and small owners of property, develop economic construction, and resist foreign aggression. It is multi-functional with suppression as the most essential. Reactionaries in society and representatives of the exploiting class who have infiltrated into the Party must all be suppressed. Some should be beheaded, some imprisoned, some taking up forced labour, some expelled from the Party, and

PART I: REPORTS AND SPEECHES

some be dismissed from their offices. Otherwise, it will mean that we don't understand the fundamental views of Marxism regarding political power, we will lose political power and become big fools.

In recent years, especially last year, Chairman Mao brought forth the question of preventing revisionism both inside and outside the Party, on all fronts, in all areas and at all different levels. From what I understand, he refers mainly to the leading organs. Chairman Mao, in recent months, has paid particular attention to the prevention of a counter-revolutionary coup d'état and has adopted many measures. He talked about it after the Lo Jui-ching case was uncovered. When the Peng Chen issue broke out, Chairman Mao talked about it again with some people. In addition, he has posted necessary personnel to prevent a counterrevolutionary coup d'état, to prevent them from occupying our vital positions, radio and broadcasting stations. Both the troops and public security departments have completed proper dispositions. This is what Chairman Mao has been preoccupied with in the past few months. This is something that has not been put to writing completely, and this is Chairman Mao's unprinted piece of writing. We should study this unprinted piece, for which Chairman Mao has not slept well for several nights. This is a very penetrating and serious problem.

Coup d'état has become a political fad these days. Generally speaking, the change of political power results from either people's revolution, which starts from below, like the rebellions of Chen Sheng and Wu Kuang (in Chin Dynasty), the Tai Ping Uprising (in Ching Dynasty) and the Communist revolution of our Party; or from a counterrevolutionary coup d'état.

Most counterrevolutionary coups d'état take place within the imperial court, from within; some take the form of collusion between the high and the low; some result from collusion with foreign subversive activities or with armed

invasion; some are timed to take advantage of natural calamities. This has been so both historically and at present.

Talking about coups d'état in the world, according to incomplete statistics since 1960, already 61 coups had taken place in a number of capitalist countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Of this total, 56 were successful. Eight chiefs of states were executed; seven were retained as puppets; and 11 were deposed. These statistics were compiled before the coups in Ghana, Indonesia and Syria. In the period of six years, an average of 11 coups took place every year.

The Marxists are materialists who always put emphasis on realities. We simply cannot remain unaffected with what we see and hear. If we make hot issues of many other things and forget this one, we shall fail to grasp the essentials of a problem and be fools. Without vigilance there will be great trouble ahead.

What we had tried to accomplish in the decades before the liberation was to seize political power. After the victory of revolution, and when political power had been seized by us, many comrades began to neglect the problem of political power. They devoted themselves to reconstruction, education, to dealing with the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the United States; they hardly realized that seized political power can be lost again, and dictatorship of the proletariat can be turned into dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. On this point, we, at least I myself, have not done enough thinking; much of my thought had been given to the problem of fighting and the outbreak of war. Judging from large numbers of facts, our primary task is to prevent internal subversion, and counter-revolutionary coup d'état. The reason is very simple. On many things we depend on large numbers of facts to deepen our impression and understanding. The law of human knowledge is from perception to rationality.

Historical facts of our country show us that political

power was lost through coups d'etat before a dynasty existed for 10, 20, 30 or 50 years.

Rebellions broke out soon after the founding of the Chou dynasty. In the periods of the Spring and Autumn Annals and the Warring States, widespread disturbances never ceased. "There was no righteous war in the period of the Spring and Autumn Annals." The states conducted subversive operations against each other. Shang Chen, son of Emperor Cheng of the State of Chu, encircled the palace of his father with guards to force Emperor Cheng to commit suicide. Emperor Cheng liked eating bear's paws very much and pleaded for his favourable dish before death in a bid to stall for time and wait for outside help. Shang Chen rejected his plea, saying "bear's paw take a long time to cook," and Emperor Cheng was forced to take his own life without delay. The Prince of Wu seized political power by sending Chuan Chu to assassinate Wang Liao. Before Prince Hsien of Chin, Princes Huan and Yi of Chi came to power in their respective states and times, many coups d'etat broke out here and there, and many lost their lives in violence. There were too many incidents like those mentioned above and I don't want to go on citing more. Besides assassination and bloodshed, there were other forms of treachery for the seizure of political power. For example, Lu Pu-wei offered to Prince Chuang Hsiang of Chin his pregnant concubine Chao, who gave birth to Chin Shih Huang. During the early years of the latter's rule, political power was actually in the hands of Lu Pu-wei.

The three emperors of the Chin dynasty altogether ruled the country for 15 years. Chin Shih Huang died after keeping his throne for 12 years. When Chin Erh Shih succeeded the throne with Chao Kao's support, he killed 26 of his brothers and sisters.

Liu Pang of the Han dynasty ruled for 12 years. Empress Lu seized the throne from the Liu family which was toppled not long afterwards by Chou Po and Chen Ping.

Ssu-ma Yen of the Tsin dynasty ruled for 25 years, and civil wars broke out among the eight princes who resorted to merciless killings to settle their differences.

During the period of the South and North dynasties, struggle for political power resulted in still more and cruel killings.

Emperor Wen of the Sui dynasty ruled for 24 years and was killed by his own son later known as Emperor Yang. There is a theatrical piece "Bridge of River Royal", which depicts Yang Kuang's assassination of his father and his brother Yang Yung.

In the Tang dynasty, brothers killed each other for the seizure of power. Li Shih-min killed his elder brother Chien Cheng and younger brother Yuan Chi. The case later was referred to as the "Coups at the Hsuan Wu Gate."

Chao Kuan-yin of the Sung dynasty ruled for 17 years and then was killed by his younger brother Chao Kuang-yi. "Shadow of candle and sound of an axe remain a mystery for 1,000 years." This incident was depicted in a Peking opera called "Queen Ho Rebukes the Emperor."

Kubla Khan of the Yuan dynasty ruled China for 16 years, and his son Temour ruled for 13 years. Thereafter, a power-seizure war broke out between the queen and her grandson, resulting in violent disturbances and killings.

Chu Yuan-Chang of the Ming dynasty ruled for 31 years. His fourth son, Prince Li of Yen launched a war against his grandson Emperor Chien Wen. Civil war went on for three years resulting in the destruction by fire of the palace in Nanking and disappearance of the heir-apparent Emperor Chien Wen. No one could tell for sure whether Chien Wen was burnt to death as fire destroyed the palace. Afterwards, envoys were said to have been sent abroad in search of the missing emperor heir-apparent.

During the last years of Emperor Kang Hsi, not long after the establishment of the Ching dynasty, power struggle touched off a series of palace intrigues and plots. It was said that Kang Hsi in his will named his 14th son to succeed him, but Yung Cheng changed it for his own benefit, and the story went on that Kang Hsi died after taking some ginseng brew prepared by Yung Cheng. After his accession, Yung Cheng killed many of his brothers.

The Revolution of 1911 made Sun Yat-sen President of China. Three months later, Yuan Shih-kai seized political power from him. Four years later when Yuan Shih-kai made himself an emperor, he was overthrown. Thereafter, China was engulfed in a series of civil wars between the warlords, two wars between Hopei and the Northeast Provinces, and war between Hopei and Anhwei.

These reactionary coups d'etat in the history of our country should be terrifying enough to heighten our vigilance.

It's been 16 years since the founding of our government. Will this political power of the proletariat be overthrown and usurped? We shall lose it if we are not careful enough. Khrushchov subverted the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia changed its colour long ago. Hungary suffered a great deal for more than ten days because of the reactionary stand of Imre Nagy; this also resulted from subversion. Examples like these are too many to be cited. Now Chairman Mao has noted this problem to which we seldom paid attention. He has on several occasions held talks with the responsible comrades on the prevention of counterrevolutionary coup d'etat. Did he do so without a good reason? No. There are many indications that may be best described in the line of a poem "wind fills the house as mountain rain is approaching." "On Distinguishing a Traitor," an article in an anthology of ancient Chinese prose Ku Wen Kuan Chih, says: "To see the symptoms and know what is going to happen." "A halo round the moon indicates wind; a damp plinth indicates

rain." Bad things are always revealed by some signs beforehand. Substance is revealed through phenomenon. Recently, there are many ghostly things and phenomena which will arouse attention for sure. A counterrevolutionary coup d'etat may break out; there will be killings, seizure of political power, and there will be an attempt to restore capitalism and to do away with the socialist setups. There are many such phenomena and information, but I am not going to talk about them in details. After going through the experience of struggling against Lo Jui-ching, Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi and his wife, and Yang Shang-kun, you should have smelled something, the smell of gun-powder. Representatives of the bourgeoisie have infiltrated into our Party and its leadership organs; they have become persons in authority who control the government machinery, political power, military authority, and the headquarters of the ideological war front. They have joined hands to carry out subversive activities designed to create widespread disturbances.

Lo Jui-ching holds the military authority. Peng Chen has seized many lines of authority in the Party's Central Secretariat. Lo Jui-ching's "hands" are long, but Peng Chen's "hands" are longer still. Lu Ting-yi is the commander on the cultural and ideological war front. Yang Shang-kun is in charge of confidential affairs, intelligence information and liaison work. To launch a coup d'etat, there are two things that must be taken care of: one is ideological which covers propaganda organs, newspapers, radio and broadcast, literature, motion picture and publication. When the bourgeois elements launch a coup d'etat, they, too, must create ideological confusions in the people's mind. Another thing concerns military power, seizing of the gun. When there is coordination between the civilians and the armed forces, when public opinion is properly shaped, and when guns are controlled, they will be in the position to launch a counter-revolutionary coup d'etat. When it comes to voting, they have the necessary people. When it comes to fighting, they have the gun. Whether it is a coup in the meeting hall, or a coup

on the battlefield, they are equally capable of accomplishing the task. There are a good number of Teng Tos, Wu Hans, and Liao Mo-shas, big and small "Three-Family Villages!" Chairman Mao said that we had not occupied the ideological front for the past 16 years. If this situation continues, people will vote them instead of us. Should war break out, people will follow them, and pick up the gun to fight us. Seizure of political power depends upon the barrel of the gun and the pen. They deserve our close attention. Therefore, we must not be paralyzed ideologically, and we must take concrete measures and action to prevent its occurrence. We must uncover all representatives of the bourgeoisie, all time bombs and landmines while there is still time. Otherwise, when the time is ripe for action, a counterrevolutionary coup d'etat will occur. Or in the event of a natural calamity, or war, or the death of Chairman Mao, this kind of political crisis will come upon us, and the great nation of 700 million people will writhe in confusions. This is a very great problem.

Of course there are two possibilities. They may not pull through with their plot; their conspiracy may not be successful. This is because of the fact that our Party has a revolutionary stand of several decades under the leadership of Chairman Mao; it is a Party armed with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought; it is not juvenile; it is mature. Our Party always has a firm control over the barrel of the gun; it has never engaged in any parliamentary activities, unlike those European parties. Our Party is bound with the labouring masses in blood and flesh; it has a long revolutionary tradition, and rich revolutionary experiences.

The overall situation is excellent, the world situation and the situation in China are both excellent. It won't be easy for them to realize their conspiracy. They may succeed, they may fail. If we don't pay attention to the situation and we think like fools, they may win. If we raise our vigilance, they will not win. They want to cut our heads off but it is unlikely that they will make it! If they really try to launch a counter-

revolutionary coup d'etat, we'll have their heads chopped off.

At all times, no matter how fine the situation is, things always have a dark side. We should be able to see the dark side when the situation is fine. If there is no bad side of a thing, there will be nothing to say about its good side. The good can be good only because there exists a bad side; the bad is bad only because there exists a good side of it.

Now that Chairman Mao is still healthily alive, we may as well take a good rest under the shade of such a big tree. Chairman Mao is already over 70, but he is still very healthy; he may live up to over 100.

Because of the fine situation, we must guard against being paralyzed, and we must adopt necessary measures to prevent occurrence of incidents. Some may try to stir up trouble, and they are actually going ahead with their scheme. Careerists are to be found everywhere. They are representatives of the bourgeoisie, they attempt to topple our proletarian authority, we must never let them succeed. There are a bunch of bastards who are eager to embark on a great adventure; they are waiting for the opportune moment. They want to kill us, we must suppress them! They are fake revolutionaries, fake followers of Marxism and Mao Tse-tung's thought; they are renegades. While Chairman Mao is still healthily alive, they are already turning themselves into renegades; they feign compliance but they are against us covertly; they are careerists and trouble makers; they want to kill right now, and they are resorting to different methods of killing. Lu Ting-yi is one and his wife is another. He says that he knows nothing about his wife's activities! How could we believe this? Lo Jui-ching is one of them too. Peng Chen's activities are more covert and cunning, so that people hardly know what he's been doing. He pretends to follow Chairman Mao, while in fact he had been an out and out follower of Wang Ming's line in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area; he's more thorough than Wang Ming himself. a follower of "ultra-Wang

Ming line!"

In 1938, when the Wang Ming line was criticized at the 6th plenary session of the 6th CCP Central Committee, Peng Chen participated in the session. Afterwards, he praised Chiang Kai-shek as a man "of the greatest political vision," so that he wanted to "most sincerely support Generalissimo Chiang." He also said that "the most formidable centre of the war of resistance is Generalissimo Chiang." He added that "between the Kuomintang and the CCP there should be mutual help, mutual love and mutual forbearance. (I am) against using difficulties to make trouble with the government (the Kuomintang government)." When he was in Yen-an, he pretended to oppose the Wang Ming line, but he promoted it after he arrived in the Northeast. Peng Chen refused to carry out directives of the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao in the Northeast. When guns were still roaring on the battlefield, he dreamed of peace and of holding talks with Chiang Kai-shek; he had no preparation for war, but dreamed of winning victory at the conference table. He smacked nothing at all of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought, and he did nothing to conduct class struggle. He put no emphasis on the rural area; he dispatched no cadres and his main force to establish rural bases, as he could not bear to leave the city. Even after he pulled out from Shenyang, he still tried to linger on in the suburbs of Shenyang. When he next moved to Penchi, Wushun and Meihokou, he was still unwilling to settle down in the rural area; he was not prepared for war, but was eager to seek peace. In the Northeast, he had tried to concentrate his main force to engage the enemy in a last-ditch battle. He did so just in order to cover up his political capitulationism with his military adventurism. He cultivated his personal sphere of influence under the pretext of taking care of the "mountain-top." He paid no attention to replenishing the main force, but simply recruited some deserters and set up a number of local troops. Afterwards, these local units became turncoats and would not leave their "mountain-tops." Verbally he's against mountain-

top-ism, while in fact he was bent on building up his own "mountain-top." He gathered deserters and absorbed traitors just in order to swell the rank and file of his own troops. He formed personal cliques and promoted "sworn-brotherhood." Consequently, the Peking Municipal Government was turned into a water-tight position impregnable to any outside attack. He created a party within the Party, and a faction within the Party. Chairman Mao and Premier Chou and other comrades have all sensed it, and I have sensed it too.

Quite a few people while exhibiting the signboard of Marxism and Mao Tse-tung's thought are actually opposed to Marxism and Mao Tse-tung's thought. They are actually anti-communist elements although they are card-carrying members of the Party. The present exposure is a great victory for the Party; it would have been highly dangerous otherwise. If they were allowed to go on with their activities, possibly it would not be the Party's exposure of them, but that they would put the Party "on trial".

Our society is still established on the foundation of class antagonism. The bourgeoisie, the landlord class and all other exploiting classes have been overthrown, but we have not yet eliminated them. We have confiscated their properties, but we are unable to confiscate their reactionary thinking even if we have them imprisoned. They do want to stage a comeback. They are but a small minority in proportion to the whole population; however, they have great political potentials, and their power of resistance considerably outweighs their numbers. New elements of the bourgeoisie continue to emerge from among the spontaneous influence of the petty bourgeoisie in urban and rural areas. Certain complicated characters have also adulterated the working class. Certain Party and government functionaries have become decadent. In addition, the imperialist and modern revisionist countries are attempting to encircle and subvert us. All these conditions have engendered in our country a danger of capitalist

restoration. This kind of danger is all-embracing, as the various reactionary forces complement one another. They exist both inside and outside the country, mainly those inside the country; they operate both inside and outside the Party, but mainly those inside the Party; they are present both at the top and bottom levels, but mainly those at the top level where lies the real danger. The emergence of Khrushchov alone was enough to change the colour of the entire Soviet Union.

We have overthrown the exploiting class for only 16 years, but they are still living and hoping, and the landlords have secretly put away their title-deeds. The toppled landlords and the bourgeoisie always dream of recovering their lost paradise. They have lost their guns, and their seals of authority. But, they still enjoy certain superiority in the ideological and cultural fields. They take every possible advantage of this superiority to spread poison so as to prepare public opinion for a capitalist restoration. The current great proletarian cultural revolution is precisely the kind of acute class struggle between the bourgeois plot for restoration and the counter-restoration of the proletariat. It is an event of the first magnitude that not only concerns the destiny of the Party and State, but also the future of the world revolution.

We must pay serious attention to this important issue of capitalist restoration, do not forget it, but keep it in the mind at all times. Never forget class struggle and dictatorship of the proletariat; never forget to give prominence to politics, and to hold high the great ideological red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought. Otherwise, we'd all be fools. Don't lose your vigilance because of the thousand and one business routines you have to deal with daily; otherwise, they may suddenly start killing at night. By then, many heads will roll, the State system will be changed, the colour of the regime will be changed, and the relations of production will also be changed from one of progress to retrogression.

To say that there is no contradiction in socialism is

wrong, is contrary to Marxism and in discord with dialectics. How can there be no contradiction? Contradiction will still exist even after 1,000, 10,000 and 100 million years. The earth may perish, and the sun may die, but contradiction will continue to exist in the universe. Not long ago, after an earthquake struck the Hsingtai area, our Premier Chou personally looked after the situation there. This means that struggle also exists in the realm of nature. When sunspot increases to a certain level, radio communication will be impossible. All things exist in contradictions, struggles and changes – this, indeed, is the view of Marxism. From a grain of sand to the sun, no matter whether it is something as big as the Milky Way or as small as a tiny nucleus, whether macrocosm or microcosm, there exists contradiction. The nature of Marxism is critical and revolutionary. Its basic point is to criticize, to struggle and to make revolution. Only through criticism, struggle and revolution can the proletariat seize and keep the political power, and push our enterprise forward. Therefore, we should heighten our vigilance and struggle, and there must be no illusion about peace. Struggle is life – if you don't struggle against him, he will struggle against you; if you don't strike him, he will strike you; if you don't kill him, he will kill you. If we lose this kind of vigilance, and not to unite ourselves in struggle, we cannot be Marxists. The better we unite, the more eagerly we should struggle, and the stronger will be our fighting capabilities. But, we will never talk about unity with the anti-Party elements; we must criticize them, expose them until after they are expelled from the Party. Unity is not absolute but relative; it is the kind of unity for criticizing and exposing the anti-Party elements.

In short, we must struggle. This time we struggled against Peng Chen, Lo Jui-ching, Lu Ting-yi and his wife, and there is also Yang Shang-kun. Our action is that of Marxism and dialectic materialism; it is a highly significant political measure, and a measure designed to prevent counter-revolutionary subversion. Otherwise, we shall lose what we have gained; we shall be unable to keep what we have created;

the blood of our revolutionary martyrs in the past 100 years as well as in the past decades would have been shed in vain; and we ourselves shall become criminals of history, and opportunists.

We want to struggle against them, but we must first of all unite ourselves with Chairman Mao and Mao Tse-tung's thought as the centre. These people have something in common, that is, they are opposed to Chairman Mao and Mao Tse-tung's thought. Characters such as Peng Chen, Lo Jui-ching, Lu Ting-yi, Yang Shang-kun, Teng To, Wu Han and Liao Mo-sha are all alike. Materials against them are too many to be enumerated. Either defiantly or subtly they have maliciously opposed Chairman Mao and Mao Tse-tung's thought by using different languages, styles and schemes.

Chairman Mao is the founder of our Party, founder of the revolution of our country, he is the great leader of our Party and government, and he is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era. Chairman Mao has inherited, defended and developed Marxism-Leninism with genius, creatively and comprehensively and has brought it to a higher and completely new stage. Mao Tse-tung's thought is Marxism-Leninism of the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to world-wide victory. Mao Tse-tung's thought is the guiding principle for all the work of the Party and the country. We must present Mao Tse-tung's thought to the people of the whole country, introduce it to still more people of the nation, let it be more broadly absorbed by the people; let it penetrate still deeper into the hearts of the people so as to further revolutionize the ideology of the people of the whole country. We should use Mao Tse-tung's thought as an ideological weapon to criticize and expose all kinds of revisionism, criticize and expose all bourgeois representatives on all fronts and in every department, criticize and expose the bourgeois ideology which paves the way for a capitalist restoration so as to carry the great proletarian cultural revolution and the socialist

revolution through to the end. In this way, we should be able to assuredly prevent the spread of revisionism, and to avoid a capitalist restoration. This is the most fundamental issue. Many bad elements in the Party are opposed to the study of Mao Tse-tung's thought, they are anti-Party characters. The Propaganda Department of the Central Committee under Lu Ting-yi's control, for instance, is opposed to the study of Chairman Mao's works which this department has contemptuously described as rudimentary, Philistine and pragmatic. They don't publicize Mao Tse-tung's thought but the bourgeois ideology. They don't publicize revolutionary thought but reactionary thinking; and instead of pushing the revolution forward they drag it backward. When others propagate Mao Tse-tung's thought, they'd jeer at them, and they'd exhaust their ways and means to suppress, attack and oppose them.

The Marxists at least should know that man's social being determines his consciousness. Material is primary and spirit secondary, and consciousness has a great pushing capability. Material may be transformed into spirit, and vice versa. Chairman Mao said: "Where do correct ideas come from? Do they drop from the skies? No. Are they innate in the mind? No. They come from social practice, and from it alone. They come from three kinds of social practice: The struggle for production, the class struggle and scientific experiment. It is man's social being that determines his thinking. Once the correct ideas characteristic of the advanced class are grasped by the masses, these ideas turn into a material force which changes society and changes the world. This is the viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism and Comrade Mao Tse-tung's. If we can make very good use of Mao Tse-tung's thought, we shall be able to advance with great strides. The potential spiritual force is truly great.

For several decades, Chairman Mao has always expounded the dialectical relationship between spirit and material. The nucleus of Marxism is dialectics. Chairman Mao

applies dialectics with great ease. Dialectical materialism which is the ideological foundation of the proletariat is materialized in everything he does. Chairman Mao has comprehensively and creatively developed the dialectics of Marxism.

What Chairman Mao has gone through is much more than Marx, Engels and Lenin did. Of course, Marx, Engels and Lenin were all great men themselves. Marx lived to 64, and Engels to 75. Both had very great visions, they inherited advanced thought of mankind, and they predicted the development of the human society. Unlike Chairman Mao, they did not have the experience of personally leading the proletarian revolution, personally commanding so many important political campaigns, especially military ones. Lenin died six years after the victory of the October Revolution at the age of only 54. He, too, had never experienced, like Chairman Mao, the so many protracted, complex, violent and multifarious struggles. China's population is ten times that of Germany and three times of Soviet Union, so that no other country can excel the abundance of her revolutionary experience. Chairman Mao enjoys the highest prestige in our whole country and in the world; he is the most outstanding and the greatest personality. Chairman Mao's sayings, works and revolutionary practice have all testified to his great proletarian genius. Some people don't recognize genius, but this is non-Marxian. A genius must not be unrecognized. Engels said that Hegel and St. Simon were geniuses of the 18th century, and Marx a genius of the 19th century. He said that Marx stood higher than all others; he could see further, observe more and quicker, so that he was a genius. Lenin also recognized genius, for he once said that there had to be more than ten leaders of genius to lead the Russian revolution to victory. Chairman Mao is a genius. What makes him different from us? We carry out struggle together, some are even senior to him in age; we are not as old as he, but we, too, have plenty of experience. We also read books, but we either don't understand at all what we read, or we don't quite understand. Chairman Mao read books and understand them. When I see

someone mark all the lines he reads with circles and dots, I know he does not understand what he reads, because he doesn't know which is the central idea, and which is less important. Several decades ago Chairman Mao already understood the nucleus of dialectics, but we didn't. He not only understood it, but was also able to apply it with great ease. There is a great distance between comprehension and application. One may understand something but still unable to use it. It's like playing table tennis, you may know all the rules, but you still cannot beat Chuang Tse-tung and Hsu Yin-sheng. It is the same with fighting a battle. You may know some military knowledge from reading books, but you may not win in actual combat. Dialectical materialism pervades Mao Tse-tung's thought in its entirety. Chairman Mao has extensively applied and developed the theory of Marxism-Leninism, and he is second to none in the contemporary world. Marx and Engels were geniuses of the 19th century; Lenin and Comrade Mao Tsetung are the geniuses of the 20th century. Don't be obstinate, no good is no good. If we don't admit it, we shall commit a serious mistake. Failing to see this point, we shall not be able to make the greatest genius of the proletariat our helmsman.

The basic difference between man and animal is that man knows how to make tools. In the process of labour, man develops step by step his brain and learns to think. Thinking is the greatest characteristic of man. Thinking functions decisively under certain conditions. We should cherish the function of advanced thinking, advanced thinking in the socialist era, and we should cherish the function of Mao Tse-tung's thought. Philistine and mechanical materialism does not cherish the function of thinking. It is impermissible and highly dangerous to promote material incentives and to ignore the function of thinking in the socialist era and under the condition of public ownership of property. We are different from the revisionists, and we should not promote material incentives like they do. We must never follow this bourgeois line of material incentives. We must use Mao Tse-tung's

thought and the great cause of righteousness to whip up the people's enthusiasm, make them look into the future with vision, unswervingly move forward, shake off all traditions of the exploiting classes and influence of the force of habits of several thousand years; liberate them from such narrow influences so as to demonstrate the great power of the people and make them develop their mighty strength.

The cultural and ideological fronts are controlled by the bad elements. The Propaganda Department of the Central Committee under the control of Peng Chen and Lu Ting-yi is dedicated to serving the interest of the bourgeoisie. The Ministry of Culture under their control is to serve the interest of the bourgeoisie. They hate Mao Tse-tung's thought, and they obstruct the propagation of Mao Tse-tung's thought. Mao Tse-tung's thought must be brought to the people on the most extensive scale, and the appearance of our country must not be changed. We must make Mao Tse-tung's thought penetrate deep into the masses of the people. Once Mao Tse-tung's thought is linked up with the people, rapid changes will take place in every respect.

Mao Tse-tung's thought is the concentrated expression of proletarian ideology; it is diametrically opposed to private ownership and the ideology of the exploiting class. We are against the system of private ownership and the idea of self, which are important factors that engender revisionism. Such factors cover an extensive area of things. In rural area, there are private and collective plots of land, and there is a struggle over whether a basket of dung should be first taken to one's own plot of land, or to the collective plot. This reflects the psychology and ideology of two classes; it is an expression of two different roads, an expression of class struggle. If we don't fight with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought, the bourgeois ideology will capture the position and cause a qualitative conversion and make trouble. Didn't Hungary have a bunch of academic lords of the Petofi Club? It was through their instigation that some 200,000 people

encircled the parliament, demanding Nagy to take over the government. The bad characters of our Party are Nagys of China. In time of trouble, and when they raise their arms to call for following, certain people will respond to their call. Fortunately we have in the past years struck down a number of our Nagys, like Kao Kang, Peng Teh-huai and Chang Wen-tien. This time we have struck down another group of Nagys and some Khrushchov revisionists.

Don't entertain the idea of peace when the present struggle is over. The ideas of self and of the exploiting class have steeped every single cell of certain people who are ever-ready to start trouble, so that we still have to heighten our vigilance.

The human mind is a reflection of existence. It has contradictions and class characteristics. Our socialist society is no exception. Take, for example, those in the revolutionary ranks. There exist in the minds of the revolutionaries contradictions between correct and erroneous thoughts, contradictions between the proletarian and bourgeois ideologies, contradictions between collectivism-communism and individualism, between genuine and fake Marxists, and between those who follow the mass line and those who are against the mass line. All these contradictions keep struggling against each other in the mind, resulting in one overcoming the other.

In the minds of some people, there are even contradictions between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary thoughts. Be prepared to confront the enemy, and destroy covered counterrevolutionary ideas.

Be aware of the fact that the earth keeps moving about, and everything is in the course of development; take a good look at the law of the development of history, and don't act against the forward movement of history. To act thus is

harmful to others as well as to oneself; it'll ruin one's future and reputation completely. It is for this matter that Chairman Mao has called upon us to preserve our old-age integrity. Our veteran comrades should also train and reform themselves in strict accordance with Chairman Mao's five requirements for a successor to the revolutionary enterprise of the proletariat. If we fail to see this general situation clearly, and care only for self-interests, we are bound to commit grievous mistakes, and even may shamelessly join hands with the anti-Party conspirators.

We now stand by Chairman Mao, we will continue to do so even after he passed away. Mao Tse-tung's thought should be handed down from generation to generation. Mao Tse-tung's thought is genuine Marxism-Leninism; it is Marxism-Leninism which is highly integrated with practical conditions; it is the best possible textbook and compulsory reading material for the people of the whole country; it is the common ideological foundation for unity and revolution of the nation's labouring masses; and it is the guiding principle of the activities of the people. Mao Tse-tung's thought is the light tower for mankind; it is the sharpest weapon for the world revolution, and it is universal truth that can be applied to all situations. Mao Tse-tung's thought can transform man's ideological appearance, change the face of the motherland, make the Chinese people stand up and stand up forever in front of the whole world, and can make all oppressed and exploited people of the whole world to stand up. Chairman Mao may live to 90 or over 100, and as long as he lives, he remains the surpreme leader of our Party, and his words continue to stand as the yardstick of our action. Whoever opposes him will be condemned by the whole Party, and the whole country. Whoever makes a secret report of the Khrushchov style behind Chairman Mao's back must be a careerist and a notorious character, and should be condemned by the whole Party and the whole country.

Mao Tse-tung's thought forever stands as universal truth,

as the yardstick of our action; it is the wealth shared by the Chinese people and the revolutionary peoples of the world; its brilliance is everlasting. The Liberation Army uses Chairman Mao's works as the textbook for all cadres and fighters of the entire army. I don't claim credit for doing so, because we are doing what must be done. Using Mao Tse-tung's thought to unify the entire army and Party, there will be nothing that cannot be solved. Every sentence of Chairman Mao's words is truth; one sentence of his is better than 10,000 sentences of ours. As to Chairman Mao's works, there is so much more for me to learn, and I must study hard from now on.

We must not loosen our grip on politics. We must not loosen our grip on our living study and application of Chairman Mao's works. This is necessary for the revolution, for the present situation, for waging struggle against the enemy, for war preparation, for thoroughly winning the victory of the great proletarian cultural revolution, for preventing and opposing revisionism, and for preventing restoration of capitalism. Those bad characters call us pragmatists. But this is no pragmatic stuff; it is objective truth that conforms to reality and can be effectively carried out. What is pragmatism? Pragmatism is subjective idealism of the bourgeoisie. From their point of view, anything of interest to the bourgeoisie is truth; anything detrimental to the bourgeoisie is no truth. We grasp the prominence of politics, and we study and apply Chairman Mao's works in a living way, and our action is in conformity with the law of social development in a socialist society, and with the law of development in the realm of nature, as well as with the revolutionary requirement of the proletariat. We are bound to make serious mistakes and we are bound to fail if we fail to direct our action according to the need of revolution.

SPEECH AT THE MASS WELCOME MEETING IN HONOUR OF THE DEMOCRATIC PERSONAGES

February 26, 1949

by Lin Piao

Gentlemen, Comrades:

It is of great significance for us to hold today in Peiping (note) such a large-scale and solemn meeting to welcome the democratic personages from all circles. Among those present, there are representatives of the various democratic parties, groups and public figures without party affiliation who have managed to reach, after overcoming all kinds of difficulties, the liberated area from the Kuomintang region; and there are also delegates of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, peasants of the liberated areas, national student bodies, women and minority nationality groups. This serves to show that China's revolution has been moving toward its final victory, and that the democratic force of the Chinese people is great and unified. The gentlemen from the Kuomintang area had for a long time in the past carried out democratic struggles under the suppression and persecution of the Kuomintang, they had persisted in expanding the democratic movement in the Kuomintang area. The democratic movement in the Kuomintang area stands as a powerful support to the fighting and struggle of the army and people in the liberated area. We wish to take this opportunity to express our admiration for and heartfelt welcome to all the democratic figures who have come here from both the Kuomintang region and the liberated area.

The question you and the people of the whole country are most concerned with is the question of peace. Many gentlemen have expressed valuable opinions on this subject, and the Chinese Communist Party is also making persistent effort in realizing genuine peace in the whole country.

I feel that what the people of the whole country are eager to solve isn't the question of whether they want peace or not, but the question of genuine or sham peace, and the question of how to achieve genuine peace. The kind of "peace" the reactionary Kuomintang clique is toying with was brought up at a time when the counter-revolutionary and heinous civil war that it had launched was about to finish it off. It is known to all that the reactionary Kuomintang clique never has any sincerity for peace. With the support of U.S. imperialism it launched the present war two years and eight months ago in disregard of the aspiration for peace of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people, of Chairman Mao's personal visit to Chungking after the Japanese surrender in 1945, of the Double Tenth Agreement, the Cease Fire Agreement and the Resolution of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, as well as the repeated warnings by the Chinese Communist Party. But, the Kuomintang has already lost five million troops on the battle-fields throughout the country. It has been completely routed on all fronts to the north of the Yangtze River, while in areas to the south of the Yangtze River it is no longer possible for them to open any strategic battle-field; they no longer have the necessary strength to wage big battles. That the Kuomintang is bound to be defeated had long been affirmed by us. What surprises us is the fact that they were beaten so quickly. In the Northeast in last autumn and winter, we destroyed 470,000 men of Kuomintang troops in 52 days. On the Huai Hai battlefield, we annihilated 600,000 enemy troops in 65 days. The liberation of North China was realized faster than we expected. Militarily, the reactionary Kuomintang clique neither has the strength to attack, nor to put up an organized

resistance. Politically and economically it also has been torn to pieces. It was under such a condition that they began to put up a pretence for peace under instruction of U.S. imperialism. It is with this pretence for peace that they are trying to deceive the people of the whole country, to make the People's Liberation Army halt its advance to areas south of the Yangtze River so as to gain militarily a breathing-space in preparation for launching a counter-offensive. Meanwhile, they also attempt to organize an "opposition" within the democratic camp to undermine the unity of the democratic force. Therefore, the "peace" they are striving to achieve is for the benefit of preserving the reactionary force and for the benefit of the war criminals; such a "peace" is detrimental to the people of the whole country. However, as the people of the whole country have considerably heightened the degree of their awakening, the "peace" scheme of the reactionary clique can never succeed. The plot of the so-called "opposition" will also fall through.

What the people of the whole country are anxious to achieve is peace for the masses, not the kind of peace that existed between the "Northern and Southern Dynasties". In other words, it calls for complete realization of the Eight Conditions as set forth by Chairman Mao, for total destruction of the reactionary influence, for complete surrender of political powers and for complete reorganization of the reactionary troops. Such a peace will be beneficial to the people of China. We the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army, in close coordination with the people of the whole country, possess completely sufficient military strength to wipe out in a short period all reactionary cliques in the country, and realize fully the Eight Conditions of Chairman Mao's. But, in order to reduce destruction of war, and to preserve to the maximum the manpower and material force of the people, we are adopting a method for peaceful settlement. The peaceful settlement of the Peiping Case serves as a successful example of this method. The success of Peiping's peaceful settlement, first of all, was

attributed to the fact that following its complete liberation of the Northeast provinces the People's Liberation Army scored in North China new victories in Chang Chia Kou, Hsin Pao An and Tientsin, together with the concerted efforts of the people both inside and outside the city of Peiping, and General Fu Tso-yi's understanding of the situation under which he did not try to put up meaningless resistance.

We warmly welcome peace patterned after the peaceful settlement of Peiping; in dealing with any reactionary force unwilling to accept the Peiping-style of peaceful settlement, we shall have no alternative but to solve the problem through the Tientsin formula. We welcome all gentlemen present to help us realize the Peiping-style settlement in all areas south of the Yangtze River. Today, as the main force of Chiang Kai-shek's has been completely destroyed, and as there isn't much remaining on his side, it can be said that the stage of large-scale warfare has been over, and no big battle can now possibly break out in areas south of the Yangtze River. In the five major liberated areas in the Northeast, North, East, Central and Northwestern China, mammoth construction work has been started or preparation is being made. In the not too distant future, construction in areas south of the Yangtze River will be commenced shortly after genuine peace has been achieved. The objective of our revolution is precisely to bring benefit to the people's construction. Destruction is for the purpose of eliminating obstacles to construction, it is the necessary and unavoidable action in the course of revolution. During the course of revolution. During the course of destroying the old China, we the Chinese Communists having been able to unite with the people of the whole country will liberate the whole of China in the near future. We shall, henceforth, take a step further in joining hands with all democratic strata, democratic parties, democratic personages and the people of the whole country to carry out, on a national scale, construction in the political, economic and cultural fields. In view of the fact that the war of liberation has not yet been completely finished, the

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primary construction task at present still centers on giving support to the front, but we should at the same time try our utmost in improving the people's livelihood and to lay a foundation for organized construction to be carried out on a national scale. You all have contributed greatly in the struggle against Japanese and U.S. imperialism as well as in the struggle against the reactionary Kuomintang clique, and we hope you will make still greater contribution in the building of a new China. I wish you all the best of health !

(The text of the speech was originally published in a booklet entitled "Carry the Revolution Through to the End", edited by "Liberation Press" and printed by "Hsinhua Book Company", Northeast, in September, 1949.)

Note: Prior to the founding of the Chinese Communist Government in October 1949, Peking was generally known as Peiping.

Part II

THE GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION

MESSAGE ON STUDY OF MAO TSE-TUNG'S WORKS IN INDUSTRIAL AND COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENTS

(March 11, 1966)

by Lin Piao

The industrial and communications departments have laid stress on putting politics in command and keeping politics in the fore. It is very good to do so. It is very helpful for raising the level of political consciousness of the working class and for strengthening our socialist construction. It will increase the initiative and creativeness of the working class and make our socialist cause flourish more.

You are putting energetic study of Chairman Mao's works as the first item in all your work policies for the industrial and communications departments. That is very good.

China is a great socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and has a population of 700 million. It needs unified thinking, revolutionary thinking, correct thinking. That is Mao Tse-tung's thinking. With it, and in no other way, we can maintain vigorous revolutionary enthusiasm and a firm and correct political orientation.

Mao Tse-tung's thought reflects the objective laws of the domestic and international class struggle; it reflects the fundamental interests of the proletariat, of the working people. Mao Tse-tung's thought has not grown spontaneously from among the working people; rather it is the result of Chairman Mao's inheriting and developing in a talented way the ideas of Marxism-Leninism on the basis of great revolutionary practice.

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It has summed up the new experiences of the international communist movement and carried Marxism-Leninism forward to a new stage.

Therefore, it is essential to imbue the workers and peasants with Chairman Mao's ideas through the living study and application of his works. Only so can the mental outlook of the working people be changed and the forces of the spirit transformed into tremendous material strength.

The industrial and communications departments have started acting in this way in the last few years. At their current meeting these departments have now summed up their experience and put forward new measures. They will certainly achieve fresh results.

("Jen-min Jih-pao", Peking, June 19, 1966)

SPEECH AT THE MASS RALLY CELEBRATING THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

(August 18, 1966)

by Lin Biao

Comrades, Students:

First of all, on behalf of our great leader Chairman Mao and on behalf of the Party's Central Committee, I give you greetings!

We firmly support your proletarian revolutionary spirit of daring to break through, to act, to make revolution and to rise up in rebellion!

Our Chairman Mao is the highest commander of this great proletarian cultural revolution. Chairman Mao is the supreme commander. Under the guidance of the great supreme commander, Chairman Mao, and faithfully following his instructions, we will certainly carry the great cultural revolution forward smoothly and win a great victory!

The great proletarian cultural revolution initiated by Chairman Mao is a great creation in the communist movement, a great creation in the socialist revolution!

The great proletarian cultural revolution is aimed precisely at eliminating bourgeois ideology, establishing proletarian ideology, remoulding people's souls, revolutionizing their ideology, digging out the roots of revisionism, and consolidating and developing the socialist system.

We will overthrow those in authority who are taking the capitalist road, overthrow the reactionary bourgeois authorities and all bourgeois royalists, oppose any act to suppress the revolution, and overthrow all ghosts and monsters!

We will energetically eradicate all the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes, and transform all those parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base. We will sweep out all the vermin and remove all obstacles!

We will make vigorous efforts to establish proletarian authorities and the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat. In a word, we will work with great energy so that Mao Tse-tung's thought achieves complete ascendancy. We will enable hundreds of millions of people to grasp Mao Tse-tung's thought, ensure that it seizes all ideological positions, apply it in transforming the mental outlook of the whole of society, and enable Mao Tse-tung's thought, this great spiritual force, to transform into a great material force!

The current great cultural revolution is a tremendous event affecting the destiny and the future of our Party and our country!

On what do we rely to make this great cultural revolution successful? We rely on the great thought of Mao Tse-tung and on the wisdom and strength of the masses!

Chairman Mao is the most outstanding leader of the proletariat in the present era and the greatest genius in the present era. Chairman Mao has the strongest faith in the masses. He pays the greatest attention to them. He gives the strongest support to the revolutionary movement of the masses. His heart beats with the hearts of the revolutionary masses!

Mao Tse-tung's thought marks a completely new stage in

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the development of Marxism-Leninism. It is Marxism-Leninism at the highest level in the present era. It is contemporary Marxism-Leninism for remoulding the souls of the people. It is the most powerful ideological weapon of the proletariat.

The people are the makers of history. Once they master Mao Tse-tung's thought, they will become the wisest and the most courageous people, capable of exerting inexhaustible strength!

With the brilliant leadership of Chairman Mao and having mastered Mao Tse-tung's thought which is the sharpest weapon, we will be invincible and all-conquering and will achieve complete victory in the great proletarian cultural revolution!

The Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution recently promulgated by the Party's Central Committee was drawn up under the personal direction of the great leader Chairman Mao. It is the magnificent programme of the great proletarian cultural revolution and the latest embodiment of Mao Tse-tung's thought. We must resolutely act in accordance with this decision, arouse the masses boldly, firmly oppose any methods of doing things which the masses should be left to do for themselves, firmly rely on the revolutionary Left, win over the middle and unite with the great majority, concentrate all forces to strike at the handful of ultra-reactionary Rightists, and thus carry the great proletarian cultural revolution through to the end!

The great cultural revolution is a long-term task. In-between, there will be campaigns and small campaigns. It will last a very long time. So long as bourgeois ideology exists, we will fight on to the end!

The present campaign is a big one; it is a general attack on the ideas of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes. Under the leadership of Chairman Mao, we must launch fierce attacks on bourgeois ideology, old customs and old forces of

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habit! We must thoroughly topple, smash and discredit the counter-revolutionary revisionists, bourgeois Rightists and reactionary bourgeois authorities, and they must never be allowed to rise again!

Long live the great proletarian cultural revolution!

Long live the great Chinese people!

Long live the great Communist Party of China!

Long live the great thought of Mao Tse-tung!

Long live the great leader Chairman Mao! Long live, long live Chairman Mao!

("Jen-min Jih-pao," Peking, August 19, 1966)

**SPEECH AT THE PEKING RALLY TO RECEIVE
REVOLUTIONARY TEACHERS AND STUDENTS
FROM ALL PARTS OF CHINA**

(August 31, 1966)

by Lin Piao

Comrades, Students, Red Guard Fighters:

On behalf of our great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander and great helmsman Chairman Mao, I extend greetings to you students coming from all parts of the country; greetings to you all! On behalf of the Party's Central Committee, I greet you all!

Students! You have come to Peking and have been exchanging experience in the great cultural revolution with the revolutionary teachers and students of Peking. You have travelled a long way and worked hard! We are confident that after your return, you will work even better, in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions and the 16-point decision of the Party's Central Committee, to break down all resistance, overcome all difficulties and develop the great proletarian cultural revolution with even greater vigour and vitality!

The present situation in the great proletarian cultural revolution is very fine!

The Red Guards and other revolutionary organizations of the young people have been springing up like bamboo shoots after a spring rain. They take to the streets to sweep away the "four olds" (old ideas, culture, customs and habits — tr.). The great cultural revolution has already touched on politics

and economy. The struggle (to overthrow those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road), the criticism and repudiation (of the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes) and the transformation (of education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base) in the schools have been extended to the whole of society. The revolutionary torrents of the masses are washing away all the mire left over from the old society, and are changing the whole face of society in our country.

Young revolutionary fighters! Chairman Mao and the Party's Central Committee warmly acclaim your proletarian revolutionary spirit of daring to think, to speak up, to act, to break through and to make revolution. You have done a good deal of good things. You have put forward a great many sound proposals. We are greatly elated, and we warmly support you! We firmly oppose any attempt that is made to suppress you! Your revolutionary actions are very fine! We hail you and salute you!

Comrades, Students!

We must act in accordance with Chairman Mao's teachings; dare to struggle and dare to make revolution and be good at waging struggles and at making revolution. We must take Mao Tse-tung's thought as our compass in the great proletarian cultural revolution and carry out the 16-point decision seriously, fully, thoroughly and without reservation.

We must, in accordance with Chairman Mao's teachings, distinguish who are our enemies and who are our friends. Attention must be paid to uniting with the great majority, and concentrating forces to strike at the handful of bourgeois Rightists. The main target of the attack is those persons in authority who have wormed their way into the Party and are taking the capitalist road. It is essential to hold fast to this

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main orientation in the struggle.

We must act in accordance with the teachings of Chairman Mao, and carry out the struggle by reasoning and not by coercion of force. Don't hit people. This applies also to the struggle against those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road as well as to the struggle against landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and Rightists. Coercion or force in the struggle against them can only touch their skins. Only by reasoning is it possible to touch their souls. Only by reasoning, by exposing them fully and criticizing them profoundly, is it possible to expose their counter-revolutionary features thoroughly, isolate them to the fullest extent, discredit them, refute them and overthrow them.

The Red Guards and other revolutionary organizations of the young people in the colleges and middle schools are the shock force in the great cultural revolution and a powerful reserve force of the People's Liberation Army.

Students and Red Guard fighters! Always be loyal to the Party, to the people, to Chairman Mao and to Mao Tse-tung's thought. Work hard to study and apply Chairman Mao's works creatively; make big efforts to apply what you study. Serve the people wholeheartedly, keep in close contact with the masses, be exemplary in carrying out the Party's policies, safeguard the interests of the people, protect state property, and abide by the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention.*

Students! Provided we earnestly study Chairman Mao's works, follow his teachings and act according to his instructions, the great proletarian cultural revolution can certainly achieve great victories! Let imperialism, modern revisionism and all reactionaries tremble before our victories!

Long live the great proletarian cultural revolution!
Long live the Communist Party of China!

SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

Long live the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung!
Long live the great leader Chairman Mao! Long live, long
live Chairman Mao!

("Jen-min Jih-pao," Peking, September 1, 1966)

* The Three Main Rules of Discipline are: (1) Obey orders in all your actions; (2) Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses; and (3) Turn in everything captured. The Eight Points for Attention are: (1) Speak politely; (2) Pay fairly for what you buy; (3) Return everything you borrow; (4) Pay for anything you damage; (5) Do not hit or swear at people; (6) Do not damage crops; (7) Do not take liberties with women; and (8) Do not ill-treat captives.

SPEECH AT THE PEKING RALLY TO RECEIVE REVOLUTIONARY TEACHERS AND STUDENTS FROM ALL PARTS OF CHINA

(September 15, 1966)

by Lin Piao

Comrades, Students, Red Guard Fighters:

In order to carry the great proletarian cultural revolution well, you have come from all parts of the country to Peking, and are here by the side of our great leader Chairman Mao. You have travelled a long way and worked hard! I greet you on behalf of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the Party. We extend you a warm welcome!

Led by Chairman Mao and guided by the 16-point decision drawn up under his leadership, the great proletarian cultural revolution in our country is advancing triumphantly on a nation-wide scale. The situation is very fine! It is getting finer every day.

Red Guard fighters, revolutionary students, the general orientation of your struggle has always been correct. Chairman Mao and the Party's Central Committee firmly support you! So do the broad masses of workers, peasants and soldiers! Your revolutionary actions have shaken the whole of society and given a blow to the dregs and remnant evil elements from the old world. You have scored brilliant successes in the vigorous fight to destroy the "four olds" and foster the "four news." You have created utter consternation among those in authority who are taking the capitalist road, the reactionary bourgeois "authorities," and bloodsuckers and parasites. You have acted correctly and done well!

Chairman Mao teaches us that the fundamental contradiction to be solved by the great proletarian cultural revolution is the contradiction between the two classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and between the two roads, the socialist and the capitalist. The main target of attack in the present movement is those in the Party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road. To bombard the headquarters is to bombard the handful of persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road. Ours is a socialist country under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The leadership of our country is in the hands of the proletariat. It is precisely for the purpose of consolidating and strengthening our dictatorship of the proletariat that we must struggle against and overthrow the handful of persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road. Quite clearly, the handful of reactionary bourgeois elements, and those belonging to the five categories of landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and Rightists who have not really turned over a new leaf, are different from us. They oppose the dictatorship exercised by the proletariat, and they are trying to bombard our headquarters of the proletarian revolution. Can we tolerate these actions? No, we must smash the plots of these ghosts and monsters, we must see through them, we must not let their schemes succeed. They are only a small handful, but they can deceive some good people at times. We must keep firmly to the general orientation of our struggle. Any deviation from this general orientation will lead us astray.

In the great proletarian cultural revolution, the broad masses of workers, peasants and soldiers and the revolutionary students have a common aim and their orientation is the same. All of them must unite and go forward hand in hand under the banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

Some people are now going against Chairman Mao's instructions and the 16-point decision. By exploiting the profound class feelings of the masses of workers and peasants for the Party and Chairman Mao, they are creating antagonism

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between the masses of workers and peasants and the revolutionary students and are inciting the former to struggle against the latter. Under no circumstances must we let them hoodwink us!

The masses of workers, peasants and soldiers, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party headed by Chairman Mao, have always been the main force of the revolution in our country. Today, they are the main force of the socialist revolution and socialist construction in our country and also the main force in the country's great proletarian cultural revolution.

Our workers, peasants and soldiers must follow Chairman Mao's teachings and stand fast at their posts in production and combat stations. They must stand firmly on the side of the revolutionary students, support their revolutionary actions and give them powerful backing.

The Red Guards and all revolutionary youth are good sons and daughters of the Chinese people. You must learn from the workers, peasants and soldiers. Learn from them their extremely firm revolutionary stand and their most thoroughgoing revolutionary spirit. Learn from them their high sense of organization and discipline and all their other fine qualities. Like the workers, peasants and soldiers, be forever loyal to Chairman Mao, to Mao Tse-tung's thought, to the Party and to the people and temper yourselves in the great storm of the revolutionary struggle to become successors to the proletarian revolutionary cause.

Led by Chairman Mao, our great leader, great teacher, great supreme commander and great helmsman, and under the banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, let the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers and the revolutionary students unite, let all revolutionary comrades unite, and carry the great proletarian cultural revolution through to the end.

SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

Long live the great proletarian cultural revolution!
Long live the great Communist Party of China!
Long live the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung!
Long live the great leader Chairman Mao! Long live, long
live Chairman Mao!

("Jen-min Jih-pao", Peking, September 16, 1966)

**SPEECH AT THE RALLY CELEBRATING THE
17TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

by Lin Piao

Comrades and Friends:

Today is the great festival of the 17th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. On behalf of our great leader Chairman Mao, the Central Committee of the Party and the Government of the People's Republic of China, I most warmly salute the workers, peasants and soldiers, the revolutionary teachers and students, the revolutionary Red Guards and other militant youth organizations, the revolutionary people of all nationalities and the revolutionary cadres throughout the country, and extend a hearty welcome to our friends from different countries of the world!

The 17 years that have elapsed since the founding of the People's Republic of China have been no ordinary years. They are years which have witnessed earth-shaking changes in China. They are years which have witnessed earth-shaking changes in the world as well.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung led the Chinese people in carrying out the revolution, and they traversed a tortuous path beset with all kinds of hardships. Our domestic and foreign enemies were strong, but in the end they were overthrown and driven out by the Chinese people. The imperialists headed by the United States, all the reactionaries and the modern revisionists — all these paper tigers have been punctured by the Chinese people and all the revolutionary people of the world.

In the short space of 17 years, the Chinese people have completely changed the face of old China. This is a highly meritorious deed performed by the masses of the Chinese people under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. We are convinced that all the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations of the world will take their own paths in the light of their own countries' conditions and seize final victory as the Chinese people did.

Today, we are celebrating this great festival amidst the upsurge of the great proletarian cultural revolution. This revolution is a great revolution, an entirely new and creative revolution, carried out after the seizure of political power by the proletariat. It is to overthrow through struggle the small handful of persons within the Party who have been in authority and have taken the capitalist road, to sweep away all ghosts and monsters in our society, and to smash the "four olds" of the exploiting classes and foster the "four news" of the proletariat, with a view to further consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and developing the socialist system. The historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the world teaches us that if we fail to do so, the rule of revisionism will come about and the restoration of capitalism will take place. Should this come to pass in our country, China would go back to its former colonial and semi-colonial, feudal and semi-feudal road, and the imperialists and reactionaries would again ride roughshod over the people. The importance of our great cultural revolution is therefore perfectly clear.

At present, hundreds of millions of people have been aroused. The revolutionary people feel proud and elated, while the reactionary bourgeoisie has been completely discredited. We are forging ahead. We have already laid the corner-stone of great victory.

The great proletarian cultural revolution is promoting the revolutionization of people's thinking and has thus become

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a powerful motive force for the development of socialist production in our country. This year is the first year of our Third Five-Year Plan. The plan for this year's industrial production is expected to be overfulfilled. As for agriculture, another good harvest is to be reaped. New heights are being scaled in China's science and technology. Our great motherland has never been so prosperous and so full of vigour. Our national defence has never been so strong.

Chairman Mao long ago pointed out that the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and the struggle between the roads of socialism and capitalism exist throughout the historical period of socialism. The great proletarian cultural revolution constitutes a new stage in the struggle between the two classes and between the two roads. In the course of this revolution, the struggle is still going on between the revolutionary proletarian line represented by Chairman Mao and the bourgeois line which opposes revolution. Those who cling to the erroneous line are only a small handful of persons, who divorce themselves from the people, oppose the people and oppose Mao Tse-tung's thought, and this spells their certain failure.

Comrades and friends! At present, an excellent situation prevails in the world. The great upheavals of the past few years in the world show that the days of imperialism headed by the United States, modern revisionism and all reaction are numbered.

U.S. imperialism is trying hard to find a way out by launching a world war. We must take this seriously. The focal point of the present struggle lies in Vietnam. We have made every preparations. We are determined, and we will not flinch from making maximum national sacrifices, to give firm support to the fraternal Vietnamese people in carrying the war of resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation through to the end. Imperialism headed by the United States and modern revisionism with the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as its centre are colluding with each

actively plotting deceitful peace talks for the purpose of stamping out the raging flames of the Vietnamese people's national revolutionary war against U.S. aggression, of the national revolutionary struggles in Asian, African and Latin American countries and of the world revolution. They will not succeed in their schemes so long as the people of the whole world keep their eyes wide open. Twenty years ago, Chairman Mao said that the people of the whole world must form a united front against U.S. imperialism so as to defeat it. The revolutionary people of all countries are now advancing along this road.

Chairman Mao has said, **"People of the world, be courageous, dare to fight, defy difficulties and advance wave upon wave. Then the whole world will belong to the people. Monsters of all kinds shall be destroyed."** Such is the inevitable future of the world.

The Chinese people will continue to hold high the banner of Marxism-Leninism and the banner of proletarian internationalism and, together with the Marxist-Leninists of the whole world and the revolutionary people of all countries, carry the struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys and the struggle against modern revisionism with the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as its centre through to the end!

Comrades and friends!

All our achievements and successes have been scored under the wise leadership of Chairman Mao and represent the victory of Mao Tse-tung's thought. We must use Mao Tse-tung's thought to unify the thinking of the whole Party and the thinking of the people of the whole country. We must hold high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought and further unfold the mass movement for the creative study and application of Chairman Mao's works throughout the country. We must turn the whole country into a great school of Mao Tse-tung's thought. We must build our great motherland into

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a still more powerful and prosperous country. This is the demand of the Chinese people as well as the hope placed in us by the people of all countries.

Long live the people of all the nationalities in China!

Long live the People's Republic of China!

Long live the Communist Party of China!

Long live the ever-victorious thought of Mao Tse-tung!

Long live our great leader Chairman Mao! Long live, long live Chairman Mao!

("Jen-min Jih-pao", Peking, October 2, 1966)

SPEECH AT THE CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE WORK CONFERENCE

(October 25, 1966)

by Lin Biao

I shall chiefly talk on two questions — the necessity of the cultural revolution and how to carry it out. In other words, is it necessary to carry out the cultural revolution and if so, how? These two questions are actually interrelated. My point of emphasis shall be on the importance of the cultural revolution.

This conference has been going on for 17 days and is proceeding well. Directed personally by Chairman Mao from the beginning to the end, it is actually a continuation of the 11th Plenary Session (of the 8th CCP Central Committee — tr.) aimed at further clarifying the question of the two different lines.

The situation of the great cultural revolution in the past several months was such that great effort had been exerted at the two ends but insufficient effort in the middle. There was even some resistance in the middle and the situation was at one time a little tense. In view of this situation, Chairman Mao suggested to gather everybody together for discussion.

This conference was originally scheduled for three days; it was later extended to a week and now it has been on for more than two weeks. The longer it goes on, the clearer is the situation and our understanding and the better can we grasp Chairman Mao's line and hold on to it. This meeting is therefore very necessary.

The two ends I referred to are Chairman Mao's leadership and the masses. With vigour and vitality, the broad masses of people have developed the revolution from schools to society and extended its influence from the cultural sphere to the economic, political and social spheres, and have made great achievements, especially in the political sphere. A number of capitalist roaders in authority have been dragged out from the Party; many bourgeois reactionary authorities in society have been discredited; many hidden counter-revolutionaries and bad elements have been rooted out; many counter-revolutionary cases have been broken and many weapons, radio stations and gold have been uncovered. But the most important thing is that ideologically, it has touched upon people's souls, smashed the old and fostered the new ideology. This is a profound and great revolution. It has brought about great changes in the outlook of society and men's spiritual outlook. Chairman Mao's thought has been widely propagated in the course of this movement; it has taken root in people's minds and has given profound education to the whole society as well as to the young people. Through this movement, many young people can be brought up as reliable successors to the revolution.

During the great cultural revolution, our social production has not been disrupted as some comrades feared it would be. On the contrary, production has continued to increase. Theoretically, the cultural revolution should stimulate production and facts have proved this to be true. This movement has established an example in the world which is without precedent in history; it goes a long way towards opposing revisionism.

As everybody can clearly see, Chairman Mao is at the top. This movement is initiated and led by the Chairman from start to finish. With great energy and determination, he has launched this movement and has mobilized the broad masses to take part in it. An ordinary leader of the political party of the working class cannot possibly have such energy and such a great determination. No one but Chairman Mao, a great Marxist-Leninist with extremely rich experience in struggle

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and profound wisdom of Marxism-Leninism, would have dared to launch such a thunderous revolutionary mass movement that has shaken the whole country and the whole world.

Some comrades under the leadership of Chairman Mao have also made very considerable contributions. They have persistently supported and implemented Chairman Mao's line.

I have just said that there was some resistance in the middle. This was pointed out in the "May 16 Circular" of the Central Committee, which says:

"Most Party committee members have a very poor understanding of the task of leadership in this great struggle and their leadership is far from being conscientious and effective"

Just before this meeting, such a situation still existed in many places. The degree of gravity varied: some places were more serious and some places less serious; some places improved more quickly and other places slowly. In some cases, it was subjective resistance, but in most cases, it was a question of lack of understanding. In the last couple of days, everybody has come to see that the situation existing in various localities can be attributed to two causes: one is local and ideological, but the more important one is that several leading comrades at the central level, namely Comrades Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, have concocted another line which is opposite to Chairman Mao's. This line is as described by Chairman Mao in his big-character poster:

"Adopting the reactionary stand of the bourgeoisie, they have enforced a bourgeois dictatorship and struck down the surging movement of the great cultural revolution of the proletariat. They have turned facts upside-down and juggled black and white, encircled and suppressed revolutionaries, stifled opinions different from their own, imposed a white terror, and felt very pleased with them-

selves. They have puffed up the arrogance of the bourgeoisie and deflated the morale of the proletariat. How poisonous!"

During these last few days, you comrades have come to understand more clearly the source of reversal.

Culture is the summation of ideology, social consciousness, world outlook, customs and habits, political, legal and artistic viewpoints, the arts including movie, drama and plastic arts, literature and system of education, etc. Why must we carry out this cultural revolution? The deciding factor in carrying out a revolution in the social-ideological sphere is that there has been a fundamental change in the economic base of our society.

Where does ideology come from? Marxism-Leninism and Comrade Mao Tse-tung have always held that ideology comes from material and social consciousness comes from the existence of society, from the economic base of society and from the social ownership system. Since the proletariat seized political power after the liberation of the whole country, there has been a fundamental change in the system of ownership of our society. Lands formerly owned by the landlords have been confiscated and turned over to the peasants and subsequently transformed into collective ownership. Thus, the ownership of farmland has undergone two changes, from ownership by the landlord to ownership by the individual peasants and then to collective ownership by the peasants. The system of ownership by the bourgeoisie, having gone through several stages of transformation, has changed to socialist public ownership. Now we must be prepared to eliminate fixed interests. Since there has been a change in the economic base, the superstructure — the ideology of our society — is bound to change accordingly. We must catch up. If we fail to catch up, our socialist ownership system will not be consolidated, our progress will be retarded, the new social production forces will not develop, and the fruits of revolution will not be

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secure. Should this be the case, we will face capitalist restoration, the people's democratic regime protecting the socialist ownership system will be subverted, the socialist ownership system will be overthrown and revisionism will rule China and lead her back to a semi-feudal, semi-colonial state. Hence, whether to carry out the great cultural revolution or not is an important political question bearing on whether or not the proletarian regime can be consolidated and the fruits of revolution can be developed, a political question bearing on the success or failure of the revolution.

The proletarian revolution, the class struggle conducted by the proletariat, involves three aspects: political, economic and ideological.

To overthrow a regime by means of war is an act of violence. Between 1946 and 1949 (of course, there were many more years before that), we defeated the Kuomintang, seized political power and set up our own country, a country of proletarian dictatorship. The revolution to overthrow the feudal ownership system and the bourgeois ownership system took less time. However, the struggle on another front is more drawn-out and tortuous, namely, the struggle in the ideological sphere. This struggle takes a long time than seizing political power and transforming ownership systems. Next year will be the 50th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet revolution. Can you see to what extent bourgeois ideology has been eliminated and proletarian ideology has grown in that country? After 50 years and the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union has gone backward instead of going forward; she is heading for revisionism, heading for bourgeois restoration of a new form, heading for capitalism which is expressed in a new form and in varying degrees. Yugoslavia was the first to restore capitalism. Besides the Soviet Union, certain other "socialist" countries which won victory ten or twenty years ago, also failed to grasp the struggle in this sphere firmly. As a result, revolution was either suspended or reversed, and capitalism was restored. If we do not grasp this struggle

firmly, we shall encounter the same situation as having taken place in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union has won the revolution for nearly 50 years, but now revisionism is assuming control. If we do not grasp the cultural revolution perseveringly, the same may come about in China. That is why Chairman Mao made this call: **"You should concern yourselves with state affairs and carry the great proletarian cultural revolution through to the end."**

Chairman Mao regards the great cultural revolution as an important state affair, a political affair. In March this year when Chairman Mao revised the "Summary of the Forum on the Work in Literature and Art in the Armed Forces," he agreed to adding the passage that every class struggle is a political struggle, thus reaffirming a classical viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism. If we do not grasp the great cultural revolution firmly and carry the great proletarian cultural revolution through to the end, we may also change colour half-way.

Ordinarily we have grasped economic construction firmly and this is fine. But not all of the comrades grasped as firmly and paid as much attention to the work of destroying the old and fostering the new in the cultural and ideological spheres as Chairman Mao did. Some people even felt that it was an extra burden: Aren't we doing all right? Why should we carry out the great cultural revolution? It is logical that after seizing political power, we should carry out economic reconstruction. But, on the other hand, a more important task from the long-term point of view is to carry out ideological reconstruction. Ideology provides tremendous impetus for social, political and economic development. Old ideas serve the cause of the old economic base, reflect the demands of the reactionary classes and impede social development. New ideas serve the cause of the new economic base, reflect the demands of the advanced classes and promote and expedite social development.

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Once progressive ideas prevail among the masses, they will transform into a powerful material force pushing social development forward. Therefore, we must break the old ideas in a big way (not in a small or moderate way) and foster new ideas in a big way. It is Chairman Mao's thought that represents the new ideology, the ideology of the people, of the proletariat, of communism and of Marxism-Leninism. It is only Chairman Mao's thought which is sufficiently capable of counteracting the old ideas. Therefore, we should energetically establish ascendancy of his thought. Many comrades have also failed to grasp this point firmly; they have failed to grasp well the work of breaking old ideas and fostering new ideas in a big way. The attitude taken by Comrades Liu and Teng who work in the Centre, toward the propagation of Chairman Mao's thought has been known to all of you in the last few days. The attitude taken by Lu Ting-i of the former Propaganda Department has also been known to all of you. One cannot but feel indignant at this. It is intolerable.

After seizing political power, our domestic tasks have been to suppress the resistance and opposition by exploiters and to engage in economic reconstruction. Apart from that we must also engage in cultural reconstruction, i.e., breaking the old and fostering the new in the cultural sphere. Not only should we do so, but all ruling classes in history have done the same. Any country and any ruling class does not permit the propagation of ideas contrary to its own class stand; it must firmly uphold its ideology so as to consolidate its political and economic systems. The ruling ideology of every historical period has been portrayed as representing the whole society, but actually, it only represented the interests of the exploiting class which occupied the ruling position. The ideology of the ruling class of every era invariably represents the interests of its own class. The ideology of the labouring people had not been in the ruling position during those bygone periods, and most of the labouring people had been fooled and cheated for a long time.

Ours is a party of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought. In accordance with the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought, we want to break with the old ownership system and the old traditional ideas completely. We have the right, as well as the need, to establish proletarian rule in the realm of ideology.

Now we have assumed the ruling position in the political and economic spheres, but ideologically we have not been established fully in such a position. Economically and politically, we have overthrown the old class. In the ideological sphere, however, the stuff of the old class is still preponderant. Therefore, there is an imperative need for us to wage a struggle on the ideological front with perseverance, and carry it through to the end. For several decades Stalin had failed to solve the question of ideological struggle. Chairman Mao brought this question up in time and wanted us to solve it. We are fortunate to be entrusted with such a great and glorious task.

I am afraid it will take far longer than several decades, perhaps more than 100 years or several hundred years, to eradicate the old ideas. Of course, contradictions between what is new and what is old will still exist in society in future, even in 200, 300, 400, 1,000 or 10,000 years. Hence, there will still be a struggle in the ideological sphere in which the new opposes the old while the old refuses to concede or withdraw from the historical stage in order to preserve itself. That situation is different in nature from our present class struggle. There is, however, one point in common and that is, the new wants to conquer the old.

I believe there will still be ideological contradictions and ideological struggles in future. Therefore, the struggle in the cultural and ideological spheres is a long-term one and is not a simple and easy matter. Our struggle sometimes takes the form of criticism by newspapers and other publications, as in the cases of criticizing and repudiating "The Life of

Wu Hsun" and "Studies in the 'Dream of the Red Chamber'." The criticism and repudiation of the reactionary ideas of Hu Shih and Hu Feng and of Yang Hsien-chen, Wu Han, Teng T'o, Chien Po-tsan, Chou Yang and others were campaigns of profound significance which Chairman Mao personally directed. When the struggle develops to a certain stage, it requires a dynamic mopping-up and crushing movement of a large scale such as that in the past five months which has shaken the whole society. A movement or campaign of this kind should be carried out for six months or one year in order to establish a solid foundation. Such a movement cannot be substituted by criticisms in the press; it plays an enormous and extraordinarily effective role.

The current movement is a great, epoch-making movement. But large and small campaigns may be carried out alternately.

What is the essence of old culture and old ideology? We may use many different words to express it, such as old culture, old ideas, poisonous weeds, ghosts and demons, reactionary authorities, old learning, old virtues, old arts, old laws, old educational system, old world outlook, etc., etc. These things are essentially old because they are based on the system of private ownership and on self-interest. As to the new things and new ideas, they are new because, to put it briefly, they are based on public interests.

Human society has a very long but unrecorded history of at least 500,000 years. Scientists say the earth was formed six billion years ago. But in the several thousand years of civilization, human society has always been a class society — slave society, feudal society, capitalist society. These societies have one thing in common, that is they are all based on the system of private ownership. This ownership system has had a history of several thousand years. The different schools of thought of the exploiting class — there are ten, eight or twenty of them — all speak for the private ownership system.

The present society of ours is one of socialist public ownership. Land, factories and means of production alike all belong to the public. In the circumstances, in order to consolidate this system of public ownership it is necessary to destroy the old culture of the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes, destroy the old ideology which is manifested in different forms and seeks to protect and restore the private ownership system. The existence of the ideology of the exploiting classes and its influence may eventually lead to restoration of the old regime which protects private ownership. Those people who are against wiping out old culture and old ideology are bound to suppress the revolution and the masses. In order to consolidate the socialist economic and political systems, we must foster the concept of devotion to public interests. We must create new men, men with communist spirit, to build a new society. Men with communist spirit are those commended by Chairman Mao, such as Chang Ssu-te, Norman Bethune, Liu Hu-lan and Lei Feng, and also Ouyang Hai, Chiao Yu-lu, Wang Chieh and Liu Ying-chun, etc. They are men of communism, men of a new type. We need this kind of people to create our new society. We must gradually transform members of our society into men of this kind.

What is communism? In a certain sense, communism is for the public. It may therefore be called the doctrine of public ownership. The kind of people we need to cultivate are, as Chairman Mao has said, those virtuous men detached from ignoble interests. We need to cultivate people with such new virtues, men who serve the people with all their hearts and devote themselves wholly and completely to the people. This kind of people are communist people. The other kind of people do everything for private interests. They are concerned only with their own names and interests, they fight for their own names and interests, fight for power and position and struggle to cut a smart figure of themselves. They think of themselves in doing everything and forget the masses and the labouring people; in short, they only care for themselves.

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In a class society, every individual belongs to a certain class, to a certain stratum or group of this class, or to that class, to a certain stratum or group of that class. An individual does not exist in the abstract sense or in isolation. To think of only oneself is an out-and-out bourgeois world outlook. Bourgeois individualism is to gain at other people's expense. For the sake of their own fortune and advantage, they don't care if millions of other people go bankrupt. They see the world from the egoist viewpoint, from the bourgeois viewpoint, but not from the proletarian viewpoint.

We need to cultivate men who do everything for the public. Devotion to public interests also has different class characters. The "public" we talk about refers to the people, to the proletariat, to socialism and communism. Since the founding of our Party, there have been many public-spirited people and there are even more now due to the further spread of Chairman Mao's thought. Since the launching of the campaign for the workers, peasants, soldiers and intellectual youths to study of Chairman Mao's works, good men and good deeds have emerged in very great numbers.

There are two lines for building our country. One is the line similar to that adopted by the Soviet Union, giving sole emphasis to materials, machinery, mechanization and so-called material incentives. The other is the line we are taking now under the leadership of Chairman Mao.

Chairman Mao is leading us to build a country of a new type. This country not only works on mechanization, but puts still greater emphasis on revolutionization, so that the latter takes the lead. By comparison, man is of course more important than machinery. Chairman Mao has said that man is the most precious thing in the world. In military operations, weapons are important, but they are not the deciding factor, the deciding factor is man. This is the Marxist point of view, the genuine Marxist point of view. Only through men can machinery be transformed into productive force. Without men, machinery is just a heap

of steel. Machinery is created by men and is used by men. Without men, the machines are nothing because they are useless. Machinery is a potential productive force, which can be turned into a real productive force only through men, through the integration of men and machinery.

Machinery is nothing but an artificial organ. Unlike animals, our people are the tools for liberation. Machines of all types and models are actually substitutes for the different organs of ours for production and labour. They take the places of our hands, assist and increase the capabilities of our hands. All machines are meant to strengthen the capabilities of our organs, to strengthen the capabilities of man. Hence, man is the centre of emphasis. To ignore man is to ignore the greatest source of productive power. Politically, to ignore man is to ignore the forces of revolution.

We are different from countries under revisionist leadership. They devote their efforts solely to mechanization, while we devote ours to revolutionization as well as mechanization, and use the former to lead the latter. Chairman Mao pointed out long ago that the Liberation Army must be revolutionized and modernized. He meant both revolutionization and modernization, not just either one. This applies not only to the army, but to the whole country as well. We should proceed with mechanization on the one hand and revolutionization on the other, and use revolutionization to lead mechanization.

Questions have been asked as to what the priority of the great proletarian cultural revolution is, whether it is necessary, and whether it is an extra burden or a matter within our call of duty. If it is a matter within our call of duty, then if we don't carry it out, we would have neglected our duty. A country under the dictatorship of the proletariat has three main tasks, namely, political construction, economic construction and ideological construction. We have emphasized political and economic construction in the past, but ideological construction, that is, cultural revolution, has not been fully

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developed. We must realize that if the cultural revolution, or ideological construction, is not carried out satisfactorily, the fruits of political and economic construction would also be destroyed. We must therefore follow the example of Chairman Mao and carry out the cultural revolution with great efforts. Chairman Mao's theory can be found in his written works. His books provide us the essential basis for study. We must also study the numerous works of Chairman Mao not included in the books. We must do what Chairman Mao does. Chairman Mao is in every way superior to us, whether in practical experience, in Marxist-Leninist theories and in personal talents. He is the greatest Marxist-Leninist in the world today. We must use Chairman Mao as an example to measure ourselves. We must follow him closely, pattern after him and learn from him. We should place the great cultural revolution initiated by Chairman Mao in a very important position and regard it as an important affair of the state, a political question, an important part of the class struggle and a major battle front. That is exactly what it should be.

Since the cultural revolution is a political struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, a struggle between the proletarian and the bourgeois lines is bound to take place. In the last couple of days, all of you have become aware of the struggle between the two lines, one being represented by Liu and Teng which suppresses the masses and opposes the revolution. The other is Chairman Mao's line which puts daring above everything else, trusts the masses, relies on the masses and arouses them into action. That is the mass line of the Party, the revolutionary line of the proletariat. One is the mass line and the other opposes the masses. These two lines within our Party are diametrically opposed to each other. For a short period of time, the Liu-Teng line seemingly took the dominating position and the whole nation acted according to their way of doing things. In the long run, however, Chairman Mao's line is always the victor, because it represents the truth.

Chairman Mao has said, **"People, only the people, are the motive force which creates world history."** This remark is highly classical; it embodies the finest essence of Marxian historical materialism. Historical materialism asserts that it is the masses of people who push history forward. Only when the live productive forces are moving forward can there be social revolution, can changes be brought about in the system of ownership and in production. The masses are therefore the motive force, the primary force and the persistent force which pushes history forward from one period to another. The masses, because of their great number, have immense power and wisdom. You give them an idea, they come forth with their own. When the ideas and wisdom of a multitude of people are pooled together, problems can be solved one way or another and things can be created.

A revolutionary mass movement is always justified. Even if certain segments or individuals among the masses show deviations to the "Left" or the Right, the mainstream of the mass movement is always in accord with social development and is always rational. This is why we should trust the masses and rely on their creativeness. At the beginning of this movement, we did not set many rules to be followed. Chairman Mao has repeatedly said that the Red Guards were not instituted by us but created by the masses. Thereafter, they appeared all over the country. Many things were initiated by the masses. We must first be pupils of the masses and learn from them. We put their ideas together and elaborate them, and then we become their teachers. To gather and sum up the views of the masses and take the resulting ideas back to the masses for implementation — this has been Chairman Mao's consistent idea and practice.

Young people of this generation have been brought up in the 17 years after the victory of our revolution. They are now about 20 years old. Most of them are mentally very sharp. Nurtured by Mao Tse-tung's thought and guided by the correct revolutionary line, they are comparatively more sus-

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ceptible to the new world outlook, the proletarian world outlook. In the midst of the cultural revolution, we should trust these young people.

These path-breaking young fighters are highly commendable for their dauntless spirit. Their daring to blaze the trails has brought to light many inconceivable things and long-standing, difficult problems hitherto unsolved, and helped us make up our minds. At present, many of our comrades are still afraid of the students and the masses. They are afraid of many things. Comrade Po-ta has given many examples, and I shall not repeat them here. The Decision of the 11th Plenary Session of the Central Committee Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has pointed out that the persons in charge in many units are afraid of disturbances. Many are really afraid of disturbances, but such disturbances can only disrupt the enemy, not us. At times we also created some small disturbances among ourselves.

Chairman Mao pointed out long ago that disturbances have their merits and demerits. We should not see only the demerits and turn a blind eye to the merits. Besides, demerits may gradually transform into merits.

Generally speaking, there will not be any big disturbances. Our army is very stable and our production is on the increase. What disturbances can a few students and youths who are engaged in the cultural revolution make? They cannot make any big disturbances. This is the way we look at the question of disturbances.

Chairman Mao has said: "A revolution is not a dinner party, nor a composition, nor a painting, nor a piece of embroidery. It cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. . ." It is unavoidable that there should be some deviations. But, the main current is correct and there is nothing to be afraid of. If you are afraid of small disturbances now, there will

be big disturbances in future. The ghosts and monsters will make rebellion against the proletariat, against us. This time I asked Comrade Hsieh Fu-chih to prepare a report on the results of the Red Guard movement, and I even sent someone to make observations. The fact is that there are people who plan to rebel against us. They have indeed worked out plans to overthrow us. Some people treasure their old title deeds as much as their own lives. They would patch them up when they are torn and would photograph them for preservation before they are worn out. What do they want these things for and why do they keep them in secret places? They fancy that when the Kuomintang and the imperialists come, they can claim ownership to this house and that piece of land. Although the exploiting classes have been overthrown, these people are still alive. Their minds are filled with reactionary ideas and hatred for the people. There are also people within our Party who attempted to change the existing order, people like P'eng (Chen), Lo (Jui-ch'ing), Lu (Ting-i) and Yang (Shang-K'un). These guys attempted to change the existing order by staging a counter-revolutionary coup d'etat. If we don't carry out this cultural revolution, if we don't take care of them, they will take care of us and attack us. At present, there are many rumours and speculations, reactionary handbills and anonymous letters, all hostile to the revolution. These people are vainly thinking of changing the existing order. As soon as an opportunity arises, these scoundrels will come out to make trouble and rebel against the people. Some of them will make use of the organizational principle "subordinates must obey the superiors" to give orders for seizing political power and changing our social order. In fact, they are attacking us, and we have no alternative but to take care of them and attack them. If we don't hit at them, they will hit at us. This is why we say there is a great, latent danger. The Soviet Union had been engaged in revolution for 40 years, but once Khrushchov came out, the whole country changed colour.

We should not be afraid of some disturbances. We should put daring, not fear, above everything else. Otherwise we will

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make mistakes, big political mistakes. It is a big mistake not to trust the masses. It is the Liu-Teng line that does not trust the masses, neither does it trust Chairman Mao. They have no faith in the masses and only believe in themselves, in those who share the same views with them, in the bourgeois world outlook and the bourgeois line.

Didn't Chairman Mao bring up the question of preserving proletarian revolutionary integrity in the autumn of one's life? There is no other way to preserve one's integrity but to have faith in Chairman Mao, trust the masses and treat oneself correctly. These three conditions are essentially in accord with the five conditions laid down by Chairman Mao for successors to the proletarian revolutionary cause. The first condition laid down by Chairman Mao is that they believe in Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism is a unified doctrine, the only distinctions being the change of time. Mao Tse-tung's thought is higher and more developed Marxism-Leninism.

The second condition laid down by Chairman Mao for proletarian successors is that they serve the people; the third, they be capable or rallying the overwhelming majority; the fourth, they be exemplary in applying democratic centralism. These are all questions of believing in the masses. The masses are the makers of history. If we are any better than they are at all, it is only because we are older and have more experience. Truthfully speaking, in wisdom and virtues we are not nearly as good as Lei Feng and Chang Ssu-te. We have not so far been able to catch up with these heroes. Many comrades are holding senior positions and are well-experienced, but this does not mean that they are better than others in ideology and talents.

There is plenty of wisdom among the masses. Don't you look down upon the students of some twenty years old. I have come in contact with some of them and they really have brains. They can say what we older people, say 60, 70 or 80 years old, cannot say.

The fifth condition laid down by Chairman Mao for successors to the proletarian revolution is how to treat oneself correctly. How should we look upon ourselves? We should divide one into two. We may have some strong points, but certainly we must also have some shortcomings. We should bring our strong points into full play for the cause of the revolution and carry out unceasing struggle against our shortcomings to meet the requirements of the revolution. We should look upon ourselves as part of the revolutionary force, and always consider ourselves as a target of the revolution. A revolution cannot be carried out well unless we also revolutionize ourselves. We must disengage ourselves from the "ego." We should not look at ourselves only, for if we do, we are localizing ourselves. Marxist-Leninists must transgress such localization. I belong to that "mountain top," so I only look after the interests of that "mountain top" and not the interests of others. This is a kind of localism. Some of our comrades think only of their own unit, but not the 700 million Chinese people and the several billion people in the world. This also a kind of localism. We should not feel different to the others just because our position is higher. We should liberate ourselves from the "ego," liberate ourselves from the localized state and from our own small unit. We must look after the interests of the bigger unit, the interests of the whole. Chairman Mao said the proletariat not only must liberate its own class, but also all of mankind. Until the whole mankind is liberated, the proletariat cannot achieve its own ultimate liberation. This is why we must make an effort to break the shackles of localism.

In order to preserve proletarian revolutionary integrity in the autumn of our lives, it is most important that we implement the five conditions laid down by Chairman Mao for successors. Briefly put, this means that we must have faith in Chairman Mao, trust the masses and treat ourselves correctly.

Chairman Mao has said that we must trust the masses and trust the Party — these are the two basic principles. To

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have faith in Chairman Mao and trust the masses is precisely what we should do now. Otherwise we cannot do anything well. To preserve one's integrity in the autumn of his life is indeed a serious matter, a grave matter. Not everyone can do so. Some people have participated in the revolution for 30, 40 or even 50 years and some have reached the age of 50, 60, 70 or even 80, but whether they can preserve their integrity is really a question. Quite a few have slipped up and failed to preserve their integrity just because they did not do well in the last few years. We must do our best and cautiously and attentively strive to preserve our integrity in the latter part of our lives so as to set an example for posterity. If we have no faith in Chairman Mao and do not trust the masses, but believe too much in ourselves, we will not be able to preserve our integrity.

Liu and Teng are the sponsors of the erroneous line for the current cultural revolution movement, but this line has been enforced in many localities. You comrades have shown great concern for this problem. Of course this problem has to be handled differently according to the individual cases. The sponsors are different from the implementors; some have made serious mistakes and some, light mistakes. The general estimate is that most of the comrades have followed the erroneous line unconsciously, and have unintentionally resisted Chairman Mao's line. In most cases it is a question of lack of understanding and not a question of opposing the Party, socialism and Mao Tse-tung's thought. This we all know. Most of the present secretaries of Central Committee bureaus, provincial Party committees and municipal Party committees are fine old men, but there are also a few bad ones. Naturally, you also have your responsibility. You are responsible, in a varying degree, for implementing the erroneous line in various regions. But individual cases must be handled appropriately according to the gravity of their mistake, which must not be magnified nor toned down. Many people often overlook the fact that a change in quantity will lead to a change in quality; they treat different quantities as the same quantity and

different qualities as the same quality. For example, water freezes below zero degree centigrade; it is a liquid above zero degree centigrade and becomes steam above 100 degrees centigrade. Because the temperature is different, it becomes a different thing. This is why we must treat the cadres at different levels differently and not all the same. They have made light or grave mistakes, but generally, most mistakes stem from a lack of understanding. Only a small handful opposes Chairman Mao's correct line.

So long as our comrades try hard to master Mao Tse-tung's thought, study the policies of the Party's Central Committee, trust the masses and correctly deal with their own shortcomings and mistakes as they occur in the course of work, they can correct their errors and do their work well, do their work in a relaxed and cheerful mood. This will further strengthen the unity of the whole Party under the banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

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**SPEECH AT PEKING MASS RALLY TO RECEIVE
REVOLUTIONARY TEACHERS AND STUDENTS
FROM ALL PARTS OF CHINA**

(November 3, 1966)

by Lin Piao

Students, Comrades, Red Guard Fighters:

With boundless love and infinite loyalty for our great leader, Chairman Mao, you have come to Peking in the new nation-wide upsurge of the great proletarian cultural revolution, to see Chairman Mao and exchange revolutionary experience. On behalf of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the Party, I extend my warmest welcome to you!

Chairman Mao is very glad to receive you today. This is the sixth time in two months and more, including National Day, that Chairman Mao has received the revolutionary teachers and students from all parts of the country. Chairman Mao, the greatest of proletarian revolutionaries, is always in the midst of the masses, has full confidence in them, shares weal and woe with them and wholeheartedly supports the revolutionary mass movement. Chairman Mao has set the most glorious example for all comrades in our Party and for the younger generation.

The present situation of the great proletarian cultural revolution is excellent! With each passing day, the gigantic, vigorous mass movement is developing in depth. A tremendous change has taken place in the whole face of society and the mental outlook of the people. The great thought of Mao Tse-tung has become more extensively disseminated and it

has gone deeper into the hearts of the people. As a result of Chairman Mao's call for "grasping revolution and promoting production," the great cultural revolution has been promoting the revolutionization of people's thinking and spurring very rapid development in industry and agriculture and in science and technology. The recent successful test in the launching of a guided missile with a nuclear warhead is a great victory for Mao Tse-tung's thought, a great victory for the proletarian cultural revolution!

The 11th plenary session of the 8th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party announced the victory of the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao and the bankruptcy of the bourgeois reactionary line. In the past two months, the correct line of Chairman Mao has been put before the broad masses and has been grasped by them, and criticisms have been made of the erroneous line. The broad masses have really translated into action Chairman Mao's call, "Concern yourselves with State affairs." This is an extremely fine thing. It is an important guarantee that the great proletarian cultural revolution will be carried through to the end.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung's line is one of letting the masses educate themselves and emancipate themselves. It is the line of putting "daring" above everything else and of daring to trust the masses, daring to rely on them and daring boldly to mobilize them. It is the application and a new development in the great cultural revolution of the Party's mass line. It is the line of the great proletarian cultural revolution.

The bourgeois line is one of opposing the mass line, of opposing the education and emancipation of the masses by themselves, of repressing the masses and opposing the revolution. This bourgeois reactionary line does not direct the spearhead of struggle against the small handful of persons within the Party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road, and all the monsters and demons in society, but against the revolutionary masses. It uses various ways

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and means to incite one group among the masses to struggle against another group, and incite one group of students to struggle against another group.

The proletarian revolutionary line of Chairman Mao Tse-tung is as incompatible with the bourgeois reactionary line as fire is to water. Only by thoroughly criticizing the bourgeois reactionary line and eradicating its influence can the line of Chairman Mao Tse-tung be carried out correctly, completely and thoroughly.

Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's correct line, the broad revolutionary masses of our country have created the new experience of developing extensive democracy under the dictatorship of the proletariat. By this extensive democracy, the Party is fearlessly permitting the broad masses to use the media of free airing of views, big-character posters, great debates and extensive exchange of revolutionary experiences, to criticize and supervise the Party and Government leading institutions and leaders at all levels. At the same time, it is providing the people with full democratic rights along the principles of the Paris Commune. Without such extensive democracy, it would be impossible to initiate a genuine great proletarian cultural revolution, stage a great revolution in the depths of people's souls, carry out the great proletarian cultural revolution thoroughly and completely, eradicate the roots of revisionism, consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and guarantee the advance of our country along the road of socialism and communism. This extensive democracy is a new form of combining Mao Tse-tung's thought with the broad masses, a new form of mass self-education. It is a new contribution by Chairman Mao to Marxist-Leninist theory on proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

International historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat has demonstrated that without carrying out a thorough-going, great proletarian cultural revolution of this kind, without practising such extensive democracy, the dic-

tatorship of the proletariat grows weaker and degenerates, capitalism uses various forms to stage a come-back and the exploiting classes once again ride on the backs of the people.

It is not only essential to practise such extensive democracy thoroughly between the leadership and the masses, but it is also absolutely necessary to carry it out thoroughly among the masses themselves and between all sections of the masses. Unless there is such extensive democracy among the masses themselves, unless they become good at mutual consultation, good at listening to dissenting views, good at presenting facts and reasoning things out, and good at using their brains and pondering over problems, the masses cannot possibly educate and emancipate themselves, achieve the purpose of developing the ranks of the Left, uniting the great majority and isolating the handful of bourgeois Rightists, and carry out to the full the line of the great proletarian cultural revolution put forward by our great teacher, Chairman Mao.

Chairman Mao supports comrades going around on foot to exchange revolutionary experience, the advantages of which are widespread contact with the masses, contact with all aspects of the life of society, and a deeper understanding of the class struggle in socialist society. It provides better opportunities to learn from the workers and the peasants and to propagate Mao Tse-tung's thought on an even broader scale. All this is very useful for the revolutionary teachers and students in carrying further their comprehension of Mao Tse-tung's thought and the correct line of Chairman Mao. Of course, this kind of travelling around on foot for the exchange of revolutionary experience needs to be planned, organized and prepared.

The Central Committee of the Party believes that, having had the experience of the last few months, the great proletarian cultural revolution will make still better progress and attain still greater success!

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March forward under the great banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought!

Long live the victory of the line of Chairman Mao Tse-tung!

Long live the victory of the great proletarian cultural revolution!

Long live the Chinese Communist Party!

Long live Chairman Mao! Long, long life to him!

("Jen-min Jih-pao", Peking, November 4, 1966)

FOREWORD TO THE SECOND EDITION OF QUOTATIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG

(December 16, 1966)

by Lin Biao

Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era. He has inherited, defended and developed Marxism-Leninism with genius, creatively and comprehensively and has brought it to a higher and completely new stage.

Mao Tse-tung's thought is Marxism-Leninism of the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to world-wide victory. It is a powerful ideological weapon for opposing imperialism and for opposing revisionism and dogmatism. Mao Tse-tung's thought is the guiding principle for all the work of the Party, the army and the country.

Therefore, the most fundamental task in our Party's political and ideological work is at all times to hold high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, to arm the minds of the people throughout the country with it and to persist in using it to command every field of activity. The broad masses of the workers, peasants and soldiers and the broad ranks of the revolutionary cadres and the intellectuals should really master Mao Tse-tung's thought; they should all study Chairman Mao's writings, follow his teachings, act according to his instructions and be his good fighters.

In studying the works of Chairman Mao, one should have specific problems in mind, study and apply his works in a creative way, combine study with application, first study what must be urgently applied so as to get quick results, and strive

hard to apply what one is studying. In order really to master Mao Tse-tung's thought, it is essential to study many of Chairman Mao's basic concepts over and over again, and it is best to memorize important statements and study and apply them repeatedly. The newspapers should regularly carry quotations from Chairman Mao relevant to current issues for readers to study and apply. The experience of the broad masses in their creative study and application of Chairman Mao's works in the last few years has proved that to study selected quotations from Chairman Mao with specific problems in mind is a good way to learn Mao Tse-tung's thought, a method conducive to quick results.

We have compiled *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung* in order to help the broad masses learn Mao Tse-tung's thought more effectively. In organizing their study, units should select passages that are relevant to the situation, their tasks, the current thinking of their personnel, and the state of their work.

In our great motherland, a new era is emerging in which the workers, peasants and soldiers are grasping Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought. Once Mao Tse-tung's thought is grasped by the broad masses, it becomes an inexhaustible source of strength and a spiritual atom bomb of infinite power. The large-scale publication of *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung* is a vital measure for enabling the broad masses to grasp Mao Tse-tung's thought and for promoting the revolutionization of our people's thinking. It is our hope that all comrades will learn earnestly and diligently, bring about a new nation-wide high tide in the creative study and application of Chairman Mao's works and, under the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, strive to build our country into a great socialist state with modern agriculture, modern industry, modern science and culture and modern national defence!

("Jen-min Jih-pao," Peking, December 17, 1966)

CHANGING WORLD OUTLOOK IN THE COURSE OF REVOLUTIONARY MASS CRITICISM

(August 9, 1967)

by Lin Piao

The questions discussed by Chairman Mao at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee were of great significance to the socialist revolution. This was a major development of Marxism.

However, we did not understand why, in doing new things, we still cherished the same old ideas in our minds. Our Party is a political party of the proletariat. In the past, however, only the leading nucleus of our leadership group was genuinely Marxist-Leninist. Apart from the backbone elements, many had bourgeois ideas and some were bourgeois elements. Therefore, when we make mistakes, we must correct them; failing this, we would embark on the capitalist road, the State would change colour and individual persons would become power-holders taking the capitalist road.

The present great cultural revolution is actually a transitional movement leading to a great political revolution. Without a great political revolution, capitalism would come about. The great cultural revolution is a great socialist revolution in the political and ideological fields. Without such a revolution in the political and ideological fields, there can be no socialist society. Theoretically and ideologically, we still do not know whether it will be capitalism or socialism. We are still confused as to what is right and what is wrong, but we will see the light if we study Chairman Mao's theories well. Only when we have mastered the thought of Mao Tse-tung can we attain socialism.

SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

Today, under the leadership of Chairman Mao, we must study well and properly transform our world outlook. Otherwise, we would make mistakes. Once we have learned and mastered Mao Tse-tung's thought, we will also have understood Marxism-Leninism. Only thus can we avoid making mistakes.

(Wen-ke T'ung-hsin [Cultural Revolution Bulletin], No. 1, October 9, 1967, published jointly by "August 20" News Agency of Red Guard HQ. of Public Organs of Canton, and Editorial Department of Tung-t'ai [Panorama] of Shanghai New Chemical Workers HQ.)

DIRECTIVE ON THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

by Lin Piao

Chairman Mao has taught us that bad things may turn into good things under given conditions. The Wuhan incident is a very bad thing, but it has had great repercussions in all parts of the country and has had immense educational significance. It has thoroughly exposed Ch'en Tsai-tao's reactionary line and his counter-revolutionary activities; it has also exposed the acuteness and complexity of the class struggle.

Of all the large military regions in the whole country, we were worried about two — Peking and Wuhan — in the past. We had no way to deal with them, but the great cultural revolution has solved this problem. The law governing the development of things is such that when a bad thing reaches its limit, it will change for the better. Chairman Mao has said that the worst is bound to take a quick turn for the better. The forces of the revolution will always advance, while the forces of reaction will always come to nought. However reactionary he may be, Ch'en Tsai-tao cannot resist the torrent of the revolution. To expose is better than to conceal, and it is a good thing for bad people and bad things to be exposed. Chairman Mao has taught us that the worst is bound to take a quick turn for the better. The solution of a problem will be stalled if it gives us no pain. When the problem is not solved and exposed completely, we have no reason to strike him down.

The situation of the great cultural revolution is excellent. Great, brilliant victories have been won. In carrying out the great cultural revolution, we rely on two conditions: firstly, the thought of Mao Tse-tung and Chairman Mao's lofty prestige;

secondly, the power of the Liberation Army. It is only with these two conditions that we dare to give free rein to the masses and let all bad things be fully exposed. With these two conditions, bad things can be turned into good things. We cannot do without these two conditions, and, in particular, without the wise leadership of Chairman Mao and the absolute authority of Mao Tse-tung's thought. Only Chairman Mao has such courage and stamina. At present, Chairman Mao, healthy and robust, is personally leading and steering the great cultural revolution. In this revolution, all bad things will be fully exposed and all latent troubles brought to light. They will be transformed into good things, things beneficial to the proletariat, so that our political power will be further consolidated. The old stage will be smashed and transformed into a new stage of victory.

A very great victory has been won in this great cultural revolution. The price we have paid is very, very, very small, but the victory we have gained is very, very, very great. On the surface, it seems very chaotic, but it is the reactionary line and the reactionary classes which have been thrown into disorder. They have been exposed, and the handful of Party persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road have been toppled. Such disorder is necessary and normal, without which reactionary things cannot be brought to light. The reason that we have dared to do so is precisely because we have the extremely high prestige of Chairman Mao and the power of the Liberation Army to depend on. With such conditions, if we do not let them expose themselves now, when should we? Disorder is nothing to be feared of under Chairman Mao's leadership.

Disorder is manifested in four different conditions:

1. Good people struggling against bad people.
2. Bad people struggling against bad people. We may make use of such struggles in an indirect way.
3. Bad people struggling against good people. This is the case with Peking, the navy, the air force, the General

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Staff Department and the General Rear Services Department, where good people have been struggled against. They have suffered, but this has also done them some good.

4. Good people struggling against good people. This of course is not good, and some damage has been done. But this is a contradiction among the people, and it can be easily resolved.

Only the third case — bad people struggling against good people — we do not want to see. Good people were struggled against: for instance, Comrade Ch'iu Hui-tso was subjected to struggle by bad people for more than a month. Li Tso-p'eng, Wang Hung-k'un and Chang Hsiu-ch'uan were also struggled against, and so did Wu Fa-hsien. In the past you have suffered some hardship; now you have gained something. Good people should not be afraid of being struggled against by bad people. At most, you would share the lot of Ch'iu Hui-tso, Li, Wang, Chang and Wu Fa-hsien. You must put up with it and control yourselves. You should see that the situation is very favourable to us, and that this is a great plan for a hundred years, a thousand years. With our great leader Chairman Mao living in good health, with his lofty prestige and the power of the Liberation Army, we have nothing to be afraid of. Bad people will certainly be criticized and punished. Even if Heaven has been turned upside down, we can reverse it.

In various areas, some comrades have made mistakes. Now that we have Ch'en Tsai-tao, let us not have Chang Tsai-tao or Li Tsai-tao. Those who can be saved should be saved. As for those who have not fallen, we should not hope that they will fall. But we ourselves should make up our minds to rectify our mistakes. If we fail to do so and persist in taking the road which will lead to our downfall, then nothing can be done.

There are three ways to prevent our fall:

First, we must tightly grasp the conditions at the lower

level. We must carry out investigation and study of the Left, the Right and various mass organizations in order to understand their conditions. Chairman Mao has said that investigation and study are essential work. Only when we have grasped the true situation can we bring forth the questions and suggest ways to settle them.

Second, we must closely follow the Central Committee. We must seek instructions from and report to Chairman Mao, the Central Committee and the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee. We must not have the idea that we need not report to the Central Committee so long as we ourselves understand the situation, nor the idea that we need not seek instructions from and report to the Central Committee because the matter is small and we are intelligent enough to handle it ourselves. We must not hesitate to trouble the Central Committee. We must seek instructions from and report to it on all matters, big and small.

The Premier and the comrades of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee are all working day and night. You may send a telegram or make a telephone call. In the case of a telephone call, few people would hear it and the message would be passed around slowly. A telegram may be read by everyone. Besides, you may take a plane and reach here in one or two hours. Don't act on your own because you think your ideas are right and you are clever. This I must repeat for it is the most important of the three ways.

Third, after one year of the great cultural revolution, the line has been drawn clearly between the Left and the Right. You must not divide people into Left or Right on the basis of whether or not they attack the military districts, but on the basis of whether they support or oppose the great cultural revolution which Chairman Mao has personally initiated, and whether they protect or oppose Chairman Mao. You must stand firmly on the side of Chairman Mao, on the side of the Left, on the side of the masses. You must not judge a group

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as to whether it is leftist or rightist and look at the problem simply on the basis of whether the class status of its members is pure or not, whether it has many or few Party members or many or few cadres. Class status must be examined, but it is not everything. The main thing is to see on what line it stands.

In dealing with the conservatives, you must carry out adequate political and ideological work and the work of splitting them up and winning them over. Don't let them stand opposite to us for a long time. It is necessary to win over the broad masses who have been hoodwinked and make them stand on the side of the revolutionaries. In dealing with leaders of the conservative groups, you must act according to the spirit of Chairman Mao's instructions, and arouse the masses to drag them out. You must firmly support the Left and win over the hoodwinked masses. If there are problems among the Leftists themselves, you should emphasize the importance of alliance and convince them not to engage in a civil war, and not to promote departmentalism, the mentality of getting into the lime-light, and devotion to the interests of small groups. These tendencies can do no good to the Leftists, but can do good to the Rightists.

The masses must not be suppressed. When problems arise or incidents occur, make a report to and seek instructions from the Central Committee. There is no need for haste; instead, you should solve the problems slowly and step by step, follow the principle of "four quick, one slow." Make yourself understand the situation and then make a report to and ask instructions from the Central Committee. Wait for its approval before you act. This is the style of work consistently advocated by Chairman Mao.

Frankly speaking, I am worried lest our comrades who are entrusted with such heavy tasks would make mistakes to the disadvantage of the great cultural revolution. Now that we rely on the army, things will be fine if the army does not

make mistakes. To avoid making mistakes, it is necessary to rely on the Left and the masses, but the most important thing is to seek instructions from the Central Committee, from the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee.

Those who have made mistakes would be wise to admit them and examine and rectify them as soon as possible. This will satisfy the masses and gain their understanding. It is no good to refuse to admit mistakes and try to hide them. It is dangerous to persist in the mistakes and refuse to correct them; it is useless trying to resist. The army's involvement in the great cultural revolution occurred in a hurry. Since they don't understand the situation, they can hardly avoid making mistakes. When they make mistakes and refuse to admit them, they cannot get away with them. If they correct the mistakes they have made, they will gain the understanding of the masses. A communist should have such a spirit.

The past revolutions were also carried out in a hurry, such as the land reform, the Autumn Harvest Uprising, the struggle against local bullies, the fight against Chiang Kai-shek and Japan. After the lapse of several decades, we finally became familiar with the rural conditions and clear about these problems. Following the victory of the revolution, we embarked on a new stage and adopted new systems, and new situations arose. The theory, the line, the principles and policies of the socialist revolution had not been studied before, and we were not prepared theoretically and ideologically. We had overthrown the "three big mountains" (imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism) in the past, and we did it in the pattern of a bourgeois democratic revolution. After the victory things have changed, and we have to carry out a revolution against the bourgeoisie.

The present revolution is a revolution against those of us who have been engaged in the former revolutions. We are not prepared for such a revolution and we do not understand it. Only Chairman Mao — who has attained the highest theoretical

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level — has had the foresight with regard to the theory, line, ideology, principle and policies. He knows very well what should be done and has long prepared himself. Those comrades with a higher ideological and theoretical level are prepared; other comrades in general have not prepared themselves ideologically. In the past, we were familiar with the land revolution in the countryside, but were not familiar with capitalism. In such developed capitalist countries as the United States, Britain, France and Japan, even an ordinary worker knows clearly what capitalist exploitation and aggression means. But in China capitalism was not developed, and in the past, because we were in the countryside, we did not see much of capitalism and had little understanding of the law governing the development of capitalism. If we view the revolution of today in the light of the ideas, policies and theories that applied to the bourgeois democratic revolution, we can hardly avoid making mistakes and we cannot understand the great cultural revolution of today. If we still use the methods which we used to fight the local bullies, to fight Chiang Kai-shek and to fight Japan, we are bound to make mistakes. There are two different attitudes towards mistakes made: there are those who are willing to correct their mistakes and those who refuse to correct their mistakes. Great harm would be done to the Party by those who refuse to correct their mistakes. Those who have made mistakes in the last 18 years generally followed these two patterns. Those who have made mistakes are still welcome if they correct them.

The questions discussed by Chairman Mao at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee were of great significance to the socialist revolution. This was a major development of Marxism. However, we did not understand why, in doing new things, we still cherished the same old ideas in our minds. Our Party is a political party of the proletariat. In the past, however, only the leading nucleus of our leadership group was genuinely Marxist-Leninist. Apart from the backbone elements, many had bourgeois ideas and some were bourgeois elements. Therefore, when we make mistakes, we must correct

them; failing this, we would embark on the capitalist road, the state would change colour and individual persons would become power-holders taking the capitalist road.

The present great cultural revolution is actually a transitional movement leading to a great political revolution. Without a great political revolution, capitalism would come about. The great cultural revolution is a great socialist revolution in the political and ideological fields. Without such a revolution in the political and ideological fields, there can be no socialist society. Theoretically and ideologically, we still do not know whether it will be capitalism or socialism. We are still confused as to what is right and what is wrong, but we will see the light if we study Chairman Mao's theories well. Only when we have mastered the thought of Mao Tse-tung can we attain socialism.

Today, under the leadership of Chairman Mao, we must study well and properly transform our world outlook. Otherwise, we would make mistakes. Once we have learned and mastered Mao Tse-tung's thought, we will also have understood Marxism-Leninism. Only thus can we avoid making mistakes.

In order to make a success of the great cultural revolution, we must rely on the Liberation Army, which was created by Chairman Mao. In order to avoid making mistakes, we must seek instructions more often from the Central Committee and from the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee. On the other hand, we must strengthen political and ideological work in the armed forces, put politics in command, study Chairman Mao's works, let Mao Tse-tung's thought command everything, and develop and advance in the socialist direction indicated by Chairman Mao, and not in the direction of capitalism.

Chairman Mao's thought must be put in command. The work of the armed forces is very complicated. But all problems can be solved readily if we grasp the study of Chairman Mao's

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works and study and apply them creatively. Unless we do a good job of this, we would suppress the people, as in the case of Inner Mongolia.

For some time after the struggle against T'an Cheng, the study of Mao's works was quite successfully grasped in the General Political Department, but in the course of the great cultural revolution, it performed badly and failed to keep abreast of the situation. Its principal leading cadre made one mistake after another, and we tried again and again not to let him fall, and now we are still trying to help him out.

We principally rely on the military regions, armies, divisions, regiments, battalions and companies to promote the study of Mao's works. Grasping the study of Chairman Mao's works is a magic weapon. We mainly rely on the military regions to carry out this work. The main thing is to grasp well the study of Mao's works and the education on the two lines, and to teach the troops to treat the revolutionary Leftists, Red Guard young fighters and revolutionary masses correctly.

At present, it is necessary to grasp the mass criticism — criticism of the bourgeois reactionary line and the small handful of top-level power-holders in the Party who are taking the capitalist road. Only by grasping well the political and ideological work, knowing well what is in the minds of the cadres and fighters and arming them with Mao Tse-tung's thought, can we accomplish the "three-support" (support the Left, industry and agriculture) and "two-military" (military control and military and political training) tasks.

Some cadres participate in the three-in-one combinations; others have been transferred to local work. The basic question of the revolution is political power. But many people have an inadequate understanding of the importance of this question, of the importance of political power and the importance of the leadership group. They need to sober up their minds. In the

past 18 years, the capitalist roaders in the Party controlled a number of Party and government organs. Since the start of the cultural revolution, some leadership groups have fallen, and a new State machine has to be built. The leadership group is very important, for it holds political power and is itself a State machine. The leadership group of the old power-holders has proved itself incompetent to be a State machine. It has fallen and has been taken over by the military. Our State machine was infested with capitalism and revisionism. Its fall did not do any harm, so let it fall. Our leadership group should be forever loyal to Chairman Mao and to Mao Tse-tung's thought; it should be composed of people who always follow Chairman Mao's revolutionary road.

In taking over the State organs, military men should avoid making mistakes, but if mistakes are made, they should correct them immediately in accordance with Chairman Mao's teachings. Cadres of the military regions, provincial military districts and people's armed forces departments who have made mistakes should be called here for corrective training in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions. Let the revolutionary rebels be their teachers and their own mistakes be their teaching materials. They will come here to learn the lessons of experience. Those Party and government personnel who failed to correct their ideology in the past should also be given education. Their failure to correct their ideology can be turned into a good thing through education. Those who return to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line should be welcome.

Cadres should be treated in accordance with the policy of "learning from past mistakes to avoid futures ones, curing the sickness to save the patient," which was set forth by Chairman Mao. Even for those who have been overthrown for the time being, it would be good if they can be made to change over through education. The majority of the cadres can be won over, including even those who have not yet corrected their ideology, so that they can be made to change their attitude. Those who have corrected their mistakes may be given work,

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while those who are still unable to correct their ideology may be replaced. Those who may be saved from being overthrown should not be overthrown; those who have been overthrown may still turn over a new leaf after education.

The leadership group is a State machine. It must conform to the thought of Mao Tse-tung and adhere to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, or it must be replaced. But we cannot destroy them without giving a warning by teaching.

Lest you may make mistakes, let me remind you once again of the three ways to avoid mistakes, especially the second one. Things should rather be done a bit slowly. Give everything a good thought and make no haste. If they are delayed for a few days, the sky would not fall. The Premier and Comrades Po-ta and Chiang Ch'ing are working day and night. I hope that all of you at the higher and lower levels will pay more attention to seeking instructions and making reports.

*(Chu-ying Tung-fang-hung [The
"East Is Red" of Pearl River Film
Studio], Canton, September 13, 1967,
published by the Editorial Department
of Chu-ying Tung-fang-hung of Pearl
River Film Studio, Red Guard HQ.
of Organs of Joint Committee of
Red Rebels)*

**SPEECH AT PEKING RALLY TO CELEBRATE THE
18TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

(October 1, 1967)

by Lin Piao

Comrades and Friends,

Today is the 18th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. On this glorious festive occasion, on behalf of our great leader Chairman Mao, the Central Committee of the Party, the Government of the People's Republic of China, the Military Commission of the Party's Central Committee and the Cultural Revolution Group under the Party's Central Committee, I most warmly salute the workers, peasants, commanders and fighters of the People's Liberation Army, the Red Guards, the revolutionary cadres and revolutionary intellectuals and the people of all nationalities throughout the country, and extend a hearty welcome to our comrades and friends who have come from different parts of the world!

We are celebrating the 18th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China at a time when tremendous victories have been won in the great proletarian cultural revolution and an excellent situation prevails both in China and in the whole world.

The great proletarian cultural revolution movement initiated and led personally by Chairman Mao has spread to the whole of China. Hundreds of millions of people have been

aroused. From the capital to the border regions, from the cities to the countryside, and from factory workshops to workers' homes, everyone, from teenagers to grey-haired old folks, concerns himself with State affairs and with the consolidation and strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Never before has a mass movement been so extensive and deep-going as the present one. The broad masses of workers and peasants, commanders and fighters of the People's Liberation Army, Red Guards, revolutionary cadres and revolutionary intellectuals, gradually uniting themselves through their struggles in the past year, have formed a mighty revolutionary army. Under the leadership of the Party's Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao, they have badly routed the handful of Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road headed by China's Khrushchov, who have collapsed on all fronts.

Frightened out of their wits by China's great proletarian cultural revolution, U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism and all reactionaries in various countries hoped that this great revolution would upset our national economy. The facts have turned out to be exactly the opposite of the wishes of these overlords. The great proletarian cultural revolution has further liberated the productive forces. Glad tidings about the successes in our industrial production keep on coming in. In agriculture, we are reaping a good harvest for the sixth consecutive year. Our markets are thriving and the prices are stable. The successful explosion of China's hydrogen bomb indicates a new level in the development of our science and technology. What is even more important, the great cultural revolution has educated the masses and the youth, greatly promoted the revolutionization of the thinking of the entire Chinese people, enhanced the great unity of the people of all nationalities and tempered our cadres and all the PLA commanders and fighters. Our great motherland has never been so powerful as it is today.

China's great proletarian cultural revolution has won decisive victory. In the history of the international communist movement, this is the first great revolution launched by the

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proletariat itself in a country under the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is an epoch-making new development of Marxism-Leninism which Chairman Mao has effected with genius and in a creative way.

In response to the great call of Chairman Mao, we must not only thoroughly destroy the bourgeois headquarters organizationally, but must also carry out more extensive and penetrating revolutionary mass criticism and repudiation so that the handful of Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road, headed by China's Khrushchov, will be completely overthrown and discredited politically, ideologically and theoretically and will never be able to rise again. Such mass criticism and repudiation should be combined with the struggle-criticism-transformation in the respective units so that the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought will fly over all fronts.

At present, the most important task before us is, in accordance with Chairman Mao's teachings and his theory, line, principles and policy for making revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, to hold fast to the general orientation of the revolutionary struggle pointed out by Chairman Mao, to closely follow his strategic plan and, through the revolutionary mass criticism and repudiation combined with the struggle-criticism-transformation in the respective units, to consolidate and develop the revolutionary great alliance and revolutionary "three-in-one combination" and make a success of the struggle-criticism-transformation in these units, thus carrying the great proletarian cultural revolution through to the end.

Chairman Mao has recently instructed us that "it is imperative to combat selfishness and criticize and repudiate revisionism." By combating selfishness, we mean to use Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought to fight selfish ideas in one's own mind. By criticizing and repudiating revisionism, we mean to use Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's

thought to combat revisionism and struggle against the handful of Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road. These two tasks are interrelated. Only when we have done a good job of eradicating selfish ideas, can we better carry on the struggle against revisionism through to the end.

We must respond to the great call of Chairman Mao and, with the instruction "combat selfishness and criticize and repudiate revisionism" as the guiding principle, strengthen the ideological education of the army and civilian cadres and of the Red Guards. Various kinds of study classes should be organized both at the central and local levels and can also be run by the revolutionary mass organizations, so that the whole country will be turned into a great school of Mao Tse-tung's thought. These studies will help our veteran and new cadres and young revolutionary fighters learn and apply Mao Tse-tung's thought in a living way, liquidate all sorts of non-proletarian ideas in their minds, raise their ideological and political level and perform new meritorious deeds for the people.

We must respond to the great call of Chairman Mao to "grasp the revolution and promote production," energetically promote the development of our industrial and agricultural production and rapidly raise our scientific and technological level.

We must respond to the great call of Chairman Mao and unfold a movement of "supporting the army and cherishing the people." We must strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat and resolutely suppress the sabotaging activities by class enemies, domestic and foreign.

The great proletarian cultural revolution is a movement that integrates Mao Tse-tung's thought with the broad masses of the people. Once Mao Tse-tung's thought is grasped by hundreds of millions of people, it turns into an invincible material force, ensuring that the dictatorship of the proletariat

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in our country will never change its colour and enabling our socialist revolution and socialist construction to advance victoriously along the road of Mao Tse-tung's thought!

Proletarian revolutionaries, unite, hold high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought and carry the great proletarian cultural revolution through to the end!

Workers of all countries, unite; workers of the world, unite with the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations!

Down with imperialism headed by the United States!

Down with modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist leading clique as its centre!

Resolute support to the Vietnamese people in their great war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation!

Resolute support to the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America!

Resolute support to the revolutionary struggles of all peoples in the world!

We are determined to liberate Taiwan!

Long live the great unity of the peoples of all nationalities of China!

Long live the People's Republic of China!

Long live the great, glorious and correct Communist Party of China!

Long live great Marxism-Leninism!

Long live the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung!

Long live Chairman Mao, our great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander and great helmsman! A long, long life to him!

("Jen-min Jih-pao," Peking, October 2, 1967)

ON EDUCATIONAL REFORM

by Lin Piao

The content of education must be simplified and condensed. Things of secondary importance should be axed. We must axe those things of secondary importance without reluctance. One who wants to learn everything will learn nothing in the long run. In fighting a battle, it is necessary to concentrate forces on one point in order to achieve a breakthrough. One must not be too greedy. To use only a small part of one's energy on matters of secondary importance is the dialectical way of doing things.

Everything has many aspects. There is the primary aspect and the secondary aspect. Once the primary aspect is solved, the secondary aspect will be readily solved.

With respect to military affairs, politics and philosophy, the basic principles are only a few. If you have mastered them thoroughly, you will be able to apply them as you wish.

It is necessary to grasp the important point. This is true of all things. What is the important point? This must be chosen carefully. In fighting a battle, for example, the important points are concentration of forces, giving major prominence to the orientation, and the timing of a general offensive, etc.

There are people who always want to learn more, but the result is just the opposite. The more they try to learn in excess of their ability, the less they will be able to learn. This is dialectics too. That is the meaning of Lao Tzu's saying: "One gains by learning a little, but is bewildered when he learns much." If there is too much to learn, both teachers

and students will be too busy. They cram their brains, but they don't have a clear understanding of what they have learned and therefore are not versed in practical work. Every time students are through with school, they are utterly worn out. They may have learned a great amount of things, but they have no method, so that they can hardly make use of them with skill. This does not tally with the principle of achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results.

In order to choose the important points properly, it is necessary for everyone to make a genuine effort to get to the very core of things, and correctly and appropriately decide on what to retain and what to discard.

We must carefully study and perfect the teaching methods. We must not use the bourgeois methods. The bourgeoisie regard education as a commercial enterprise, deliberately making it deep so as to prolong the time of education and raise the prices. The content of our education must be simple and easy to understand, and methods of education must be diversified so that everybody can really learn something. We should do away with formalistic and trivial things.

(Chung-hsüeh Hung-wei-ping [Middle School Red Guard], November 6, 1967, edited by Canton Middle School Red Guards Revolutionary Joint Committee)

SPEECH AT PEKING RALLY COMMEMORATING THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

by Lin Piao

Comrades, Young Red Guard Fighters and Friends,

Today the Chinese people join the proletarians and revolutionary people throughout the world in grand and solemn commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution.

The October Revolution led by the great Lenin was a turning point in human history.

The victory of the October Revolution broke through the dark rule of capitalism, established the first state of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the world and opened a new era of the world proletarian revolution.

For more than one hundred years since Marx and Engels formulated the theory of scientific socialism, the international proletariat, advancing wave upon wave and making heroic sacrifices, has been waging arduous struggles for the great ideal of communism and has performed immortal exploits in the cause of the emancipation of mankind.

In his struggle against the revisionism of the Second International and in the great practice of leading the October Socialist Revolution, Lenin solved a series of problems of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat as well as the problem of victory for socialism in one country, thus developing Marxism to the stage of Leninism. Leninism

is Marxism in the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution. The salvoes of the October Revolution brought Leninism to all countries, so that the world took on an entirely new look.

In the last fifty years, following the road of the October Revolution under the banner of Marxism-Leninism, the proletariat and revolutionary people of the world have carried the world history forward to another entirely new era, the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to worldwide victory. It is a great new era in which the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are locked in the decisive battle on a worldwide scale.

Led by the great leader Chairman Mao, the Chinese people have followed up their victory in the national-democratic revolution with great victories in the socialist revolution and socialist construction. Socialist China has become the mighty bulwark of world revolution. Adhering to the road of the October Revolution, the heroic people of Albania have raised a bright red banner in Europe. By their war against U.S. imperialist aggression and for national salvation, the Vietnamese people have set a brilliant example of struggle against imperialism for the people of the whole world. The movement of national-democratic revolution in Asia, Africa and Latin America is developing vigorously. The ranks of the Marxist-Leninists are growing steadily, and a new situation has emerged in the international communist movement.

Compared with half a century ago, the world proletarian revolution today is far deeper in content, far broader in scope and far sharper in its struggle. The new historical era has posed a series of important new problems for Marxist-Leninists. However, in the final analysis, the most fundamental problem remains that of seizing and consolidating political power.

Chairman Mao has said: "The aim of every revolutionary struggle in the world is the seizure and consolidation of political power." This is a great Marxist-Leninist truth.

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The struggle between the Marxist-Leninists and the revisionists always focuses on this fundamental issue. The modern revisionists, represented by Khrushchov and his successors, Brezhnev, Kosygin and company, are wildly opposing the revolution of the people of the world and have openly abandoned the dictatorship of the proletariat and brought about an all-round capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union. This is a monstrous betrayal of Marxism-Leninism. It is a monstrous betrayal of the great Soviet people and the people of the world. Therefore, if the proletariat fails to smash the wanton attacks of the modern revisionists, if it does not firmly defend the road of the October Revolution opened up by the great Lenin, continue to advance along this road under the new historical conditions and thoroughly solve the question of how to seize and consolidate political power, it will not be able to win final victory, or will probably lose political power even after seizing it, and, like the Soviet people, will come under the rule of a new privileged bourgeois stratum.

It is our good fortune that because Comrade Mao Tse-tung has comprehensively inherited and developed the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin on proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, the most fundamental issue of the world proletarian revolution, that is, the road to the seizure and consolidation of political power, has been brought to a higher stage in theory and in practice. Our great leader Chairman Mao has developed Marxism-Leninism and raised it to an entirely new peak. The ever-victorious thought of Mao Tse-tung is Marxism-Leninism in the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to worldwide victory.

In the course of leading the great struggle of the Chinese revolution, Chairman Mao has with genius solved a whole series of complicated problems concerning the seizure of political power by force of arms. Under his leadership, the Chinese people went through the most protracted, fierce, arduous and complex people's revolutionary war in the history

of the world proletarian revolution and founded the red political power, the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The way the Chinese people seized political power by force of arms under Chairman Mao's leadership may be summarized as follows: Under the leadership of the political party of the proletariat, to arouse the peasant masses in the countryside to wage guerrilla war, unfold an agrarian revolution, build rural base areas, use the countryside to encircle the cities and finally capture the cities. This is a great new development of the road to the seizure of political power by force of arms indicated by the October Revolution.

Chairman Mao has said: "As a rule, revolution starts, grows and triumphs first in those places in which the counter-revolutionary forces are comparatively weak." Since in our time all the reactionary ruling classes have a tight grip on the main cities, it is necessary for a revolutionary political party to utilize the vulnerable links and areas of reactionary rule, fully arouse the masses, conduct guerilla warfare, establish stable revolutionary bases and so build up and temper their own forces, and, through prolonged fighting, strive step by step for complete victory in the revolution. Hence, reliance on the masses to build rural revolutionary base areas and use the countryside to encircle the cities is a historic task which the oppressed nations and peoples in the world today must seriously study and tackle in their fight to seize political power by force of arms.

Not only has Comrade Mao Tse-tung creatively developed Leninism on the question of the seizure of political power by the proletariat, he has made an epoch-making creative development of Leninism on the most important question of our time — the question of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and preventing the restoration of capitalism.

From the first day of the victory of the October Revolution, Lenin paid close attention to the consolidation of the

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new-born Soviet state power. He recognized the sharp and protracted nature of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat, pointing out that "the transition from capitalism to communism takes an entire historical epoch. Until this epoch is over, the exploiters inevitably cherish the hope of restoration, and the hope turns into attempts at restoration."

The biggest lesson in the history of the international communist movement in the last fifty years is the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This harsh fact has strikingly brought the Marxist-Leninists of the world face to face with the question of how to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and prevent the restoration of capitalism.

It is Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the great teacher of the world proletariat of our time, who in the new historical conditions, has systematically summed up the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the world, scientifically analysed the contradictions in socialist society, profoundly shown the laws of class struggle in socialist society and put forward a whole set of theory, line, principles, methods and policies for the continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. With supreme courage and wisdom, Chairman Mao has successfully led the first great proletarian cultural revolution in history. This is an extremely important landmark, demonstrating that Marxism-Leninism has developed to the stage of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

The victory of the great proletarian cultural revolution has opened up in China, which has a quarter of the world's population, a bright path for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and for carrying the socialist revolution through to the end. The proletariat and the revolutionary people of the world who are fighting imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction resolutely support our great proletarian cultural revolution. They find in the victory of this revolution tre-

mendous inspiration, bright prospects and greater confidence in victory.

The imperialists headed by the United States and their lackeys the modern revisionists and all the reactionaries have taken great pains to curse and vilify our great proletarian cultural revolution. This proves by negative example that our victory has dealt the enemy a very heavy blow and that they are nothing but a bunch of vampires that are bound to be destroyed.

The world is moving forward. And theory, which reflects the laws of the world, is likewise developing continuously.

Mao Tse-tung's thought is the banner of our era.

Once Mao Tse-tung's thought — Marxism-Leninism at its highest in the present era — is grasped, the oppressed nations and peoples will, through their own struggles, be able to win liberation.

Once Mao Tse-tung's thought — Marxism-Leninism at its highest in the present era — is grasped, the countries that have already established the dictatorship of the proletariat will, through their own struggles, be able to prevent the restoration of capitalism.

Once Mao Tse-tung's thought — Marxism-Leninism at its highest in the present era — is grasped, the people of those countries where political power has been usurped by revisionists will, through their own struggles, be able to overthrow the rule of revisionism and re-establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Once Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought is integrated with the revolutionary practice of the people of all countries, the entire old world will be shattered to smithereens.

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Comrades, young Red Guard fighters and friends:

The fifty years since the October Revolution have been years of fierce struggle between socialism and capitalism and between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism, with the former winning one victory after another. The imperialist system resembles a dying person who is sinking fast, like the sun setting beyond the western hills. The emergence of Khrushchov revisionism is a product of imperialist policy and reflects the death-bed struggle of imperialism. Although imperialism and revisionism will go on making trouble in collusion with each other, the reactionary adverse current can, after all, never become the main current. The dialectics of history is irresistible. Henceforth, the proletariat and the revolutionary people of the world will raise still higher the great red banner of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, and march forward in giant strides along the road opened up by the October Revolution!

Those who betray the October Revolution can never escape the punishment of history. Khrushchov has long since fallen. In redoubling its efforts to pursue the policy of betrayal, the Brezhnev-Kosygin clique will not last long either. The proletariat and the working people of the Soviet Union, with their glorious tradition of revolution, will never forget the teachings of the great Lenin and Stalin. They are sure to rise in revolution under the banner of Leninism, overthrow the rule of the reactionary revisionist clique and bring the Soviet Union back into the orbit of socialism.

Comrades, young Red Guard fighters and friends!

The situation in our great motherland is excellent. Under the guidance of the latest instructions of the great leader Chairman Mao, the great proletarian cultural revolution is forging ahead victoriously.

We must raise still higher the great banner of the October

SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

Revolution and the great banner of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, and carry the great proletarian cultural revolution through to the end.

We must build our great motherland into a still more powerful base for world revolution.

We must give ever more vigorous support to the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat and people of all countries.

We must, together with the revolutionary people everywhere, carry through to the end the struggle against U.S.—led imperialism and against modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique as its centre.

We must intensify our efforts in studying and mastering Mao Tse-tung's thought and disseminate it still more widely throughout the world.

These are glorious tasks entrusted to the people of our country by history, and they are our incumbent international duty.

Our great leader Chairman Mao has given the call: "Let the Marxist-Leninists of all countries unite, let the revolutionary people of the whole world unite and overthrow imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction. A new world without imperialism, without capitalism and without exploitation of man by man will surely be built."

Let us fight with courage for the realization of this great call of Chairman Mao's!

Long live the great October Socialist Revolution!

Long live the great proletarian cultural revolution!

Workers of all countries, unite!

Workers of all countries, unite with the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations!

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Long live the invincible Marxism, Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought!

Long live the great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander, great helmsman Chairman Mao! A long, long life to him!

("Jen-min Jih-pao", Peking, November 7, 1967)

INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF THREE-IN-ONE COMBINATION

by Lin Piao

Without this movement, this vigorous movement of the great cultural revolution, many good people would have slipped our attention, successors would have slipped our attention and new people of the younger generation would have gone by unnoticed. In the course of this struggle, bad people have of course been exposed, struck down, discredited and toppled, but good people have also sprung up. This provides a guarantee for our future plans, plans for a hundred years to come. Many good people, many proletarian revolutionaries, have sprung up. These people would have otherwise been hard pressed and would not have been able to show their heads. Bad people have been struck down; good people have been discovered. Without this revolution, bad people would not have been struck down and good people would not have been discovered, and our leadership may fall into the hands of bad people in the future.

It is not absolutely necessary to liberate all standing committee members before forming the three-in-one combination. Those to be included in this combination should be competent, otherwise you would have to handle the businesses yourselves. Those who did not take part in the struggle but merely showed themselves should not be included. Include only those who have been tempered in the struggle. It will take a considerable length of time for those included in the combination to build up their prestige among the masses.

The number of cadres serving in the three-in-one organ

should be kept to the minimum. They may be divided into several groups. Apart from those on duty, students should still attend school, workers should still go to the factories. Otherwise, capitalism will make a comeback very soon. We should get used to this right from the beginning. It is impossible to form a great alliance or three-in-one combination of one colour, which would be an ideal. Some people can still be dragged along for as long as necessary. As to what is called a "big hotchpotch," only those without leadership power can be considered as a big hotchpotch, those with basic leadership power are not.

Without the support of the army, the rebels would have a hard time passing their days. The masses are aware of the importance of arms. Without the support of arms, they are not secure even after seizing power, for there is not one single political power without arms.

If we don't trust the army and the revolutionary leading cadres, it would become necessary to effect a reorganization. If we don't trust the representatives of the mass organizations, then all three components of the three-in-one combination are questionable and should be kicked aside. We should make it clear to everybody that the revolutionary committee is itself a provisional power organ. It cannot be so perfect and needs readjustments from time to time. You should retain the good ones and send away the bad ones. On the one hand, it is the political power of today; on the other, it paves the way for the establishment of a formal organ of power.

(Reprinted by Propaganda Department of Red Guard HQ. of Municipal Organs and "Steel August 1" of Kuang Shih, January 28, 1968)

SPEECH AT RECEPTION OF ARMY CADRES

(March 24, 1968)

by Lin Piao

Comrades:

The meeting is now in session.

This meeting is to announce an important decision adopted recently by the Central Committee.

Recently, new problems and new contradictions have emerged in the activities of the Party and a new situation has arisen in the class struggle. Although these problems are not as big as those of Liu, Teng, T'ao, P'eng, Lu, Lo and Yang, they are bigger than other ordinary problems. The Chairman said that although the problems were not big, they were not small either.

These problems are concerned with the conspiracy between Yang Ch'eng-wu and Yu Li-chin to usurp the leadership of the Air Force and to overthrow Wu Fa-hsien, and the conspiracy between Yang Ch'eng-wu and Fu Ch'ung-pi to overthrow Hsieh Fu-chih. Moreover, Yang Ch'eng-wu had the personal ambition of eliminating Hsu Shih-yu, Han Hsien-ch'u and Huang Yung-sheng, and others of similar rank to his.

The Central Committee convened four meetings consecutively at the Chairman's place and decided to dismiss Yang Ch'eng-wu from his post as Acting Chief of the General Staff, to have Yu Li-chin arrested and dealt with according to law, and to dismiss Fu Ch'ung-pi from the post of Commander

of Peking Garrison. It also decided to appoint Comrade Huang Yung-sheng as Chief of the General Staff, and Wen Yu-ch'eng, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, as Commander of Peking Garrison concurrently.

Comrades: Life is full of contradictions and struggles. It develops and advances through these contradictions and struggles. Contradictions are resolved through struggles. Hence, we should not take this as a very strange thing. Naturally, we hope that there are no contradictions, but contradictions exist objectively. Contradictions represent the objective law of things. There were contradictions in the past, there are contradictions now and we cannot expect to be free from contradictions in future.

On the other hand, we of course would do our best to prevent contradictions from turning into grave contradictions and grave situations, do our best to enable comrades not to make mistakes or make less mistakes, and do their work well. This has been Chairman Mao's wish in the past as well as at present. It shows his consistent concern for the cadres.

We comrades of the Central Committee all share his feelings. It is our wish that there will be no trouble, that trouble will occur less frequently, and that there will be no big trouble. This is our feeling and our will. However, troubles do occur and this is an objective law which does not change according to our will. So, we have no alternative but to face the reality and expose and resolve the contradictions. The abscess has to be punctured and fire cannot be wrapped in paper. We, therefore, have to face the contradictions and resolve them.

First, Yang Ch'eng-wu's mistake is chiefly that of mountain-topism, double-dealings and distortion of Marxism. Mountain-topism, sectarianism, devotion to the interests of a small group, individualism and factionalism are essentially the same kind of things. Although they differ in name, in

meaning and in scope, they are essentially the same: they are non-proletarian ideas, ideas of the exploiting classes and the bourgeoisie which are incompatible with the Party character and the unity of the Party, and are opposed to communism, opposed to the Party and harmful to unity. If such ideas grow a bit, our Party will be a bit less united. Hence, if we are to strengthen the unity of the Party, we must oppose mountain-topism, sectarianism, devotion to the interests of a small group, individualism and factionalism. (Comrade Wen-yuan shouted the slogan: Down with individualistic ambitionists! Down with conspirators!)

Communist ideas are sharply and diametrically opposed to such backward ideas. If such backward ideas grow a bit, progressive ideas will depreciate a bit and this will bring a bit bigger loss to our cause.

The whole set of communist theories, numerous as they are, can be generalized as destroying self-interest and fostering devotion to the public interests. Mountain-topism runs counter to communist ideology and is bound to give rise to all kinds of bad conduct. Such backward ideas may lead to seditious activities. In some places, such a possibility has become a fact; in other places, it is still in a state of latency.

Yang Ch'eng-wu believes only in his tiny group of men, men with whom he has close ties. He does not believe in others. This is incompatible with the historical facts of victory of the Chinese revolution. The whole war was won by the four field armies — the first, second, third and fourth field armies. The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Area Command was only a part of the four field armies and Yang Ch'eng-wu was only in charge of its first sub-district. There were three other sub-districts. The first sub-district consisted of cadres of the 115th Division — only one-fourth of them; the other three-fourths were somewhere else. He only used his men, leaving the others out of consideration. If his method of doing things was to be followed, he would have got rid of Wu Fa-hsien and

Hsieh Fu-chih, and then Hsu Shih-yu, Han Hsien-ch'u, Huang Yung-sheng, Ch'en Hsi-lien and Yang Te-chih. We cannot adopt his way of doing things because, firstly, he is wrong, and secondly, he is in the minority. After weighing the pros and cons, we are to strike down, not the others, but them.

Historically, sectarianism and mountain-topism have always been harmful to the Party cause. Whenever such ideas prevailed, damage would be done to our cause; whenever Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought gained the upper hand in our struggle against these things, our fighting strength would be increased, and our power would grow bigger. In order to defend the Party cause and for the interests of the Party, we must resolutely oppose these trends of thought, these backward ideas. All those who have such ideas and do such things will have no good end. Whoever believes in mountain-topism and does things harmful to the revolutionary cause will have no good end. Communism, utter devotion to public interests, the Party character — these are the ideology and moral principles of the proletariat, a political quality peculiar to the proletariat, which any other class does not possess.

Ours is a proletarian party. We are representatives of communism, and communism is the goal of our struggle. It is for this reason that we cannot adopt such backward ideas, and that is why our Chairman has always opposed them.

Mountain-topism is actually an enlarged form of individualism. Superficially, it is for the interests of a particular group; actually, it is for the interests of the individual who makes use of that group. Mountain-topism would turn the political power of our Party and our class into a political power of the individual, a sectarian political power, a bourgeois political power, a political power that suppresses the proletariat. We should therefore very carefully guard ourselves against making such mistakes. (Comrade Chiang Ch'ing shouted the slogan: Down with individualistic ambitionists! Down with Double-dealers!)

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On the one hand, we must oppose the mountain-topism of Yang Ch'eng-wu; on the other, we must pay attention to:

(1) We must not, just because we oppose Yang Ch'eng-wu, oppose all those who worked under him, knew him and supported him. These relations were determined by historical conditions independent of one's choice. By displaying the signboard of the Communist Party and that of Chairman Mao, Yang Ch'eng-wu could easily pull the wool over people's eyes and prevent them from seeing through his personal ambitions. Hence, we must trust all those comrades who had worked under him. However, after this issue has been clearly explained, we cannot use those who still fail to draw a line of distinction between themselves and him and continue to follow him. Nor can we tolerate them. After we have made it clear, those who come over to the line of Chairman Mao's shall have our full confidence. (Comrade Chiang Ch'ing shouted the slogan: Learn from the Liberation Army! Salute to the Liberation Army!)

(2) Those who were in the past opposed by Yang Ch'eng-wu in or outside the General Staff Department, such as Wang Hsiang-yung, Lei Ying-fu and Chang Ai-p'ing, have their own debts to settle. It was proper and right to oppose and overthrow them at that time. It was done under the leadership of the Party and with the approval of the Central Committee. Wang Hsiang-yung and Lei Ying-fu are Ho Lung's men, and participated in Ho Lung's overall plot to seize military power, the power of the General Staff Department, the power of the Navy. It was correct to struggle against them, to expose Ho Lung's ambition to usurp army leadership. It was correct to drag out his henchmen. These people should not be allowed to have their verdict reversed just because they opposed Yang Ch'eng-wu. Similarly, the dismissal of Wang (Li), Kuan (Feng) and Ch'i (Pen-yu) does not mean that the verdict on the "February adverse current" can be reversed. It was correct to struggle the February adverse current and it was necessary and correct to topple T'an Chen-lin and company, the black generals of

the February adverse current. (Comrade Chiang Ch'ing shouted the slogan: Down with T'an Chen-lin, black, ferocious general of the February adverse current! Vice-Premier Hsieh Fu-chih shouted: Defend Chairman Mao till death! Defend the Party Central Committee till death! Defend the Cultural Revolution of the Central Committee till death!)

That is the first point I wanted to talk about. Another point is that Yang Ch'eng-wu's political character is very bad. He is a double-dealer. As Chairman Mao has said: "In the struggle against incorrect tendencies, the behaviour of double-dealers deserves our serious attention. The most dangerous aspect of double-dealers' behaviour is the possibility of their developing into small groups to carry out activities. The history of Chang Kuo-t'ao testifies to this. It is characteristic of the double-dealers to feign compliance, to say one thing but mean another, to talk sweet words in one's presence but speak against him behind his back. We must arouse the attention of the cadres and Party members to the activities of double-dealers so that our Party discipline can be strengthened." (Comrade Wen-yuan shouted: Down with individualistic ambitionists! Down with conspirators!)

Chairman Mao said: "What still exists in our Party to a serious extent, and almost everywhere, is a more or less blind 'mountain-stronghold' mentality. For instance, there is a lack of mutual understanding, mutual respect and unity among comrades of different units, which arises from differences in their background of struggle, differences in the areas in which they work (as between one base area and another and as between the Japanese-occupied areas, the Kuomintang areas and the revolutionary base areas) and differences in their departments of work (as between one army unit and another and as between one kind of work and another); this phenomenon seems quite commonplace but in fact it seriously obstructs the unity of the Party and the growth of its fighting capacity."

Chairman Mao also said: "Sectarian tendencies in internal

relations lead to exclusiveness towards comrades inside the Party and hinder inner-Party unity and solidarity, while sectarian tendencies in external relations lead to exclusiveness towards people outside the Party and hinder the Party in its task of uniting the whole people. Only by uprooting this evil in both its aspects can the Party advance unimpeded in its great task of achieving unity among all Party comrades and among all the people of our country."

Everybody thought Yang Ch'eng-wu was opposed to Lo Jui-ch'ing. Actually, however, he was a Lo Jui-ch'ing element. He closely followed Lo Jui-ch'ing, although superficially he opposed him. He participated in the struggle against P'eng Chen but actually he supported him. His behaviour was such that he did one thing in one's presence and another behind one's back, and he would not admit what he had done. For example, Fu Ch'ung-pi led several truck-loads of fully armed troops to storm into the premises of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee to arrest people. They were actually sent by Yang Ch'eng-wu but he denied having done so. He and several others went to see Nieh Yuan-tzu and wrongly spoke ill of her, but he would not admit that either. He told the General Staff Department not to give him publicity, but on the other hand, he let his subordinates publicize him. All these are double-faced tactics.

Yang Ch'eng-wu opposed Ho Lung and P'eng Chen's seizure of power and dismissal of others from office, but he did the same thing himself. No one in the Air Force belonged to the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region in the past, so he formed close ties with Yu Li-chin by making use of illicit sexual relations. A secretary in the Air Force was involved in illicit sexual relations. His wife wanted to make a complaint and the secretary wanted a divorce. Later Wu Fa-hsien, out of good intention, isolated this comrade from others in order to protect the honour of Yang Ch'eng-wu and his daughter. But Yang insisted on branding those comrades who made a report on the matter as counter-revolutionaries and wanted Wu Fa-

hsien to admit his mistake. This was utterly unreasonable and insulting, and was designed to overthrow Wu Fa-hsien.

The Central Committee prohibits spying within the Party. However, Yang Ch'eng-wu spied on Wu Fa-hsien, spied on when Wu Fa-hsien's car went out, where to, and what time it returned. He even spied on the activities of the comrades of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee and the Premier.

In the struggle against Lo Jui-ch'ing, Yang disagreed to the verdict that Lo was a capitalist roader. Superficially he opposed Lo Jui-ch'ing, but actually he protected him. He opposed Lo at the enlarged meeting of the Military Commission, but, seeing that Teng Hsiao-p'ing and P'eng Chen spoke in defense of Lo, he retracted his statement. He would not permit mentioning of Lo Jui-ch'ing's relationship with P'eng Chen and Yang Shang-k'un. He ganged up with Wang, Kuan and Ch'i and masterminded many of the bad things done by them. He is, therefore, the real back-stage boss of Wang, Kuan and Ch'i. He is a typical double-dealer and ambitionist with a very bad political character.

On the surface he supported Chairman Mao, but actually he was disloyal to Chairman Mao, to the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee. He even employed secret police methods to spy on the activities of Chairman Mao and Comrade Chiang Ch'ing.

Last spring when I was in Peitaiho due to poor health, the Chairman asked him to call on me to discuss the problems of Wang, Kuan and Ch'i, but he refused. He consented to go only after being urged again and again. So don't you believe that he supports Chairman Mao, he does not.

I once said that we were very fortunate to have Chairman Mao leading us, and I cited the saying: "It is good to enjoy the cool breeze under the shade of a big tree!" Some people

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opposed this remark, yet Yang Ch'eng-wu defended them, saying: "That is nothing to be proud of." It can thus be seen that he underestimated the great role of Chairman Mao to the whole Party, the whole country and the people of the whole world.

On the surface he supported Comrade Chiang Ch'ing, but actually he was discontented with her. When Comrade Chiang Ch'ing was ill, he and Ch'i Pen-yu started to collect black material against her as early as last spring, and treated it as a special case. (The Premier shouted: Beat down anyone who opposes Comrade Chiang Ch'ing! Comrade Yeh Ch'un shouted: Whoever collects black material against Comrade Chiang Ch'ing cannot escape punishment!) They persecuted Comrade Chiang Ch'ing.

Quite obviously, Comrade Chiang Ch'ing is a very outstanding one among women comrades of our Party, a very outstanding one among our cadres. She has very warm revolutionary feelings, at the same time she is very thoughtful, very sensitive about things, and is capable of discovering problems and adopting timely and effective measures to deal with them. She had not been in good health in the past, so we did not understand her. But we can see her great role in the great cultural revolution. On the one hand, she faithfully implements Chairman Mao's directives; on the other, she has great creative power and has performed great merits during the great cultural revolution. The great successes attained in the great cultural revolution are attributable to the wise leadership of Chairman Mao, to the efforts of the Central Committee comrades, and to the unique role played by Comrade Chiang Ch'ing. She has always been standing in the forefront of the movement.

Superficially, Yang Ch'eng-wu did not seem to have personal ambitions, but actually he did have. After the 11th plenary session of the 8th Central Committee, he wanted to have the word "acting" removed from his title as Acting Chief

of the General Staff. The Chairman and the Central Committee had found out long ago that he was not the suitable person. The Chairman said that he really had no faith in him, but would let him show his paces. Now it appears that the Chairman's appraisal was correct. But Yang Ch'eng-wu does not understand himself well enough. He was not content with his post as Acting Chief of the General Staff and wanted to have the word "acting" removed.

In the General Staff Department, he wanted to establish his absolute authority. Ostensibly he did not care for personal fame, but actually he was very keen on building up his reputation. A woman comrade in the General Staff Department did not go along with his theory of absolute authority, so he had her isolated from others to make self-examination, and put her under the surveillance of three persons. Recently, a document of the three services was not supposed to be handled by him, yet he insisted on having his name written on his article "Establish in a Big Way." He fought desperately to have his article published, and was not satisfied with having it printed on the second page either. On that day, the first page of the newspapers was to be devoted to Chairman Mao's instruction on the educational revolution, but Yang wanted to place his article above the Chairman's. After his article was published, he even issued an order for the whole army to study it. When this order was withheld by Wu Fa-hsien, he even informed the departments concerned by telephone.

There are many instances in which Yang Ch'eng-wu manifested his mountain-stronghold mentality and two-faced tactics. I have picked up some titbits about him during the meetings in the last two days. They are, however, not complete and inaccurate. Nevertheless, the facts mentioned above are sufficient to show his political character.

The third question deals with his article. Chairman Mao spoke to me today that besides mountain-topism and double-dealings, I should also discuss Marxism-Leninism. Yang Ch'eng-

wu's article is anti-Marxist. It is necessary to explain clearly the question of absoluteness and relativity.

Chairman Mao does not agree to Yang's thesis of "absolute authority." This point was first brought up by an ordinary fighter, and his view was subsequently published in the *Jen-min Jih-pao*. It is permissible to use this term romantically to express a fighter's warm affections for Chairman Mao, but it is incorrect to use it as a scientific and philosophical term. Yang Ch'eng-wu thought it could also be applied philosophically. This is not correct and is a departure from Marxism-Leninism.

Chairman Mao commented on this in December last year. He said: **"It is not appropriate to advocate absolute authority. There has never been an absolute authority that exists singly. All authorities are relative. All absolute things exist in relative things. Similarly, absolute truth is the sum total of numerous relative truths; absolute truth exists only in the individual relative truths."**

This was Chairman Mao's comment on the question.

Relativity and absoluteness are within the category applicable to the question of truth, the category of the unity of opposites. Marxism does not believe absoluteness can exist in isolation. Absoluteness can only exist within relativity and is always integrated with relativity. We are closer to the absolute truth as our cognition improves. Absoluteness cannot exist independently and form an entity of its own, just as an abstract concept cannot be separated from the concrete matters, the general cannot be separated from the individual, and identity cannot be separated from individuality. We admit that there is absoluteness, but it can only exist within relativity. Our knowledge is always relative — whether our knowledge of Nature, of society or of a certain principle of ideology, they all remain in a state of relativity. Only through numerous relativities can our knowledge approach absoluteness. But there is never an end to our knowledge; it can be absolute

only when things have stopped to develop, but things are always developing. Dialectics may also be described as the law of development, the law of movement, or the law of change. Things are always developing and are not unchangeable. We cannot consider a concept as fixed and unchangeable; a concept changes along with the change of things. If we entertain an absolute concept, our thinking would be ossified.

Of course, our knowledge of things under given conditions has its reliability. This we cannot deny for if we do, we would become relativistic. But if we consider things and truths as absolute, the development of things would be ossified and our concept and thinking would be ossified. This is also true to natural sciences. The truths of natural sciences are also conditional, temporary, relative and not unchangeable. For example, water is a liquid at above zero degree centigrade; it becomes gas at above 100 degrees, and turns solid at below zero degree. This is also relative and conditional. If we take the water to a very high mountain, it turns gas even at less than 100 degrees because of the low atmospheric pressure. Under another condition, water would not turn solid even at zero degree. All sciences — physics, chemistry, biology, etc. — exist under given conditions; they are developing and are conditional. There are many things we still don't know at present, and there are many mistakes in what we have already known. Whatever the books say about natural sciences, therefore, are subject to development. This applies to certain things which are universally known, as many mistakes can be found in them. Many established theories are applicable only to the conditions of the earth; they would be exploded if taken to the moon. Still more things would be exploded if taken to the sun, where the temperature is over 10,000 degrees. This is why communist ideology is not conservative but developing constantly, thanks to the relations between the relative truth and the absolute truth.

All of our knowledges are absolute as well as relative; they are as a rule dualistic and not monistic. Lenin said that

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relativity and absoluteness are also relative. This guiding thought enables us to see the changes of all things, including science. These two categories are used regularly in epistemology, and in the theory of truth. If we make a mistake on this question or fail to understand it, we would cease to develop and would commit a mistake of dogmatism, resulting in our thinking being ossified. Marxism is correct, but Lenin has greatly developed it. Certain rules under the conditions of Marxism became unapplicable afterwards, but certain basic principles are still correct and conform with the truth. Marxism-Leninism has embarked upon the new stage of Mao Tse-tung's thought. Chairman Mao has greatly developed Marxism-Leninism. Has not Chairman Mao solved the questions Marxism-Leninism has not been able to solve and brought forth the questions Marxism-Leninism has failed to bring forth? Isn't Chairman Mao still continuing to develop his own thought?

Therefore, it is wrong to consider that things are absolute. As a rule, things are concrete and not abstract, such as table, teacup, amplifier and so forth. The concept of a table can only exist in the table, which is a concrete thing. This is why Chairman Mao taught us again and again to look for the abstract from the concrete, the ordinary from the specific. He has taught us to "dissect the sparrow," that is to integrate absoluteness with relativity, the ordinary with the specific.

Yang Ch'eng-wu's thesis is ridiculous. It is not only philosophically absurd, but also politically wrong. Historically absolute authority existed only in the slave society, where the slaves were legally not human beings but animals and speaking tools. Only in those times was there absolute authority. There is no place for absolute authority in the feudal and capitalist societies, still less in the socialist and communist societies.

The term "absolute authority" can probably still be used as a literary and romantic expression of one's warm affections for Chairman Mao, but it is wrong to use it in the philosophical,

scientific or political sense, for it is anti-Marxist. It negates the development of things, the development of ideology. An ideological mistake is bound to lead to mistakes in action, so we must make this matter clear.

My speech is based on fragmentary materials picked up here and there. I have been talking at random on very incomplete and inaccurate materials. But I have told all of you the decision of the Central Committee. I have discussed three questions — the question of mountain-topism, the question of double-dealers and the question of relativity and absoluteness. Let us call out several slogans to bring my speech to an end.

Be forever loyal to Chairman Mao !

Be forever loyal to Mao Tse-tung's thought !

Be forever loyal to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line !

Strike down whoever opposes Chairman Mao! Strike down whoever opposes the Party's Central Committee!

Strike down whoever opposes the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee! Down with Liu, Teng and T'ao!

Down with P'eng Teh-huai! Down with Ho Lung! Down with P'eng, Lo, Lu and Yang!

Down with Hsiao Hua! Down with T'an Chen-lin, black general of the February adverse current!

Oppose reversal of verdict on the February adverse current! Down with mountain-topism!

Down with sectarianism! Down with double-dealers! Down with bourgeois ambitionists!

Never forget the class struggle, never forget the dictatorship of the proletariat, never forget giving prominence to politics, never forget holding high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought!

Long live the victory of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line!

Long live the dictatorship of the proletariat!

Long live the great, glorious and correct Communist Party of China!

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Long live our great leader Chairman Mao! A long life, a long long life to him!

(Kung-jen Lien-ch'ou [Workers' Alliance Preparatory Committee] of Hsin Hua Printing Factory, Canton, April 15, 1968. Reprinted by Political and Propaganda Unit)

LIN PIAO'S INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING SZECHUAN

(Transmitted by P'ei Chou-yu on June 5)

On May 27, Vice Chairman Lin Piao gave the following important instructions to Chang Kuo-hua and Liang Hsing-ch'u:

The XX conference can solve problems well if it conducts self-criticism. Only in this way can it set up an alliance. Only when an alliance has been formed will it be possible to wage a common struggle against the enemy. The struggle between the two factions cannot go on forever. Some disorder was called for at the beginning to confound the enemy. Work can be done easily **when** the enemy has been duly confounded.

The great cultural revolution is just fine. It has unearthed the deeply entrenched renegades, secret enemy agents and sham communists. Liu Shao-ch'i is a big renegade who has betrayed us on four occasions and is still keeping contacts with the Kuomintang and the United States. Cadres who are proven renegades and trouble-makers should not be used, but those who merely have ideological problems can still be used after being educated.

If Mao Tse-tung's thought is disseminated and studied well, useful persons will be brought up. Formerly our fighters were not trained in schools but were tempered chiefly through the practice of struggle. Cadres can be brought up through the dissemination and study of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

Szechuan is a dark lair. Things of the same kind are grouped together; different kinds of people fall into different

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groups. Li Ching-ch'uan is not a Communist Party member; he sneaked into the Party . . . Some people are ostensibly members of the Communist Party but actually are members of the Kuomintang. P'eng Chen was just like that when he was in the Northeast. He did not replenish the main force but organized local troops. It was previously thought that Ho Lung's problem was one of work style, but now it appears that his is not merely a question of work style but a political problem.

It is a good thing to expose some bad people. But it is not sufficient to attack only those in the open. It is also necessary to drag out those under cover.

Army men participating in local work may be promoted and boldly promoted if they have done well. Without promoting them, we can not maintain the situation.

On the other hand, it is necessary to carry out political work. Cadres may be brought up through education in Mao Tse-tung's thought. At present, some cadres have to be toppled, including the capitalist roaders, renegades, secret enemy agents and diehards who persist in their mistakes and refuse to correct them. Some people have been overthrown by mistake, but we can still use them. Many cadres are needed and the army must become a crucible.

(Tzu-liao Chuan-chi [Special Collection of Materials], No. 1, July 1968. Compiled by the Data Unit of Hung-chi T'ung-hsin of the Workers' Revolutionary Rebel Joint HQ.)

Part III

MILITARY THOUGHT

PRINCIPLES OF LIN PIAO'S MILITARY TACTICS

by Liu Ya-lou

"Four quick, one slow", "two flanks of a point" and "three three rules of formation" -- these are the principles of military tactics put forward by Comrade Lin Piao during the War of Liberation.

By "four quick, one slow," it means that full preparations be made before each combat operation if at all possible, and that while swift and vigorous action is called for to pounce upon the enemy, no move should be made rashly, no battle be fought unprepared and without the confidence of winning it. It was on the basis of this spirit that the principle of "four quick, one slow" was formulated.

"Four quick" means that when advancing towards an enemy, we should move quickly; when preparing for an attack, we should move quickly; when spreading out to take advantage of a breakthrough, we should move quickly; and when pursuing, we should move quickly. "One slow" means that when making a decision to launch a general attack, we should take our time. In other words, an attack should be made only when all preparations have been completed; otherwise, the operation should rather be delayed for a while to allow the troops ample time to get fully prepared.

"Two flanks of a point" means that during an enemy attack, a superior force must be concentrated to break through the enemy line at its weakest point, and then spread out in

the midst of the enemy. No attempt should be made to disperse the forces to swoop down upon the enemy everywhere. At the same time a section of the men should be used to attack the enemy from other directions, so as to encircle the enemy on two, three or four sides. This assists the main forces to break through and ensure the complete annihilation of the enemy.

"Three three rules of formation" is a pattern of tactical organization for basic-level infantry units. A squad is usually divided into three to four teams, each team being made up of three or four men. Such formation makes it convenient for the squad leader to control and direct the operation. It facilitates flexible activities of small groups and enables each group to provide cover for the other. It also helps to minimize casualties caused by enemy fire.

Note: The above are footnotes to the article "Reminiscences of the Battle of Tientsin" written by Liu Ya-lou, former commander of the Chinese Communist Air Force.

HOLD HIGH THE RED BANNER OF THE PARTY'S GENERAL LINE AND MAO TSE-TUNG'S MILITARY THOUGHT AND ADVANCE IN BIG STRIDES

by Lin Piao

I

Our great motherland, the People's Republic of China, now marks the 10th anniversary of its founding. All officers and men of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) join the people of the whole country in enthusiastically greeting this day of great historical significance for the whole people.

Ten years is but a short and brief moment in the course of history. However, in these ten years, our country has scored another great victory in socialist revolution closely following the victory of the new democratic revolution.

In the struggle between the two roads — socialism and capitalism — socialism has, in many respects, basically defeated capitalism. The history of the system of exploitation of the past several thousand years has ended once for all. The 650 million people of our country, constituting one-fourth of mankind, have entered into socialism.

Following three years of economic recovery, during the period from 1953 to 1957, our country fulfilled the First Five-Year Plan for national economic development, raising the primary foundation for the socialist industrialization of our country.

SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

In 1958, in accordance with the proposal initiated by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Party put forward the general line of going all-out, aiming high, and getting greater, quicker, better and more economical results in building socialism. Under the brilliant beacon light of this general line, a giant leap forward in industrial and agricultural production as well as in culture and education has been brought about, making it possible for our country to fulfil the major targets of the Second Five-Year Plan three years ahead of schedule.

In less than two months in autumn last year, the general establishment of people's communes was rapidly achieved in the rural areas throughout the country. In less than a year, the people's communes have consolidated their ground and are on the way to healthy development, bringing their superiority into full play ever more prominently with each passing day.

The development of our socialist construction at such a high speed unparalleled in history and the spectacular achievements made therein have eloquently proved that under the leadership of the great Communist Party of China and the great leader of the people, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the wisdom and the might of the Chinese people in making history are boundless.

Nevertheless, the imperialists are at all times carrying out sabotage activities in an attempt to overthrow us. Shortly after the founding of the People's Republic of China, American imperialism unleashed the war of aggression in Korea and, in the meantime, encroached upon our territory Taiwan in an attempt to strangle the newly born People's Republic after first occupying Korea. The result: they met ignominious defeat.

Frightened and helpless in the face of our giant leap forward and the people's communes, the imperialists have carried out the most vicious slander and attacks against our

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country. Today, they have also met ignominious defeat.

The wheel of history in China is rolling ahead at a flying speed of "one day equals 20 years" in defiance of the obstructions and sabotage of the imperialists and reactionaries. The Chinese people have become strong!

In the past ten years, as in socialist construction and on other fronts, great achievements have also been scored on the national defence front. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the PLA swiftly mopped up remnants of the Kuomintang reactionary troops and liberated the mainland of the country.

The Chinese People's Volunteers together with the Korean People's Army defeated the imperialist forces known as the best in the world. American imperialism - the paper tiger - was exposed to the people of the whole world.

Our armed forces have triumphantly carried through the tasks entrusted to them by the people of the motherland in liberating the offshore islands, in the struggle to defend the frontiers, the coastal regions, and the air space of the motherland, in taking punitive action against the Chiang troops on Quemoy, in the struggle to make preparations for the liberation of Taiwan, and in putting down the reactionary rebellion in Tibet.

On the national defence front and at strategic points in depth, large-scale modern national defence building construction has been carried out, making a start in turning our country into a state equipped with a more integral system of modern defence facilities.

With regard to the armed forces themselves, under the guidance of the correct policy of the Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung for building our armed forces into a fine modernized revolutionary force, and with

the assistance of the Soviet Union and various fraternal countries, they have undergone new and tremendous changes in the history of the development of our armed forces, improving the technical equipment of the armed forces and introducing a series of reforms in the command of armed forces, in organization, training, systems, and so forth.

Today, our armed forces have developed from a single service into an armed force composed of several services: Various major technical services of the army have been significantly strengthened; a powerful air force has been built; and corresponding development has been made in the naval forces. In carrying out the modernization of our armed forces, the Party's absolute leadership over the armed forces has been consolidated and the glorious traditions of the military and people as one entity and officers and men as one entity have been activated; the mass line has been consistently upheld in work in various fields.

Through the great rectification campaign and inspired by the Party's general line for socialist construction and the nation-wide giant leap forward, a heaven-storming all-round giant leap forward has also been brought about in work in the armed forces. In addition to having a standing army which is politically firm and equipped with modern technical equipment, our national defence might also include a militia force of several hundred million people. With such an army, it will be possible — if imperialism dares to launch an attack on our country — to sound the call of "everyone a soldier" and activate all the people to fight in coordination with the standing army, drawing the enemy into the inferno of an all-people's war.

While carrying out the development of the armed forces, our armed forces have constantly and on a large scale participated in national construction and social reform work. Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i noted in the political report delivered on behalf of the Party Central Committee

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before the second session of the 8th National Party Congress that **"the PLA is the defender of socialist construction and also the builder of socialism."** In these ten years, our armed forces have been faithfully carrying out this glorious task.

In these ten years, our country has been undergoing great changes following the basic victory in democratic revolution to socialist revolution and socialist construction; our armed forces are changing from a single service into modern combined armed forces of multiple services. This is also a giant leap forward.

Under such circumstances, a series of important questions concerning the building of our armed forces has appeared before us, questions such as: In this stage of modernization of our armed forces, is it still important to put politics in command? Concretely speaking, questions relating to the status of political work and ideological work, the question of attitude of armed forces personnel towards national economic construction and the mass campaign, the question of how to handle correctly the internal relations among the armed forces, and how to further strengthen leadership over the armed forces have become questions which must be solved in the new stage of our armed forces' development.

In these ten years, as a result of our having adequately solved these important questions, the above-mentioned achievements and victories were scored. These are the experiences we would like to speak of in the main on the 10th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China today.

Realizing socialism and communism has long been the lofty ideal of heroic struggle on the part of our armed forces commanders. Even during the democratic revolution, the Party never for a moment slackened its efforts to teach its

armed forces the ideal of socialism and communism. The great majority of the comrades in our armed forces not only displayed perseverance and courage during the democratic revolution, but they also revealed themselves, during the period of socialist revolution, to be determined fighters in the valiant struggle for socialism.

Although inclined towards the ideal of socialism and cherishing the desire to realize such an ideal, quite a number of comrades, however, lack keen socialist awareness to the extent that at the outset of the socialist revolution, some of the people in this group were still ideologically attached to the stage of democratic revolution. A great number of people gradually achieved the mental preparedness necessary for carrying out socialist revolution only after the start of the socialist revolution. Socialist revolution is far more extensive and penetrating than democratic revolution; it calls for elimination of exploitation systems in all forms and also the elimination of private ownership of means of production. Each and every step in this revolution will have an important effect on the livelihood and thinking of several hundred million people in our country, and the trends of all types of thinking among the people will inevitably reflect in the armed forces in a direct or indirect way. It would be impossible for a revolutionary military man, lacking ample mental preparedness for socialist revolution and who had failed to carry out self-reform seriously, to stand firm in the course of socialist revolution and consciously and unswervingly implement the Party's general line of socialist construction. He will be shocked and will lose his bearings when socialism is genuinely achieved and when private ownership of means of production by the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie ends. Such being the case, the poisonous germs of bourgeois ideology will spread in that physical portion which is low in resistance in our Party and our armed forces, and will play a corrosive and disintegrating role in our Party and our armed forces. As a result, we shall, in the struggle for the realization of

socialism, encounter an opposing force from within.

Within our armed forces, there does not exist the two opposing classes - the working class and the bourgeoisie - but there exists the struggle between the ideology of the working class and that of the bourgeoisie. This form of ideological struggle is the reflection of the two roads - the struggle between socialism and capitalism during the transitional period.

Speaking in the light of the present situation, although the transformation of the old social economic system has been completed, it still has not been thoroughly completed; although the social economic system has changed, remnant ideological and political activities of the bourgeoisie still exist: this shows that while the social foundation of the bourgeoisie is diminishing, it still retains some social basis. The force of habit of the bourgeoisie and small producers is a form of social basis for bourgeois thinking which still finds a market among some people who will take every opportunity to create disturbance and wriggle like worms. If socialist ideology fails to hold ground in the minds of the people, capitalist ideology will occupy that ground. Therefore, during the transitional period, the struggle to promote proletarian ideology and eliminate bourgeois ideology always remained an important subject of discussion in the building of our armed forces. All undertakings of our armed forces and the modernization of our armed forces are inseparable from this ideological struggle. This political and ideological struggle waged by the working class against the bourgeoisie is comparable to billowy waves surging high and low and which still surge even today. This form of struggle will cease only when classes become extinct in the end. Therefore, our education in socialism cannot be accomplished at one stroke but must ride the rolling waves of the class struggle; we must constantly carry out education on theories and policies, a large-scale rectification campaign and an ideological remoulding campaign. The ground for socialist ideology

is occupied and expanded step by step by means of education and struggle. Each and every revolutionist must carry on continuous revolution within the ideological sphere. The "three-anti" campaign, the resist-U.S. and aid-Korea campaign, the campaign for the study of the Party's general line for socialist construction during the transitional period, the campaign for the elimination of counter-revolutionaries, the rectification campaign, the anti-rightist struggle, the great socialist debate centred around the agricultural cooperative movement, and the campaign for the study of the general line for socialist construction centred around the people's communes and the giant leap forward undertaken by us during the past ten years are examples of outstanding and effective political and ideological work. Nevertheless, we must not rest on the laurels of our achievements and must not think that these achievements will, in the future, lighten our tasks on the political and ideological fronts.

In the course of the struggle on the political and ideological fronts, we have always held that speaking of the overwhelming majority of comrades, this is a major question of education and elevating political understanding. Our commanders and fighters sincerely support socialism and resolutely struggle for socialism; they have been tested in many hardships. Those who adhered to the capitalist road and intentionally opposed socialism formed only a handful of dissident elements who sneaked into the armed forces.

However, owing to the fact that the overwhelming majority of our officers and combatants are from the peasantry, it is quite natural that some comrades from time to time consider their problems based on interests of a transient and local nature, and have failed to gain a clear understanding of certain questions concerning socialist transformation; it is also unavoidable that a handful of comrades, under the influence of bourgeois ideology and petty bourgeois ideology — particularly the ideology of rich middle peasants — have revealed an unfirm stand in the

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course of socialist revolution. Such situations do exist; if they are allowed to develop, bourgeois ideology will expand in our armed forces. Therefore, we should never slacken our ideological work. This ideological problem falls within the scope of questions concerning contradictions among the people, which cannot be solved by using the methods used in handling contradictions between ourselves and the enemy, coercive measures, or the method of attack, but can only be solved through democratic methods, the methods of discussion and criticism, and the methods of persuasion through education.

In the new historical era, the political work and ideological work in the armed forces is extremely important and under no circumstances should this work be neglected. "Political work is the lifeline of our armed forces" is a truth which has been proven by our armed forces through practice in revolution in the past several scores of years. Comrade Mao Tse-tung furthermore pointed out in a foot-note to his work "Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside": "Political work is the lifeline of all economic work. At the time when a basic change has taken place in the economic system of society, this line is more important than ever." This remark naturally is applicable to the armed forces. In the course of modernizing our armed forces, we must naturally pay special attention to improving equipment and mastering new techniques, but we must not forget the other side, the most important side, that is, politics and the importance of political work. Our armed forces are military organizations serving politics and socialism. We must use politics to command and guide military affairs as well as other daily routine tasks. Politics is the fundamental factor; we cannot talk about other work if we fail to carry out political and ideological work properly.

That such tremendous achievements could be scored by our armed forces in every field in the past ten years is, first of all, attributable to the blossoming and bearing of

fruit of socialist ideology. To strengthen our education in Marxist-Leninist theory, socialist education, and education in our Party's general line, to combine this educational work with the experiences accumulated in the current revolutionary struggle and the ideological changes which have occurred among the component members of the armed forces, and to struggle unceasingly to eliminate the remnant bourgeois ideology and petty bourgeois ideology from the minds of the people and to further elevate their socialist consciousness are some of the basic tasks in building our armed forces in the future.

III

The Chinese People's Liberation Army, born and developed through the mass revolutionary struggles of the people, has all the time considered the revolutionary mass movement as its own affair. When the people rose to destroy the old systems and to carry out an arduous and heroic struggle to transform society and Nature, the PLA stood closely on the side of the people, rendering sincere and vigorous support to the people and personally participating in the mass movements so as to gain for itself the maximum and best in refinement. When hostile forces attempted to obstruct and undermine the revolutionary mass movements, the PLA always stood in the foremost front to support the masses of people. Moreover, the large-scale movements have also brought immense encouragement and education to the armed forces, forming a revolutionary furnace in which to refine and elevate the political consciousness of the armed forces.

That the PLA could defeat the enemy who was much superior in equipment and number under extremely difficult conditions is due to the fact that it is an armed force having ties of flesh and blood with the people. When the masses of people are fully mobilized, this strength will "drown the enemy in an ocean of disaster, create favourable conditions

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making up for a shortage of weapons and other things, and create prerequisites for overcoming difficulties arising in all wars." Such a relationship between the Chinese PLA and the people has been determined by the basic characteristics of the PLA and the principles underlying the establishment of the PLA. It was like this during the democratic revolution and remained unchanged during the course of launching the socialist revolution.

In March 1949, when a decisive victory in democratic revolution was achieved and a new stage of socialist revolution was approaching, a great call was issued to us by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the 2nd plenary session of the Party's 7th Central Committee, saying that: "**The People's Liberation Army is always a fighting force. In the meantime, it is also a whoking force.**"

After the liberation of the mainland of our country, the major tasks of our armed forces changed chiefly from combat to training and from scattered stationing in rural areas to stationing in barracks, which reduced the opportunities of direct contact between the armed forces and the masses of people. At that time, a certain number of comrades held that there was a division of work between economic construction and national defence construction; that the training duties of the armed forces are very arduous and heavy; and that it is not necessary for the armed forces to participate in the mass revolutionary struggle, national economic construction, and other "local affairs." We expeditiously criticized and corrected such erroneous viewpoints and continued to make efforts to further develop the glorious tradition of performing simultaneously the three major tasks of combat, mass work, and participation in production which were assumed by our armed forces a long time ago.

According to different demands in different periods in the course of carrying out socialist transformation and

socialist construction, activities have been carried out in every aspect to support mass movements. In the past ten years, the PLA has always positively supported and enthusiastically participated in every social transformation campaign and mass movement which was of great importance. Mouthpieces of imperialism who are extremely hostile to our country's socialist cause have described the positive participation of our armed forces in the people's revolutionary movements as "armed suppression." This is actually most fallacious and comical in point of fact. It is none other than the big shots of imperialism themselves who are in the habit of using their reactionary armed forces to suppress barbarously the people within their countries and the national democratic movements in every colony. Such rumours and slanders only show their fear of the close unity between our powerful PLA and the more than 600 million people in our country and their attempt to cover up their shameful activities with lies.

The great leap forward in national economy and the upsurge in people's communes since 1958 demonstrate the great brilliance of the Party's general line for socialist construction. The rapid mastering of the Party's general line for socialist construction by the masses of people has developed into a tremendous material force and brought about a vigorous mass movement unparalleled in history. How should one look upon such a great mass movement? Should one personally take part in the movement, providing the masses with enthusiastic support? Or stand apart from the movement, finding fault with things here and there? Or stand on the opposite side of the movement to oppose it? Contrary to the right opportunist elements, thanks to the long period of indoctrination by the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the PLA which stands side by side with the people, firmly supports this great mass movement. The commanders and fighters of the PLA fully understand from their personal experiences that the objective material foundation of the great leap forward and the people's

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commune movement is the natural product of our country's historical development. The Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung concentrated the people's determination and creative forces to push forward the development of this great movement. In the course of the great leap forward and the people's commune movement, that such an upsurge of revolutionary enthusiasm and socialist consciousness could be demonstrated by the masses of labouring people is due to the fact that they are determined to change our country's backward economy as soon as possible, to do away with the situation of being "poor and blank," and to build our country into a great socialist state with highly developed modern industry, agriculture, science and culture.

The commanders and fighters of the PLA completely understand such lofty aspirations and surging enthusiasm of the masses and are deeply moved by their great determination. They fully understand that the imperialists and their running dogs have always watched our country's socialist construction with hostility, waiting for an opportunity to undermine it. This requires us to be constantly on the alert and firmly implement and safeguard the Party's general line for socialist construction in order to develop our country's national economy at a high speed. Only by means of developing the national economy at a high speed and by strengthening and modernizing our country's national defence will it be possible for our country to realize such a hope and to protect the happiness and security of the people in our country.

The commanders and fighters of the PLA fully understand that fear of mass movements is the basic characteristic of right opportunist elements and bourgeois reactionaries. These people do nothing but picking up faults and exaggerating shortcomings in the course of the movements with a view to disseminating lethargic, spiritless, resentful and pessimistic sentiments, negating the achievements and discrediting the Party's general line.

However, we are determined to mobilize the masses boldly to carry the socialist revolution through to the end and to carry out socialist construction with great vigour. To discard the mass movement and to seize hold of certain isolated, local and temporary shortcomings which have already been overcome so as to oppose the mass movement is tantamount to abandoning progress and the revolution.

While taking part in the mass movement, the PLA commanders and fighters take notice first of the soaring enthusiasm and the great achievements of the people in their hundreds of millions. This is the main current and essence of the mass movement.

Speaking of the people's communes, we have seen not only the great vitality and unmatched superiority of this new-born social organization, but also the tremendous role it plays in developing national economy and culture and in improving the people's livelihood. We have also come to realize that the people's communes in which government administration and commune management are integrated and industry, agriculture, trade, education and military affairs are combined, are a powerful reserve to realize in a most effective way the plan of making everybody a soldier and to support the front line, defend the motherland and bring destruction upon the invaders at a time when the imperialists launch a war of aggression against our country.

How can anyone who is really concerned with the prosperity of the motherland not heartily support and warmly praise such revolutionary undertakings of the masses to promote the progress of socialism and strengthen the national defence construction at the same time? Naturally, in the course of developing such a large-scale revolutionary mass movement as the people's commune movement certain shortcomings are unavoidable due to the lack of experience. However, what is worthy of great mention and our respect and study are definitely not shortcomings of this kind or

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that kind, but the very few shortcomings in comparison to the achievements, the speed with which the shortcomings are overcome, the superior art of the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung in leading the mass movement.

We mentioned about that the PLA is an instrument of political struggle. Revolutionary military personnel should not divorce themselves from politics but should pay attention to and study politics. The mass movement and the practice of social struggle are rich in political content. We must always maintain our contacts with the masses and absorb the valuable experiences from revolutionary mass movement to enrich ourselves.

By taking the initiative to participate actively in national construction and mass movements, the commanders and fighters of the armed forces can broaden their vision, enrich their minds, enhance their mass viewpoint and labour viewpoint, increase their understanding of theory and policy in conjunction with their rich experience in practice, and also learn from the local functionaries the method of class analysis and the vital and versatile working methods of the mass line. Experience has shown once and again that participation by the armed forces in the mass movement has always been the most vital, most intensive and richest political lesson for the commanders and fighters. In those units which have taken this into account, the cadres and fighters would achieve political and ideological progress faster; in those which have neglected this point, the cadres and fighters are as a rule politically ignorant. They take a narrow view of things and ideologically fall behind the development of the situation. A few years ago, some comrades considered participation in the mass movement to help the people in production as an extra burden. To their minds, training meant only attending class-room lectures and taking part in field exercises; participation in socialist struggle was not training. On the contrary, they thought, it would hinder training and therefore "the gain does not recompense for

the loss." Such a viewpoint was very wrong.

IV

In the course of building up modernized armed forces when our armed forces are constantly improving their technical equipment and attaching greater importance than before to learning and improving their skills, does the human factor continue to be of decisive significance?

Some comrades are of the opinion that modern warfare is different from that of the past. When our troops fought with very backward arms and equipment, they depended primarily upon man, relying on the bravery and wisdom of man to win battles. Modern warfare involves technology, iron and steel, and machinery. In the face of these things, the functions of man should retreat to a position secondary in importance. They hold in esteem only machines and also attempt to change revolutionary soldiers into mechanical men devoid of their revolutionary spirit of initiative.

We are different from them. In our opinion, while equipment and technology are important, the factor of man is nevertheless even more important. Technology itself is to be mastered by man. Man and things should be united, with man as the leading factor. What is constantly in our minds is the question of how to mobilize all positive factors to sufficiently enhance the initiative of the masses of officers and soldiers. During the last ten years, it was precisely this idea which led us in our work of building up the armed forces to pay close attention to the relationship between officers and men, to the relationship between the lower and the upper levels, and to the implementation of the mass line in all our work.

This PLA is a completely new type of people's armed forces, built upon destruction of the warlord system of feudal mercenary troops and the establishment of the system

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of democracy and unity. Our army has the most authoritative system of command and a close and cordial relationship based on agreement between the upper and the lower levels and unity among officers and soldiers in the big family of revolution. Our army is a combat organization with the greatest degree of centralism and the highest discipline, an armed force with the richest democratic life. All members of our army perform their duties according to unified orders issued from the upper to the lower levels, in the same manner as they follow the mass line in the performance of all tasks.

On the surface, officers and soldiers, centralism and democracy, and unified orders and the mass line appear to be extreme contradictions. In our armed forces, however, they are extremely well combined. This has been the Marxist-Leninist tradition developed over a long period by the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung in the Chinese PLA. During the last ten years, regardless of the changes in the arms, equipment, and the organizational system of our armed forces, we have always adhered to and constantly developed this glorious tradition.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out long ago that whether the officer-soldier relationship is good or bad is not a question involving skills and methods, but a question of attitude, pointing to such a fundamental question as whether or not to respect the personality of a soldier. We are always of the opinion that the difference between an officer and a soldier is a division of labour in the rank-and-file of the revolution; and that politically and as a person, there is no distinction between either the high or the low, or the elevated and the humble. Officers are not special personages towering above the masses of soldiers. It is only when officers love and protect the soldiers, soldiers respect the officers, and officers and soldiers respect each other, that it will be possible to attain a relationship of equality and fraternity, and gain the goal of agreement among officers and soldiers. This agreement will generate an inexhaustible power in combat.

In 1958, our armed forces responded to the call from Comrade Mao Tse-tung and began to adopt a system whereby the officers would serve one month each year as common soldiers at the company level. This system was carried out in all military areas, services and branches of arms, with the comrade generals the commanders and political commissars - taking the lead. Officers who served as soldiers in the companies joined the soldiers in training, performing productive labour and daily routine, having recreation, and taking orders from the squad leaders. When there was anything they did not understand, they would ask for instructions from the squad leaders and soldiers in the manner of primary school students. Soon they were united as one with the soldiers and became their close friends. It was generally agreed by all the troop units that when officers served as ordinary soldiers in whichever companies, political sentiments were particularly lively in those companies and morale ran very high. The officers set themselves as examples and the soldiers also showed the greatest concern for the officers and tried their utmost to alleviate the physical labour of the officers. For the officers themselves, to perform the duty of ordinary soldiers is also of great benefit since in the course of performing productive labour and forming daily contacts with the soldiers, they can cultivate the Communist style of treating others with equality, do away with the imposing air of an officer, and strengthen the mass viewpoint. They can also learn to evaluate the directives and decisions of the leading organs and the working style of the leadership from the angle of the soldiers. Thus, even though the system of officers serving as soldiers began only one year ago, it is obvious that the system will enable our armed forces to achieve further unity between the officers and soldiers, who will join one another in mind and thought to generate an invincible power.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung always held in esteem the enhancement of democratic life and also issued many directives in this respect. He said that the troops should

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practise democracy to a certain extent which would render it possible to achieve agreement between the officers and soldiers and thus increasing the fighting power for the troops. He called for launching a campaign in each troop unit to support the cadres and cherish the soldiers so that the officers would love and protect the soldiers who, in turn, would support the former. They would openly discuss and promptly correct mistakes and shortcomings together, so as to strengthen internal unity. He also said that the so-called question of correctly handling contradictions among the people is precisely the question of following the mass line to which our Party has constantly referred. These democratic methods of working and the mass line methods of working, as directed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, were first implemented in the people's armed forces with rich experience achieved.

Within the PLA, the soldiers are the administered and the led, but they are also entitled to the right of taking part in the administration and of offering opinions and suggestions in work; the cadres are the administrators and leaders who, however, accept supervision from the masses and rely upon and mobilize the masses in work. Upon discovery of contradictions, the method of democratic persuasion and education would be employed to attempt readjustment according to the formula of "unity-criticism-unity." Thus, it is possible to strengthen unity, raise morale, enforce discipline, and enhance the initiative and enthusiasm of the broad masses of officers and soldiers. During the last ten years, we have made considerable development in this respect.

The Chinese People's Volunteers also realized outstanding achievements in applying democracy to modern warfare in the campaign to "resist the U.S. and aid Korea." The "Underground Great Wall" — the system of underground tunnels — which performed a great service, was precisely a product of the unity among the upper and the lower

levels, and of concentration of the wisdom of the masses.

We have also applied democracy to modernized military training. The result is that those troop units which quickly followed the mass line would achieve outstanding success in their training. Launched in 1958 was the mass campaign for mastery of military skills aiming at making "everyone learn one specialty and many skills, and one soldier perform many functions." Also extensively developed was the technical innovation campaign directed at improving technical equipment. Many sensible suggestions were offered and many valuable discoveries and creations were made. Moreover, the democratic forms of large-scale blooming, contending, and debating and big-character posters extensively adopted throughout the country since the rectification campaign have also been employed in the armed forces. These forms were most suitable for mobilizing the masses to conduct self-education, to solve internal contradictions, to enhance the initiative of the masses, and to strengthen the sense of responsibility of the masses.

The democracy which we practise with leadership is the democracy under centralized guidance. At all times, we are always opposed to anarchism and equalitarianism. While promoting democratic life for the troops, we also always take into consideration the characteristics of the troops. We regard democracy as our means, and enhancement of unity, consolidation of discipline, and improvement of the fighting power as our goal. Since there is agreement in political aims among the officers and soldiers of our armed forces based on the common ideological foundation of uniting ourselves and defeating the enemies, the democratic life in our armed forces, therefore, is able to progress along a healthy path.

We should firmly believe in the majority of the masses. Should those with ulterior motives resort to democracy to undermine our armed forces, not only would the

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leadership at all levels never tolerate them, but the commanders and fighters likewise would never let them carry out their scheme.

V

The absolute leadership of the Party over the armed forces and the strong Party character of the broad masses of cadres in our army constitute the greatest assurance of victory for the undertakings of national defence in the socialist construction of our country. In building up national defence and in the military struggle during the last ten years, we deeply realized that whenever we encountered significant problems, we always obtained the correct directions for successful solutions from the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung. These included the decision regarding the guiding principle for building up a modernized revolutionary armed force, the correct handling of the relationship between the national defence construction and the national economic construction, the brilliant policy decision and the correct strategic guidance in the campaign of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea, the decision of various policies regarding the struggle to liberate Taiwan and the operation on the Fukien front, and presentation of the guiding principle for integration of the powerful standing army, the special technical troops and the armed militia forces in preparation for making everyone a soldier. Of all these, there is not a single one which was not a result of the direct leadership exercised by the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

In his article "On the Question of War and Strategy," Comrade Mao Tse-tung said: "From the viewpoint of Marxist theory concerning the state, the armed forces constitute an essential part of the political power of a state. Whoever intends to seize the political power of a nation and to consolidate it should have powerful armed forces."

In the same article, he also said: "Members of the

Communist Party will not fight for their own personal power over the troops (must never fight for that and never follow the example of Chang Kuo-t'ao). However, they should fight for the power of the Party over the troops, and the power of the people over the troops Our principle is to have the Party directing the guns, and never allow the guns to direct the Party."

During the last ten years of national construction just as it was during the war period - the PLA has always resolutely supported the leadership of the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, and served as the most faithful and reliable tool in implementing the Party line and policy, and the most resolute defender of the people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist cause under the Party leadership. Accordingly, the masses have always accorded the greatest honour and ardent love to the PLA, while the imperialists and reactionaries of all descriptions have always looked upon the unconditional loyalty of the PLA to the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung as the most unfavourable thing to themselves.

The cadres and Communist Party members working in our armed forces must always maintain vigilance against the conspiracy of the enemies. We must keep up our vigilance against any attack that may be launched by enemies with guns, and also against "sugar-coated bullets" of all descriptions, as well as sabotage from within. The cadres and Communist Party members who are working in the armed forces are charged with the specially important responsibility of very diligently defending the interests of the people, the socialist undertakings, and the Party leadership, so that they will not suffer from attack and destruction by any enemy. This responsibility calls on the cadres and the Communist Party members of the armed forces, first of all, to study humbly, to remould themselves, and to enable themselves to acquire a high degree of political consciousness and firm Party character.

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Party character is not an abstract thing. To the Communist Party members and cadres who are working in the armed forces, a firm Party character should express itself in the form of determination to defend the unity of the Party at any time and under any circumstances, and in wholeheartedly carrying out the struggle for the realization of the programme and line of the Party. This calls for constant concern for and attention to the political situation, policy, line, and other such matters pertaining to the orientation, and for taking a firm stand, making a clear distinction between right and wrong, and avoiding vacillation and losing one's bearings on matters of principle.

The position of the individual must be correctly placed in relation to the Party. It is absolutely necessary to obey the Party, without any personal ambition. It is necessary to strictly observe discipline and always to hold in esteem the unity of the Party, and never to carry out any scheme contrary to Party interests. It is necessary to be just, honest, and unselfish, and never to use any deceitful means to achieve personal fame. We must be humble and modest and not arrogant. We must bravely accept criticism and education and wage a struggle against all erroneous tendencies, instead of rejecting criticism and persisting in making mistakes. In short, individualism constitutes the source of all evils. Whenever it appears, we must resolutely criticize it, strive to overcome it, and never tolerate it in any way.

Under the constant guidance of the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the broad masses of cadres of our armed forces have continuously enhanced their Party character. It is because of the large number of our cadres with strong Party character that the Party has been able to exercise its leadership over the troops, and to achieve such great successes.

The Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung have pointed

out again and again that the fundamental question of strengthening the Party character is a matter of replacing the bourgeois idealist world outlook in the minds of men by the proletarian world outlook of dialectical materialism. This calls for assiduous efforts exerted for a long period. Unless a Communist Party member can thoroughly reform his own world outlook, and refrain from observing and handling questions according to the bourgeois world outlook, it is inevitable that he will make mistakes. Without remoulding one's world outlook, it would be impossible to strengthen the cultivation of Party character. It is the obligation of every cadre and Communist Party member of our armed forces to conscientiously study the theories of Marxism-Leninism and the works of Mao Tse-tung, and to establish firmly the world outlook of the proletariat.

While we are celebrating the brilliant achievements in national construction and the building of the armed forces in the past ten years, the socialist construction of our country continues to leap forward at a high speed. The international situation, on the other hand, is also developing in a direction favourable to peace, democracy and socialism. A prosperous atmosphere prevails in the Soviet Union and other socialist fraternal countries. Throughout the world, the anti-colonialist struggle for liberation is surging ahead.

The imperialist camp, meanwhile, is replete with contradictions under a dark shadow. More and more facts have emerged to attest to the brilliant judgement of Comrade Mao Tse-tung that the "East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind" and that the enemies are increasingly rotten, while we are getting better with each passing day. In view of the daily increasing possibilities for relaxation of the international tension and consolidation of world peace, we should resolutely strive for peace. Despite the attempt by American bellicose elements at intensifying the cold war and creating incidents repeatedly to perpetrate provocation against the socialist camp and the movement

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for national independence, while certain imperialist elements, too, are constantly conducting vicious instigation to oppose the People's Republic of China, we should, while maintaining sufficient vigilance, nevertheless firmly believe that the new-born force will inevitably vanquish the corrupt force. The undertakings for world peace, democracy and socialism will certainly continue to leap forward in big strides. Both the international and the domestic situations are now very bright.

Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of the people of all nationalities in China, and with encouragement from the brilliant achievements of our motherland during the past ten years and from the militant call issued by the 8th Plenary Session of the 8th Party's Central Committee, the 650 million Chinese people will certainly achieve new and even more brilliant victories in the undertakings of socialist construction! In the years of the victorious march towards socialism, the PLA will certainly fulfil at its fighting posts every task entrusted to it by the Party, and satisfactorily meet the expectations of the people of the whole country! Let us continue to raise high the red banner of the general line of the Party and the military thinking of Mao Tse-tung, go all-out, aim high and march forward bravely to consolidate the national defence, to liberate Taiwan, to defend peace and to build our motherland!

(Hung-ch'i, No. 19, 1959)

SPEECH AT CLOSING SESSION OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF MILITIA REPRESENTATIVES

(April 27, 1960)

by Lin Piao

Comrades:

The National Conference of Representatives of the People's Militia end triumphantly today. This conference has been a success. In the past ten days at the conference we have heard many important reports and speeches, conducted discussions, exchanged experiences, and learned many things. We have also achieved a better understanding with regard to Chairman Mao's thinking of making everyone a soldier and of the strategic position of the people's militia. We believe that through this conference we shall be able to strengthen the building of the people's militia, bolster the national defence force, further activate the enthusiasm of the hundreds of millions of militiamen, and greatly promote the continued leap forward in the national economy.

We are all aware that old China had long been a country bullied by imperialism. From 1840 to 1937, our country suffered imperialist armed aggression on seven occasions. Imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism rode roughshod over the Chinese people, turning our country into a land of wretched poverty, and the broad masses of the Chinese people suffered untold oppression and exploitation, living a life worse than that of cattle. Our people have for the past one hundred years or so waged an indefatigable heroic struggle for the defeat of the reactionary rule of the enemies at home and abroad. They

have finally won a great victory in the people's revolution under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao, overthrowing the three major enemies (imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism).

Since the liberation, the people of our country have, under the wise leadership of the Party and Chairman Mao, triumphantly carried out socialist revolution and socialist construction, overcome famine, unemployment and illiteracy left over from the old China, ending forever the history of the system of class exploitation of the past several thousand years. The Chinese people are now marching in giant steps towards a happy future of socialism. Since 1958, under the brilliant light of the Party's general line, continued big leaps forward have been achieved in production and the major targets of the Second Five-Year Plan were fulfilled within two years. Everywhere throughout the country there prevails a new atmosphere of boom and prosperity.

It is on this victorious basis that the people of our country are now marching forward courageously to build our country into a powerful socialist State with our own modern industry, modern agriculture, modern science and culture, and modern national defence with still greater revolutionary vigour and at the high speed of "one day equals to 20 years."

It is the urgent desire and also the glorious duty of the people of the whole country to develop the cause of socialism at high speed. Ours is a country with vast territory, rich natural resources, a huge population and excellent climatic conditions. We have the correct leadership of the CCP Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao and the three magic weapons of the general line, the big leap forward, and the people's communes. We have also the help of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. Therefore, the building of socialism in our country must be carried out at high speed which is entirely within the

realm of possibility.

Socialist economic construction is the material foundation for defence construction. The question of national defence is in fact a question of strength. National defence strength is a consolidated manifestation of the political, economic and scientific and technological strength of a country. In analysing the relations between national defence construction and economic construction, Chairman Mao has called upon us to concentrate all available forces for the high-speed development of socialist economic construction and the realization of modernization of industry, agriculture, science and culture through which to fundamentally bolster national defence construction in order to achieve modernization in national defence. For the past several years, we have been following Chairman Mao's instructions and have correctly adjusted the relations between economic construction and national defence construction, thereby accelerating economic construction and strengthening the national defence forces.

The result of practical work proves that the path pointed out by the CCP Central Committee and Chairman Mao is the only correct path which integrates Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice in China.

At present, the situation is very good not only in China, but also in international affairs. The world situation, with the East Wind continuing to prevail over the West Wind, has become ever more favourable to world peace and also to the socialist camp. Compelled by these circumstances, the U.S. imperialists have to make some gestures for relaxation. This is the outcome of the world people's struggle against war and for peace.

However, the certain gestures for relaxation made by U.S. imperialism is not and will never be a change in the fundamental policy of the United States. In reality, the U.S. imperialists are speeding up arms expansion and war

preparations and are actively carrying out aggressive activities. During the period between September last year and April 20 this year alone, as many as 35 instances of war clamouring and aggression by the imperialists can be cited. U.S. imperialism is still occupying our territory Taiwan. From October last up to the present, the U.S. imperialists have violated our territorial waters and air space on 21 occasions. On March 16 this year, 50,000 U.S. troops and the Chiang Kai-shek clique conducted a large-scale military exercise in our Taiwan Straits. All this serves to expose fully the U.S. "peace" gestures as nothing but a fraud. We have to maintain high vigilance against this. We are persistently for peace and are opposed to war, but if the imperialists insist on forcing war on us, we will use our revolutionary war to stamp out the counter-revolutionary war and win eternal peace for mankind.

The imperialists are now doing their utmost to prepare for large-scale guided missile and nuclear warfare. To deal with such a war, the most important thing for us to do is to mobilize and rely on the people to carry out a people's war. We are Marxist-Leninists; we hold the conviction that men are the decisive factor in war; but we also recognize the important role modern technology plays in war. We must therefore lose no time in vigorously improving the technical equipment of our forces and in strengthening the modernization of our forces. We have already built up powerful regular armed forces. With the rapid development of the whole national economy as well as in culture and science, our armed forces are now scaling the peak of military science and technology.

However, building a powerful regular army with the most modern technical equipment is only one aspect of the building of national defence. Another aspect of great importance is to strengthen the building of the people's militia and establish large numbers of people's militia divisions, making everyone a soldier. Coordinating the

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building of a modernized revolutionary army with the organizing of large numbers of people's militia divisions represents a concrete application in the sphere of building national defence of the Party's policy of "walking on two legs," and also an important development, under current conditions, of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's teaching on people's war. It is an important strategic task for our country in the sphere of building national defence to arm hundreds of millions of people ideologically and organizationally, to actively extend military and political training as well as national defence sports activities so as to build them into a powerful people's armed force of immense vigour, excellent health, and high political consciousness, and having a certain amount of military training.

Establishing large numbers of people's militia divisions and making everyone a soldier has not only an important bearing on strengthening the building of national defence but also on speeding up socialist economic construction, because the hundreds of millions of people's militiamen represent an industrial army among the whole people full of vigour for labour.

The People's Militia has made spectacular achievements on various fronts during the past several years. The current central task of the People's Militia throughout the country is to exert full efforts for socialist construction. I hope that all comrades who are present at this conference will take exemplary action to lead the hundreds of millions of people's militiamen to participate in socialist construction in various fields. While marching along the path towards socialism, you should continue to develop the communist style of daring to think, to speak out and to act boldly, march forward bravely and contribute all your wisdom and energy to building our country into a powerful and prosperous socialist State and to realizing the lofty ideal of communism.

SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

Comrades, before long you will be returning to your fighting posts. I hope that each of you will play your role as the backbone, the leader and the bridge well, widely publicize the spirit of this conference, bring the enthusiasm of the masses of the People's Militia into full play, and arouse them still more fully. Under the leadership of the Party and holding aloft the three red banners of the general line, the great leap forward and the people's communes, you should march forward bravely and with still greater revolutionary vigour, to fulfil and overfulfil the 1960 state economic plan, fulfil ahead of schedule the national programme for agricultural development, implement the "everyone a soldier" policy, and continuously strengthen the national defence forces. The great people of China under the banner of Mao Tse-tung will certainly surmount all obstacles on their way of advance from victory to still greater victories.

("Jen-min Jih-pao", Peking, April 28, 1960)

THE VICTORY OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR IS THE VICTORY OF THE THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG

by Lin Piao

The long awaited fourth volume of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* has been published. It is a Marxist-Leninist summation of the experience gained in the victory of the great revolution of the Chinese people. The fourth volume includes the principal works written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung during the period of the Third Revolutionary Civil War. As is well known, this was a period in which the final decisive battle was fought between the revolutionary forces and the counter-revolutionary forces during the stage of the democratic revolution in China. During the first year of this historical period, the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung led the people of the whole country in carrying out the struggle, with great efforts and enormous patience, to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from unleashing civil war; they conducted peace talks with the Kuomintang several times, and tried to bring about social and political reforms in China by peaceful means. At the same time, they time and again pointed out the serious danger of Chiang Kai-shek plotting to launch civil war on a countrywide scale so that the people of the whole country, all the members of the Chinese Communist Party and the armies led by the Party were kept in a constant state of preparedness. Afterwards, when the Kuomintang reactionaries had torn up the "Truce Agreement" and the "Resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference" and imposed a countrywide civil war on the people, the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung resolutely led the people of the whole country in a victorious armed

struggle. In less than four years, we wiped out Chiang Kai-shek's troops, thoroughly smashed the reactionary Kuomintang rule, which was directly backed by U.S. imperialism and which represented the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, and established a state of the people's democratic dictatorship, led by the proletariat and based on the worker-peasant alliance.

The victory of the Chinese revolution is the victory of Marxism-Leninism and the victory of the thought of Mao Tse-tung. Basing himself on the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, Comrade Mao Tse-tung creatively applied and developed Marxism-Leninism, and in the most resolute and most thoroughgoing proletarian revolutionary spirit and with the greatest ingenuity and dextrousness in the art of struggle, guided the whole Party and the people of the whole country to achieve a victory of great historic significance under complex conditions, involving twists and turns. It is beyond question that an earnest study of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's works during this period of history, like the study of all of his other works, will ensure the continuous advance of our socialist cause along the right path.

I

After conducting the extremely difficult and arduous War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression for eight years, the people of our country defeated Japanese imperialism, which was ferocious and strong, and so cleared away an extremely big obstacle to their liberation. Following the resolution, in the main, of the contradiction between the Chinese people and the Japanese aggressors, the contradiction between the Chinese people and U.S. imperialism and its running dog, the Kuomintang reactionaries, sharpened and developed to be the principal contradiction. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out at that time: "A look at the picture of the whole situation shows that the stage of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression has ended and that internal

struggle has now become the new development and the new task. Chiang Kai-shek talks about 'building the country,' and from now on the struggle will be: build what sort of country? To build a new-democratic country of the broad masses of the people, led by the proletariat, or to build a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country under the dictatorship of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie? This will be a most complicated struggle. At present it takes the form of a struggle between Chiang Kai-shek trying to snatch the fruits of victory of the War of Resistance and ourselves opposing his attempts."¹

The Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung made a scientific analysis of the domestic and international situation following the victory of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression and the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves and pointed out that in the light of the domestic and international situation at that time, and mainly as a result of the continuous upsurge of the struggle of the people throughout China against civil war and for peace, against autocracy and for democracy and against a national sell-out and for independence, there existed in the country the possibility for the emergence of a peaceful situation; at the same time they clear-headedly pointed out that the danger of civil war was very serious. Comrade Mao Tse-tung said that the course adopted by Chiang Kai-shek "is a course of launching civil war. Our course, the course of people, is that we want no civil war. Those opposed to civil war are the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people only and, unfortunately, do not include Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. Here one side is against fighting and the other is for it. If both were against it, there would not be any fighting at all. Now since only one side is against it, and since this side is not yet strong enough to stay the hand of the other side, the danger of civil war is extremely serious."² The policy of our Party at that time was to strive for the best, namely, to strive for peace throughout the country; at the same time, to prepare for

the worst, namely, to prepare to cope with a countrywide civil war unleashed by Chiang Kai-shek, and to place all our work on the basis of augmenting our own strength to cope with the worst eventuality.

Bent on dragging China back to the old road of semi-colonialism and semi-feudalism, the Kuomintang reactionaries had long been plotting and preparing to destroy the Chinese Communist Party and the revolutionary forces of the people. During the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, they had already followed the policy of passively resisting Japanese aggression, actively opposing the Communists, preserving their own strength and preparing for civil war. After the Japanese surrender, they went further in putting themselves under the wing of U.S. imperialism; they worked treacherously to destroy the Chinese Communist Party and the revolutionary forces of the people and wrest from the hands of the people the fruits of victory of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, and attempted to unleash a countrywide civil war in contravention of the peaceful aspirations of the people throughout the country. But both the domestic and international situation following the victory of the War of Resistance made them feel that there would still be a host of difficulties if they wanted to unleash the countrywide civil war immediately. They saw that after eight years of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, the strength of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army had grown immensely, and that it was a strength which had to be reckoned with. The Chinese Communist Party's stand for peace and against war was exerting an ever-increasing influence throughout the country. The voice of the people in the Kuomintang-controlled areas calling for peace and opposing civil war, demanding democracy and opposing autocracy was growing louder and louder. Internationally, the broad masses of the people in various countries were dissatisfied with the reactionary forces in China and disapproved of Chiang Kai-shek's policies; they expressed sympathy with the Chinese people's struggle

for peace and democracy. In a word, on the one hand, those who opposed civil war in China, opposed Chiang Kai-shek's autocracy and stood for peace and democracy, were not confined to the people in our liberated areas, they included also the broad masses of the people in the Kuomintang-controlled areas and the broad masses of the people throughout the world. On the other hand, because the main forces of the Kuomintang army in evading the fight to resist Japanese aggression had been stationed far to the rear in southwest and northwest China, time was required to transport these main forces to the fronts for civil war, to bring the big cities and key communication lines under their renewed control, to take over all the equipment of the Japanese troops which had invaded China and to incorporate all the puppet armies into their own forces and to complete the various preparations needed for attacking the liberated areas. In these circumstances, the Kuomintang reactionaries, with the backing of U.S. imperialism, pretended to agree with the peaceful aspirations of the people, made "peaceful" gestures and conducted negotiations with the Chinese Communist Party, while the U.S. reactionary elements came forward to carry out a so-called "mediation for peace" between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. At the same time, under cover of these negotiations and the so-called "mediation for peace," they issued secret orders for "the armed suppression of Communists," stepped up their preparations for war and incessantly launched local military offensives against the liberated areas at times and places they deemed favourable. Facts proved that the "peace" manoeuvres of the Kuomintang reactionaries were nothing but plots and were a sort of stalling tactics. Approximately during the twelve months following the conclusion of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, the Kuomintang reactionaries, relying on direct participation and aid in other forms by the U.S. air force and navy, seized and occupied nearly all the big cities and key communication lines throughout the country and transported a million troops to the fronts for attacks on the liberated areas. The

reactionary Chiang Kai-shek clique and U.S. imperialism thought that by using these "peace" tricks they could hoodwink the people throughout the country and lull the Chinese Communist Party and thus wipe out China's revolutionary forces at one stroke. But their rosy calculations proved all wrong. Under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist Party had long since become highly mature politically; Chiang Kai-shek could never realize his dream of restaging his counter-revolutionary coup of 1927.

In coping with the counter-revolutionary two-tactics of the U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries in playing "peace" tricks and preparing countrywide civil war, our Party adopted revolutionary two-tactics and conducted a "tit-for-tat" struggle against them. The Party, on the one hand, led the people of the whole country in a struggle by peaceful means to expose the "peace fraud" of the U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries so as not to be taken in by their "peace" snares, and on the other, maintained sharp vigilance at all times, made full preparations and developed and expanded the people's forces so as to be able to deal crushing blows to Chiang Kai-shek through a war of self-defence when he launched a military offensive.

After the victory of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, our Party and the people of the whole country waged an extremely complicated struggle to halt civil war and win peace. On August 16, 1945 our Party put forward to the Kuomintang clique a six-point proposal for halting the civil war and on August 25 of the same year issued the three great slogans of peace, democracy and unity. The Chinese Communist Party on several occasions conducted peace talks with the Kuomintang and Comrade Mao Tse-tung even went personally to Chungking to enter into patient negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek, with the result that the two parties reached a peace agreement. Afterwards, thanks to the joint efforts of the Chinese Communist Party, various democratic parties and groups, and the people of the whole

country, the Kuomintang was compelled to sign a "truce agreement," convene a political consultative conference, and adopted at the conference five agreements concerning the programme for peaceful national reconstruction, reorganization of the Kuomintang government, and so on. During the negotiations, our Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung never ceased reminding the people of the whole country that acceptance of peace talks by the reactionaries by no means indicated that they were really "laying down the cleaver and becoming buddhas overnight" but that they were trying, through peace talks, to achieve their end of eliminating the revolutionary forces. As peace talks were a serious class struggle, we must carry out such struggle flexibly while adhering to the stand of safeguarding the people's revolutionary interests, and co-ordinate the peace talks closely with the struggle of the broad masses. To make the talks fruitful, we made certain concessions in line with the principle that they did not harm the fundamental interests of the people, and this was necessary. These concessions won for our Party political initiative and the sympathy of world public opinion as well as of middle-of-the-roaders at home and at the same time were conducive to exposing the Kuomintang reactionaries' plot for civil war before the eyes of the masses of the people.

During the negotiations with the Kuomintang, our Party never abandoned the people's armed forces, nor slackened its revolutionary vigilance. As soon as the U.S. -Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries launched a local offensive against the liberated areas, we hit back in self-defence, wiping out the offensive enemy troops resolutely, unreservedly, thoroughly and completely. Comrade Mao Tse-tung said: the result of the talks between our Party and the Kuomintang "is that the Kuomintang has agreed to a policy of peace and unity. That's fine. If the Kuomintang starts civil war again, it will prove itself wrong in the eyes of the whole nation and the whole world, and we shall be all the more justified in waging a war of self-defence to smash its attack. Now that

the 'Double Tenth Agreement' has been concluded, our job is to insist on its fulfilment, see that the Kuomintang honours it, and keep on striving for peace. If they want to fight, we will finish them off completely. This is how things will be: if they launch an attack, we shall give them satisfaction by wiping out their forces. We shall give them partial satisfaction by wiping out part of their forces, more satisfaction by wiping out more and complete satisfaction by wiping out all. Since China's problems are complicated, our minds must also work in a somewhat complicated way. If the other fellow starts fighting, we shall fight back, but then we shall be fighting in order to win peace. Peace will not come unless we strike a hard blow at the reactionaries who dare attack the liberated areas."³

To halt civil war and win peace, we not only stood for peace talks but actually conducted them with the Kuomintang reactionaries. However, we always understood clear-headedly that the achieving of internal peace and victory in the people's revolution could not rely on peace talks but must rely on revolutionary struggle by the masses of the people. In August 1945, on the eve of the talks between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung warned all the comrades of the Party: "You should in no case count on such talks or hope that the Kuomintang will show you kindness, because it never will; you must rely on your own strength, on giving correct guidance to action and on brotherly unity within the Party and cordial relations with the people."⁴ Comrade Mao Tse-tung also said: "It should always be borne in mind that the ending of the ten-year civil war and the repulse of the three anti-Communist onslaughts and numerous other provocations during the War of Resistance (up to Chiang Kai-shek's recent invasion of the southern part of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region), did not occur because Chiang Kai-shek was strong, but on the contrary, because, relatively speaking, Chiang Kai-shek was not strong enough, while the Communist Party and the people were strong. The

ten-year civil war was stopped not as a result of the appeals made by people throughout the country who desired peace and feared war (such as the former 'League for Banning Civil War'), but as a result of the demand by arms of the Chinese Communist Party and of the Northeastern Army and the Northwestern Army under Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng. The three anti-Communist onslaughts and countless other provocations were repulsed, not through endless concessions and submissions by the Communist Party, but because the Party resolutely adopted a just attitude of self-defence: 'we will not attack unless attacked; if attacked, we will certainly hit back.' ⁵ The experience gained in the many years past proved that the only correct way of preventing the Kuomintang reactionaries from starting civil war was to organize the people's forces to fight them. Had we thought of altering their policy of civil war, autocracy and betraying the country by relying on talks and did not rouse and organize with a free hand the broad masses of the people in resolute struggle against the enemy; and had we, in the course of the talks with the Kuomintang reactionaries, shown credulity towards them and slackened our vigilance, without paying much attention to developing and expanding the people's forces, then we would not only have been unable to defeat the enemy but would have put ourselves in an exceedingly dangerous plight. To rouse the masses with a free hand, to expand the people's forces, and under the leadership of our Party, to defeat the aggressors and build a new China — this was the principle laid down by the Party's Seventh National Congress. To carry out thoroughly this principle, following the victory of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, we, under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, undertook the work of consolidating and expanding the various liberated areas, the most important of which was to train soldiers, reduce land rents and develop production. It was precisely because we had done all this in earnest and achieved good results that once the U.S. - Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries forced the countrywide civil

war upon the people, we were strong enough to smash completely the attack of the Kuomintang reactionaries by a war of self-defence.

II

In July 1946, having completed the preparations for his offensive by setting up a "peace" smokescreen, and with immense support from U.S. imperialism and under its instigation, the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek clique perfidiously tore up the "Truce Agreement" and the "Resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference," put 1,600,000 troops into the field, and launched an all-out offensive against the liberated areas in northeastern, central, eastern and northern China, thus starting civil war on a scale unprecedented in Chinese history. In the early days of the war the situation was an extremely serious one for the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people. At that time, the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek clique had a total military strength of over four million men, held areas with a population of over 300 million, and controlled all of the country's big cities and most of the railway lines; it had taken over all the equipment of the one million aggressive Japanese troops in China and had, in particular, obtained large quantities of arms and equipment and economic aid from U.S. imperialism. On the other hand, the People's Liberation Army's strength at the time was less than one-third that of the Kuomintang troops. Its forces were cut off from each other in more than ten base areas, its weapons and equipment were poor, and it had no foreign aid. The liberated areas had a population of only a little over 100 million and, in the greater part of these areas, the reactionary feudal forces had not been cleaned out, the work of land reform was only beginning and the rear had not yet been consolidated. In these circumstances, the Kuomintang reactionaries were filled with overweening arrogance, acted as if nobody on earth could beat them, and loudly proclaimed that they would wipe out the People's Liberation Army

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in a matter of three to six months.

In this situation where the enemy had military superiority while we were in an inferior position, could we repulse the attacks of the Kuomintang reactionaries and defeat them? What could be the prospects of the war? At that time, there were some among the broad masses of the people and even within our Party and our army, who had doubts and anxieties. Some well-intentioned friends at home and abroad were also worried about us. At this critical juncture, on the basis of a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the enemy's strength and ours, Comrade Mao Tse-tung put forward the thesis that all reactionaries are paper tigers. He said: "All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance, they are frightening, but in reality they don't amount too much. From the long-term point of view, it is the people who really have great strength, and not the reactionaries."⁶ Like a beacon, this brilliant thesis of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's illuminated the road of our advance. It ideologically armed our entire Party and army, inspired and strengthened the confidence of the people throughout the country in victory over the Kuomintang reactionaries, and swept away the fear that some people had of U.S. imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionaries and their pessimism toward the future of the revolution. The course of the war and its outcome fully confirmed the correctness of this thesis of Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

Although the reactionary Kuomintang clique enjoyed military superiority at that time, although they had the backing of U.S. imperialism which they considered to be "extraordinarily powerful" and "unrivalled in the world" and which had the atom bomb in its possession, yet there was a fatal weakness which they could never overcome, that is, they represented the rotten, moribund classes of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, and the war they were waging was an unjust, counter-revolutionary war aimed at selling out the country and enslaving the people. They

could find no justification for their war, they ran counter to the will of the people, and could not win the people's support, thus driving themselves into utter political isolation. So-called "aid" from U.S. imperialism was designed to turn the Kuomintang-controlled areas into a colony of U.S. imperialism. This all the more aroused hatred for U.S. imperialism and the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries among the people there. China's big landlord and big bourgeoisie classes, represented by the four big families of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H.H. Kung and the Chen brothers, knew no limit in imposing exorbitant taxes and levies on the people and sucking their blood, thus hurling the masses into an abyss of misery and bringing them endless suffering; in this way, they pushed the people daily unto the road of revolution. Insurmountable contradictions existed between the officers and men of the Kuomintang army, between its higher and lower ranks, between its various cliques, and between itself and the people, and as the war developed, these contradictions daily grew sharper.

The situation as regards the People's Liberation Army was just the reverse. Despite its temporary inferiority in equipment and numerical strength, it enjoyed absolute superiority politically. Representing the interests of the proletariat and the masses of the people, waging a just, revolutionary war, fighting in self-defence and for China's peace, democracy and independence, we commanded the sympathy and support of the masses of the people. The people of the whole country put their hopes in the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese People's Liberation Army, in the victory of the revolutionary war. Enduring and overcoming numerous hardships and difficulties, the broad masses of the people adopted various means to support and work in co-ordination with the operations of the People's Liberation Army. Led and cultivated by the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the People's Liberation Army had a high degree of political consciousness and an indomitable will to fight. Every commander and fighter knew what

they were fighting for and for whom, and the officers and men, the higher ranks and the lower, were united to a man. We relied mainly on this political superiority in overcoming difficulties and defeating the enemy. We recognized the fact that the enemy's superiority in military strength would play a certain role and that aeroplanes, guns, tanks and so on would exert a certain strength, and we must deal with all these seriously in our fighting, but we knew that the enemy's retrograde political acts and his unpopularity constituted a fatal wound which he could never cure. "Chiang Kai-shek's military superiority is only temporary and can play only a temporary role and likewise the aid from U.S. imperialism can play only a temporary role, while the anti-popular character of Chiang Kai-shek's war and the feeling of the people are factors that will play a constant role; it is precisely here that the People's Liberation Army enjoys superiority. Patriotic, just and revolutionary in character, the war waged by the People's Liberation Army is bound to receive the support of the whole nation. This is the political foundation for victory over Chiang Kai-shek."⁷ This penetrating analysis and great foresight by Comrade Mao Tse-tung gave tremendous inspiration to the whole Party, the whole army and the whole people, so that, at times when the sky became overcast, we were able to see that the darkness would soon end and that the light of the dawn showed ahead.

In order to defeat the U.S. -Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries, Comrade Mao Tse-tung further taught us that, while slighting the enemy strategically, we should take full account of him tactically. In other words, judged from their essence, from a long-term point of view and appraising the situation as a whole, imperialism and all reactionaries must be taken for what they really are, namely paper tigers, and we must dare to struggle against them and dare to seize victory. But in every specific struggle, we should also see the other side of the enemy - that he is a living, iron and real tiger, capable of eating up people. Therefore, in each particular situation, in each military action, we must exercise caution, pay serious

attention to the art of struggle, adopt suitable forms of struggle and method of fighting according to time, place and conditions, so that we can isolate the enemy and wipe him out step by step. In the Third Revolutionary Civil War, our army resolutely carried out these directives of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, thus possessing firm confidence in defeating the Kuomintang reactionaries and quickly bringing about a change in the war situation in our favour.

In the early days of the war, we were operating on interior lines; the enemy was acting on the strategic offensive while our army was standing in the strategic defensive. However, after eight months of bitter fighting, our army succeeded in forcing Chiang Kai-shek to abandon his all-out offensive and limit himself to so-called attacks on key points on the two flanks of the war front, that is, Shantung and northern Shensi. These attacks were again quickly smashed. At the close of the first year of the war, our army had already annihilated ninety-seven and a half enemy brigades (a monthly average of eight brigades), and our own regular army had been expanded from 1,200,000 men to two million men. This victory dealt a telling blow to the enemy, caused profound defeatist feelings to crop up throughout the enemy camp, lifted the hearts of the people of the whole country, and laid the foundation for the complete annihilation of the enemy forces by our army and the winning of final victory. Thus a tremendous change took place in the war situation. Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary army, which had lost huge numbers of its effectives, had to shift from strategic offensive to strategic defensive, while the People's Liberation Army switched over from strategic defensive to strategic offensive. Meanwhile, the people's revolutionary movement in the Kuomintang-controlled areas had also made great headway. At the end of May 1947, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out: "There are now two battlefronts in China. On the first battlefront there is the fight between Chiang Kai-shek's invading troops and the People's Liberation Army. On the second battlefront, which has now been formed, a sharp

struggle is being waged between the great, just movement of the students and the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek government." "The Chiang Kai-shek government, which has made itself the enemy of the entire people, now finds itself besieged by the entire people."⁸

At the beginning of the second year of the war, the People's Liberation Army shifted to operations on exterior lines. The basic task of the year's operations was to launch a countrywide counter-offensive, that is, to send our main forces to fight on the exterior lines, carry the war into the Kuomintang-controlled areas, and wipe out enemy troops in large numbers on the exterior lines, thus completely shattering the Kuomintang's counter-revolutionary strategic principles of continuing to carry the war into the liberated areas to further destroy and exhaust our manpower and material resources there and make it impossible for us to fight a protracted war. Part of the operational task of our army that year was to keep up interior-line operations with part of its main forces and the numerous local armed units, wipe out the enemy troops on the interior lines, recover lost towns and villages and fight in co-ordination with the operations on the exterior lines. By the end of 1947, the war was being waged chiefly not in the liberated areas but in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, and the main forces of the People's Liberation Army had already fought into the Kuomintang-controlled areas. At this time Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the Chinese people's revolutionary war had reached a turning point. He said: "This marks a turning point in history. It is the point at which Chiang Kai-shek's 20-year counter-revolutionary rule turns from expansion to extinction. It is also the point at which imperialist rule in China, now over a hundred years old, turns from expansion to extinction."⁹

When the war went into November 1948, that is, almost two and a half years after U.S. imperialism had backed Chiang Kai-shek in launching the countrywide civil war,

a fundamental change took place in the war situation: the enemy's total strength had dwindled to 2,900,000 men as a result of continuous annihilation by our army, while the total strength of the People's Liberation Army had grown to more than three million. Not only had our army long surpassed the enemy in quality, but it now surpassed him in numerical strength too. As soon as our army's all-round superiority emerged, the stage of the decisive battle between the enemy and ourselves began. The great victories of the Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin campaigns followed on the heels of the Liaosi-Shenyang campaign, and we wiped out as many as 1,500,000 of Chiang Kai-shek's crack forces in these three campaigns. By now the troops of the Kuomintang reactionaries had basically disintegrated, and their reactionary regime had in the main collapsed. Unprecedented changes took place in the balance of class forces in China. Those who had been under the influence and control of the reactionary Kuomintang regime now came over to the side of the revolution in ever larger groups. In April 1949, following Comrade Mao Tse-tung's directive for a countrywide advance, the People's Liberation Army embarked on a great, all-out march on an unprecedented scale towards the vast areas which had not yet been liberated; they speedily wiped out the reactionary Kuomintang troops which obstinately continued their resistance, and liberated Suiyuan, Changsha, Kunming, western Szechuan, Sinkiang, Tibet and other areas by peaceful means. Our great motherland thus achieved her regeneration by shattering the fetters of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism.

And so this is the dialectics of history: Although new-born forces are very weak and small and are in an inferior position at the beginning, they will ultimately triumph over the decaying forces that are superficially strong and hold a superior position. That the new-born supercedes the decaying is a law of the development of nature and of the development of society too. It is a law independent of

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human will, and naturally, also independent of the will of U.S. imperialism and the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries. They made a vain attempt to reverse the wheel of history through a counter-revolutionary war, but the result was that "they lifted a stone only to have their own toes crushed." The Chiang Kai-shek regime, the last autocratic dynasty in China, sank like a wrecked ship in the storm of the people's revolution. U.S. imperialism, which supplied money and guns to Chiang Kai-shek, tried to boost his morale, suggested various stratagems to him and even intervened in person, received a substantial number of blows from the iron fists of the Chinese people and then fled from the Chinese mainland with its tail between its legs.

III

The great victory of the Third Revolutionary Civil War was the result of the protracted struggle waged on all fronts by the whole Party and the people throughout the country, under the leadership of the Central committee of the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung; it was primarily the result of the use of revolutionary arms to wage a heroic fight against counter-revolutionary arms. How, then, did Comrade Mao Tse-tung lead the People's Liberation Army in defeating the powerful enemy, swallowing him up bit by bit and hurling him down from his superior position to one of inferiority and ultimately to his final destruction?

In this period Comrade Mao Tse-tung creatively developed the Marxist-Leninist strategic and tactical ideas of a people's revolutionary war on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the prevailing situation and the rich experience gained in the revolutionary wars fought under the leadership of the Party. The famous ten major military principles laid down by him are the most exhaustive and scientific generalization of the operational methods of our army. Comrade Mao Tse-tung not only worked out the correct strategic and tactical principles, but from beginning to end gave concrete

leadership and direction to our army's strategical planning and major campaigns, enabling it to win victory after victory under extremely difficult conditions.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung laid down the correct operational principle — **“make it our chief aim to wipe out the enemy's effectives, not to hold or seize a city or place.”**¹⁰ This principle played a decisive role in turning the scale in the war as a whole, forcing the enemy to change from the strategic offensive to the strategic defensive and enabling our army to turn from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive. Relying on their superiority in numbers and equipment, the enemy forces at the outset of the war launched large-scale offensives against us on all fronts with huge numbers of troops, trying to force our army to take up a frontal, positional defence and seeking decisive battles with our main forces. In these circumstances, our army resolutely implemented Comrade Mao Tse-tung's directive and, instead of taking up a frontal, positional defence, carried out large-scale mobile warfare against the enemy, took the initiative to avoid the brunt of the enemy attacks, moved to his flanks and annihilated him piecemeal while on the move. Our army was thus freed from the passive position of being beaten, gained the initiative and was able to concentrate its forces to a great extent and to achieve a superiority of strength in every local operation. The enemy forces, on the contrary, employed tremendous strength from the very beginning to invade and occupy many cities and places; this not only cost them a certain number of casualties, but also compelled them to leave huge forces to garrison these cities and places, with the result that their power to attack was weakened, and from being originally in a strategically offensive position, they were thrown into the difficult passive position of being beaten. In just a year after the beginning of the war, the second-line forces of the enemy were already exhausted; 1,120,000 enemy troops were wiped out, though they had occupied 105 cities in the liberated areas. At that time, the enemy had lost its power to take strategic offensive and was

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forced on to strategic defensive, while our army turned from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive. Of course, for our army to make it its chief aim the wiping out of the enemy's effectives, did not mean the casual giving up of any cities or places. Even in the stage of the strategic defensive, our army firmly defended or captured every place where the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves permitted and which was important for a campaign or tactically important. After our army turned to the strategic offensive, as a result of the change in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, the improvement in our army's tactics in attacking enemy fortified positions and the establishment and strengthening of our artillery and engineering corps, positional warfare for the storming of fortified enemy positions to take enemy cities became gradually important, and gradually became the principal operational method. Consequently, in the second year of the war, our army not only went on to wipe out more than 1,520,000 enemy troops, but also recovered or liberated 164 cities. Facts proved that the implementation of the operational principles laid down by Comrade Mao Tse-tung could both achieve the aim of wiping out large numbers of enemy troops and accomplish the task of holding or taking cities and other places.

In accordance with the principle of "mustering an overwhelming force to wipe out the enemy piecemeal," Comrade Mao Tse-tung propounded the operational method of a war of annihilation whereby in every campaign or battle, a force two, three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's strength should be used to surround the enemy and every possible effort be made to wipe him out completely and leave him no loophole for escape, as it was better to cut off one of the enemy's fingers than to hurt all ten of them. This operational method had to be applied not only to the planning of a campaign, but also to tactical dispositions. The use of this operational method by our army dealt a mortal blow to the enemy who lacked second-line

strength. When the enemy was annihilated by our army, he lost both his men and equipment completely. If the unit wiped out was a brigade, his strength was reduced by one brigade; if it was a regiment, his strength was reduced by one regiment. It was very difficult for him to replenish or re-establish his strength in time. Moreover, the bulk of the enemy troops became demoralized when a part of them was wiped out. So the enemy immediately fell into a state of confusion and consternation the moment he was engaged by our army. This created the favourable situation in which our army was assured of victory in every battle and was sure to annihilate the enemy whenever we surrounded him. Because of the adoption of this operational method, our army, though it was on the whole in an inferior position (numerically), was in an absolutely superior position in every local operation, in every campaign or battle; it could fight and decide the outcome of a campaign or a battle quickly and, after wiping out one section of the enemy, immediately turn to wipe out another. The constant victories won by our army added to its high morale and increasingly lifted the hearts of the people. And the adoption of this operational method enabled our army to replenish and supply itself with manpower and material mainly from the front. It is well known that in addition to relying on the enthusiastic volunteering of new recruits by the masses of the people in the liberated areas, the People's Liberation Army, at that time, also took in large numbers of soldiers liberated from the Kuomintang army; as regards arms, ammunition and equipment, they were taken from the enemy to an even greater extent. Fighting a war of annihilation played an extremely important role in the replenishment of manpower and supply of equipment for our army. So, as the war developed, with the continuous addition of minor victories into major victories, through the process of proceeding from quantitative to qualitative change, our army transformed its partial superiority into total superiority and ultimately wiped out the enemy completely. In the Third Revolutionary Civil War, the massive military structure of the Kuomintang

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reactionaries was thus demolished brick by brick and tile by tile until, finally, its foundations were also uprooted.

It must be mentioned here that Comrade Mao Tse-tung has always worked out and employed different strategies and tactics in a flexible way, in accordance with developments and changes in the situation. As indicated above, some of the military principles laid down by Comrade Mao Tse-tung did not remain unchanged in their concrete application throughout the entire course of the war, but constantly developed along with the changing situation. In the autumn and winter of 1948 when a fundamental change in our favour occurred in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves and in the war situation throughout the country, Comrade Mao Tse-tung seized in good time this opportunity for strategic decisive battles, correctly determined the direction of the decisive battles and organized the three major campaigns of Liaosi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin. Throughout the course of these campaigns Comrade Mao Tse-tung not only laid down correct operational principles in each case, but in a comprehensive way applied and developed our army's military principles of the earlier period of the war and raised its operational skill to unprecedented heights, using superb military art to closely combine the annihilation of the enemy's effectives with the capture of cities and other places, the mustering of a superior force to wipe out the enemy forces piecemeal with the total elimination of the enemy's powerful army corps, and large-scale mobile warfare with positional warfare. Judged by their tremendous scale and the enormous number of enemy troops annihilated, these three great campaigns were not only unprecedented in Chinese military history but rare even in world military history.

After the three major campaigns of Liaosi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin, Comrade Mao Tse-tung set forth three different patterns for dealing with the remnant Kuomintang troops more than one million strong. One was

the Tientsin pattern, which meant dealing with the enemy through battle. The second was the Peiping pattern, which meant forcing the enemy troops to be reorganized into the People's Liberation Army by peaceful means. The third was the Suiyuan pattern, which meant deliberately keeping intact a part of the Kuomintang troops for later reorganization after we had annihilated the main enemy forces. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out at that time that in the first place we had to pay attention to and be prepared for dealing with the enemy through battle and must not in the least slacken our determination to fight or harbour any idea of underestimating the enemy. At the same time, the application of the two other patterns was also a process of struggle; it by no means implied that the question could be settled without struggle. In the final analysis, the counter-revolutionary vestiges and political influence among these troops had to be liquidated. It would be a long-term, arduous task to transform these old troops. It was precisely due to our resolute implementation of the above-mentioned directives of Comrade Mao Tse-tung that, in the latter period of the war, our army was able to sweep forward so swiftly and many regions were peacefully liberated.

These ideas of comrade Mao Tse-tung on strategy and tactics could be put into effect because they were based on a people's army and people's war. Although the enemy was familiar with these operational methods of our army, and although the Chiang Kai-shek generals and the U.S. military personnel in China attempted in every possible way to find counter-measures, all their efforts were in vain. For example, in order to deal with our army's tactics of mustering a superior force to annihilate the enemy forces piecemeal, Chiang Kai-shek racked his brain in employing the tactics of so-called "heavy concentration and simultaneous advance," the tactics of using large operational formations whereby five to six brigades or even up to twelve and thirteen brigades were concentrated at a time, trying hard not to expose their weaknesses and vainly hoping to make it

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impossible for our army to "swallow them up" or "gnaw away at them." However, all these efforts failed to save the enemy from defeat. When the enemy employed these tactics, our army, taking advantage of its weakness in leaving its rear poorly defended, advanced to the rear of the enemy forces and annihilated them in large numbers there. Facts have proved that no anti-popular army can possibly employ or counter the strategy and tactics that are based on a people's army and a people's war. These can only be employed by a people's army and in a people's revolutionary war.

Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army organized effective revolutionary political work. During the Third Revolutionary Civil War, in accordance with Comrade Mao Tse-tung's directive, a new type of campaign to consolidate the army was universally carried out. This consisted in airing sufferings in the old society and carrying out three check-ups (of class origin, performance of duty and fighting spirit); and three forms of democracy, namely, military democracy, political democracy and economic democracy were put into effect within the army. This greatly raised the level of the class consciousness of the commanders and fighters, strengthened the unity between officers and men, between the higher and lower ranks and between the army and the people, and enhanced the fighting determination of the commanders and fighters so that they were able to defeat the enemy in battle through their collective wisdom and efforts, fighting bravely and tenaciously like one man, and having no fear of sacrifices or difficulties.

In order to win victory in the war, the Chinese Communist Party engaged in a tremendous work of mobilizing and organizing the people. First of all, a vigorous land reform movement was launched in the liberated areas. The broad masses of poverty-stricken peasants received land, and their revolutionary enthusiasm and initiative soared to un-

precedented heights. Large numbers of young and middle-aged people vied with each other to join the army and rushed to the front. The People's Liberation Army thus grew in strength rapidly. The militia forces, which were formed by the whole people, engaged in extensive guerilla warfare in the enemy's rear, giving great aid to the People's Liberation Army and co-ordinating with its operations. At the same time, the national democratic united front led by the Party throughout the country developed on an unprecedented scale and became more consolidated than ever before. People in the Chiang Kai-shek controlled areas, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, launched a mammoth mass movement against civil war, hunger, persecution and U.S. interference in China's internal affairs. These struggles were effectively co-ordinated with the armed struggle waged by the army and people of the liberated areas and helped to isolate the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique to the greatest extent. The combination of extensive mass movements and revolutionary armed struggle constituted the most important guarantee for our triumph over the enemy.

The experience of the Third Revolutionary Civil War once again proves that given correct leadership and by waging a really hard fight, the revolutionary people are bound to triumph eventually in war no matter how strong the enemy or how frightful the weapons in his hand. Of course, revolution is not all plain sailing and victory cannot be won hands down. In the course of the revolution, we must surmount all kinds of unimaginable difficulties; we must have the determination and steadfastness to surmount difficulties and stand the test of ordeals when we meet with setbacks and failures. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has always taught us to do the hardest work, rather giving more thought to difficulties than trying to gain easy success. It is inconceivable that all the reactionaries will, of their own accord, fall to their knees overnight. He said, "Our cadres must clear their minds of all ideas of winning easy victory through lucky accidents without waging a hard and sustained

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struggle and paying the price in blood and sweat.”¹¹ We admit difficulties, analyse them and have the courage to struggle against them. Nor do we fear setbacks or failures. Certain partial setbacks and failures are always unavoidable during the struggle. The question that matters is that one should know well how to draw lessons and temper one’s self into a more steadfast and mature person. Only through protracted, hard and sustained struggle and the use of correct strategy and tactics will it be possible to gradually change the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves. It is unrealistic to attempt to swallow the enemy up all at once. Only by one battle after another will it be possible to whittle down the strength of the reactionaries bit by bit and eliminate them at last. Only through hard fighting will it be possible to build up and augment the revolutionary forces bit by bit, and steel and enhance them gradually. This is the way the Chinese people and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, led by the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, passed, within not a very long period, from military inferiority to superiority, wiped out the enemy and won victory.

IV

The victory of the great revolution of the Chinese people was a great victory of historic world significance which further changed the face of the East and of the world, following the victory of the October Revolution in Russia and that of the world’s anti-fascist war. The winning of this victory was of course inseparable from the international and domestic situation of the time. It was unimaginable that this victory could have been won without the victory of the anti-fascist war waged by the people of the world with the Soviet Union as the main force, without the revolutionary forces accumulated by the Chinese people in the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression and during the protracted struggles before it. However, the objective situation provided only a possibility for victory in the revolution; full

recognition of this possibility and transforming it into reality by organizing the broad masses of the people to carry out an extraordinarily arduous struggle depended on the correct ideas and the correct line which guided the revolution. The fact that the Chinese people were able to win this great victory in good time was due to the guidance of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's correct revolutionary line.

True The experience of the Third Revolutionary Civil War proves that no matter how much revolutionaries may hope for peaceful development of the revolution, the reactionary rulers never sit idle when the revolution touches their fundamental interests and they are inevitably the first to resort to force. Therefore, whether the desire for peace can be fulfilled depends not on us, but on the ruling class of the time. It would have been impossible to win victory in the revolution if, when the enemy took up the sword and thrust it against us, we demonstrated weakness and gave way, did not dare to "pay him back in his own coin," and did not dare to wipe out completely his armed forces and all the other instruments of violence of the state. The Chinese people have learnt a bitter lesson on the question of armed struggle. When it was still in its infancy, that is, during the period of the First Revolutionary Civil War between 1925 and 1927, our Party, then under the Right opportunist leadership of Chen Tu-hsiu, had an insufficient understanding of the nature of the class enemy and the significance of armed struggle, and thus left the leadership of the Northern Expeditionary Army completely in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek - the right wing of the Kuomintang. Consequently, when the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek clique staged their counter-revolutionary coup d'etat in 1927, the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people were unable to carry out effective counter-attacks against the enemy's brutal massacres and, as a result, all the rights already won by the people were completely lost and the vigorous great revolution ended in failure. The sanguinary lesson of 1927 opened our eyes to the utterly ruthless and extremely

insidious class nature of the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries who represented the big landlord and big bourgeois class; it gave us a profound understanding of the necessity of opposing armed counter-revolution with armed revolution. From that time onward, the Chinese people took up arms and carried out protracted and arduous armed struggles against the Kuomintang reactionaries. Summing up the experience of the Third Revolutionary Civil War at the Eighth National Congress of the Party, Comrade Liu Shao-chi pointed out: "When the people were compelled to take up arms, they were completely justified in doing so. To have opposed the people taking up arms and demanded that they submit to the attacking enemy would have been to follow an opportunist line. Here, the question of following a revolutionary line or an opportunist line became a major issue involving the question whether our 600 million people should or should not capture political power when conditions were ripe."¹²

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's line is a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary line, different from opportunist line of every type. His guidance of the Chinese revolution in the period of the Third Revolutionary Civil War, as in other historical periods, was a good example of integrating revolutionary firmness of the proletariat with flexibility of tactics. Looking at the fourth volume of the *Selected works of Mao Tse-tung* as a whole, it is very clear that one outstanding central idea runs through all its pages: that is, the integration of the revolutionary spirit of daring to gain victory with the art of struggling skilfully to gain victory. In face of such a powerful enemy as the Kuomintang reactionary clique with the energetic U.S. imperialist support, to dare to rouse the masses with a free hand, to expand the forces of the people and to wage "tit-for-tat" struggles against him; to dare to hold on to the fruits of victory already won by the people, insist on the maintenance of the people's armed forces and the people's political power, firmly repel all armed provocations by the enemy, expose all his "peace"

tricks and be fully prepared to smash by force the all-out attacks which the enemy might start, while negotiating with the enemy and striving hard to carry out social and political reforms by peaceful means; and, after the enemy launched all-out attacks, to dare to unleash a people's war to defeat him and resolutely carry the revolution through to the end until revolutionary victory was won throughout the country — (this firm, Marxist-Leninist revolutionary spirit) is precisely an outstanding characteristic of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary line. The integration of this firm, thoroughgoing revolutionary spirit with skill and flexibility in the art of struggle was the key factor which enabled the Chinese people in the period of the Third Revolutionary Civil War to seize state power on a national scale when conditions were ripe.

ha-ha The publication of the fourth volume of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* is an event of great importance in the political life of the Chinese people. At the same time, it is also a great event in the international working-class movement because this work is a reflection of the victory of Marxism-Leninism in a big and the most populous country in the world. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's ideas about daring to win victory and of being skilful in waging struggle, his ideas about the use of revolutionary two-tactics to counter and the counter-revolutionary two-tactics, his ideas about imperialism and all reactionaries being paper tigers, his ideas about slighting the enemy strategically and taking full account of him tactically, his ideas about the people's revolutionary forces, inferior numerically and in equipment, defeating the counter-revolutionary forces which are superior in these respects — these and other ideas and theories will retain their great vitality in the long historical period to come. It is our present important fighting task to arm our minds with Mao Tse-tung's thought, to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism and combat every form of ideological trend of modern revisionism.

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1. "The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression", pp. 11-26 *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 4.
 2. *Ibid.*
 3. "On the Chungking Negotiations", pp. 53-63, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 4.
 4. "On Peace Negotiations with the Kuomintang — Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party", pp. 47-51, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 4.
 5. "On a Statement by Chiang Kai-shek's Spokesman", pp. 41-45, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 4.
 6. "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong", pp. 97-101, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 4.
 7. "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", pp. 157-176, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 4.
 8. "The Chiang Kai-shek Government Is Besieged by the Whole People", pp. 135-139, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 4.
 9. See "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", Note 7, pp. 157-176.
 10. See Note 7, pp. 157-176.
 11. "Build Stable Base Areas in the Northeast", pp. 81-85, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 4.
 12. "The Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Eighth National Congress of the Party." The report was originally published in the *Red Flag*, No. 19, 1960.
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**SOME POINTS IN THE DIRECTIVE OF CHIEF
LIN PIAO ON THE POLITICAL—
IDEOLOGICAL WORK IN 1961**

*— Transmitted at the discussion meeting of the political
commissars and directors of political departments of
the military regions and districts.*

(17 December 1960.)

*by Hsiao Hua **

This morning Chief Lin had a long telephone conversation with me, during which he raised a number of important points of instruction. Now I am transmitting them to you.

Chief Lin said that he had read the first draft of the directive of the General Political Department on the key points in the political work to be carried out in 1961. He thinks that the document is good, and it is very necessary to have it circulated. He also thinks that greater emphasis should be laid on the question of ideology in some points of the directive. Some of them may have to be withheld from writing, but they may be transmitted orally.

Chief Lin's instruction mainly cover the following points:

First, the question of living ideological education: Chief Lin said that the two-remembrances and three-investigations movement is itself a living education, and it represents an effective method which should be popularized on the basis of basic-level rectification in the entire army. According to the present state of ideological conditions, major effort

should be directed at grasping situational education, and ideological education, on struggling through and overcoming difficulties. In view of this year's exceptionally serious natural calamities, there is some difficulty in the supply of foodstuffs and subsidiary foods. The servicemen are in fact peasants and workers in military uniforms, so that whatever problems arise in a locality the same will be reflected in the troop units of the area. Judging from the conditions in some troop units, the number of political incidents has been increasing as a result of difficulties in the present economic life. We should during the course of carrying out the political work anticipate that in the year of 1961, especially in the first half of the year, more political incidents and cases possibly will take place than in any previous year. Due to certain difficulties in our economic life, some cadres and fighters may engender in their mind feelings of dissatisfaction; they may even nurse grievances against the local authorities, and create problems of disunity. It is, therefore, imperative that living ideology must be grasped in the field of political work. It is imperative that action be taken to transmit deeply into the troop units the 12-Point Emergency Directive on Current Policies in the People's Communes issued by the Central Authorities, and Premier Chou's report on the current situation. The troop units should be taught not to raise complaints against the local government organs, not to find fault with them, but to strengthen unity with them and vigorously help them with their problems. This temporary difficulty in economic life directly affects every cadre and serviceman, and, for this reason, special effort must be made in the most recent period to take firm hold of such an ideological problem, and to grasp in an extensive manner the education on domestic situation, or primarily education on the domestic economic situation. Naturally it is also necessary to grasp the education on opposing imperialism and revisionism. However, domestic economic situation still remains the most direct problem at the present time. It is essential that arduous ideological work be carried out to pacify the feelings of the troops units,

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and to ensure that they create no problems.

Chief Lin emphatically pointed out that the greater the difficulty is, the more effective it will be for putting our political-ideological work to test; the greater the difficulty is, the more determined we should be in demonstrating the mightiness of the spiritual atom bomb. We must during the first half of next year solve this practical problem in our political work. Our every cadre, Party and League member must be able to stand the test of this difficulty. The first half of next year will pose a major obstacle to our effort. We should in the field of political-ideological work perform well the two-remembrances and three-investigations movement, do a good job in promoting the education on the 12-Point Emergency Directive and the current situation, in order that every cadre and serviceman may under the most difficult circumstances see clearly the situation, hold on firmly to our stand, and develop the glorious tradition of our army; our every cadre and serviceman must stand up to test of difficulties, commit no mistakes, do no evil things, safeguard the honors of revolutionary military men, join hands with the people of the whole country in the struggle against hardships, unite with them and surmount difficulties. We must pull ourselves through this temporary difficulty, and we are positive that we can. Our future is full of boundless brightness.

Secondly, the question of military training: Chief Lin said that the training guideline of "compactness and quality" laid down by the Military Affairs Commission will continue to be implemented next year, and the training work will be completely revised on the basis of this guideline. Proper arrangement, especially military training, should be made with regard to the various fields of work for 1961. Chief Lin stressed that the importance of military training must be recognized from the ideological point of view. He said that our training work will be carried out under new conditions and circumstances, which are different from those

during the war period. In the past, military subjects were learned through actual combat; every single battle was like a military drill. In those days, we seldom had time for the exclusive purpose of military training, because we relied mainly on fighting battles. After one battle was fought, we would rest for a few days to sum up our experiences before engaging the enemy in another battle. The first thing the new recruits were expected to do was also fighting, through which they were trained and tempered. In short, we relied on combat activities for training. In the past, our troops appeared to have been given the least training, while actually they were the best trained. There is no better and more effective way of training than combining it with actual combat on the battlefield. From this point of view, we may say that our troops were the best trained units.

Conditions have changed since the conclusion of the War of Liberation, and the War To Resist America and Aid Korea. At present, none of the fighters in our troop units have had the experience of fighting; the great majority of the cadres with combat experiences from the past have not seen any action in recent years either. Besides, large numbers of newly promoted basic-level cadres in the squads, platoons and companies are without combat experiences. We also have to bear in mind that the number of inexperienced cadres will continue to increase, while the veterans will be relatively decreased. Because of having no battle to fight for so long, we are no longer very familiar with the various battlefield actions, and this is a new situation. In the past, much of the training work was accomplished through actual combat; now we have to rely on drills for training and for operational purposes. Like fighting a battle, training must be conducted in very serious manners. In terms of technical equipment, what the present troop units possess are also different from the past. Old equipment in the past was comparatively simple, while new ones are considerably more complicated. Without sufficient time for training, new and complex military techniques cannot be well managed. The

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function of new equipment cannot be fully exploited without learning to master its operations. This is another new situation.

Speaking from the relations between military training and politics, politics naturally comes first, and it is of primary importance. However, if we look at the question from the time for training, military drills should take up more time, because it takes precedence of politics. Technique depends on practice, and more practice, or it will be forgotten. For instance, the Military Affairs Commission has ruled that the time for military and political trainings in this year should be fixed at 60% and 40% respectively, and some specialized troop units spend as much as 70% of their time on military trainings. During the course of training, physical labour should not take up too much time, it should be reduced to some extent. Cultural education and sports should also be shortened so as to provide sufficient time for military training. Our cadres should with all seriousness grasp the training work of our troop units under new conditions, and our political work should be centered on further improving military drills in 1961 during which still greater results may be achieved.

Thirdly, the question of preventing occurrence of accidents: Chief Lin said that serious accidents involving aircraft of the air force and the naval air force have repeatedly taken place of late, this should arouse our close attention, and forceful steps should be taken to prevent future occurrences. Preventive measures should be adopted first in the air force, next in the navy and other specialized units. The air force and navy are different from the army which operates on land, and army accidents are comparatively easier to handle. When an infantryman falls down, he can get up and go on with his work. But with the aircraft in the air and the ship on the sea, an accident involves a great deal more danger and loss. When the plane crashes, the flier is lost too. In order to prevent accidents, it is imperative that all possible steps be taken to provide maximum safety

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to all personnel and property involved. In this particular case, it is necessary to handle with great care the question of man and the question of machines. Let accidents be considerably reduced in 1961.

On the question of personnel, ideological work must be done well both during training and performance of duties; the mastery of techniques should be properly handled, and the daily life of fliers and crew on ships should be placed under proper management in that work should be combined with pleasure, and rashness must be avoided. To go at full steam has nothing to do with being rash in action. The question of machines means that serious and persistent efforts be made to master the operations of equipment; it is imperative that all operational manuals be followed without reservation, and attention be constantly directed at inspection, maintenance and management so as to combine personnel with techniques.

Chief Lin also pointed out that peacetime is different from wartime. In wartime, one must be brave in the face of enemy, he must be daring, defiant of physical tiredness, capable of overcoming difficulties to accomplish his combat mission; in peacetime he should be discreet both during training and performance of duties. As the situation stands, the air force, navy, and other specialized units should all in the near future hold a special meeting of their own to study the causes of the recently reported accidents in order that remedial measures be worked out to prevent similar occurrences, and to provide maximum safety to all concerned.

Fourthly, the question of learning Mao Tse-tung's works: Chief Lin said that the cadres of our armed forces should all study Chairman Mao's writings in good earnest. Study should have certain key points to follow. At present, both the cadres and the servicemen should select from among the writings of Chairman Mao a number of essential articles

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having direct and close bearing on the practical side of life for perusal, and they should try to appreciate the spirit of the words for the purpose of solving the present ideological problem in the troop units. In other words, priority should be given to things of more urgent need. To study Mao Tse-tung's thought, we should try to obtain quick results; we should use the "arrow" of Mao Tse-tung's thought to shoot the "target" of ideological reality of the troop units. Principal leading cadres and political cadres should take the initiative in its study and keep themselves ahead of others. ✓

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**TALK AT THE SECOND TELEPHONE
CONFERENCE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
COUNCIL OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS
COMMISSION HELD ON 30 DECEMBER 1960**

by Hsiao Hua

Recently Chief Lin has given important instructions concerning the work of 1961. On the basis of these instructions, the Administrative Council of the Military Affairs Commission called the responsible comrades of various branches of the armed forces, command headquarters, the Peking Military Region, and the academies in Peking to a discussion meeting. Now, comrades, I am transmitting the message to you.

Chief Lin considered that 1960 was the year in which we raised questions in the various aspects concerning army building, laying emphasis on the question of ideological understanding of leadership organs and leadership cadres. Implementation of the many problems and tasks presented this year depends on the work of next year. Chief Lin said: "This year our work in various areas consists of making plans, setting up tasks, and of carrying them out in a thoroughgoing manner. Next year our work in various areas will be entirely composed of the implementation of plans with emphasis on concrete performance, on results and outstanding achievements." The task of 1961 is to translate the policies and measures as contained in the resolution of the Enlarged Session of the Military Affairs Commission into practical work, piece by piece, or, in other words, to transmit the key programmes of our work below, to take root at the primary level, and in the company. This year

✓ we stress on the method of "keeping watch over the most advanced and the most backward so as to bring along the majority in between." Next year we shall concentrate on developing the "middle" with our main effort directed at the company and centre our work at the primary level. Chief Lin submitted that work at the company in the coming year should be devoted to grasp the following four areas: (1) Political work, that is, living ideology, or simply ideology; (2) working style, that is, the three-eight working style; (3) training, mainly military training; (4) livelihood. On the basis of these instructions from Chief Lin the Liberation Army Daily has written an editorial to be published on 1 January 1961. The various units should study and arrange their work on the basis of this editorial and the key instructions of the General Political Department concerning the political work of the entire army in 1961, based on the actual situation of each unit. The editorial should be taken as the guide in the struggle and the programme of action in next year's company work. It should be posted in the company to enable all comrades to frequently read it. The Military Affairs Commission also will prepare a written instruction to be issued around 15 January of next year. I therefore invite your attention to the study and execution of these instructions.

Presented below are a few brief notes on the question of grasping next year's company work with emphasis on four areas as set forth by Chief Lin.

I. TO GRASP IDEOLOGY WITH EMPHASIS ON LIVING IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION

As far as the entire army is concerned, the work of ideological education for the coming year mainly lies in dealing with the following three aspects: (1) vigorous publicity and study of Mao Tse-tung's thought, mainly the fourth volume of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung; (2) study and

implementation of the resolution of the Enlarged Session of the Military Affairs Commission; (3) deep and thorough study of the Three Red Flags and of the current situation. In the company, the principal task is to deal with living ideology. It is Chief Lin's opinion that the education should be carried out constantly in the light of the situation, task and ideological trends and activities of the troops, and should not depend entirely on books and major political campaigns to bring out the important points. At present, the primary duty of the company is to grasp education on existing conditions, and to develop the movement of "two remembrances and three investigations".

Through the rectification of working styles and Party branches, and after receiving the Twelve-Article directive of the Central Authorities and Premier Chou En-lai's report, an overwhelming majority of the comrades in the troops have gained a relatively clear understanding of the current situation at home and abroad, and on the whole, their ideology is relatively sound. This is the main stream of the ideological trend in the army units. However, because of the temporary and partial difficulties of the present economy, a small number of comrades have begun to waver in their ideological stand and have thus caused some problems. Some persons have erroneous opinions and are discontented with the temporary difficulties in their economic life. According to the findings of investigations in individual units, this kind of persons comprises roughly 10% of the whole army. In the troop units, the number of incidents and cases of a political nature has also increased recently. Chief Lin called our attention to the fact that during the first half of next year, cases of this kind may become more frequent, so that the leadership should be mentally prepared. Chief Lin pointed out that next year, especially the first half of it, will be a big hurdle over which we must leap. We must try to overcome difficulties in foodstuff and in the lack of political understanding. For this reason, the work of ideological education in the troop units should be primarily

directed toward the internal situation, toward overcoming and enduring the difficulties. It is important to make every cadre and soldier recognize the situation clearly, keep a firm hold on his stand, promote the glorious traditions of our army, survive the test of hardships, make no errors, do nothing bad, unite and strengthen their confidence in surmounting difficulties.

All the army should continue to carry out in a thoroughgoing manner the current economic situation at home, so that all the comrades in the army will correctly understand the existing conditions, treat local cadres correctly, unite successfully with local cadres, and struggle hard to overcome the temporary difficulties in coordination and cooperation with all the people of the nation. This education must be conducted well, for it is the most important task in the company's ideological education.

The movement of "two remembrances and three investigations" has proven to be one of the most effective means of conducting living education. Development of this movement will produce very good effect in raising class consciousness of the troop units, in clarifying their stand and in keeping a firm hold on their political direction. Starting in January of next year, all units should develop this movement one by one, but on an overall basis. They do not have to wait for the completion of the entire rectification of Party branches to start this movement. Those Party branches which have completed their rectification should immediately start the movement of two remembrances and three investigations. A few branches which have not yet completed their rectification task should continue it in combination with the new movement in order to make up their deficiencies. Those branches which have not started their rectification may now get started, but they should not unduly delay the movement of two remembrances and three investigations. In the course of the movement, the leadership should pay attention to summarizing and applying

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the experience derived from those units that have already been tested. The movement must be closely united with the internal situation and be considered as the key points of the whole problem. The purpose of this movement is to develop the class consciousness of all men in the army, to make them correctly understand the internal situation and voluntarily support the Three Red Flags, fortify their morale, strengthen their solidarity and determination in overcoming difficulties. As to the method of carrying out the movement, it may be worked out by the various units in the light of their individual conditions.

All cadres in the army should endeavour to study Mao Tse-tung's thought, and learn to know well the fourth volume of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*. The method of learning, Chief Lin told us, should be purposeful, i.e., learning what is most urgently needed. Studying Mao Tse-tung's thought ought to be combined with practice, i.e., the unity of learning and applying should be established. At present, both cadres and fighters should select and study some articles which are required and are closely related to practical life under existing circumstances. They should learn in good earnest to grasp the spirit and the substance of these articles so as to solve existing ideological problems in troop units. The study of Mao Tse-tung's thought should lead to immediate application and positive result. We must use this thought as an "arrow" to strike at the "target" of the ideological reality in troop units, and we must also criticize and reject the abstract and purposeless method of learning used in the past.

All cadres and comrades of the army should earnestly study and thoroughly implement the "Resolution on Strengthening Political and Ideological Work in the Army" passed at the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Affairs Commission. The resolution, having been revised by Chairman Mao himself and approved by the Central Authorities, has been transmitted to all units concerned. In its reply, the

Central Authorities pointed out: The Enlarged Meeting of the Military Affairs Commission was well conducted and the resolution good. It maintains that the resolution has followed and displayed the tradition of the Ku-t'ien Conference of 1929; has, under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought, made a complete synthesis of the rich experience gained while building the army and conducting political and ideological work during the eleven years since the Liberation; has unequivocally pointed out the direction of political work in the army of the new historical period, has set forth operational measures and struck the key issues. The Central Authorities also pointed out that this resolution not only serves as the guide line for building the army, and conducting political and ideological work, but also embodies the kind of basic spirit that should be useful to Party organizations of various levels, to government departments, schools and enterprises. The Central Authorities in its reply also gave important instructions in regard to the study of Marxism-Leninism and Chairman Mao's works. All comrades of our army must seriously study this resolution and the official reply of the Central Authorities. It represents the best method of learning in that it combines the study of Mao Tse-tung's thought with the reality of our army. We must with all seriousness study and learn the spirit of the resolution and apply it to our practical work, especially our work in the company.

In addition to its fine illustration of many of the vital ideological principles, the resolution also provides a good many practical measures for the improvement of political and ideological work, including the establishment of a series of new organizations in the company. Each of these measures and organizations must be established on a solid foundation so that it may gradually take root in the company. For this reason, we should be ready for periodical inspections, the synthesis and dissemination of experiences, and prepare to check twice a year the condition of progress with which the resolution is implemented.

II. TO GRASP THE WORKING STYLE BY CONTINUOUSLY DEVELOPING THE THREE-EIGHT WORKING STYLE

The movement of the three-eight working style started by the army in May of this year has brought very good results. In the coming year, this movement will be further developed for still greater achievements. It is a long-range project and should not be neglected.

To promote the three-eight working style, we must carry out propaganda and education through stimulating vigorous mass movements. In addition, we should also cultivate and train ourselves in daily life and in the performance of our duties to ensure that this working style dominate every part of our life. We should emphasize the importance of cadres making themselves examples for the masses to follow. Of particular importance are company cadres who must take the lead in developing the working style and in introducing it to the rank and file. Recently the *Liberation Army Daily* has successively published eight special editorials on the development of the three-eight working style. They can be used as teaching materials in the company.

The three-eight working style should be applied in various aspects of our life and work. In leadership organs of various levels, emphasis should be placed on grasping the question of speed and depth. The genius of an army lies in its mobility. A swift working style is particularly significant for troop units, and we must respond to orders with immediate action. On the significance of responding to orders with immediate action, the resolution offers an allround explanation, that is, we must seriously, responsibly, completely and systematically transmit the directives of the Central Authorities of the Party, Chairman Mao and the Military Affairs Commission; once they are transmitted, we should take immediate action to study carefully and learn the directives; and then in combination with the practical

situation, we should work out effective measures for the complete and thorough execution and implementation of these directives. "To take immediate action upon receiving an order" does not mean to transmit an order and act on it without order or plan. If we fail to grasp this point, and if all departments assign duties to the company, no one will be able to do the company's work. What the three-eight working style requires is that the leadership organ, in discovering and solving problems, should stress on speed and depth. All work must be implemented at the company level. The leadership organ must penetrate into the primary level, into the company, to evaluate the situation and to assist the company's work.

The three-eight working style should be materialized in the appearance and discipline of troop units. Recently the General Staff Department issued regulations concerning military appearance and discipline. We should educate troop units to enforce these regulations on a permanent basis, for they are closely related to the question of developing the three-eight working style, raising the army's capacity for organization, discipline and accuracy, and for enhancing their combat strength. We must therefore educate all the army's personnel to guard against laxity in discipline and other bad tendencies.

We must make earnest effort to enforce all regulations and systems to reduce and eliminate incidents. Incidents in troop units, especially flying incidents, are very serious. Though the cause of incidents varies, the lack of strength in political and ideological work is largely responsible. Besides, the lack of training in operational skills, especially the failure to observe operational rules, is also an important reason. Many phenomena are in fact quite shocking. In order to reverse the situation of serious incidents, we should on the one hand work successfully on the question of man, i.e., do well our ideological work in the course of training and executing our duties. On the other hand, we should

skilfully control our technical equipment, do our work strictly in accordance with technical operational rules, and carefully execute rules and systems without giving merely lip service or being unreasonably stubborn. This item of work should be taken as one of the principal aims in the course of developing the three-eight working style.

III. TO GRASP AND DEVELOP MILITARY TRAINING

As regards military training, we must make it a success next year. Chief Lin emphasized that we must ideologically recognize the importance of military training. He said that we are now carrying on our training under a new condition and a new situation. This differs from the conditions in the past periods of fighting, in which we were frequently engaged in battles and therefore used the fighting of battles to learn fighting and to train soldiers. It seems on the surface that in those days our army had very little training. But, in reality, it had a good deal of training, namely, practical training. At that time, the troop units could fight a battle without or with little training. Since techniques were relatively simple in those days, they were easy to learn. But the situation today is basically different. Most of the troop units have not fought battles for a very long time. Some fighters and lower-level cadres have not even fought a single battle. Thus we must strengthen our training. Modern weapons are far more complicated than the old ones. Our men need full training before they can handle them. If our training is bad, incidents will occur in the time of peace, and defeat will follow in the time of war. We shall not only fail to fight well, but also fail to do well with many other things and activities like eating, walking, sleeping, conducting reconnaissance and sentry duties, maintaining contact and communication work. In the past we fought battles and now we do not fight them; in the past techniques were relatively simple and easy to learn, and now they are relatively complicated and difficult to learn. This is the basic change

in the situation, a great, not small, difference between the present and the past. Formerly we relied on actual combat to train our troop units, and now we depend on training to fight battles. For all these reasons, Chief Lin told us that we must persist in doing well with our training, and the leadership at various levels should follow it through with sincere efforts.

Chief Lin stressed the primary importance of politics; that politics is our foundation; that politics should take command in every part of our work; that politics should play the role of the supreme commander; and that the military must serve the interest of politics; this holds in term of the relationship of politics to the military, and therefore is entirely correct. However, it cannot be taken to mean that with politics in command, we no longer need the military. There are several component parts to a thing, and none of these is dispensable. As far as the time for military and political training is concerned, the military requirement is the principal part and therefore should be given more time than political training. The time used for education, manual labour and sports should be still less. With regard to the time for training next year, the General Staff Department announced on 20 December the following: The training time for the infantry of the Ground Force should be eight months in a year, and seven hours in a day; for the Navy and the Air Force, the time of training should be arranged by themselves. Some comrades had different opinions regarding this regulation. The Administrative Council of the Military Affairs Commission studied this question and maintained that the time of training in each year might be arranged in several ways. For instance, (1) eight months of training in each year, and seven hours in each day; (2) eight months of training in each year, and eight hours in each day; (3) nine months of training in each year, and seven hours in each day. Each unit may present its opinion on the basis of its own concrete conditions. But there are two restrictions, namely, (the time of training in) each year cannot exceed nine months, and in each day it cannot exceed eight hours.

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Next year we should give it a try. If there are other opinions, they may be submitted to us.

Chief Lin held that in the course of military training, the main thing to do is to implement the policy of "compactness and quality" as regulated by the Military Affairs Commission, and on the basis of this policy, to effect an overall reform in the work of training. The course of training should not be too broad, so as to embrace everything and achieve nothing. Some of those things need not be studied in a special course, because they can be easily learned when used. As to the things of decisive significance, they must be studied and practiced over and over again. Fewer lectures should be given on those things which are not crucial, and more lectures and assignments should be given on the essential ones. As in the case of studying a telephone or a simple machine, it is not very useful for the average person to learn thoroughly all the principles involved. It is sufficient for him to acquire some general knowledge and to know how to use it. For the troop units the main thing is to have a successful basic training, especially technical training. Technical training chiefly consists of shooting and the operation of equipment. Skilled operation is as important for mobility as accuracy for shooting. Whether it is an airplane, warship, gun or a tank, we should train the men to operate it skilfully and to shoot accurately. We need more training, and we must save time from other activities to develop our techniques. Commanding officers should study tactics well and also the basic concepts and general tactical rules of Mao Tse-tung's military thought. Chief Lin held that in the course of technical training, we should assume different conditions, and simulate the most difficult situations; otherwise, we would not be able to increase our combat strength. If we adopt a way of thinking in the time of peace that everything goes well, we shall not have sufficient ideological preparation in the time of war, and, as a consequence, we shall not be able to fight successfully. This, Chief Lin said, is a matter of principle. Besides, we

should also pay attention to the training in night combat. One is to learn fighting, and the other to learn walking. Whether in troop units, or academies or schools, in military training, political or cultural education, whether in the course of military training, in technical training, or in tactical training, we should firmly implement the policy of "compactness and quality" and employ various practical and effective measures according to concrete conditions in the various branches of service, military arms, and troop units. All military and political academies and schools should further reform their teaching methods according to the principles of "compactness and quality" and "conciseness and compactness."

IV. TO GRASP AND IMPROVE THE CONDITIONS OF LIVELIHOOD

To arrange the life in troop units successfully is an important political task at present. Both the Central Authorities and Chairman Mao have always concerned themselves very much with men, with the life of the masses, and instructed us that we should look at the life of the masses in relation to the basic interests of the revolutionary work. Especially at present, when the State is in the face of temporary economic difficulties, this problem has become all the more important. Troop units must manage well the livelihood of the officers and men, avoid causing trouble, in order not to affect their physical strength. Chief Lin recently emphasized again and again that the question of livelihood must be handled well as efforts are made to improve the ideological conditions.

Recently, some troop units, organs and schools discovered that a few men were affected by edema. Attention must be paid to their conditions and analysis must be made. Some of the men had edema as a result of other diseases and were seriously weakened in their ability to absorb

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nourishment. In those units where edema has occurred, active measures should be taken to cure it. In other units where many effective measures have been taken, the rate of the sick has dropped very quickly. In still other units where no such condition has occurred, attention should be given to preventing its occurrence. The situation, however, should not be exaggerated, nor should we be so frightened as not to adopt proper measures.

The successful management of livelihood in troop units primarily depends on good supervision and well organized work. We must take good care of the men's daily requirements under the existing conditions. We must watch the two important aspects of their life in the army: the material life and the spiritual life. ✓

With regard to material life, we should give special attention to the successful operation of the mess halls. We must by all means meet the requirement of the Central Authorities to "send politics to the mess halls and cadres to the kitchens." In addition to assigning certain responsible cadres to attend to the work of mess halls themselves, we should also send other cadres to work in the kitchen. Under the existing standard, we must very successfully adjust our food and arrange our meals. We must provide both officers and men with the necessary nourishment and calories. In regard to the food ration in troop units, we must carry out the regulations approved by the Military Affairs Commission in its communication to the General Rear Services Department on 9 November concerning the further saving of food and the reduction in the food ration. If food is saved on the basis of these regulations, no further reduction should be made in the food ration. At the same time, attention should be paid to the supervision and control of food and the elimination of corruption, theft and waste.

We should find means to obtain substitute foods, such as organized hunting and fishing. These are effective means

to improve livelihood and to save food in troop units. The Shenyang Military Region has up to the present time made over 230,000 catties of artificial flour; and each division has organized a team of 30 to 50 persons to hunt animals for food. Troop units in the South should pay attention to planting vegetables and make use of their time to prepare for the production work of the following spring.

We must successfully unite labour with leisure. The Central Authorities has repeatedly pointed out that we must pay attention to this need. Under general circumstances we must firmly execute the regulation of eight-hour day in order to assure both officers and men that they will have sufficient time for rest and sleep. The time for productive labour should not be too long. Those units and individuals who are heavily loaded with work or doing particularly complex technical work may be excused from production assignments. In both life and work, tension and laxity, labour and leisure should be united in order to assure that troop units will maintain peak energy and physical strength. At present there are still some units which have not paid sufficient attention to the combination of labour and leisure. In some schools the time of study and labour takes up 12 to 13 hours a day. This situation must be corrected.

✓ While dealing with material life, we should also consider spiritual life in troop units, i.e., to vitalize their cultural life, and conduct a successful recreational club. All military personnel should learn to sing the 11 songs prescribed by the General Political Department. We must check and see whether they learned all these songs. Around the New Year Days and the Spring Festival, we should organize entertainment programmes in the company and encourage cadres and fighters to give performances. In a word, we should make use of holidays to vitalize our life. Our troop units must be active like living dragons and tigers, full of energy and the spirit of revolutionary optimism.

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For the coming year, we should chiefly deal with these four aspects in our company work. But this is only a general requirement. Each period may require special emphasis. All military regions and districts should therefore make good arrangements according to the condition of their own units. Chief Lin also pointed out in his telephone conversation that consideration should be given to the commencement of a movement toward the creation of four-good companies in accordance with these four requirements, and I hope you will give a thought to it. In short, we must concentrate our strength next year and successfully accomplish our company work.

In order to perform well our company work in 1961, the leadership organs of the various levels should carefully study and improve their working methods.

The leadership organs and leadership cadres must personally go to the companies and set the direction of their operation for the companies. The leadership organs at the divisional level or above should make sure that one third of their cadres will constantly work in the companies. This regulation must be carried out. Those effective systems, such as the establishment of direct contact between leadership cadres and (Party) branches and the assignment of officers to work as soldiers, should be firmly executed and implemented.

The leadership organs and cadres at the regimental level should employ the face-to-face method of leadership and arrange their operations straight down to the bottom. The organs and chiefs must make direct contact with cadres and soldiers. They should not give written instructions. All instructions should be given and transmitted orally. When lower organizations report to the regiment, they should also use the oral method. The division when assembled in a given area should use this method of leadership as much as possible. ✓

Chief Lin suggested that organs below the army level should not make written reports; instead, they should make oral reports (face-to-face talk or telephone conversation) as much as possible. Every event and indication must be reported at the proper time. Organs at the army level and above may find it hard to stop writing out their orders and reports. However, they should try to cut the number of documents to the minimum. At present there are still too many documents and periodical reports. We must eliminate some of them. Those which can be reduced must be reduced, and those which can be merged with others must be merged. The frequency of periodical reports should not be too high. We should not send a large number of periodical reports to the company, and tire them out with having to deal with them. In the future, the time for group training of cadres should be reduced. The time for group training and meeting should be properly controlled. We must make sure that the company always has 70 percent (over two thirds) of its cadres working in it.

The key programme for the work of 1961 is to direct all-out effort toward company work. All of us should strive for the successful operation of our company work in the four areas and in the creation of the four-good company.

After Comrade Hsiao Hua's talk, Comrade Yang Cheng-wu transmitted some of Chief Lin's instructions: (1) The key points of the company in 1961 should not only be published in newspapers but also be printed in propaganda pamphlets to be circulated in companies so that they will become the programme of action for comrades throughout the army and serve as the basis of inspection. Next year we must succeed in our political work and in our working style, and at the same time lay down a good foundation for future development. (2) With regard to the arrangement of livelihood, we must find ways and means in the course of

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our work to do more thinking in the direction of how to obtain successful organization and management of our life. We should not think of the problem in terms of how to raise the standard of supply. A successful organization and management will yield a satisfactory life. (3) We should emphasize the strict enforcement of rules and systems and make this enforcement an important part of the implementation of the three-eight working style. Many incidents occurring in troop units are associated with the failure to execute rules and systems. (4) [Chief Lin] agreed to the time for training prescribed by the General Staff Department, especially with regard to the time for training special forces which should be somewhat more than the time for the ordinary infantry. The various military arms and branches of service may make arrangements in accordance with their own concrete conditions.

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**IT IS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND FULLY THE
IMPORTANT CHANGES IN THE TRAINING OF
OUR ARMED FORCES**

*— Instruction of Lin Piao upon receiving the report of
Chang Tsung-hsun on military training of the armed forces.*

from "Kung Tso T'ung-hsin"

On December 8 (1960), Marshal Lin Piao, after listening to the report of Deputy Chief of the General Staff Chang Tsung-hsun on the conditions of military training of the troop units, pointed out that training of the troop units must be strengthened, that during the course of training, Mao Tse-tung's thought must be thoroughly implemented, and that emphasis be placed on basic training, with technical training in particular. He further stated that training of troop units should be started from the most complex and difficult conditions so as to turn the units into an army with exceptional combat capabilities.

Deputy Chief of the General Staff Chang said to Marshal Lin Piao: Training of troop units in 1960 achieved noticeable result. But because the duties of the cadres were many and their abilities rather limited, and also due to the fact that the principle of maintaining compactness and quality was not fully followed, and the training programme was stretched to cover too many things at a time, a good deal of time, material and manpower was wasted. The effect of training therefore wasn't very good, and the record less outstanding.

Marshal Lin Piao said: A programme which is spread too broad and aims to do everything at the same time inevitably results in achieving nothing. Some things need no special training, but in time of necessity, they can be picked up ✓

easily. Things of decisive importance must be repeatedly learned and practised. Otherwise, we shall find ourselves unable to overcome tough situations in battle. In the past, battles were frequently fought. In those days we learned to fight through fighting, and we trained our troops through fighting. In those days, there appeared to have had very little training in the narrow sense of the word, while in fact trainings were many and practical. In those days, our troops were able to go into action at anytime without or with very little training. The techniques involved were rather simple, and were easier to learn. But the present conditions are entirely different from those in the past, the troops no longer have a battle to fight, nearly all fighters and some cadres have never been in action, that's why training must be strengthened. Modern weapons are considerably more complicated than the old ones, and the mastery of them calls for sufficient training. Without proper training no troop unit can possibly do well with fighting on the battlefield. Not only such a unit cannot fight well, but will find itself unable to do many other things well, like eating, walking, sleeping, conducting reconnaissance, and maintaining communication. Some troop units will under such circumstances suffer a defeat in battle, or even break up and disappear. In the past, we were in war, but now there is no battle to be fought; in the past techniques were relatively simple and easy to learn, and now they are comparatively complicated and difficult to learn. This is the basic change in the situation, a great, not small, difference between the present and the past. Formerly we relied on actual combat to train our troops, now we depend on training to learn how to fight battles. We must therefore persist in our training work. We must stress the principle that politics comes first, and politics is the commander. But, in terms of time consumed, political education should not take the first place, and still less time should be occupied by cultural activities and physical labour, as the first place should be given to military training.

Deputy Chief of the General Staff Chang said: Since the recent Enlarged Meeting of the Military Affairs Commission,

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all branches of the armed forces have in every possible way translated the spirit of the meeting into action, and considerably strengthened the political and ideological work. In the past, we didn't do well enough in making politics command our performance of duties and training. Some cadres had studied Chairman Mao's works, but they were unable to apply their study to practical conditions, nor to their daily performance of duties.

Marshal Lin Piao said: This question must be solved with great care. The cadres must be taught that politics cannot be separated from reality. Otherwise, they may make five points (the highest mark) in examinations, while in action either get a zero (lowest mark) or even commit a "crime." Politics should exercise control over practical conditions and professional duties, and living education should be conducted on the basis of living conditions.

Deputy Chief of the General Staff Chang said: Chairman speaks of concentration of superior military force so as to exterminate the enemy. This is both a tactical thinking and a good method of work. Everyone has learned it, but some comrades do not know how to apply it to practical situations, and they fail to persist in implementing during the course of training the principle of compactness and quality. Chairman Mao tells us that we should scorn difficulties strategically while paying full attention to them tactically. But some troop units during the course of holding tactical exercises choose to start from the easy side of things instead of centering their attention on the most difficult situation; they work out only one method instead of a number of alternatives.

Marshal Lin Piao said: In tactical training, it is necessary to consider all possible situations, and to think of the most difficult conditions, or it will be impossible to improve the fighting strength of the unit. If we form in our mind the concept of plain sailing in peace time, we shall in time of war find ourselves without sufficient ideological preparedness, and things

will not turn out well. This is a question that concerns the direction and policy of development.

Deputy Chief of the General Staff Chang said: During field exercises, some troop units still followed the practice of one-dimensional advance without learning to encircle the enemy from the sides. During an attack manoeuvre, some units often engaged in break-through assaults and counter-assaults one after another without any keypoint guidance. Penetration is a big problem during an attack, it is essential for the units to master the skill of penetration under different conditions and through different ways. For instance, if a tank while covering the advance of an infantry unit is destroyed, the engineering unit, the recoilless guns and flame throwers may be called in to continue the penetration assault; there should be several alternatives. During an attack, the question of how to deal with the enemy's centre of resistance is a big problem, which should be studied and practised over and over again.

✓ Marshal Lin Piao said: The most undesirable thing on the battlefield is to use the method of "level push" (p'ing t'ui); there should be more than one direction, at least there should be two, three or four directions of the operation. In the "two flanks of one point", the term "one point" means that an overwhelmingly superior number of troops should be concentrated in order to break through a point in the enemy line and create confusion in its troop disposition, but if the troops are scattered to cover many points at a time, the operation will end up in breaking no point in the enemy line. However, it won't do without flanking operations, otherwise you may succeed in breaking a point, but the enemy will flee, so that it is necessary to plunge into his flanks and cut off his rear by encirclement (two flanks). Besides, it won't be easy to make the main attack effective without dispersing the enemy from two or three directions. Military dialectics tells us that when the enemy's main force is routed, all the rest will collapse, because the various points of the enemy line are linked with one another.

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Deputy Chief of the General Staff Chang said: The troop units have paid due attention to basic training, but there is still room for improvement, especially in technical training which is not good enough and more should be done for the purpose of consolidation. Just exactly what each subject is after, and where lies the point of emphasis which should be studied thoroughly and in depth; which subject needs less attention or no attention needed.

Marshal Lin Piao said: A thorough review should be made to determine which subject needs no study, which calls for less time and effort, and which demands more attention and time. To solve this problem is a very important task. The troops primarily should make a good job in basic training, especially in technical training. The commanding officers should be mainly concerned with map exercise and field exercise; concentration on one's major responsibility is both time-saving, and more effective. Try not to hold too many large-scale field exercises. Major operations are bound to have lots of changes, so that one must learn to be resourceful and flexible in adapting himself to different situations. Technical training covers target practice and driving; all must be tried out for the purpose of driving well and shooting accurately. It will be a mess not driving well and shooting accurately. Basic training should also cover the study of outlines of tactics and the fundamental points of Mao Tse-tung's military thought.

Deputy Chief of the General Staff Chang said: Some troop units during the course of technical training have failed to concentrate on what is more important; they talk more about general theory and non-essential things, but have not done enough in the study and practice of essential matters.

Marshal Lin Piao said: Now we must reverse the order by spending less time on lecturing non-essential things, but more time on talking and practising the essential ones. Like in the case of learning to use the telephone, for the ordinary person it is no use to learn all about the general theory of the

operation of a telephone, some commonsense plus the method of using it will do.

Deputy Chief of the General Staff Chang said: The troops have not done enough to develop the tradition of our army during night operation trainings; particularly in the case of the technical soldiers (occupational specialists), they haven't done enough in combining actual combat conditions with their trainings, nor have they paid sufficient attention to night trainings.

Marshal Lin Piao said: During night operations, one must be able to fight well, and walk well.

At the end of the conversation, Marshal Lin Piao told Deputy Chief of the General Staff Chang: Make the cadres fully understand that the present conditions of our troop units are fundamentally different from the situation in the past. Formerly our troops could fight without a thorough training; at present, they will be unable to fight like they did in the past without a thorough training. For this reason, all arms of services at different levels should take up training in good earnest. Military cadres should learn politics, they should let politics take command, but they must also pay close attention to the study of military affairs, it won't do without learning military things. To learn politics, one should know what to learn; he should carry on his study in the light of existing conditions and practical requirement. He should start from practical conditions, and it is necessary to study published works and theory on the basis of professional requirement. The troops should thoroughly develop the three-eight working style, and spread its influence deeply into the field of training. Besides, formation drill should also be strengthened. After the recruits have been organized into units, certain time should be set aside to make them learn such simple moves as: attention, at ease, and march. In training, each area should turn out some model units, and then popularize the experiences throughout the entire army. We must train our troop units

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and turn them into a mighty army with exceptionally strong combat capabilities.

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LIN PIAO'S IMPORTANT DIRECTIVE ON SIGNAL AND LIAISON WORK

from "Kung Tso T'ung-hsin"

On March 17, 1961, Comrade Lin Piao, after listening to the report of Comrade Chiang Wen of the Signal Corps, gave important instructions concerning signal and liaison work as follows:

Signal and liaison work is very important; if this work does not succeed, the (entire) command will be paralyzed. ✓

It is required that signal and liaison work be swift, correct, discreet and incessant, and of these the most important are speed and discretion. ✓

Signal and liaison work needs an extensive renovation, and it requires continuous improvement from this time forward. This is a struggle of the signal battle. It is necessary to send small groups to proceed with the special investigations and to study the situation and the problems of all military arms and branches of service on all levels. Different methods should be applied to different problems on the various levels. Consistent treatment is necessary to correct the problems whenever discovered. We must at least catch up with the standards in effect during the Civil War, the War of Resistance (to Japanese Aggression), the War of Liberation and the War to Resist America and Aid Korea.

We must sum up the experience of the signal work of our army so as to improve it continuously. We must hold progress contests and encourage rivalry.

SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

We must convene a special meeting and approach the problem from all angles in order to make sure of detecting any defects, such as those concerning technique, training, organization, military service, political ideology and working attitude. After discovering any insuperable problems, it is necessary to report them to the Military Affairs Commission.

Training must be based on the principle of "compactness and quality" and familization through repetition. In the past we depended on war to carry out training. Now we have to train the men without a war to rely on; what is more, the technique is much more complicated at the present time, so that only through repetition can one learn to master the technique. Even the work is not too complicated, as in the building of antennae and cranking the motors, repeated drill is necessary. We should have the skill to set up a radio communication station within a few minutes.

A good job was done in the radio training network in all units above the battalion level over the entire army. Work and training must have two sets of regulations; during work, training must cease, and training may be resumed only when there is no work. Thus the radio technician not only can get more actual training but also can bewilder and confuse the enemy.

Technical experts must be trained. In ordinary radio communication stations only one skilled technician is needed, but larger stations need two. It has always been this way. It is necessary to make the technicians play the leading role and function as backbone cadres in technical work and to assure the completion of the duty under a complicated and difficult situation.

As to the question of organization, except for the organizational system in peacetime, we must use the system of separate unit organizations larger than the company in wartime. In the past, one cook was assigned to a group of over 30

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persons, which was not appropriate; pots, dishes and hurricane-lamps should also be counted beforehand. Whether or not buglers are needed, and if needed, to what rank they should belong, must be carefully studied. The troop units on duty must be organized according to wartime requirement.

Signal communication is very important, because it is needed to transmit combat orders and to command the action of the troop units, stopping and waiting for orders, moving to the left or right; all can be done in one or two code messages. Signal communication must be practised in peacetime, and especially technicians who must be thoroughly familiar with it.

During combat action, a long code may cause the loss of life. For this reason the message must be brief and clear, and the codes must also be simple and clear.

The system of service must also be studied, in order to see who wishes his year of service extended and to allow those who have had the distinction of special qualifications to remain in the armed service at increased salary.

The present radio communication stations are all too cumbersome, and besides, some of them are not reliable in liaison work when the troop is in motion. These must be quickly revamped.

On the morning of May 15, Comrade Lin Piao again issued the following important directives concerning actual problems of signal work and the signal special conference, after he listened to Comrades Chiang Wen and Chu Ming of the Signal Corps reporting on the signal special conference; he spoke as follows:

In training, the signal units have not strictly followed the guiding principle of "compactness and quality." Their general training time occupies 60 percent of the total time and

special training only 30 percent; besides, the special training is not very specific, how can this kind of training be useful? This trend must be reversed. The training programme must provide more practice and less lectures; it should be like the training of table-tennis players who may go on practising for a number of years to develop the necessary skill for victory.

Some signal units place emphasis only on target practice, not on the technique of communication, which is incorrect. Signal workers must emphasize the practice of signal techniques. The dispatch of cables is the real "target practice" for the signal unit. One must give primary consideration to his professional line, and regard all other activities as of secondary importance.

Special training in a signal unit takes up only 500 hours in a year, the daily average being a little over an hour. A technician specially trained for this line spends only a little more than an hour daily on this subject, which is clearly inadequate. Therefore, not only must the training time be increased, but also a concrete plan must be formulated to determine which techniques should be practised on a daily basis and which on a less frequent basis.

✓ In order to solve the problem of cumbersome equipment, first we must cut down the weight of equipment, especially that of primary units smaller than regiments, since there are not enough vehicles to carry them. It is necessary to solve the problem of cumbersomeness of their equipment. With reference to the problems of size and type, we must study and decide which equipment to retain and which to leave behind.

If the duties of signalmen are too heavy, if relations with all other organizations become too complicated, and the present leadership cannot supervise the situation adequately, then it is necessary to strengthen the leadership structure. You are different from the military regions and districts; you cover wider areas, so you can reinforce your organizational structure accordingly. We must be practical, and whatever we do must

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be carefully organized, with the person in charge carefully chosen.

In treating the cadres, it is necessary to be bold in promoting them to important positions in spite of low rank. Some old cadres are physically weak and not too familiar with signal work. Therefore we must promote young, intelligent cadres whenever it is feasible. The old cadres may be assigned political work, which can also be done by those from the political academies. We need not fear a lack of ability; determination will enable one to do the work well. The cadres of the signal units must minimize their movement, and the technical cadres of all units must do the same in order to stabilize themselves.

Signal and liaison (work) must depend mainly on wireless transmission in wartime, but telegraph, lights, signal flags and whistle messages are also needed. Whether or not bugle call is needed I have no opinion. Please make a concrete study of it. Do not feel that because we have had it in the past we must have it now, or because others cease to use it we should do the same.

It should be adopted and made legal in our army that orders may be issued by cross-level command. In an emergency there are too many things to be done, and too little time in which to do them. If we send a message level by level, we shall delay until tomorrow that which can be done today. The problem of cross-level command should be solved after giving it some thought.

This meeting has been very successful. Now the problem is how to solve our problems. We must translate successfully into action the resolutions made at the meeting. The decisions must be carried out immediately. We must not wait. We need to adopt the vigour of rectification to reach the objectives of this meeting, and we must also organize and inspect what is pertinent. At the end of the year or next year we must have

✓ | another meeting to assess our accomplishments and failures and to see whether there are any new problems. There should be fewer participants in future meetings, which must be longer. Thus we can establish step by step the signal work, and, bracing it up, reverse the trend from bad to good.

The major problem existing in signal work is the general unfamiliarity with the techniques. This must be dealt with by raising the political thinking, and by stressing on practice in training. If the cadres' ideology is not clear, they will not be willing to practise; if the training guides and methods are not correct, the practice will not be successful. When we speak of the relations between politics and technique, we know politics comes first. But speaking from the point of view of time allotment, time spent on technique must be more than that spent on politics. This is to say, politics comes first, but more time should be spent on training. These two aspects must both be successful, and more practice is the best method for accomplishing our purpose.

There are many other problems such as the military service system, instrument manufacture system, etc. to be taken into consideration. To solve a string of problems is not easy, since every aspect must be attended to, and each must have its own procedure. At present the special problem is technique, which must be well learned and practised. Those who learn electric wiring must consider it as having the first importance, and those who learn wireless communication must put it first. We must first think of our specialty, then of our side line. Your problem is not one of shooting accurately; for one cannot afford to generalize. Neither must political work be generalized. We must not copy others, and we must not consider the conditions of others, for the duties and methods are our own and no one else's. The foregoing problems, all encountered in the meetings, remain to be solved during your work. While working to solve these problems, you must consider what it would be like under combat conditions during a sudden attack, and you must allow for these differences in

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your work. Military affairs are a matter of bloodshed, and must be faced in a firm and straightforward manner, not in an evasive and slippery one. Under these circumstances a telegram failure would be disastrous. Imitating and copying the work of others must be avoided. We must apply diverse remedies in different situations, not simply apply the same remedy to all. Of course there are similarities between cases. But there are also differences which must be considered. Signal work is concerned with the sending and delivery of messages, and political work must safeguard this task, otherwise it cannot be successfully carried out. These two (signal and political work) are, namely, technique and politics. Of course there are general technique and politics, but there are also politics and technique based upon the actual situation of signal work which are not those of common politics and technique.

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SPEECH AT THE ALL-ARMY CONFERENCE ON SUPERVISORY EDUCATION

(Summary)

(19 May, 1961)

by Lin Piao

The work of supervisory education is a big question not a small one; an old question not a new one; a regular question not an occasional one. It is an important question that concerns the heightening of battle efficiency. The question of raising battle efficiency covers numerous points, with supervisory education featuring a prominent part of it. To begin with, political work must be done well. But this is not enough. The work of supervisory education must keep pace with the progress of political work. Supervisory education stands as a further materialization of political work. Ours is different from the army in the old days. Our supervisory education has certain political nature, but it is not exactly the same as political work itself. Supervisory education should be shared by both the military commanders and political workers. And in certain cases it is not merely a work of reasoning, but action as well. Where an order is issued, there action follows. When an order forbids something, action must be taken to stop it. An order is issued to be obeyed, and an order must be carried out thoroughly. To perform well the work of supervisory education will have a great significance toward internal unity of the army; it will have a direct bearing on improving the relations between officers and men, on the safe-keeping of weapons and on the performance of various duties and responsibilities.

The army must be conditioned to battling the enemy from all sides. What is an army for? The army's primary duty is to

carry out struggle against the enemy. When the troops are under good management, and when good habits are formed in normal times, it will be possible to make them meet combat requirement. There are two sides to this question: First the question of internal unity, and second the question of meeting combat requirement. Struggle against the enemy calls for unity and obedience. An army must live up to its title; a loosely organized unit never can meet combat requirement.

Strictness stands as a common characteristic of all armies, be they ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign. We need to be strict in combat. All troops with battle efficiency, be they old, or new, socialist, bourgeois or feudal in origin, must have been strictly trained. Conversely, an army without strict discipline has no fighting strength to talk about. This is a point that must not be overlooked. In fact, it is materialized in this particular set of rules and regulations (it refers to the document entitled "Rules and Regulations Governing Supervisory Education at the Company Level of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" [Draft] — ed.) When our comrades are sent out to transmit this document for compliance, they should pay close attention to this point. Otherwise, there will be little battle efficiency to talk about, and the troop units simply won't look right. An army must never be slovenly.

But ours is an army of the people, it is a new army, and it is different from the old ones. The old armies acted as an instrument of the exploiting class in its oppression of the exploited; it was a case of the minority that oppressed the majority. The new army serves as a tool of the exploited in their suppression of the exploiters; it represents the majority that exercises control over the minority. There was class antagonism in the old armies. Ours is an army of the labouring people; its biggest difference from the old armies lies in its emphasis on patient persuasion. This is an instinctive product of the social and class nature of our army. This good point of ours is what the exploiting class lacks. We have this good quality but they don't. We should properly, intensively and

fully exploit this good trait of ours to make sure that we all work harmoniously, happily, naturally and consciously. We must properly reason our way to the truth in such a way that is democratic and yet centralized. Let us combine democracy with centralization, and strictness (of discipline) with patient persuasion; the two make an integral whole, and we are against one-sided emphasis. To speak only of the strictness of (discipline) is to talk the old way, the way of warlordism, it is not suitable for our People's Army. Or if we only adopt the method of mass work in the rural communities and factories without any consideration of the characteristic of the army, such a method is not good either. There are also two sides to the mass work in rural communities and factories, that is, patient persuasion on the one hand, and discipline on the other. Besides patient persuasion, the army's requirement for strictness (of discipline) should be higher than the standard for rural communities and factories. The higher the standard of strictness is set, the greater will be the need for patient persuasion which, if necessary, should be repeated again and again. Neither of the two sides should be separated from the other. To be merely strict (in discipline) is not good, but to rely only on persuasion without resorting to order under impelling circumstances is not good either. We should combine one with the other. But it is by no means easy to have them combined. There are always those who either run to one extreme or the other; they take care of one side, but neglect the other. It is not at all easy to give equal attention to both. In order to take proper care of both, nothing is more important than to strengthen the sense of responsibility of the cadres, and to raise their revolutionary fervour. To be afraid of trouble is one of the reasons why the cadres are sometimes rude and rough; the lack of boldness in exercising supervision is another sign of avoiding troubles, a reflection of having no sense of responsibility. Here we see that the two opposite extremes have their common cause. How many after all of our cadres have run to these extremes? A majority of them or a minority? Or half and half? This in itself forms another problem. No one with a strong sense of responsibility will blow up in a fit of

anger, or adopt a couldn't-care-less attitude. A strong sense of responsibility will enable the person to do his work well, he will not be rude and brusque. In fact, you may inspect the work of a certain company, and you will realize that its failure in putting up a good performance of duties is closely related to its cadres' lack of a strong sense of responsibility. Without a strong sense of responsibility one is likely to run to the extremes; with a strong sense of responsibility he should be able to take care of both. This is why the cadres' sense of responsibility should be raised.

It is imperative that we make the work of supervisory education a success. This is as important as forming a good habit. If we fail to make a success of it, we shall fail in everything else; we shall be unable to perform our duties properly, and we shall find ourselves unable to fight a good battle. We shall tell the cadres that besides doing well in political work they are expected to be equally successful in supervisory education. We shall be in a sound position only after we have done sufficiently well in these major fields of activities. Supervisory education is one of the important points as mentioned above. To do this work well, we shall be able to improve the efficiency of our cadres; and this is a good way of learning too. To handle a case is like staging a field exercise, holding a test or carrying out an experiment. Only through practice can experience be gained, and a lesson drawn. More experience makes one more correct and his position further consolidated; less experience makes him less stable, and his position less secure. Supervisory education is a subject essential to the training of cadres. One is mistaken to think that learning must be done in the classroom and through reading books; that's only part of one's learning. The greatest part of learning comes from field exercise, practice and experiment. Whether in military science or politics, there are only a few cardinal principles, and much depends on repeated practices. It is the same with fighting a battle. For instance, there is only one rule on the concentration of strength, but repeated practices must be taken to learn all the methods of con-

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centration on mountains, in the plain, in the daytime or at night, and under conditions of a numerically superior or inferior enemy. The same rule may be applied to the performance of supervisory education. One must learn to master the skill of persuasion and discipline through repeated practices.

Our army traditionally has been the Party's cadre school, many local cadres were trained in the army. Weren't some of the local Party secretaries also former army cadres? Actually, the army has the ability to train cadres for the local authorities. Our Party is a militant political body, and the army actually had served in the past as the Party's cadre school. Our Party was born through the barrel of a gun. We fought from the south to the north, and then from the north back to the south, covering a total distance of 25,000 *li*. And where a battle was fought, there the Party was present. Of course our Party also existed in noncombatant areas, though smaller in number. In the peculiar circumstances of China, only a political party with guns can exist; a party without guns would have a hard time to survive. Our success in the army's supervisory education will create a healthy influence over the performance of the Party and the local authorities, as well as over the training of cadres. Such a success will improve the quality of work and the training of cadres, and it will prove a meaningful thing to the entire Party and the whole country. ✓

Such a set of rules and regulations could not have been worked out by an army with a brief history of three or five years; nor could it have been formulated in a country not so great as ours, and with less experiences of struggle. It wasn't the result of wishful thinking, but a summation of practice and ready experiences. As conditions keep changing, so will this set of rules and regulations be revised from time to time. It won't be easy for a new cadre to perform his duties in the army through fumbling; he may have to take a roundabout way. With the promulgation of this set of rules and regulations work can be done more easily; it will enable the inexperienced to become experienced, and turn the green horn into an expert.

It took mankind several thousand years to invent the electric light and electric fans. But a college or middle school graduate of today already can master the knowledge of them. With the ready-made things on hand, the new cadres can get on the right track without fumbling; and they may from this basis develop them further in the future. Many trials and errors one has to go through if he has to feel his way out from the start. With ready-made things available, one should have the wisdom to make good use of them. Why should one go through the whole process of invention when there are ready-made electric bulbs around?

✓ | Our army has existed for decades, but this is the first time such a document on supervisory education has ever been written. In the past, there was no good summation of experiences to talk about. The present set of rules and regulations written on the rich experiences of our army should be able to unify the performance of duties in all army units. Otherwise, some units will succeed, while others will fail. However, even with the promulgation of the rules and regulations there is no way to ensure equal success for all units; but if all units follow the same rules and regulations, the results will not be marked with striking differences. The tiles from the same kiln may vary in quality, but there won't be marked differences in quality as they are from the same kiln after all. Let us all follow this set of rules and regulations in our future studies and inspections. Let us treat it as a special subject, and study it in the light of existing conditions. The subject may be introduced in schools. The many questions covered in the document are universal and highly significant ones, why shouldn't we treat it as a school subject? At the Enlarged Meeting last year the Central Military Commission adopted a resolution on carrying out politico-ideological work in the army, and this year we have this set of rules and regulations formulated. Mutually supporting each other, they will enable the troops to add new strength, with which battle efficiency can be easily raised to a higher level, and be consolidated. And as our comrades will conduct inspection in

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the future, they should be able to find out whether this has been implemented in the company-level units. With this set of rules and regulations the company will have a criterion for judgment of right and wrong, good and bad. Of course more efforts will be taken to improve the document. It is hoped that having done their discussions the various army units should add their opinions and suggestions to the document which will be revised after one or two years to see what should be added or deleted. To have a draft is better than nothing. Without rules and regulations no one would know, especially the new cadres, what to follow. Therefore this is a very necessary step to take. Our past disciplinary rules and regulations and those concerning maintenance of barracks were documents without much ideological quality and of very low ideological standards; the methods were not good ones either. This set of rules and regulations, however, has a very high ideological and policy-making standard; it is in conformity with the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, and with the principle of Chairman Mao's thought; it suits the characteristics of troops, and it suits the characteristics of our army. There is a clear recognition of policy regarding various questions. For instance, there is a fixed policy toward an erring fighter, toward the wounded and ailing servicemen, new recruits and veterans, and toward management of daily life. There are methods on running the messhall, and on taking good care of weapons and equipment, and the Party branch may learn from the methods of leadership. It is most dreadful to do things without rules and regulations. There were rules and regulations in the past, but they were not suitable. Now we have another set of rules and regulations which are found practical. The Central Military Commission will go through the document again, and more revisions may be necessary, but the main parts of the document will remain as such. It is hoped that the cadres and fighters be urged to study it carefully, and go ahead with their study.

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SELECTED WORKS OF LIN PIAO

1961 by the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army)

LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF PEOPLE'S WAR

— *In commemoration of the 20th anniversary of
victory in the Chinese People's War of
Resistance Against Japan*

by Lin Piao

Full twenty years have elapsed since our victory in the great War of Resistance Against Japan.

After a long period of heroic struggle, the Chinese people, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, won final victory two decades ago in their war against the Japanese imperialists who had attempted to subjugate China and swallow up the whole of Asia.

The Chinese people's War of Resistance was an important part of the world war against German, Japanese and Italian fascism. The Chinese people received support from the people and the anti-fascist forces all over the world. And in their turn, the Chinese people made an important contribution to victory in the Anti-Fascist War as a whole.

Of the innumerable anti-imperialist wars waged by the Chinese people in the past hundred years, the War of Resistance Against Japan was the first to end in complete victory. It occupies an extremely important place in the annals of war, in the annals of both the revolutionary wars of the Chinese people and the wars of the oppressed nations of the world against imperialist aggression.

It was a war in which a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country triumphed over a strong imperialist country. For a long period after the invasion of China's northeastern provinces

by the Japanese imperialists, the Kuomintang followed a policy of non-resistance. In the early stage of the War of Resistance, the Japanese imperialists exploited their military superiority to drive deep into China and occupy half her territory. In the face of the massive attacks of the aggressors and the anti-Japanese upsurge of the people throughout the country, the Kuomintang was compelled to take part in the War of Resistance, but soon afterwards it adopted the policy of passive resistance to Japan and active opposition to the Communist Party. The heavy responsibility of combating Japanese imperialism thus fell on the shoulders of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the people of the Liberated Areas, all led by the Communist Party. At the outbreak of the war, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies had only a few tens of thousands of men and suffered from extreme inferiority in both arms and equipment, and for a long time they were under the crossfire of the Japanese imperialists on the one hand and the Kuomintang troops on the other. But they grew stronger and stronger in the course of the war and became the main force in defeating Japanese imperialism.

How was it possible for a weak country finally to defeat a strong country? How was it possible for a seemingly weak army to become the main force in the war?

The basic reasons were that the War of Resistance Against Japan was a genuine people's war led by the Communist Party of China and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, a war in which the correct Marxist-Leninist political and military lines were put into effect, and that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies were genuine people's armies which applied the whole range of strategy and tactics of people's war as formulated by Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of and policies for people's war have creatively enriched and developed Marxism-Leninism. The Chinese people's victory in the anti-Japanese war was a victory for people's war, for Marxism-Leninism and

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the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

Prior to the war against Japan, the Communist Party of China had gone through the First Revolutionary Civil War of 1924-27 and the Second Revolutionary Civil War of 1927-36 and summed up the experience and lessons of the successes and failures in those wars, and the leading rôle of Mao Tse-tung's thought had become established within the Party. This was the fundamental guarantee of the Party's ability to lead the Chinese people to victory in the War of Resistance.

The Chinese people's victory in the War of Resistance paved the way for their seizure of state power throughout the country. When the Kuomintang reactionaries, backed by the U.S. imperialists, launched a nation-wide civil war in 1946, the Communist Party of China and Comrade Mao Tse-tung further developed the theory of people's war on a still larger scale, and in the space of a little over three years the great victory of the People's Liberation War was won, the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism in our country ended and the People's Republic of China founded.

The victory of the Chinese people's revolutionary war breached the imperialist front in the East, wrought a great change in the world balance of forces, and accelerated the revolutionary movement among the people of all countries. From then on, the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America entered a new historical period.

Today, the U.S. imperialists are repeating on a world-wide scale the past actions of the Japanese imperialists in China and other parts of Asia. It has become an urgent necessity for the people in many countries to master and use people's war as a weapon against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. In every conceivable way U.S. imperialism and its lackeys are trying to extinguish the revolutionary flames of people's war. The Khrushchov revisionists, fearing people's war like the plague, are heaping abuse on it. The two are colluding to prevent and

sabotage people's war. In these circumstances, it is of vital practical importance to review the historical experience of the great victory of the people's war in China and to recapitulate Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTRADICTION IN THE PERIOD OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN AND THE LINE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

The Communist Party of China and Comrade Mao Tse-tung were able to lead the Chinese people to victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan primarily because they formulated and applied Marxist-Leninist line.

Basing himself on the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism and applying the method of class analysis, Comrade Mao Tse-tung analysed, first, the mutual transformation of China's principal and non-principal contradictions following the invasion of China by Japanese imperialism, second, the consequent changes in class relations within China and in international relations, and, third, the balance of forces as between China and Japan. This analysis provided the scientific basis upon which the political and military lines of the War of Resistance were formulated.

There had long been two basic contradictions in China — the contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation, and the contradiction between feudalism and the masses of the people. For ten years before the outbreak of the War of Resistance, the Kuomintang reactionary clique, which represented the interests of imperialism, the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, had waged civil war against the Communist Party of China and the Communist-led Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, which represented the interests of the Chinese people. In 1931, Japanese imperialism invaded and occupied northeastern China. Subsequently, and especially after 1935, it stepped up and expanded its aggression against China,

penetrating deeper and deeper into our territory. As a result of its invasion, Japanese imperialism sharpened its contradiction with the Chinese nation to an extreme degree and brought about changes in class relations within China. To end the civil war and to unite against Japanese aggression became the pressing nation-wide demand of the people. Changes of varying degrees also occurred in the political attitudes of the national bourgeoisie and the various factions within the Kuomintang. And the Sian Incident¹ of 1936 was the best case in point.

How was one to assess the changes in China's political situation, and what conclusion was to be drawn? This question had a direct bearing on the very survival of the Chinese nation.

For a period prior to the outbreak of the War of Resistance, the "Left" opportunists represented by Wang Ming within the Chinese Communist Party were blind to the important changes in China's political situation caused by Japanese aggression since 1931 and denied the sharpening of the Sino-Japanese national contradiction and the demands of various social strata for a war of resistance; instead, they stressed that all the counter-revolutionary factions and intermediate forces in China and all the imperialist countries were a monolithic bloc. They persisted in their line of "closed-doorism" and continued to advocate, "Down with the whole lot."

Comrade Mao Tse-tung resolutely fought the "Left" opportunist errors and penetratingly analysed the new situation in the Chinese revolution.

He pointed out that the Japanese imperialist attempt to reduce China to a Japanese colony heightened the contradiction between China and Japan and made it the principal contradiction; that China's internal class contradictions — such as those between the masses of the people and feudalism, between the peasantry and the landlord class, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and between the peasantry and urban

petty bourgeoisie on the one hand and the bourgeoisie on the other — still remained, but that they had all been relegated to a secondary or subordinate position as a result of the war of aggression unleashed by Japan; and that throughout China opposition to Japanese imperialism had become the common demand of the people of all classes and strata, except for a handful of pro-Japanese traitors among the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie.

Similarly, as the contradiction between China and Japan ascended and became the principal one, the contradiction between China and imperialist countries such as Britain and the United States descended to a secondary or subordinate position. The rift between Japan and the other imperialist countries had widened as a result of Japanese imperialism's attempt to turn China into its own exclusive colony. This rendered it possible for China to make use of these contradictions to isolate and oppose Japanese imperialism.

In the face of Japanese imperialist aggression, was the Party to continue with the civil war and the Agrarian Revolution? Or was it to hold aloft the banner of national liberation, unite with all the forces that could be united to form a broad national united front and concentrate on fighting the Japanese aggressors? This was the problem sharply confronting our Party.

The Communist Party of China and Comrade Mao Tse-tung formulated the line of the Anti-Japanese National United Front on the basis of their analysis of the new situation. Holding aloft the banner of national liberation, our Party issued the call for national unity and united resistance to Japanese imperialism, a call which won fervent support from the people of the whole country. Thanks to the common efforts of our Party and of China's patriotic armies and people, the Kuomintang ruling clique was eventually compelled to stop the civil war, and a new situation with Kuomintang-Communist co-operation for joint resistance to Japan was brought about.

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In the summer of 1937 Japanese imperialism unleashed its all-out war of aggression against China. The nation-wide War of Resistance thus broke out.

Could the War of Resistance be victorious? And how was victory to be won? These were the questions to which all the Chinese people demanded immediate answers.

The defeatists came forward with the assertion that China was no match for Japan and that the nation was bound to be subjugated. The blind optimists came forward with the assertion that China could win very quickly, without much effort.

Basing himself on a concrete analysis of the Chinese nation and of Japanese imperialism — the two aspects of the principal contradiction — Comrade Mao Tse-tung showed that while the "theory of national subjugation" was wrong, the "theory of quick victory" was untenable, and he concluded that the War of Resistance would be a protracted one in which China would finally be victorious.

In his celebrated work *On Protracted War*, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out the contrasting features of China and Japan, the two sides in the war. Japan was a powerful imperialist country. But Japanese imperialism was in its era of decline and doom. The war it had unleashed was a war of aggression, a war that was retrogressive and barbarous; it was deficient in manpower and material resources and could not stand a protracted war; it was engaged in an unjust cause and therefore had meagre support internationally. China, on the other hand, was a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. But she was in her era of progress. She was fighting a war against aggression, a war that was progressive and just; she had sufficient manpower and material resources to sustain a protracted war; internationally, China enjoyed extensive sympathy and support. These comprised all the basic factors in the Sino-Japanese war.

He went on to show how these factors would influence the course of the war. Japan's advantage was temporary and would gradually diminish as a result of our efforts. Her disadvantages were fundamental; they could not be overcome and would gradually grow in the course of the war. China's disadvantage was temporary and could be gradually overcome. China's advantages were fundamental and would play an increasingly positive role in the course of the war. Japan's advantage and China's disadvantage determined the impossibility of quick victory for China. China's advantages and Japan's disadvantages determined the inevitability of Japan's defeat and China's ultimate victory.

On the basis of this analysis Comrade Mao Tse-tung formulated the strategy for a protracted war. China's War of Resistance would be protracted, and prolonged efforts would be needed gradually to weaken the enemy's forces and expand our own, so that the enemy would change from being strong to being weak and we would change from being weak to being strong and accumulate sufficient strength finally to defeat him. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that with the change in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves the War of Resistance would pass through three stages, namely, the strategic defensive, the strategic stalemate and the strategic offensive. The protracted war was also a process of mobilizing, organizing and arming the people. It was only by mobilizing the entire people to fight a people's war that the War of Resistance could be persevered in and the Japanese aggressors defeated.

In order to turn the anti-Japanese war into a genuine people's war, our Party firmly relied on the broadest masses of the people, united with all the anti-Japanese forces that could be united, and consolidated and expanded the anti-Japanese National United Front. The basic line of our Party was: Boldly to arouse the masses of the people and expand the people's forces so that, under the leadership of the Party, they could defeat the aggressors and build a new China.

The War of Resistance Against Japan constituted a historical stage in China's new-democratic revolution. The line of our Party during the War of Resistance aimed not only at winning victory in the war, but also at laying the foundations for the nation-wide victory of the new-democratic revolution. Only the accomplishment of the new-democratic revolution makes it possible to carry out a socialist revolution. With respect to the relations between the democratic and the socialist revolutions, Comrade Mao Tse-tung said:

In the writing of an article the second half can be written only after the first half is finished. Resolute leadership of the democratic revolution is the prerequisite for the victory of socialism.²

The concrete analysis of concrete conditions and the concrete resolution of concrete contradictions are the living soul of Marxism-Leninism. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has invariably been able to single out the principal contradiction from among a complexity of contradictions, analyse the two aspects of this principal contradiction concretely and, "pressing on irresistibly from this commanding height", successfully solve the problem of understanding and handling the various contradictions.

It was precisely on the basis of such scientific analysis that Comrade Mao Tse-tung correctly formulated the political and military lines for the people's war during the War of Resistance Against Japan, developed his thought on the establishment of rural base areas and the use of the countryside to encircle the cities and finally capture them, and formulated a whole range of principles and policies, strategy and tactics in the political, military, economic and cultural fields for the carrying out of the people's war. It was this that ensured victory in the War of Resistance and created the conditions for the nation-wide victory of the new-democratic revolution.

CORRECTLY APPLY THE LINE AND POLICY OF THE UNITED FRONT

In order to win a people's war, it is imperative to build the broadest possible united front and formulate a series of policies which will ensure the fullest mobilization of the basic masses as well as the unity of all the forces that can be united.

The Anti-Japanese National United Front embraced all the anti-Japanese classes and strata. These classes and strata shared a common interest in fighting Japan, and interest which formed the basis of their unity. But they differed in the degree of their firmness in resisting Japan, and there were class contradictions and conflicts of interest among them. Hence the inevitable class struggle within the united front.

In formulating the Party's line of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, Comrade Mao Tse-tung made the following class analysis of Chinese society.

The workers, the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie firmly demanded that the War of Resistance should be carried through to the end; they were the main force in the fight against Japanese aggression and constituted the basic masses who demanded unity and progress.

The bourgeoisie was divided into the national and the comprador bourgeoisie. The national bourgeoisie formed the majority of the bourgeoisie; it was rather flabby, often vacillated and had contradictions with the workers, but it also had a certain degree of readiness to oppose imperialism and was one of our allies in the War of Resistance. The comprador bourgeoisie was the bureaucrat-capitalist class, which was very small in number but occupied the ruling position in China. Its members attached themselves to different imperialist powers, some of them being pro-Japanese and others pro-British and pro-American. The pro-Japanese section of the comprador

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bourgeoisie were the capitulators, the overt and covert traitors. The pro-British and pro-American section of this class favoured resistance to Japan to a certain extent, but they were not firm in their resistance and very much wished to compromise with Japan, and by their nature they were opposed to the Communist Party and the people.

The landlords fell into different categories; there were the big, the middle and the small landlords. Some of the big landlords became traitors, while others favoured resistance but vacillated a great deal. Many of the middle and small landlords had the desire to resist, but there were contradictions between them and the peasants.

In the face of these complicated class relationships, our Party's policy regarding work within the united front was one of both alliance and struggle. That is to say, its policy was to unite with all the anti-Japanese classes and strata, try to win over even those who could be only vacillating and temporary allies, and adopt appropriate policies to adjust the relations among these classes and strata so that they all served the general cause of resisting Japan. At the same time, we had to maintain our Party's principle of independence and initiative, make the bold arousing of the masses and expansion of the people's forces the centre of gravity in our work, and wage the necessary struggles against all activities harmful to resistance, unity and progress.

Our Party's Anti-Japanese National United Front policy was different both from Chen Tu-hsiu's Right opportunist policy of all alliance and no struggle, and from Wang Ming's "Left" opportunist policy of all struggle and no alliance. Our Party summed up the lessons of the Right and "Left" opportunist errors and formulated the policy of both alliance and struggle.

Our Party made a series of adjustments in its policies in order to unite all the anti-Japanese parties and groups,

including the Kuomintang, and all the anti-Japanese strata in a joint fight against the foe. We pledged ourselves to fight for the complete realization of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles. The government of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia revolutionary base area was renamed the Government of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Special Region of the Republic of China. Our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was redesignated the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army. Our land policy, the policy of confiscating the land of the landlords, was changed to one of reducing rent and interest. In our own base areas we carried out the "three thirds system"³ in our organs of political power, drawing in those representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry and those members of the Kuomintang who stood for resistance to Japan and did not oppose the Communist Party. In accordance with the principles of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, we also made necessary and appropriate changes in our policies relating to the economy, taxation, labour and wages, anti-espionage, people's rights, culture and education, etc.

While making these policy adjustments, we maintained the independence of the Communist Party, the people's army and the base areas. We also insisted that the Kuomintang should institute a general mobilization, reform the government apparatus, introduce democracy, improve the people's livelihood, arm the people, and carry out a total war of resistance. We waged a resolute struggle against the Kuomintang's passive resistance to Japan and active opposition to the Communist Party, against its suppression of the people's resistance movement and its treacherous compromising and capitulationist activities.

Past experience had taught us that "Left" errors were liable to crop up after our Party had corrected Right errors, and that Right errors were liable to crop up after it had corrected "Left" errors. "Left" errors were liable to occur when we broke with the Kuomintang ruling clique, and Right errors

were liable to occur when we united with it.

After the overcoming of "Left" opportunism and the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the main danger in our Party was Right opportunism or capitulationism.

Wang Ming, the exponent of "Left" opportunism during the Second Revolutionary Civil War, went to the other extreme in the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japan and became the exponent of Right Opportunism, i.e., capitulationism. He countered Comrade Mao Tse-tung's correct line and policies with an out-and-out capitulationist line of his own and a series of ultra-Right policies. He voluntarily abandoned proletarian leadership in the Anti-Japanese National United Front and willingly handed leadership to the Kuomintang. By his advocacy of "everything through the united front" or "everything to be submitted to the united front", he was in effect advocating that everything should go through or be submitted to Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. He opposed the bold mobilization of the masses, the carrying out of democratic reforms and the improvement of the livelihood of the workers and peasants, and wanted to undermine the worker-peasant alliance which was the foundation of the united front. He did not want the Communist-led base areas of the people's revolutionary forces but wanted to cut off the people's revolutionary forces from their roots. He rejected a people's army led by the Communist Party and wanted to hand over the people's armed forces to Chiang Kai-shek, which would have meant handing over everything the people had. He did not want the leadership of the Party and advocated an alliance between the youth of the Kuomintang and that of the Communist Party to suit Chiang Kai-shek's design of corroding the Communist Party. He decked himself out and presented himself to Chiang Kai-shek, hoping to be given some official appointment. All this was revisionism, pure and simple. If we had acted on Wang Ming's revisionist line and his set of policies, the Chinese people would have been unable to win

the War of Resistance Against Japan, still less the subsequent nation-wide victory.

For a time during the War of Resistance, Wang Ming's revisionist line caused harm to the Chinese people's revolutionary cause. But the leading role of Comrade Mao Tse-tung had already been established in the Central Committee of our Party. Under his leadership, all the Marxist-Leninists in the Party carried out a resolute struggle against Wang Ming's errors and rectified them in time. It was this struggle that prevented Wang Ming's erroneous line from doing greater and more lasting damage to the cause of the Party.

Chiang Kai-shek, our teacher by negative example, helped us to correct Wang Ming's mistakes. He repeatedly lectured us with cannons and machine-guns. The gravest lesson was the Southern Anhwei Incident which took place in January 1941. Because some leaders of the New Fourth Army disobeyed the directives of the Central Committee of the Party and followed Wang Ming's revisionist line, its units in southern Anhwei suffered disastrous losses in the surprise attack launched by Chiang Kai-shek and many heroic revolutionary fighters were slaughtered by the Kuomintang reactionaries. The lessons learned at the cost of blood helped sober many of our comrades and increase their ability to distinguish the correct from the erroneous line.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung constantly summed up the experience gained by the whole Party in implementing the line of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and worked out a whole set of policies in good time. They were mainly as follows:

1. All people favouring resistance (this is, all the anti-Japanese workers, peasants, soldiers, students and intellectuals and businessmen) were to unite and form the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

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2. Within the united front, our policy was to be one of independence and initiative, i.e., both unity and independence were necessary.

3. As far as military strategy was concerned, our policy was to be guerrilla warfare waged independently and with the initiative in our own hands, within the framework of a unified strategy; guerrilla warfare was to be basic, but no chance of waging mobile warfare was to be lost when the conditions were favourable.

4. In the struggle against the anti-Communist die-hards headed by Chiang Kai-shek, our policy was to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and destroy our enemies one by one, and to wage struggles on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint.

5. In the Japanese-occupied and Kuomintang areas our policy was, on the one hand, to develop the united front to the greatest possible extent and, on the other, to have selected cadres working underground. With regard to the forms of organization and struggle, our policy was to assign selected cadres to work under cover for a long period, so as to accumulate strength and bide our time.

6. As regards the alignment of the various classes within the country, our basic policy was to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and isolate the anti-Communist die-hard forces.

7. As for the anti-Communist die-hards, we followed a revolutionary dual policy of uniting with them, in so far as they were still capable of bringing themselves to resist Japan, and of struggling against and isolating them, in so far as they were determined to oppose the Communist Party.

8. With respect to the landlords and the bourgeoisie. — even the big landlords and big bourgeoisie — it was necessary

to analyse each case and draw distinctions. On the basis of these distinctions we were to formulate different policies so as to achieve our aim of uniting with all the forces that could be united.

The line and the various policies of the Anti-Japanese National United Front formulated by Comrade Mao Tse-tung stood the test of the War of Resistance and proved to be entirely correct.

History shows that when confronted by ruthless imperialist aggression, a Communist Party must hold aloft the national banner and, using the weapon of the united front, rally around itself the masses and the patriotic and anti-imperialist people who form more than 90 per cent of a country's population, so as to mobilize all positive factors, unite with all the forces that can be united and isolate to the maximum the common enemy of the whole nation. If we abandon the national banner, adopt a line of "closed-doorism" and thus isolate ourselves, it is out of the question to exercise leadership and develop the people's revolutionary cause, and this in reality amounts to helping the enemy and bringing defeat on ourselves.

History shows that within the united front the Communist Party must maintain its ideological, political and organizational independence, adhere to the principle of independence and initiative, and insist on its leading role. Since there are class differences among the various classes in the united front, the Party must have a correct policy in order to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and oppose the die-hard forces. The Party's work must centre on developing the progressive forces and expanding the people's revolutionary forces. This is the only way to maintain and strengthen the united front. "If unity is sought through struggle, it will live; if unity is sought through yielding, it will perish."⁴ This is the chief experience gained in our struggle against the die-hard forces.

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History shows that during the national-democratic revolution there must be two kinds of alliance within this united front, first, the worker-peasant alliance and, second, the alliance of the working people with the bourgeoisie and other non-working people. The worker-peasant alliance is an alliance of the working class with the peasants and all other working people in town and country. It is the foundation of the united front. Whether the working class can gain leadership of the national-democratic revolution depends on whether it can lead the broad masses of the peasants in struggle and rally them around itself. Only when the working class gains leadership of the peasants, and only on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance, is it possible to establish the second alliance, form a broad united front and wage a people's war victoriously. Otherwise, everything that is done is unreliable, like castles in the air or so much empty talk.

RELY ON THE PEASANTS AND ESTABLISH RURAL BASE AREAS

The peasantry constituted more than 80 per cent of the entire population of semi-colonial and semi-feudal China. They were subjected to the threefold oppression and exploitation of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, and they were eager for resistance against Japan and for revolution. It was essential to rely mainly on the peasants if the people's war was to be won.

But at the outset many comrades in our Party did not see this point. The history of our Party shows that in the period of the First Revolutionary Civil War, one of the major errors of the Right opportunists, represented by Chen Tu-hsiu, was their failure to recognize the importance of the peasant question and their opposition to arousing and arming the peasants. In the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War, one of the major errors of the "Left" opportunists, represented by Wang Ming, was likewise their failure to recognize the importance of the

peasant question. They did not realize that it was essential to undertake long-term and painstaking work among the peasants and establish revolutionary base areas in the countryside; they were under the illusion that they could rapidly seize the big cities and quickly win nation-wide victory in the revolution. The errors of both the Right and the "Left" opportunists brought serious setbacks and defeats to the Chinese revolution.

As far back as the period of the First Revolutionary Civil War, Comrade Mao Tse-tung had pointed out that the peasant question occupied an extremely important position in the Chinese revolution, that the bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism was in essence a peasant revolution and that the basic task of the Chinese proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution was to give leadership to the peasants' struggle.

In the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Comrade Mao Tse-tung again stressed that the peasants were the most reliable and the most numerous ally of the proletariat and constituted the main force in the War of Resistance. The peasants were the main source of manpower for China's armies. The funds and the supplies needed for a protracted war came chiefly from the peasants. In the anti-Japanese war it was imperative to rely mainly on the peasants and to arouse them to participate in the war on the broadest scale.

The War of Resistance Against Japan was in essence a peasant revolutionary war led by our Party. By arousing and organizing the peasant masses and integrating them with the proletariat, our Party created a powerful force capable of defeating the strongest enemy.

To rely on the peasants, build rural base areas and use the countryside to encircle and finally capture the cities — such was the way to victory in the Chinese revolution.

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Basing himself on the characteristics of the Chinese revolution, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out the importance of building rural revolutionary base areas:

Since China's key cities have long been occupied by the powerful imperialists and their reactionary Chinese allies, it is imperative for the revolutionary ranks to turn the backward villages into advanced, consolidated base areas, into great military, political, economic and cultural bastions of the revolution from which to fight their vicious enemies who are using the cities for attacks on the rural districts, and in this way gradually to achieve the complete victory of the revolution through protracted fighting; it is imperative for them to do so if they do not wish to compromise with imperialism and its lackeys but are determined to fight on, and if they intend to build up and temper their forces, and avoid decisive battles with a powerful enemy while their own strength is inadequate.⁵

Experience in the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War showed that, when this strategic concept of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's was applied, there was an immense growth in the revolutionary forces and one Red base area after another was built. Conversely, when it was violated and the nonsense of the "Left" opportunists was applied, the revolutionary forces suffered severe damage, with losses of nearly 100 per cent in the cities and 90 per cent in the rural areas.

During the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Japanese imperialist forces occupied many of China's big cities and the main lines of communication, but owing to the shortage of troops they were unable to occupy the vast countryside, which remained the vulnerable sector of the enemy's rule. Consequently, the possibility of building rural base areas became even greater. Shortly after the beginning of the War of Resistance, when the Japanese forces surged into China's hinterland and the Kuomintang forces crumbled and fled in

one defeat after another, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies led by our Party followed the wise policy laid down by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and boldly drove into the areas behind the enemy lines in small contingents and established base areas throughout the countryside. During the eight years of the war, we established nineteen anti-Japanese base areas in northern, central and southern China. With the exception of the big cities and the main lines of communication, the vast territory in the enemy's rear was in the hands of the people.

In the anti-Japanese base areas, we carried out democratic reforms, improved the livelihood of the people, and mobilized and organized the peasant masses. Organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power were established on an extensive scale and the masses of the people enjoyed the democratic right to run their own affairs; at the same time we carried out the policies of "a reasonable burden" and "the reduction of rent and interest", which weakened the feudal system of exploitation and improved the people's livelihood. As a result, the enthusiasm of the peasant masses was deeply aroused, while the various anti-Japanese strata were given due consideration and were thus united. In formulating our policies for the base areas, we also took care that these policies should facilitate our work in the enemy-occupied areas.

In the enemy-occupied cities and villages, we combined legal with illegal struggle, united the basic masses and all patriots, and divided and disintegrated the political power of the enemy and his puppets so as to prepare ourselves to attack the enemy from within in co-ordination with operations from without when conditions were ripe.

The base areas established by our Party became the centre of gravity in the Chinese people's struggle to resist Japan and save the country. Relying on these bases, our Party expanded and strengthened the people's revolutionary forces, persevered in the protracted war and eventually won the War of Resistance Against Japan.

Naturally, it was impossible for the development of the revolutionary base areas to be plain sailing all the time. They constituted a tremendous threat to the enemy and were bound to be attacked. Therefore, their development was a tortuous process of expansion, contraction and then renewed expansion. Between 1937 and 1940 the population in the anti-Japanese base areas grew to 100,000,000. But in 1941-42 the Japanese imperialists used the major part of their invading forces to launch frantic attacks on our base areas and wrought havoc. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang, too, encircled these base areas, blockaded them and went so far as to attack them. So by 1942, the anti-Japanese base areas had contracted and their population was down to less than 50,000,000. Placing complete reliance on the masses, our Party resolutely adopted a series of correct policies and measures, with the result that the base areas were able to hold out under extremely difficult circumstances. After this setback, the army and the people in the base areas were tempered and grew stronger. From 1943 onwards, our base areas were gradually restored and expanded, and by 1945 the population had grown to 160,000,000. Taking the entire course of the Chinese revolution into account, our revolutionary base areas went through even more ups and downs, and they weathered a great many tests before the small, separate base areas, expanding in a series of waves, gradually developed into extensive and contiguous base areas.

At the same time, the work of building the revolutionary base areas was a grand rehearsal in preparation for nation-wide victory. In these base areas, we built the Party, ran the organs of state power, built the people's armed forces and set up mass organizations; we engaged in industry and agriculture and operated cultural, educational and all other undertakings necessary for the independent existence of a separate region. Our base areas were in fact a state in miniature. And with the steady expansion of our work in the base areas, our Party established a powerful people's army, trained cadres for various kinds of work, accumulated experience in many fields and built up both the material and the moral strength that provided

favourable conditions for nation-wide victory.

The revolutionary base areas established in the War of Resistance later became the springboards for the People's War of Liberation, in which the Chinese people defeated the Kuomintang reactionaries. In the War of Liberation we continued the policy of first encircling the cities from the countryside and then capturing the cities, and thus won nation-wide victory.

BUILD A PEOPLE'S ARMY OF A NEW TYPE

Without a people's army the people have nothing.⁶ This is the conclusion drawn by Comrade Mao Tse-tung from the Chinese people's experience in their long years of revolutionary struggle, experience that was bought in blood. This is a universal truth of Marxism-Leninism.

The special feature of the Chinese revolution was armed revolution against armed counter-revolution. The main form of struggle was war and the main form of organization was the army which was under the absolute leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, while all the other forms of organization and struggle led by our Party were co-ordinated, directly or indirectly, with the war.

During the First Revolutionary Civil War, many fine Party comrades took an active part in the armed revolutionary struggle. But our Party was then still in its infancy and did not have a clear understanding of this special feature of the Chinese revolution. It was only after the First Revolutionary Civil War, only after the Kuomintang had betrayed the revolution, massacred large numbers of Communists and destroyed all the revolutionary mass organizations, that our Party reached a clearer understanding of the supreme importance of organizing revolutionary armed forces and of studying the strategy and tactics of revolutionary war, and created the

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Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the first people's army under the leadership of the Communist Party of China.

During the Second Revolutionary Civil War, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army created by Comrade Mao Tse-tung grew considerably and at one time reached a total of 300,000 men. But it later lost nine-tenths of its forces as a result of the wrong political and military lines followed by the "Left" opportunist leadership.

At the start of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the people's army led by the Chinese Communist Party had only a little over 40,000 men. The Kuomintang reactionaries attempted to restrict, weaken and destroy this people's army in every conceivable way. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that, in these circumstances, in order to sustain the War of Resistance and defeat the Japanese aggressors, it was imperative greatly to expand and consolidate the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and all the guerrilla units led by our Party. The whole Party should give close attention to war and study military affairs. Every Party member should be ready at all times to take up arms and go to the front.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung also incisively stated that Communists do not fight for personal military power but must fight for military power for the Party and for the people.

Guided by the Party's correct line of expanding the revolutionary armed forces, the Communist-led Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and anti-Japanese guerrilla units promptly went to the forefront at the very beginning of the war. We spread the seeds of the people's armed forces in the vast areas behind the enemy lines and kindled the flames of guerrilla warfare everywhere. Our people's army steadily expanded in the struggle, so that by the end of the war it was already a million strong, and there was also a militia of over two million. That was why we were able to engage 64 per cent of the Japanese forces of aggression and 95 per cent of the

puppet troops and to become the main force in the War of Resistance Against Japan. While resisting the Japanese invading forces, we repulsed three large-scale anti-Communist onslaughts launched by the Kuomintang reactionaries in 1939, 1941 and 1943, and smashed their countless "friction-mongering" activities.

Why were the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies able to grow big and strong from being small and weak and to score such great victories in the War of Resistance Against Japan?

The fundamental reason was that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies were founded on Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building. They were armies of a new type, a people's army which whole-heartedly serves the interests of the people.

Guided by Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory on building a people's army, our army was under the absolute leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and most loyally carried out the Party's Marxist-Leninist line and policies. It had a high degree of conscious discipline and was heroically inspired to overwhelm all enemies and conquer all difficulties. Internally there was full unity between cadres and fighters, between those in higher and those in lower positions of responsibility, between the different departments and between the various fraternal army units. Externally, there was similarly full unity between the army and the people and between the army and the local government.

During the anti-Japanese war our army staunchly performed the three tasks set by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, namely, fighting, mass work, and production, and it was at the same time a fighting force, a political work force and production corps. Everywhere it went, it did propaganda work among the masses, organized and armed them and helped them set up revolutionary political power. Our armymen strictly observed the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention, carried our campaigns to "support the

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government and cherish the people", and did good deeds for the people everywhere. They also made use of every possibility to engage in production themselves so as to overcome economic difficulties, better their own livelihood and lighten the people's burden. By their exemplary conduct they won the whole-hearted support of the masses, who affectionately called them "our own boys".

Our army consisted of local forces as well as of regular forces; moreover, it energetically built and developed the militia, thus practising the system of combining the three military formations, i.e., the regular forces, the local forces and the militia.

Our army also pursued correct policies in winning over enemy officers and men and in giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war. During the anti-Japanese war we not only brought about the revolt and surrender of large numbers of puppet troops, but succeeded in converting not a few Japanese prisoners, who had been badly poisoned by fascist ideology. After they were politically awakened, they organized themselves into anti-war organizations such as the League for the Liberation of the Japanese People, the Anti-War League of the Japanese in China and the League of Awakened Japanese, helped us to disintegrate the Japanese army and co-operated with us in opposing Japanese militarism. *In this work, Comrade Sanzo Nosaka who was then leader of the Japanese Communist Party at Yen-an had given us a great deal of help.* (The words in italics were omitted from the official English translation published in 1968 by Foreign Language Press, Peking. Ed.)

The essence of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building is that in building a people's army prominence must be given to politics, i.e., the army must first and foremost be built on a political basis. Politics is the commander, politics is the soul of everything. Political work is the life-line of our army. True, a people's army must pay attention to the constant improvement of its weapons and equipment and its military

technique, but in its fighting it does not rely purely on weapons and technique, it relies mainly on politics, on the proletarian revolutionary consciousness and courage of the commanders and fighters, on the support and backing of the masses.

Owing to the application of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's line on army building, there has prevailed in our army at all times a high level of proletarian political consciousness, an atmosphere of keenness to study the thought of Mao Tse-tung, an excellent morale, a solid unity and a deep hatred for the enemy, and thus a gigantic moral force has been brought into being. In battle it has feared neither hardships nor death, it has been able to charge or hold its ground as the conditions require. One man can play the role of several, dozens or even hundreds, and miracles can be performed.

All this makes the people's army led by the Chinese Communist Party fundamentally different from any bourgeois army, and from all the armies of the old type which served the exploiting classes and were driven and utilized by a handful of people. The experience of the people's war in China shows that a people's army created in accordance with Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building is incomparably strong and invincible.

CARRY OUT THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF PEOPLE'S WAR

Engels said:

The emancipation of the proletariat, in its turn, will have its specific expression in military affairs and create its specific new military method.⁷

Engels' profound prediction has been fulfilled in the revolutionary wars waged by the Chinese people under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. In the course of

protracted armed struggle, we have created a whole range of strategy and tactics of people's war by which we have been able to utilize our strong points to attack the enemy at his weak points.

During the War of Resistance Against Japan, on the basis of his comprehensive analysis of the enemy and ourselves, Comrade Mao Tse-tung laid down the following strategic principle for the Communist-led Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies: "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions."⁸ He raised guerrilla warfare to the level of strategy, because, if they are to defeat a formidable enemy, revolutionary armed forces should not fight with a reckless disregard for the consequences when there is a great disparity between their own strength and the enemy's. If they do they will suffer serious losses and bring heavy setbacks to the revolution. Guerrilla warfare is the only way to mobilize and apply the whole strength of the people against the enemy, the only way to expand our forces in the course of the war, deplete and weaken the enemy, gradually change the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, switch from guerrilla to mobile warfare, and finally defeat the enemy.

In the initial period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War, Comrade Mao Tse-tung enumerated the basic tactics of guerrilla warfare as follows:

The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.

Guerrilla war tactics were further developed during the War of Resistance Against Japan. In the base areas behind the enemy lines, everybody joined in the fighting — the troops and the civilian population, men and women, old and young; every single village fought, and various ingenious methods of fighting were devised, including "sparrow warfare",⁹ land-mine warfare,

tunnel warfare, sabotage warfare, and guerrilla warfare on lakes and rivers.

In the later period of the War of Resistance Against Japan and during the Third Revolutionary Civil War, we switched our strategy from that of guerrilla warfare as the primary form of fighting to that of mobile warfare in the light of the changes in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves. By the middle, and especially the later, period of the Third Revolutionary Civil War, our operations had developed into large-scale mobile warfare, including the storming of big cities.

War of annihilation is the fundamental guiding principle of our military operations. This guiding principle should be put into effect regardless of whether mobile or guerrilla warfare is the primary form of fighting. It is true that in guerrilla warfare much should be done to disrupt and harass the enemy, but it is still necessary actively to advocate and fight battles of annihilation whenever conditions are favourable. In mobile warfare superior forces must be concentrated in every battle so that the enemy forces can be wiped out one by one. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has pointed out:

A battle in which the enemy is routed is not basically decisive in a contest with a foe of great strength. A battle of annihilation, on the other hand, produces a great and immediate impact on any enemy. Injuring all of a man's ten fingers is not as effective as chopping off one, and routing ten enemy divisions is not as effective as annihilating one of them.¹⁰

Battles of annihilation are the most effective way of hitting the enemy; each time one of his brigades or regiments is wiped out, he will have one brigade or one regiment less, and the enemy forces will be demoralized and will disintegrate. By fighting battles of annihilation, our army is able to take prisoners of war or capture weapons from the enemy in every

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battle, and the morale of our army rises, our army units get bigger, our weapons become better, and our combat effectiveness continually increases.

In his celebrated ten cardinal military principles Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out:

In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing crushing blows to the enemy, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and also to attack one or both of his flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or only break even. In this way, although we are inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers), we are absolutely superior in every part and every specific campaign, and this ensures victory in the campaign. As time goes on, we shall become superior as a whole and eventually wipe out all the enemy."¹¹

At the same time, he said that we should first attack dispersed or isolated enemy forces and only attack concentrated and strong enemy forces later; that we should strive to wipe out the enemy through mobile warfare; that we should fight no battle unprepared and fight no battle we are not sure of winning; and that in any battle we fight we should develop our army's strong points and its excellent style of fighting. These are the major principles of fighting a war of annihilation.

In order to annihilate the enemy, we must adopt the policy of luring him in deep and abandon some cities and districts of our accord in a planned way, so as to let him in. It is only after letting the enemy in that the people can take

part in the war in various ways and that the power of a people's war can be fully exerted. It is only after letting the enemy in that he can be compelled to divide up his forces, take on heavy burdens and commit mistakes. In other words, we must let the enemy become elated, stretch out all his ten fingers and become hopelessly bogged down. Thus, we can concentrate superior forces to destroy the enemy forces one by one, to eat them up mouthful by mouthful. Only by wiping out the enemy's effective strength can cities and localities be finally held or seized. We are firmly against dividing up our forces to defend all positions and putting up resistance at every place for fear that our territory might be lost and our pots and pans smashed, since this can neither wipe out the enemy forces nor hold cities or localities.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has provided a masterly summary of the strategy and tactics of people's war: **You fight in your way and we fight in ours; we fight when we can win and move away when we can't.** In other words, you rely on modern weapons and we rely on highly conscious revolutionary people; you give full play to your superiority and we give full play to ours; you have your way of fighting and we have ours. When you want to fight us, we don't let you and you can't even find us. But when we want to fight you, we make sure that you can't get away and we hit you squarely on the chin and wipe you out. When we are able to wipe you out, we do so with a vengeance; when we can't, we see to it that you don't wipe us out. It is opportunism if one won't fight when one can win. It is adventurism if one insists on fighting when one can't win. Fighting is the pivot of all our strategy and tactics. It is because of the necessity of fighting that we admit the necessity of moving away. The sole purpose of moving away is to fight and bring about the final and complete destruction of the enemy. This strategy and these tactics can be applied only when one relies on the broad masses of the people, and such application brings the superiority of people's war into full play. However superior he may be in technical equipment and whatever tricks he may

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resort to, the enemy will find himself in the passive position of having to receive blows, and the initiative will always be in our hands.

We grew from a small and weak to a large and strong force and finally defeated formidable enemies at home and abroad because we carried out the strategy and tactics of people's war. During the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the people's army led by the Chinese Communist Party fought more than 125,000 engagements with the enemy and put out of action more than 1,700,000 Japanese and puppet troops. In the three years of the War of Liberation, we put 8,000,000 of the Kuomintang's reactionary troops out of action and won the great victory of the people's revolution.

ADHERE TO THE POLICY OF SELF-RELIANCE

The Chinese people's War of Resistance Against Japan was an important part of the Anti-Fascist World War. The victory of the Anti-Fascist War as a whole was the result of the common struggle of the people of the world. By its participation in the war against Japan at the final stage, the Soviet army under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union headed by Stalin played a significant part in bringing about the defeat of Japanese imperialism. Great contributions were made by the peoples of Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma, India, Pakistan, Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand and certain other Asian countries. The people of the Americas, Oceania, Europe and Africa also made their contribution.

Under extremely difficult circumstances, the Japanese Communists and the revolutionary forces of the Japanese people kept up their valiant and staunch struggle, and played their part in the defeat of Japanese fascism.

The common victory was won by all the peoples who gave one another support and encouragement. Yet each country

was, above all, liberated as a result of its own people's efforts.

The Chinese people enjoyed the support of other peoples in winning both the War of Resistance Against Japan and the People's Liberation War, and yet victory was mainly the result of the Chinese people's own efforts. Certain people assert that China's victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan was due entirely to foreign assistance. This absurd assertion is in tune with that of the Japanese militarists.

The liberation of the masses is accomplished by the masses themselves — this is a basic principle of Marxism-Leninism. Revolution or people's war in any country is the business of the masses in that country and should be carried out primarily by their own efforts; there is no other way.

During the War of Resistance Against Japan, our Party maintained that China should rely mainly on her own strength while at the same time trying to get as much foreign assistance as possible. We firmly opposed the Kuomintang ruling clique's policy of exclusive reliance on foreign aid. In the eyes of the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek, China's industry and agriculture were no good, her weapons and equipment were no good, nothing in China was any good, so that if she wanted to defeat Japan, she had to depend on other countries, and particularly on the U.S.-British imperialists. This was completely slavish thinking. Our policy was diametrically opposed to that of the Kuomintang. Our Party held that it was possible to exploit the contradictions between U.S.-British imperialism and Japanese imperialism, but that no reliance could be placed on the former. In fact, the U.S.-British imperialists repeatedly plotted to bring about a "Far Eastern Munich" in order to arrive at a compromise with Japanese imperialism at China's expense, and for a considerable period of time they provided the Japanese aggressors with war material. In helping China during that period, the U.S. imperialists harboured the sinister design of turning China into a colony of their own.

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Comrade Mao Tse-tung said, "China has to rely mainly on her own efforts in the War of Resistance."¹² He added:

We hope for foreign aid but cannot be dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army and the entire people.¹³

Self-reliance was especially important for the people's armed forces and the Liberated Areas led by our Party.

The Kuomintang government gave the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies some small allowances in the initial stage of the anti-Japanese war, but gave them not a single penny later. The Liberated Areas faced great difficulties as a result of the Japanese imperialists' savage attacks and brutal "mopping-up" campaigns, of the Kuomintang's military encirclement and economic blockade and of natural calamities. The difficulties were particularly great in the years 1941 and 1942, when we were very short of food and clothing.

What were we to do? Comrade Mao Tse-tung asked: How has mankind managed to keep alive from time immemorial? Has it not been by men using their hands to provide for themselves? Why should we, their latter-day descendants, be devoid of this tiny bit of wisdom? Why can't we use our own hands?

The Central Committee of the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung put forward the policies of "ample food and clothing through self-reliance" and "develop the economy and ensure supplies", and the army and the people of the Liberated Areas accordingly launched an extensive production campaign, with the main emphasis on agriculture.

Difficulties are not invincible monsters. If everyone co-operates and fights them, they will be overcome. The Kuomintang reactionaries thought that it could starve us to death by cutting off allowances and imposing an economic

blockade, but in fact it helped us by stimulating us to rely on our own efforts to surmount our difficulties. While launching the great campaign for production, we applied the policy of "better troops and simpler administration" and economized in the use of manpower and material resources; thus we not only surmounted the severe material difficulties and successfully met the crisis, but lightened the people's burden, improved their livelihood and laid the material foundations for victory in the anti-Japanese war.

The problem of military equipment was solved mainly by relying on the capture of arms from the enemy, though we did turn out some weapons too. Chiang Kai-shek, the Japanese imperialists and the U.S. imperialists have all been our "chiefs of transportation corps". The arsenals of the imperialists always provide the oppressed peoples and nations with arms.

The people's armed forces led by our Party independently waged people's war on a large scale and won great victories without any material aid from outside, both during the more than eight years of the anti-Japanese war and during the more than three years of the People's War of Liberation.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said that our fundamental policy should rest on the foundation of our own strength. Only by relying on our own efforts can we in all circumstances remain invincible.

The peoples of the world invariably support each other in their struggles against imperialism and its lackeys. Those countries which have won victory are duty bound to support and aid the peoples who have not yet done so. Nevertheless, foreign aid can only play a supplementary role.

In order to make a resolution and to fight a people's war and be victorious, it is imperative to adhere to the policy of self-reliance, rely on the strength of the masses in one's own

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country and prepare to carry on the fight independently even when all material aid from outside is cut off. If one does not operate by one's own efforts, does not independently ponder and solve the problems of the revolution in one's own country and does not rely on the strength of the masses, but leans wholly on foreign aid — even though this be aid from socialist countries which persist in revolution — no victory can be won, or be consolidated even if it is won.

THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF COMRADE MAO TSE-TUNG'S THEORY OF PEOPLE'S WAR

The Chinese revolution is a continuation of the great October Revolution. The road of the October Revolution is the common road for all people's revolutions. The Chinese revolution and the October Revolution have in common the following basic characteristics: (1) Both were led by the working class with a Marxist-Leninist party as its nucleus. (2) Both were based on the worker-peasant alliance. (3) In both cases state power was seized through violent revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat was established. (4) In both cases the socialist system was built after victory in the revolution. (5) Both were component parts of the proletarian world revolution.

Naturally, the Chinese revolution had its own peculiar characteristics. The October Revolution took place in imperialist Russia, but the Chinese revolution broke out in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The former was a proletarian socialist revolution, while the latter developed into a socialist revolution after the complete victory of the new-democratic revolution. The October Revolution began with armed uprisings in the cities and then spread to the countryside, while the Chinese revolution won nationwide victory through the encirclement of the cities from the rural areas and the final capture of the cities.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's great merit lies in the fact that he has succeeded in integrating the universal truth of

Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution and has enriched and developed Marxism-Leninism by his masterly generalization and summation of the experience gained during the Chinese people's protracted revolutionary struggle.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war has been proved by the long practice of the Chinese revolution to be in accord with the objective laws of such wars and to be invincible. It has not only been valid for China, it is a great contribution to the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples throughout the world.

The people's war led by the Chinese Communist Party, comprising the War of Resistance and the Revolutionary Civil Wars, lasted for twenty-two years. It constitutes the most drawn-out and most complex people's war led by the proletariat in modern history, and it has been the richest in experience.

In the last analysis, the Marxist-Leninist theory of proletarian revolution is the theory of the seizure of state power by revolutionary violence, the theory of countering war against the people by people's war. As Marx so aptly put it, "Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one."¹⁴

It was on the basis of the lessons derived from the people's wars in China that Comrade Mao Tse-tung, using the simplest and the most vivid language, advanced the famous thesis that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun".¹⁵

He clearly pointed out:

The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries.¹⁶

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War is the product of imperialism the system of exploitation of man by man. Lenin said that "war is always and everywhere begun by the exploiters themselves, by the ruling and oppressing classes".¹⁷ So long as imperialism and the system of exploitation of man by man exist, the imperialists and reactionaries will invariably rely on armed force to maintain their reactionary rule and impose on the oppressed nations and peoples. This is an objective law independent of man's will.

In the world today, all the imperialists headed by the United States and their lackeys, without exception, are strengthening their state machinery, and especially their armed forces. U.S. imperialism, in particular, is carrying out armed aggression and suppression everywhere.

What should the oppressed nations and the oppressed peoples do in the face of wars of aggression and armed suppression by the imperialists and their lackeys? Should they submit and remain slaves in perpetuity? Or should they rise in resistance and fight for their liberation?

Comrade Mao Tse-tung answered this question in vivid terms. He said that after long investigation and study the Chinese people discovered that all the imperialists and their lackeys "have swords in their hands and are out to kill. The people have come to understand this and so act after the same fashion."¹⁸ This is called doging unto them what they do unto us.

In the last analysis, whether one dares to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against armed aggression and suppression by the imperialists and their lackeys, whether one dares to fight a people's war against them, means whether one dares to embark on revolution. This is the most effective touchstone for distinguishing genuine revolutionaries and Marxist-Leninists from fake ones.

In view of the fact that some people were afflicted with

the fear of imperialists and reactionaries, Comrade Mao Tse-tung put forward his famous thesis that "imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers". He said:

All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerful.¹⁹

The history of people's war in China and other countries provides conclusive evidence that the growth of the people's revolutionary forces from weak and small beginnings into strong and large forces is a universal law of development of class struggle, a universal law of development of people's war. A people's war inevitably meets with many difficulties, with many ups and downs and setbacks in the course of its development, but no force can alter its general trend towards inevitable triumph.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung points out that we must despise the enemy strategically and take full account of him tactically.

To despise the enemy strategically is an elementary requirement for a revolutionary. Without the courage to despise the enemy and without daring to win, it will be simply impossible to make revolution and wage a people's war, let alone to achieve victory.

It is also very important for revolutionaries to take full account of the enemy tactically. It is likewise impossible to win victory in a people's war without taking full account of the enemy tactically, and without examining the concrete conditions, without being prudent and giving great attention to the study of the art of struggle, and without adopting appropriate forms of struggle in the concrete practice of the revolution in each country and with regard to each concrete problem of struggle.

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Dialectical and historical materialism teaches us that what is important primarily is not that which at the given moment seems to be durable and yet is already beginning to die away, but that which is arising and developing, even though at the given moment it may not appear to be durable, for only that which is arising and developing is invincible.

Why can the apparently weak new-born forces always triumph over the decadent forces which appear so powerful? The reason is that truth is on their side and that the masses are on their side, while the reactionary classes are always divorced from the masses and set themselves against the masses.

This has been borne out by the victory of the Chinese revolution, by the history of all revolutions, the whole history of class struggle and the entire history of mankind.

The imperialists are extremely afraid of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's thesis that "imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers", and the revisionists are extremely hostile to it. They all oppose and attack this thesis and the philistines follow suit by ridiculing it. But all this cannot in the least diminish its importance. The light of truth cannot be dimmed by anybody.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war solves not only the problem of daring to fight a people's war, but also that of how to wage it.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung is a great statesman and military scientist, proficient at directing war in accordance with its laws. By the line and policies, the strategy and tactics he formulated for the people's war, he led the Chinese people in steering the ship of the people's war past all hidden reefs to the shores of victory in the most complicated and difficult conditions.

It must be emphasized that Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas

and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance for the present revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed nations and peoples, and particularly for the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism and its lackeys.

Many countries and peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America are now being subjected to aggression and enslavement on a serious scale by the imperialists headed by the United States and their lackeys. The basic political and economic conditions in many of these countries have many similarities to those that prevailed in old China. As in China, the peasant question is extremely important in these regions. The peasants constitute the main force of the national-democratic revolution against the imperialists and their lackeys. In committing aggression against these countries, the imperialists usually begin by seizing the big cities and the main lines of communication, but they are unable to bring the vast countryside completely under their control. The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the broad areas in which the revolutionaries can manoeuvre freely. The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory. Precisely for this reason, Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of establishing revolutionary base areas in the rural districts and encircling the cities from the countryside is attracting more and more attention among the people in these regions.

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world", then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world". Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of

the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of Asian, African and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population. The socialist countries should regard it as their internationalist duty to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The October Revolution opened up a new era in the revolution of the oppressed nations. The victory of the October Revolution built a bridge between the socialist revolution of the proletariat of the West and the national-democratic revolution of the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the East. The Chinese revolution has successfully solved the problem of how to link up the national-democratic with the socialist revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has pointed out that, in the epoch since the October Revolution, anti-imperialist revolution in any colonial or semi-colonial country is no longer part of the old bourgeois, or capitalist world revolution, but is part of the new world revolution, the proletarian-socialist world revolution.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has formulated a complete theory of the new-democratic revolution. He indicated that this revolution, which is different from all others, can only be, nay must be, a revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism waged by the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat.

This means that the revolution can only be, nay must be, led by the proletariat and the genuinely revolutionary party armed with Marxism-Leninism, and not by other class or party.

This means that the revolution embraces in its ranks not only the workers, peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie, but also the national bourgeoisie and other patriotic and anti-imperialist democrats.

This means that the revolution is directed against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism.

The new-democratic revolution leads to socialism, and not to capitalism.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of the new-democratic revolution is the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution by stages as well as the Marxist-Leninist theory of uninterrupted revolution.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung made a correct distinction between the two revolutionary stages, i.e., the national-democratic and the socialist revolutions; at the same time he correctly and closely linked the two. The national-democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution, and the socialist revolution is the inevitable sequel to the national-democratic revolution. There is no Great Wall between the two revolutionary stages. But the socialist revolution is only possible after the completion of the national-democratic revolution. The more thorough the national-democratic revolution, the better the conditions for the socialist revolution.

The experience of the Chinese revolution shows that the tasks of the national-democratic revolution can be fulfilled only through long and tortuous struggles. In this stage of revolution, imperialism and its lackeys are the principal enemy. In the struggle against imperialism and its lackeys, it is necessary to rally all anti-imperialist patriotic forces, including the national bourgeoisie and all patriotic personages. All those patriotic personages from among the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes who join the anti-imperialist struggle play a progressive historical role; they are not tolerated by imperialism but welcomed by the proletariat.

It is very harmful to confuse the two stages, that is, the national-democratic and the socialist revolutions. Comrade Mao Tse-tung criticized the wrong idea of "accomplishment both

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at one stroke", and pointed out that this utopian idea could only weaken the struggle against imperialism and its lackeys, the most urgent task at that time. The Kuomintang reactionaries and the Trotskyites they hired during the War of Resistance deliberately confused these two stages of the Chinese revolution, proclaiming the "theory of a single revolution" and preaching so-called "socialism without a Communist Party. With this preposterous theory they attempted to swallow the Communist Party, wipe out any revolution and prevent the advance of the national-democratic revolution, and they used it as their pretext for their non-resistance and capitulation to capitalism. This reactionary theory was buried long ago by the history of the Chinese revolution.

The Khrushchov revisionists are now actively preaching that socialism can be built without the proletariat and without a genuinely revolutionary party armed with the advanced proletarian ideology, and they have cast the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism to the four winds. The revisionists' purpose is solely to divert the oppressed nations from their struggle against imperialism and sabotage their national-democratic revolution, all in the service of imperialism.

The Chinese revolution provides a successful lesson for making a thoroughgoing national-democratic revolution under the leadership of the proletariat; it likewise provides a successful lesson for the timely transition from the national-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution under the leadership of the proletariat.

Mao Tse-tung's thought has been the guide to the victory of the Chinese revolution. It has integrated the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution and creatively developed Marxism-Leninism, thus adding new weapons to the arsenal of Marxism-Leninism.

Ours is the epoch in which world capitalism and imperialism are heading for their doom and socialism and

communism are marching to victory. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war is not only a product of the Chinese revolution, but has also the characteristics of our epoch. The new experience gained in the people's revolutionary struggles in various countries since World War II has provided continuous evidence that Mao Tse-tung's thought is a common asset of the revolutionary people of the whole world. This is the great international significance of the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

DEFEAT U.S. IMPERIALISM AND ITS LACKEYS BY PEOPLE'S WAR

Since World War II, U.S. imperialism has stepped into the shoes of German, Japanese and Italian fascism and has been trying to build a great American empire by dominating and enslaving the whole world. It is actively fostering Japanese and West German militarism as its chief accomplices in unleashing a world war. Like a vicious wolf, it is bullying and enslaving various peoples, plundering their wealth, encroaching upon their countries' sovereignty and interfering in their internal affairs. It is the most rabid aggressor in human history and the most ferocious common enemy of the people of the world. Every people or country in the world that wants revolution, independence and peace cannot but direct the spearhead of its struggle against U.S. imperialism.

Just as the Japanese imperialists' policy of subjugating China made it possible for the Chinese people to form the broadest possible united front against them, so the U.S. imperialists' policy of seeking world domination makes it possible for the people throughout the world to unite all the forces that can be united and form the broadest possible united front for a converging attack on U.S. imperialism.

At present, the main battlefield of the fierce struggle between the people of the world on the one side and U.S. imperialism and its lackeys on the other is the vast area of Asia,

Africa and Latin America. In the world as a whole, this is the area where the people suffer worst from imperialist oppression and where imperialist rule is most vulnerable. Since World War II, revolutionary storms have been rising in this area, and today they have become the most important force directly pounding U.S. imperialism. The contradiction between the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United States is the principal contradiction in the contemporary world. The development of this contradiction is promoting the struggle of the people of the whole world against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys.

Since World War II, people's war has increasingly demonstrated its power in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The peoples of China, Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cuba, Indonesia, Algeria and other countries have waged people's wars against the imperialists and their lackeys and won great victories. The classes leading these people's war may vary, and so may the breadth and depth of mass mobilization and the extent of victory, but the victories in these people's wars have very much weakened and pinned down the forces of imperialism, upset the U.S. imperialist plan to launch a world war, and become mighty factors defending world peace.

Today, the conditions are much more favourable than ever for the waging of people's wars by the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys.

Since World War II and the succeeding years of revolutionary upsurge, there has been a great rise in the level of political consciousness and the degree of organization of the people in all countries, and their capacity for mutual support and aid has greatly increased. The whole capitalist-imperialist system has become drastically weaker and is in the process of increasing convulsion and disintegration. After World War I, the imperialists lacked the power to destroy the new-born socialist Soviet state, but they were still able to suppress the

people's revolutionary movements in some countries in the parts of the world under their own rule and so maintain a short period of comparative stability. Since World War II, however, not only have they been unable to stop a number of countries from taking the socialist road, but they are no longer capable of holding back the surging tide of the people's revolutionary movements in the areas under their own rule.

U.S. imperialism is stronger, but also more vulnerable, than any imperialism of the past. It sets itself against the people of the whole world, including the people of the United States. Its human, military, material and financial resources are far from being sufficient for the realization of its ambition of dominating the whole world. U.S. imperialism has further weakened itself by occupying so many places in the world, overreaching itself, stretching its fingers out wide and dispersing its strength, with its rear so far away and its supply lines so long. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said:

Wherever it commits aggression, it puts a new noose around its neck. It is besieged ring upon ring by the people of the whole world.²⁰

When committing aggression in a foreign country, U.S. imperialism can only employ part of its forces, which are sent to fight an unjust war far from their native land and therefore have a low morale, and so U.S. imperialism is beset with great difficulties. The people subjected to its aggression are having a trial of strength with U.S. imperialism neither in Washington nor in New York, neither in Honolulu nor in Florida, but are fighting for independence and freedom on their own soil. Once they are mobilized on a broad scale, they will have inexhaustible strength. Thus superiority will belong not to the United States but to the people subjected to its aggression. The latter, though apparently weak and small, are really much more powerful than U.S. imperialism.

The struggle waged by the different peoples against U.S.

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imperialism reinforce each other and merge into a torrential world-wide tide of opposition to U.S. imperialism. The more successful the development of people's war in a given region, the larger the number of U.S. imperialist forces that can be pinned down and depleted there. When the U.S. aggressors are hard pressed in one place, they have no alternative but to loosen their grip on others. Therefore, the conditions become more favourable for the people elsewhere to wage struggles against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys.

Everything is divisible. And so is this colossus of U.S. imperialism. It can be split up and defeated. The peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions can destroy it piece by piece, some striking at its head and others at its feet. This is why the greatest fear of U.S. imperialism is that people's war will be launched in different parts of the world, and particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and why it regards people's war as a mortal danger.

U.S. imperialism relies solely on its nuclear weapons to intimidate people. But these weapons cannot save U.S. imperialism from its doom. Nuclear weapons cannot be used lightly. U.S. imperialism has been condemned by the people of the whole world for its towering crime of dropping two atom bombs on Japan. If it uses nuclear weapons again, it will become isolated in the extreme. Moreover, the U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons has long been broken; U.S. imperialism has these weapons, but others have them too. If it threatens other countries with nuclear weapons, U.S. imperialism will expose its own country to the same threat. For this reason, it will meet with strong opposition not only from the people elsewhere but also inevitably from the people in its own country. Even if U.S. imperialism brazenly uses nuclear weapons, it cannot conquer the people, who are indomitable.

However highly developed modern weapons and technical equipment may be and however complicated the methods of modern warfare, in the final analysis the outcome of a war will

be decided by the sustained fighting of the ground forces, by the fighting at close quarters on battlefields, by the political consciousness of the men, by their courage and spirit of sacrifice. Here the weak points of U.S. imperialism will be completely laid bare, while the superiority of the revolutionary people will be brought into full play. The reactionary troops of U.S. imperialism cannot possibly be endowed with the courage and the spirit of sacrifice possessed by the revolutionary people. The spiritual atom bomb which the revolutionary people possess is a far more powerful and useful weapon than the physical atom bomb.

Vietnam is the most convincing current example of a victim of aggression defeating U.S. imperialism by a people's war. The United States has made South Vietnam a testing ground for the suppression of people's war. It has carried on this experiment for many years, and everybody can now see that the U.S. aggressors are unable to find a way of copying with people's war. On the other hand, the Vietnamese people have brought the power of people's war into full play in their struggle against the U.S. aggressors. The U.S. aggressors are in danger of being swamped in the people's war in Vietnam. They are deeply worried that their defeat in Vietnam will lead to a chain reaction. They are expanding the war in an attempt to save themselves from defeat. But the more they expand the war, the greater will be the chain reaction. The more they escalate the war, the heavier will be their fall and the more disastrous their defeat. The people in other parts of the world will see still more clearly that U.S. imperialism can be defeated, and that what the Vietnamese people can do, they can do too.

History has proved and will go on proving that people's war is the most effective weapon against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. All revolutionary people will learn to wage people's war against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. They will take up arms, learn to fight battles and become skilled in waging people's war, though they have not done so before. U.S. imperialism, like a mad bull dashing from place to place, will finally be

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burned to ashes in the blazing fires of the people's wars it has provoked by its own actions.

THE KHRUSHCHOV REVISIONISTS ARE BETRAYERS OF PEOPLE'S WAR

The Khrushchov revisionists have come to the rescue of U.S. imperialism just when it is most panic-stricken and helpless in its efforts to cope with people's war. Working hand in glove with the U.S. imperialists, they are doing their utmost to spread all kinds of arguments against people's war and, wherever they can, they are scheming to undermine it by overt or covert means.

The fundamental reason why the Khrushchov revisionists are opposed to people's war is that they have no faith in the masses and are afraid of U.S. imperialism, of war and of revolution. Like all other opportunists, they are blind to the power of the masses and do not believe that the revolutionary people are capable of defeating imperialism. They submit to the nuclear blackmail of the U.S. imperialists and are afraid that, if the oppressed peoples and nations rise up to fight people's wars or the people of socialist countries repulse U.S. imperialist aggression, U.S. imperialism will become incensed, they themselves will become involved and their fond dream of Soviet-U.S. co-operation to dominate the world will be spoiled.

Ever since Lenin led the great October Revolution to victory, the experience of innumerable revolutionary wars has borne out the truth that a revolutionary people who rise up with only their bare hands at the outset finally succeed in defeating the ruling classes who are armed to the teeth. The poorly armed have defeated the better armed. People's armed forces, beginning with only primitive swords, spears, rifles and hand-grenades, have in the end defeated the imperialist forces armed with modern aeroplanes, tanks, heavy artillery and atom bombs. Guerrilla forces have ultimately defeated regular armies.

"Amateurs" who were never trained in any military schools have eventually defeated "professionals" graduated from military academies. And so on and so forth. Things stubbornly develop in a way that runs counter to the assertions of the revisionists, and facts are slapping them in the face.

The Khrushchov revisionists insist that a nation without nuclear weapons is incapable of defeating an enemy with nuclear weapons, whatever methods of fighting it may adopt. This is tantamount to saying that anyone without nuclear weapons is destined to come to grief, destined to be bullied and annihilated, and must either capitulate to the enemy when confronted with his nuclear weapons or come under the "protection" of some other nuclear power and submit to its beck and call. Isn't this the jungle law of survival par excellence? Isn't this helping the imperialists in their nuclear blackmail? Isn't this openly forbidding people to make revolution?

The Khrushchov revisionists assert that nuclear weapons and strategic rocket units are decisive while conventional forces are insignificant, and that a militia is just a heap of human flesh. For ridiculous reasons such as these, they oppose the mobilization of and reliance on the masses in the socialist countries to get prepared to use people's war against imperialist aggression. They have staked the whole future of their country on nuclear weapons and are engaged in a nuclear gamble with U.S. imperialism, with which they are trying to strike a political deal. Their theory of military strategy is the theory that nuclear weapons decide everything. Their line in army building is the bourgeois line which ignores the human factor and sees only the material factor and which regards technique as everything and politics as nothing.

The Khrushchov revisionists maintain that a single spark in any part of the globe may touch off a world nuclear conflagration and bring destruction to mankind. If this were true, our planet would have been destroyed time and again. There have been wars of national liberation throughout

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the twenty years since World War II. But has any single one of them developed into a world war? Isn't it true that the U.S. imperialists' plans for world war have been upset precisely thanks to the wars of national liberation in Asia, Africa and Latin America? By contrast, those who have done their utmost to stamp out the "sparks" of people's war have in fact encouraged U.S. imperialism in its aggressions and wars.

The Khrushchov revisionists claim that if their general line of "peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition and peaceful competition" is followed, the oppressed will be liberated and a "world without weapons, without armed forces and without wars" will come into being. But the inexorable fact is that imperialism and reaction headed by the United States are zealously priming their war machine and are daily engaged in sanguinary suppression of the revolutionary peoples and in the threat and use of armed force against independent countries. The kind of rubbish peddled by the Khrushchov revisionists has already taken a great toll of lives in a number of countries. Are these painful lessons, paid for in blood, still insufficient? The essence of the general line of the Khrushchov revisionists is nothing other than the demand that all the oppressed peoples and nations and all the countries which have won independence should lay down their arms and place themselves at the mercy of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys who are armed to the teeth.

"While magistrates are allowed to burn down houses, the common people are forbidden even to light lamps." Such is the way of the imperialists and reactionaries. Subscribing to this imperialist philosophy, the Khrushchov revisionists shout at the Chinese people standing in the forefront of the fight for world peace: "You are bellicose!" Gentlemen, your abuse adds to our credit. It is this very "bellicosity" of ours that helps to prevent imperialism from unleashing a world war. The people are "bellicose" because they have to defend themselves and because the imperialists and reactionaries force them to be so. It is also the imperialists and reactionaries who have taught the people

the arts of war. We are simply using revolutionary "bellicosity" to cope with counter-revolutionary bellicosity. How can it be argued that the imperialists and their lackeys may kill people everywhere, while the people must not strike back in self-defence or help one another? What kind of logic is this? The Khrushchov revisionists regard imperialists like Kennedy and Johnson as "sensible" and describe us together with all those who dare to carry out armed defence against imperialist aggression as "bellicose". This has revealed the Khrushchov revisionists in their true colours as the accomplices of imperialist gangsters.

We know that war brings destruction, sacrifice and suffering on the people. But the destruction, sacrifice and suffering will be much greater if no resistance is offered to imperialist armed aggression and voluntary slavery is accepted. The sacrifice of a small number of people in revolutionary wars is repaid by security for whole nations, whole countries and even the whole of mankind; temporary suffering is repaid by lasting or even perpetual peace and happiness. War can temper the people and push history forward. In this sense, war is a great school.

When discussing World War I, Lenin said:

The war has brought hunger to the most civilized countries, to those most culturally developed. On the other hand, the war, as a tremendous historical process, has accelerated social development to an unheard-of degree.²¹

He added:

War has shaken up the masses, its untold horrors and sufferings have awakened them. War has given history momentum and it is now flying with locomotive speed.²²

If the arguments of the Khrushchov revisionists are to be believed, would not that make Lenin the worst of all "bellicose

elements”?

In diametrical opposition to the Khrushchov revisionists, the Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people never take a sentimental view of war. Our attitude towards imperialists wars of aggressions has always been clearcut. First, we are against them, and secondly, we are not afraid of them. We will destroy whoever attacks us. As for revolutionary wars waged by the oppressed nations and peoples, so far from opposing them, we invariably give them firm support and active aid. It has been so in the past, it remains so in the present and, when we grow in strength as time goes on, we will give them still more support and aid in the future. It is sheer daydreaming for anyone to think that, since our revolution has been victorious, our national construction is forging ahead, our national wealth is increasing and our living conditions are improving, we too will lose our revolutionary fighting will, abandon the cause of world revolution and discard Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Of course, revolution in a country stems from the demands of its own people. Only when the people in a country are awakened, mobilized, organized and armed can they overthrow the reactionary rule of imperialism and its lackeys through struggle; their role cannot be replaced or taken over by any people from outside. In this sense, revolution cannot be imported. But this does not exclude mutual sympathy and support on the part of revolutionary peoples in their struggles against the imperialists and their lackeys. Our support and aid to other revolutionary peoples serves precisely to help their self-reliant struggle.

The propaganda of the Khrushchov revisionists against people's war and the publicity they give to defeatism and capitulationism tend to demoralize and spiritually disarm revolutionary people everywhere. These revisionists are doing what the U.S. imperialists are unable to do themselves and are rendering them great service. They have greatly encouraged U.S. imperialism in its war adventures. They have completely betrayed the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory of war and

have become betrayers of people's war.

To win the struggle against U.S. imperialism and carry people's wars to victory, the Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people throughout the world must resolutely oppose Khrushchov revisionism.

Today, Khrushchov revisionism has a dwindling audience among the revolutionary people of the world. Wherever there is armed aggression and suppression by imperialism and its lackeys, there are bound to be people's wars against aggression and oppression. It is certain that such wars will develop vigorously. This is an objective law independent of the will of either the U.S. imperialists or the Khrushchov revisionists. The revolutionary people of the world will sweep away everything that stands in the way of their advance. Khrushchov is finished. And the successors to Khrushchov revisionism will fare no better. The imperialists, the reactionaries and the Khrushchov revisionists, who have all set themselves against people's war, will be swept like dust from the stage of history by the mighty broom of the revolutionary people.

Great changes have taken place in China and the world in the twenty years since the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan, changes that have made the situation more favourable than ever for the revolutionary people of the world and more unfavourable than ever for imperialism and its lackeys.

When Japanese imperialism launched its war of aggression against China, the Chinese people had only a very small people's army and a very small revolutionary base area, and they were up against the biggest military despot of the East. Yet even then, Comrade Mao Tse-tung said that the Chinese people's war could be won and that Japanese imperialism could be defeated. Today, the revolutionary base areas of the peoples of the world have grown to unprecedented proportions, their revolutionary movement is surging as never before, imperialism is weaker

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than ever, and U.S. imperialism, the chieftain of world imperialism, is suffering one defeat after another. We can say with even greater confidence that the people's wars can be won and U.S. imperialism can be defeated in all countries.

The people of the world now have the lessons of the October Revolution, the Anti-Fascist War, the Chinese people's War of Resistance Against Japan and War of Liberation, the Korean people's war of resistance to U.S. aggression, the Vietnamese people's war of liberation and their war of resistance to U.S. aggression, and the people's revolutionary armed struggles in many other countries. Provided each people studies these lessons well and creatively integrates them with the concrete practice of revolution in their own country, there is no doubt that the revolutionary peoples of the world will stage still more powerful and splendid dramas in the theatre of people's war in their countries and that they will wipe off the earth once and for all the common enemy of all the peoples, U.S. imperialism, and its lackeys.

The struggle of the Vietnamese people against U.S. aggression and for national salvation is now the focus of the struggle of the people of the world against U.S. aggression. The determination of the Chinese people to support and aid the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation is unshakable. No matter what U.S. imperialism may do to expand its war adventure, the Chinese people will do everything in their power to support the Vietnamese people until every single one of the U.S. aggressors is driven out of Vietnam.

The U.S. imperialists are now clamouring for another trial of strength with the Chinese people, for another large-scale ground war on the Asian mainland. If they insist on following in the footsteps of the Japanese fascists, well then, they may do so, if they please. The Chinese people definitely have ways of their own for coping with a U.S. imperialist war of aggression. Our methods are no secret. The most important one is still

mobilization of the people, reliance on the people, making every one a soldier and waging a people's war.

We want to tell the U.S. imperialists once again that the vast ocean of several hundred million Chinese people in arms will be more than enough to submerge your few million aggressor troops. If you dare to impose war on us, we shall gain freedom of action. It will then not be up to you to decide how the war will be fought. We shall fight in the ways most advantageous to us to destroy the enemy and wherever the enemy can be most easily destroyed. Since the Chinese people were able to destroy the Japanese aggressors twenty years ago, they are certainly still more capable of finishing off the U.S. aggressors today. The naval and air superiority you boast about cannot intimidate the Chinese people, and neither can the atom bomb you brandish at us. If you want to send troops, go ahead, the more the better. We will annihilate as many as you can send, and can even give you receipts. The Chinese people are a great, valiant people. We have the courage to shoulder the heavy burden of combating U.S. imperialism and to contribute our share in the struggle for final victory over this most ferocious enemy of the people of the world.

It must be pointed out in all seriousness that after victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan Taiwan was returned to China. The occupation of Taiwan by U.S. imperialism is absolutely unjustified. Taiwan Province is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. The U.S. imperialists must get out of Taiwan. The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan.

In commemorating the 20th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, we must also point out in all solemnity that the Japanese militarists fostered by U.S. imperialism will certainly receive still severer punishment if they ignore the firm opposition of the Japanese people and the people of Asia, again indulge in their pipe-dreams and resume their old road of aggression in Asia.

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U.S. imperialism is preparing a world war. But can this save it from its doom? World War I was followed by the birth of the socialist Soviet Union. World War II was followed by the emergence of a series of socialist countries and many nationally independent countries. If the U.S. imperialists should insist on launching a third world war, it can be stated categorically that many more hundreds of millions of people will turn to socialism; the imperialists will then have little room left on the globe; and it is possible that the whole imperialist system will collapse.

We are optimistic about the future of the world. We are confident that the people will bring to an end the epoch of wars in human history. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out long ago that war, this monster, "will be finally eliminated by the progress of human society, and in the not too distant future too. But there is only one way to eliminate it and that is to oppose war with war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war."²³

All people suffering from U.S. imperialist aggression, oppression and plunder, unite! Hold aloft the just banner of people's war and fight for the cause of world peace, national liberation, people's democracy and socialism! Victory will certainly go to the people of the world!

Long live the victory of people's war!

Notes

1. Under the influence of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the people's anti-Japanese movement, Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng, who were the generals in command of the Kuomintang Northeastern Army and the Kuomintang 17th Route Army respectively, agreed to the anti-Japanese national united front proposed by the Communist Party of China and demanded that Chiang Kai-shek should stop the civil war and unite with the Communist Party to resist Japan. Chiang Kai-shek refused. On December 12, 1936, Chang Hsueh-

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liang and Yang Hu-cheng detained him in Sian. Proceeding from the interest of the entire nation, the Chinese Communist Party offered mediation and Chiang Kai-shek was compelled to accept the terms of unity with the Communist Party and resistance to Japan.

2. Mao Tse-tung, "With the Masses in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front", *Selected Works*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1965, Vol. 1, p.290.

3. The "three thirds system" refers to the organs of the political power which were established according to the principles of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and in which the members of the Communist Party, non-Party progressives and the middle elements each occupied one third of the places.

4. Mao Tse-tung, "Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front", *Selected works*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1965, Vol. II, p.422.

5. Mao Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", *Selected Works*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1965, Vol. II, pp.316-17.

6. Mao Tse-tung, "On Coalition Government", *Selected Works*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1965, Vol. III, pp.296-97.

7. Frederick Engels, "Possibilities and Perspectives of the War of the Holy Alliance Against France in 1852", *Collected Works* of Marx and Engels, Russ. ed., Vol. VII, p.509.

8. Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War", *Selected Works*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1965, Vol. II, p.116.

9. Sparrow warfare is a popular method of fighting created by Communist-led anti-Japanese guerrilla units and militia behind the enemy lines. It was called sparrow warfare first, because it was used diffusely, like the flight of sparrows in the sky; and second, because it was used flexibly by guerrillas or militiamen, operating in threes or fives,

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appearing and disappearing unexpectedly and wounding, killing, depleting and wearing out the enemy forces.

10. Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", *Selected Works*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p.248.

11. Mao Tse-tung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", *Selected Works*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1961, Vol. IV, p.161.

12. Mao Tse-tung, "Interview with Three Correspondents from the Central News Agency, the Sao Tang Pao and the Hsin Min Pao", *Selected Works*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1965, Vol. II. p.270.

13. Mao Tse-tung, "We Must Learn to Do Economic Work", *Selected Works*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1965, Vol. III, p.241.

14. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, Vol. I, p.751.

15. Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy", *Selected Works*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1965, Vol. II, p.219.

16. *Ibid.*, p.219.

17. V. I. Lenin, "The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government", *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Vol. VIII, p.529.

18. Mao Tse-tung, "The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan", *Selected Works*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1961, Vol. IV. pp. 14-15.

19. Mao Tse-tung, "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong", *Selected Works*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1961, Vol. IV. P.100.

20. Mao Tse-tung, "Statement Supporting the People of the Congo (L.) Against U.S. Aggression" (November 28, 1964) and "People of the

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World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All their Lackeys", Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1966, p.14.

21. V.I. Lenin, "For Bread and Peace", *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Vol. XXVI, p.350.

22. V. I. Lenin, "The Chief Task of Our Day", *Collected Works*, Russ. ed. Vol. XXVII, p.136.

23. Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", *Selected Works*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1965, Vol. I. p.182.

LIN PIAO'S DIRECTIONS TO THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY ON THE CREATIVE STUDY AND APPLICATION OF MAO'S WORKS

New China News Agency

Comrade Lin Piao has given extremely important directions on the study of Chairman Mao's works in the Chinese People's Liberation Army, calling on it to elevate the mass drive for the creative study and application of Chairman Mao's works to a new stage. Comrade Lin Piao's directions were communicated to a recent meeting of cadres of the air force by Comrade Hsiao Hua, Director of the General Political Department of the PLA.

Comrade Lin Piao said: "Mao Tse-tung's thought is the science of revolution, it is proletarian truth which has stood the test of prolonged revolutionary struggles, it is Marxism-Leninism closest to present-day reality, it is a programme for united action by the whole Party, the whole army and the entire people. The whole Party, the whole army and the people of the whole country must be imbued with Mao Tse-tung's thought and our thinking must be unified with it."

Comrade Lin Piao said: "The great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is now being carried out throughout the country, and the study of Chairman Mao's works by the whole Party and the whole nation has reached a new situation, has taken on a new look. The army must meet this situation and raise the mass drive for the creative study and application of Chairman Mao's works to a new stage. The army must truly become a great school of Mao Tse-tung's thought. The great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought must be raised higher

than ever. We really must take a step forward in intensive study of Chairman Mao's works and with still greater stress on practical results; we must bring about a new situation and raise the drive to a new level. Every comrade must do his utmost truly to grasp Mao Tse-tung's thought, truly to master it."

At the meeting of the air force cadres, Comrade Hsiao Hua urged all comrades in the army to respond resolutely and warmly to Comrade Lin Piao's call. He said that Comrade Lin Piao's very important and timely directions placed still higher demands on the army, and were a new and powerful stimulus in the mass drive for the study of Chairman Mao's works which was developing in depth, and they would have far-reaching influence on the building of the PLA into a revolutionized army.

Comrade Hsiao Hua said: "Why has our army work developed so rapidly and produced such great achievements in the few years since Comrade Lin Piao took charge of the work of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party? There may be thousands of reasons but they can be summed up in this single point — the holding aloft of the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, the study and application of Chairman Mao's works in a living way, the placing of politics in the forefront. Practice has proved that tremendous changes will take place in the whole ideology and work of a unit when it raises the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought on high, studies and applies Chairman Mao's works in a living way, puts politics in the forefront, persists in the 'four firsts' and makes a great effort to revolutionize the men's thinking.

"In fighting a war, our armed forces have always relied on people's political consciousness, on their courage, on the political factor, on the 'four firsts.' The fighting strength of a unit is dependent on political work, on political education, on the education in Mao Tse-tung's thought. People armed

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with Mao Tse-tung's thought are the most courageous, intelligent and revolutionary. Armed forces equipped with Mao Tse-tung's thought have the greatest fighting power, are ever-victorious and the most invincible armed forces in the world. We must equip and educate the armed forces with Mao Tse-tung's thought. When the work of education in Mao Tse-tung's thought is done successfully and the men's proletarian consciousness is raised, the result is courage, creativeness, a sense of organization and discipline, a capacity to stand up to hardship and a revolutionary spirit. And like mushrooms after rain, there will emerge heroes of the type of Lei Feng, Ouyang Hai, Wang Chieh, Mai Hsien-te and Liu Ying-chun. Comrade Lin Piao has pointed out that although, as far as the work of the whole army is concerned, the situation is very complicated, and there are all kinds of different circumstances, yet in this particular respect the situation is at once both complicated and yet not so complicated, there are differences and yet there are no differences. That is to say everything must be unified through Mao Tse-tung's thought. Since the work of the army as a whole is so complicated, what is it that must be taken hold of? The most fundamental thing is to take hold of education in Mao Tse-tung's thought, the placing of politics in the forefront. When this work is done well, every other kind of work receives an impetus and can be done well. If you don't take hold of this, you will never get results and inevitably you will lose direction however hard you strive and sweat on other matters. Out of all the thousands of things they must do, the Party committees, the political organs and the leading cadres at all levels must keep a tight hold on the study of Chairman Mao's works, on putting politics in the forefront and on the revolutionizing of people's thinking and must turn the army into a great school of Mao Tse-tung's thought. Here lies the fundamental thing, the core and soul, in our army building."

Comrade Hsiao Hua said: "The aim of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is utterly to destroy bourgeois

ideology and vigorously foster Mao Tse-tung's thought. The whole country is now engaged in vigorous study of the works of Chairman Mao. Our army must study Chairman Mao's works even better and bring about a new situation, reach a new level and achieve new results. We must study better and better every year. We must not stand still but must continue to forge ahead. We must not become complacent but must raise ourselves higher, must develop, must make creative contributions and sum up our new experiences. Otherwise we may lag behind, lag behind the situation and behind the people throughout the country.

"The broad masses of cadres and fighters of our army are infinitely loyal to Chairman Mao and have unbounded love for him. They are infinitely loyal to Mao Tse-tung's thought and have unbounded love for it. When the news reached the army of Chairman Mao's swim in the Yangtze River, and of the several occasions when he received the revolutionary teachers and students, the knowledge that Chairman Mao was very fit and well was a matter of the greatest happiness and inspiration to the commanders and fighters throughout the army. They all said that Chairman Mao's good health was the greatest happiness for the whole Party, the whole army and the people of the whole country. Throughout barracks and camps there were acclamations of long life to Chairman Mao. The cadres and fighters have an extremely profound class love for our great leader Chairman Mao. It is only when we are fired with such deep and rich proletarian feeling that we can study Chairman Mao's works well.

"The method of studying Chairman Mao Tse-tung's works should still follow Comrade Lin Piao's instructions, that is: They should be studied with problems in mind, they should be studied and applied in a creative way, study should be combined with practice, one should study first what is urgently needed so as to get quicker results and one should try hard to apply what one studies. Practice has proved that

this is the best method of studying Chairman Mao's works and solving problems. Comrade Lin Piao has said: 'The question now is not whether we do or do not study but whether we can truly grasp and apply what we study. To grasp and apply truly, we must combine study with reality. Only by linking it with reality can we understand it, fix it in our minds and apply it. Without linking it with reality, we cannot understand it, fix it in our minds and apply it. We must carry out repeated education, dissemination, study and practice linking with reality. We should not regard the army as still the same old one, as if nothing has changed. Actually things are changing every day. Don't be afraid of repetition. In linking up with reality, ideology and work, we will no longer be repetitive'."

Comrade Hsiao Hua said: "Comrade Lin Piao has instructed us that the army must implement the thought of Mao Tse-tung in order to resist revisionist ideology and all the various sorts of exploiting class ideology, to strengthen the revolutionization of our ideology, to elevate our class consciousness, to raise our understanding of policy and improve our way of thinking. Comrade Lin Piao has stressed that not only the fighters but also the cadres must study the 'three much-read articles' ('Serve the People,' 'In Memory of Norman Bethune' and 'The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains'). It is very easy to study the 'three much-read articles.' But to apply them truly is very difficult. We must study the three articles as maxims. People at all levels must study them. We must apply what we study so as to revolutionize our thinking. These instructions of Comrade Lin Piao must be implemented with the greatest earnestness."

Comrade Hsiao Hua said: "Comrade Lin Piao has always implemented Mao Tse-tung's thought and followed his correct line most faithfully, firmly and thoroughly. At every historical, critical turn in the Chinese revolution, Comrade Lin Piao has resolutely taken his stand on the side of Chairman Mao and carried out uncompromising struggle against every

kind of 'left' and right erroneous line and has courageously safeguarded Mao Tse-tung's thought. Since he took charge of the work of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Comrade Lin Piao has held the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought high, creatively applied Mao Tse-tung's thought and put forward a series of important measures for the strengthening of the revolutionization of the army. He has called on the whole army to engage in a mass movement for the study of the works of Chairman Mao and has also helped push forward a vigorous mass drive among the workers, peasants and soldiers throughout the country for the creative study and application of the works of Chairman Mao. Comrade Lin Piao is the most intimate comrade-in-arms of Chairman Mao, his best student and the best example in creatively studying and applying Chairman Mao's works. The comrades of our whole army should follow Comrade Lin Piao's example in holding high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, creatively studying and applying Chairman Mao's works, and persistently disseminating and safeguarding Mao Tse-tung's thought."

Comrade Hsiao Hua spoke about the tremendous significance of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and its great successes. He also gave important directions concerning the work in the air force.

(Peking "Jen-min Jih-pao," October 10, 1966).

CHENG SHIH-CH'ING VISITS WITH LIN PIAO

Torch Correspondence

When he was in Peking attending a conference, Comrade Cheng Shih-ch'ing, Chairman of Kiangsi Provincial Revolutionary Committee, called on Comrade Lin Piao, our respected Deputy Commander-in-Chief, at his home.

Vice-Chairman Lin's residence is austerity itself, his whole family being housed in a very modest home, unheated except by a stove. The room he uses serves both as bedroom and office. On the bed are a couple of blankets, very neatly folded. The office part of the room contains a desk and a wooden chair, several benches reserved for the use of his visitors. There is no desk light, illumination is provided by a lamp hanging from the ceiling.

An abundance of books and Chairman Mao's quotations predominates the room. A portrait of Chairman Mao and a scroll with a quotation from the Chairman written on it adorn the wall facing the door. The bookshelves are stacked with Chairman Mao's works, and books by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, all leaders of Bolshevik revolution. On the desk there is a big globe as well as a map of China.

It is in these surroundings that our venerable Vice-Chairman Lin ponders day in and day out on China's as well as the world's problems, assists our great leader Chairman Mao in directing the operations of the great Cultural Revolution, and the revolutionary struggles undertaken by the oppressed nations and peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Vice-Chairman Lin is very strict with himself, lives simply, and does not even smoke.

Two of Vice-Chairman Lin's sons were at home at that time. When they learned that Cheng Shih-ch'ing was the political commissar of revolutionary martyr Li Wen-chung's unit, both wanted to join that unit as enlisted men.

Vice-Chairman Lin gave Cheng Shih-ch'ing many important instructions during his visit.

Vice-Chairman Lin said that the situation in Kiangsi looked good. The chaos and disturbances had done the province lots of good, he said, and the revolution in Kiangsi owed its success to the mobilization of the broad masses for the revolutionary cause. The masses are exemplary in their conduct and are very reasonable, he said.

He said that the fundamental of the fundamentals in our revolutionary task was to grasp political and ideological work. Cadres in all trades and professions should do this. Expose those who try to fish in troubled waters, and it will help the revolutionary cause considerably.

Vice-Chairman Lin said that Li Wen-chung was a good example for the whole army to follow. With the army, political work is everything. Once this is done and done well, all other problems will take care of themselves. Army political work is mass work, he explained. We must have implicit faith in the masses, rely on them for they are reasonable, he emphasized.

Talking about studying Chairman Mao's writings, Vice-Chairman Lin stressed the importance of studying and applying it in a creative way. The most important, the most vital and the most fundamental task in our political and ideological work, he said, is at all times to grasp the thought of Mao Tse-tung, to grasp the revolutionization of our thought

and to grasp and persist in using it to command every field of activity. Our maximum attention should be focused on political and ideological work, and our greatest energy should be placed on the revolutionization of our thought, he said. ✓

Then he took up the problem of cadres. Vice-Chairman Lin said that testing a cadre is a long-term project. Sometimes it would take a long time to know a cadre well.

In the selection of cadres, we must emphasize the cadre's worker and peasant background, and see whether he has put politics to the fore. Once the revolutionization of man's thought is accomplished, the solution of other problems would be a walkaway. We must use the thought of Mao Tse-tung, he said, to educate the army, to educate the revolutionary rebels.

He said that Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and An Tzu-wen had made it their business to replace revolutionary cadres with renegades, for they have no faith in cadres of the Old Red Army days. Say what as you may, he emphasized, the expose of renegades is a great victory of the Cultural Revolution. Their overthrow is a great triumph for the Chinese people. We don't care a whit about disturbances at the grassroots, the important thing is that we have thrown the renegades and special agents overboard.

Vice-Chairman Lin also said that you cannot become proficient in your trade unless you are bold. |

He said that work must be enforced in a sweeping manner and one's job must be done with dispatch, precision and thoroughness. ✓

Cadres must be selected from among workers and peasants. They know how to conduct class struggle and step up production. The workers have done remarkably well

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in Shanghai. You must identify yourself with workers and peasants, he said. To ensure success on the local level, you must grasp political and ideological work well.

Armed with these instructions from Vice-Chairman Lin and through him, from Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, Comrade Cheng Shih-ch'ing bade good bye to Vice-Chairman Lin.

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Part IV

ON LITERATURE AND ART

**LIN PIAO'S LETTER TO MEMBERS OF STANDING
COMMITTEE OF MILITARY COMMISSION OF
CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON WORK IN
LITERATURE AND ART IN
THE ARMED FORCES**

March 22, 1966

Comrades of the Standing Committee:

I am herewith sending you for your attention the summary of the Forum on the Work in Literature and Art in the Armed Forces which Comrade Chiang Ch'ing convened. The summary, which has been repeatedly gone over by the comrades attending the forum and has been personally examined and revised by the Chairman three times, is an excellent document. It applies Mao Tse-tung's thought to answer many important questions concerning the cultural revolution in the period of socialism. It is of both extremely great practical and far-reaching historic significance.

The last 16 years have witnessed sharp class struggle on the front of literature and art and the question of who will win out has not yet been settled. If the proletariat does not occupy the positions in literature and art, the bourgeoisie certainly will. This struggle is inevitable. And it represents an extremely broad and deep socialist revolution in the realm of ideology. If things are not done properly, revisionism will prevail. We must hold high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought and unswervingly carry this revolution through to the end.

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The problems and the ideas raised in the summary correspond fully with the realities in the work of literature and art in the armed forces, and the ideas must be resolutely carried out so as to enable this work in the armed forces to play an important role in keeping politics in the forefront and in promoting the revolutionization of people's thinking.

Please let me know your opinions on the summary before it is submitted to the Central Committee for examination and approval.

With greetings.

Lin Piao

(Peking "Jen-min Jih-pao," May 29, 1967)

LIN PIAO ON CREATIVE WRITING

by Lin Dou Dou

Since I started working for this newspaper office, I have put down in my notebook the remarks my father had made on writing. Some of the comrades have read these, thought it useful and asked me to show them some more. Recently, my office asked me to have it so arranged as to serve as internal reading material. But my comprehension is so limited, and my memory not always dependable, that surely it has many important omissions and inaccuracies. In so far as the remarks were made for my personal consumption, they may not apply to other comrades. My lack of confidence is further deepened by the fact that these have not been shown to my father for possible revision. It is my hope, therefore, that these will only serve as reference to our writing staff at the air-force newspaper office, and that it will not be given wider distribution.

Let us start with writing short articles. Recently, my father read the two articles I wrote for the *Air Force Bulletin*, published on May 27 and July 6 respectively, under the titles of "Resolution Reaching the Clouds" and "To Flourish, a Plant Must Be Deep-Rooted." Father liked them so much that he had them cut from the papers. Since they were printed in types too small for him to read, he asked others to read it out for him. He even called me up when he was out of town, saying that the two articles were well written, that they are free from the drawbacks of the "Party eight-legged essay" and that they are short, concise and refreshing. The first article, retitled "These Heroes Are Most Admirable" was later reprinted in the *Liberation Army Daily*. He said

that the new title was more apt and read better, adding that he was certainly glad to see the younger generation coming of age. Although only a modest start, he continued, the start was well made and in the right direction.

Father said that short commentaries and essays were good media and should be used more often. They are powerful weapons in correcting misconceptions, disseminating new ideas and glorifying heroic deeds. Don't you ever try to write, he warned, articles that are dry, dull and tediously long, as if they were stereotyped writings that are machine made to order, devoid of any feeling and only good at putting people to sleep. Subject matter that is complicated in nature can of course be written into longer pieces, but like short articles, they must be solid writing. He advised me to study carefully Chairman Mao's "Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing," an experience that will not only broaden your mind, but will improve your writing, too.

As to literary form and writing style, father cautioned against writing novels, for I am still young, inexperienced in life and feeble in health. He does not want me to have the illusion that some day I'll become an established writer. He wants me to continue writing short pieces, essays and feature articles, which are a cross between stories and straight reports. Closely intertwined with the political life of the people and an apt expression of it, my father finds in the feature article the best instrument in educating the people.

Father is of the opinion that a writer should develop his own style. But as a beginner, he should experiment with all forms and all styles. What he means by experiment, he said, is not aimless experiment, but experiment with judicious care and on a highly selective basis. He likens the literary experiment of a novice to a military operation. As in a military operation you would choose a target and bring your full force to bear on the enemy in a battle of annihilation, so in a beginner's literary experiment, he will

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find an article with positive thinking and a fine style, study it over and over again and tear it into pieces and chew it. For a certain period of time, you will study only one form of writing, and try to effect a major breakthrough. Thus over a longer period of time, you will have experimented with all forms of writing and every writing style. Then, and only then, you can develop gradually your own style. In the study of other literary works, particularly works of other periods, one must assume a critical and analytical attitude, as Chairman Mao has taught us, we must discard the riffs and absorb the essence. Writers of other periods have feelings and manners entirely different from ours. They take the petty bourgeois stand, have their feet planted on the side of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals and "their innermost soul is still a kingdom of the petty bourgeois intelligentsia." Their writings are expressions of their personal feelings, melancholy and lowkeyed, which one will do well not to imitate. To develop your own style, my father said, you must first of all be inspired with revolutionary fervor and political consciousness so that the things you write will be high-keyed and in the fine tradition of revolutionary literature.

Good literary works are so numerous, father said, that one train cannot take them all. They are all different, none is set to a fixed pattern. Unlike a mathematical problem which can have only one answer, a literary work can be written in a thousand different ways. It is wrong therefore for us to adhere to some framework. Instead, we should be bold to create, on the basis of requirements demanded by revolutionary struggle and life of the broad masses, and through continuous practice and improvement, our own style. Like writing Chinese characters with a brush, you must first copy from a famous calligrapher, and given time and practice, you will gradually cultivate your own writing style. You cannot produce a replica of the old master; even if you can, it will never come to much. For all good calligraphers have their own particular styles. So, in calligraphy as well as in writing, one must

start off with copying the works of others. Then you develop your own style through practice, for proficiency is the result of practice. At first you may not like your own style, but don't you ever feel self-conscious about it, you must develop it and consolidate it so that gradually it will be perfected.

On the subject of basic training, father holds that a writer must be tough in three respects. Ideologically, he must study and uphold the thought of Mao Tse-tung through his life. In his daily life, he must be at one with the workers, peasants and soldiers. Technically he must master all writing skills.

To be tough in ideology is a life-long job. The number one criterion for a good article is its political standard, which requires the writer to train his observation power and judgment through long exposure to political life and class struggle of the most complicated kind. That is why we must adhere always to the correct line prescribed by the thought of Mao Tse-tung, always hold high the banner of the Mao Tse-tung thought and pass it on from generation to generation, and always take the stand of the proletariat and of the masses. Father sets great store by what Chairman Mao has said in his *Yenan Forum on Literature and Art*: "For members of the Communist Party, this means keeping to the stand of the Party, keeping to Party spirit and Party policy." I remember when I left for my first job, father gave me a scroll as a parting gift, on which he himself has written this quotation from Chairman Mao, asking me to hang it up on the wall as soon as I arrive at my post, and study it at all times. He wants me to rely on the Party, eulogize the new society and hit hard at the reactionaries. In every article I am to write, I must be precise in my thinking, unequivocal in my attitude and clearcut in my love and hatred. I should uphold what is beneficial and oppose what is harmful to the Party.

Also, he wants us to remember that the articles we write are written for the people, for the workers, the peasants and the soldiers. They must be closely related to the

present-day struggle, political or otherwise, and must meet the demands of that struggle. Articles and other literary compositions are for the education and reformation of people. It is therefore a foregone conclusion that the writer must first of all reform himself and effect the revolutionization of his own thinking. Chairman Mao has told us: "Today, writers who cling to an individualist, petty bourgeois stand cannot truly serve the masses of revolutionary workers, peasants and soldiers." Their interest is mainly focused on the small number of petty bourgeois intellectuals, this is the crucial reason why they cannot produce works full of revolutionary fervor that will serve the broad masses of the people. "If you are not correct in your own conduct, how can you correct others?" this old Chinese saying is well put. We who want to educate others must first of all educate ourselves. By the same token, an engineer entrusted with the transformation of man's soul must have the soul of the proletariat himself. To become a creative writer is a painstaking process. First you have to acquire the proletarian stand and the sentiment of a revolutionary; then you must labour at the task until you become proficient in writing. A sluggard can never learn to be a writer. While it is difficult to know this, it is even more difficult to put your knowledge to practice. You must study, my father said, Chairman Mao's *Yenan Forum on Literature and Art*. Since it is a basic lesson, you must carry it with you at all times, read it, study it over and over again and do lots of research if you come upon some problem. You must act according to Chairman Mao's instructions, drill and improve yourself on the anvil on life.

To live tough is to align yourself unconditionally with the workers, the peasants and the soldiers. Chairman Mao has said: "Society is the laboratory for a student of literature and art." And you must regard society as your laboratory. Plunge into the heat of life, keep in close touch with the masses and share their feelings. The most important of all, you must participate actively in the socialist education

programmes conducted in the cities and in the countryside, so that your root will strike deep in the soil of the broad mass and your foundation will become even more solid. Only in this way you can go somewhere, my father said. You should never look nostalgically back on your school days when you were cut entirely from the outside world. The life of the broad masses is the fountain-head of creative writing. Tell me, my father said, is there any piece of good writing that is not the result of careful observation and active participation in actual life? Take your own writing for instance, "Uncle Tung" (carried in *Liberation Army Literature*, January 1967), "In Memory of the Late Uncle Liu Ya-lou" (that appeared in *People's Daily*, May 12, 1965) and "Yangchow After Rain" are some of the better peices you have written, but let me ask you were you capable of these had you not experienced life? The first requirement of a writer is to grasp life, and persist in living. But not all people with experiences in life can discover and solve problems pertaining to a writer. You must at the same time use your brains. When you come upon a phenomenon you want to understand, mere looking into the matter wouldn't help you much, you must at the same time have the ability to analyze, to abstract and to raise the standard of writing. When you look into a matter you must have an objective in mind, going to it with an open mind, not with a conclusion. You must not be bound by fixed ideas, but stand ever ready to learn new things. You must plunge into life, acquiring the power of observation, relating what you see to the major events of the nation, of the Party, of class struggle and of world revolution. Then you can aim high and be broad-minded, and there will be great strength in your writing. And you will not be confined to depicting insignificant details of life, as if you had only the insight of a timorous and short-sighted rat.

People are what you should write about in your correspondence, sketches and feature articles. Such being the case, you should not encumber the character you want

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to present to the public with irrelevant matters, which very possibly will obscure its image. An article without the vivid portrayal of a man will soon be forgotten. Your "Yangchow After Rain" was well written, my father said, it suffered, however, from the lack of a central figure, that is why its emotional appeal is limited. Your failure in the past in producing readable articles is attributable to your shyness and your lack of contact with the outside world. To write well, you must go out to meet people, to find out how they are doing and what they are thinking about. You must familiarize yourself with their mannerisms, their speeches, so that you can write vividly about them. You can never expect to touch the right chord in people unless you glorify heroes in a striking manner. Once you have won the sympathy of your readers, the objective of educating the people will have been achieved. That is also one of the reasons why we say that man is the first consideration of all factors, and living thought is the most important thing in life. So you must keep people of all walks of life in constant touch, enrich your knowledge about them, engage them in conversations and ponder over what they have said in relation to the major problems of the day. Vivid metaphors, the glitter of your thought and what is generally regarded as inspiration, because of their fleeting nature, must be grasped at once, put down on paper, and stored away as accessories against the day when they will be assembled and made into an artistic whole. In writing as well as in any other undertaking, success will go only to those who are ambitious and determined.

To be tough in the mastery of techniques, you must first of all build up a vocabulary. Words, phrases, proverbs and allusion with their nuances of meaning must be carefully studied. While those of a classical or foreign origin must be acquired, more attention should be given to the living language of the broad masses of people. With the benefit of a rich vocabulary, your article will be terse and concise, giving a strong sense of solidity and shedding an artistic brilliance that will leave an indelible impression on the mind

of your readers. An article written in drab language is as insipid as distilled water. Chairman Mao listed drab language as the fourth indictment against stereotyped Party writing in his famous essay "Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing." "Like our stereotyped Party writing," he said, "the creatures known in Shanghai as 'little *piehsan*' are wizened and ugly. If an article or a speech merely rings the changes on a few terms in a classroom tone without a shred of vigour or spirit, is it not rather like a *piehsan*, drab of speech and repulsive in appearance?" Accomplished writers of all times and all countries pay particular care to their vocabularies. Leo Tolstoy, a 19th century Russian novelist and short story writer, had an active vocabulary of more than 10,000 words. It was reported that after he had mailed his manuscript of *Anna Karenina*, he discovered that there was one word he wanted to change. So he trudged to the post office, which was scores of miles away, to make the change. Although Tolstoy was not a proletarian writer, we ought to learn from him for the zealous care he had given to his vocabulary. Our own revolutionary writer Lu Hsun was equally careful with his diction; it was said that sometimes he would feel listless for days and nights on end when he was searching for one appropriate word in his translation of foreign authors, and finally when he had found that word, he would be in an ecstasy of delight. Furthermore, as was pointed out by Chairman Mao in his "Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing," Lu Hsun had never coined adjectives and terms that are not readily intelligible to others. The writings of our great leader Chairman Mao, my father said, are exemplary not only for the political view expressed therein, but for their writing style. For Chairman Mao is a consummate writer who knows how to use his tools of trade, terms, phrases and allusions. Take the three most read articles for instance, in "In Memory of Norman Bethune," he used such stock phrases "perfecting his skill" and "to change their work the moment they see something different" with great skill; in "Serve the People," he quoted Szuma Chien, famous Chinese historian of the 2nd century B. C. as saying "Though death befalls all men

alike, it may be heavier than Mount Tai or lighter than a feather;" and in "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains," he gave the ancient Chinese fable a new twist. All these are very apt, very natural, and in appropriate measure. Articles like these were vividly written, no wonder they have made interesting and absorbing reading, and they are so powerful in their inspirational force.

The building of a working vocabulary takes painstaking efforts. Just like in studying the works of Chairman Mao, you should have specific problems in mind, so in collecting an active vocabulary, you must have a definite purpose, to collect only those that will answer your need. In doing that you must have a notebook about you and take down whatever words and terms that have caught your fancy, and from time to time you have to consult your notebook to refresh your memory. Here you must learn from your mother, who, although getting on in years, and always busy with her work, picks up new phrases with an indefatigability that should be able to command your respect. When she comes across a term that would give adequate expression to our thought, she will by the force of habit take it down as if she had come upon a treasure. I would suggest, father said, that you carefully go over Chairman Mao's writings, and take down on cards all the phrases and allusions that you like. You should study your mother tongue as you would a foreign language. Memorize all the phrases and expressions you think you could use. While reading a dictionary may make you dizzy, you can easily memorize a phrase or an expression in its context. If you persevere with your effort, given time, you shall be able to build up a good vocabulary. The more terms and expressions you have at your command, the easier it is for you to express your thought. Through practice, they will become a part of you. Do you know what has made Soochow embroidery so beautiful? The silk strands that make up the embroidery are so rich and varied in colours that they are said to have 4,800 different shades, red alone accounting for several scores of them. As it is the variegated

brilliant colours that have made Soochow embroidery beautiful, so it is an enriched vocabulary that makes a piece of writing vivid and moving. Once you have accumulated enough words and expressions and have them at your fingers' ends, you will be writing with ease, and the words and expressions you need will come to you in a continuous flow. Important to you as your vocabulary is, you must guard against clichés, bromides, trite and hackneyed expressions, bombastic and flowery language. If you commit the fatal mistake of verbosity, the ideas contained in your writing and the message you want to put across will suffer.

Artistic organization is also an important factor of good writing. What has made a good novel and play so appealing? Because the story it has told is well organized. When you find straight reporting will not produce the desired result, you can use suspense and surprise to enhance readership interest. This is what we call unity of contradictions. While both image and logic are important, you should set greater store by creating an image in writing feature articles. To combine narration with argumentation is not a bad method. Nowadays, we don't think much of pages of descriptions with nothing else in it. It makes tedious reading. You would do well by interspersing your narration and description with a few passing remarks, terse and to the point. Then the piece of writing you produce will be full of fighting spirit, with both substance and artistic expression, powerful as well as graceful.

In expounding a theory, you can quote authoritative works. But you must remember what we mean by authoritative works are Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung. Typical examples are what we mean by types. Once you succeed in spinning a good yarn by combining typical examples with authoritative works, your article will be well written.

Don't pay too much attention to style. Style is determined by contents. First you must decide what you

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want to write about, then make a mental picture of it or put its outline on paper. Finally you can write it out at one sitting. Before it is done, you must carefully read it over and over again and make the necessary corrections in your manuscript.

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Lin Dou Dou, Lin Piao's daughter, is now on the editorial staff of the Chinese Communist *Air Force Bulletin*.

Part V

LIN PIAO AS I REMEMBER HIM

COMRADE LIN PIAO FIGHTS SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH US

by Pan Feng

The winter of 1932 was a winter of sanguinary battles and endless combats. Like a pack of bloodthirsty mad hounds, the Kuomintang troops pounced and prowled here, there and everywhere, gnawing their teeth and closing in for the kill whenever they got a chance. They concentrated a powerful force to invade Chihsi, a pivotal area between the Central Soviet District and the Southeast Soviet District, in a vain attempt to cut one district off from the other so that they could knock us down one by one and stamp out the revolution.

To protect Chihsi and safeguard the revolutionary base areas, our division, the 10th Division of the Fourth Red Army, was deployed near Hsuwan north of Chihsi to intercept the invading army and shatter their plot.

The area we were assigned to protect consisted of a chain of small hills stretching all the way down to the highway that traversed it. We went into hiding after we had arrived, waiting for the enemy to offer themselves as sacrifices on a silver platter.

It was in the morning that Kuomintang general Wu Ch'i-wei's troops crawled like an endless line of turtles along the highway, either wearing their coneshaped, broad-brimmed rain hats or having them strung across their shoulders. They were getting closer and closer till we could see very clearly the inscription painted on their rain hats, which read "The 4th Iron Army of the National Revolutionary Forces." So this was part of the 90th Iron Division of the vaunted 4th Iron Army that Wu Ch'i-wei was so proud of. Well-equipped and well-trained, and with the support of three old warplanes which

whirled and whined overhead, they made a big show of their strength as if the whole world belonged to them.

By the time the enemy had entered our shooting range, Comrade Li Shu-fan, our division commander, brought his hand down with a flourish, saying: "Open Fire!" Suddenly the hills and dales were reverberated with rifle shots and machine-gun rattles. Fighters of our unit sprang out of their hiding and scrambled for positions to take their aim at the enemy, that fell like wheat stalks by the sharp edge of a scythe. Fierce and cruel fighting lasted from seven o'clock in the morning till one o'clock in the afternoon; we repulsed several scores of organized enemy attacks, each time the enemy was put to rout and forced to leave their dead and wounded behind. Before the enemy was wiped out, however, their reinforcements were brought in, driving a wedge between our division headquarters and two of our fighting wings. Our casualties began to pile up, and besides, our division commander Comrade Li Shu-fan was seriously wounded. The situation became increasingly grave with the loss of central command. The special service unit, to which I belonged, the garrison company as well as the communications squad of the division headquarters withdrew from the battlefield in an effort to preserve our strength, and we fought while we retreated.

The enemy, who did not want us to get away, was now on the pursuit.

How eager and anxious we were for a commander, and how much we would like to hear the calm and reassuring voice of a commander! Suddenly we heard galloping horses and saw on the road to our south a cloud of dust. Who had come for our rescue? We wondered. In the meantime the riding party was coming up fast. It turned out to be Comrade Lin Piao, our army corps commander, and Comrade Nieh Jung-chen, the political commissar, who had rushed to our help with a handful of guards.

Like a group of bereaved children longing for the company of their elders, we welcomed the sight of Comrades Lin and Nieh, and were greatly relieved immediately. But this time the pursuing enemy were rushing on us, these were repulsed with an outburst of gunfire. Beaming with joy, we came to

life again at the sight of Comrade Lin.

"Welcome to you, comrade officers from the army corps!" we shouted our welcome, brandishing our rifles and pistol carbines in our hands.

Dismounting from his horse, Comrade Lin Piao said: "Comrades, you have fought well!" which sounded like music to our ears. We took their horses to a covered position, and returned to our chiefs for orders.

"How are things on the battlefield?" Comrade Lin Piao asked, in the calm voice that was typical of him. We reported to him in great detail what had just transpired. Then he went straight to a hilltop and stood there to observe the scene before him through his field glasses. We were all greatly impressed with the serenity and composure with which he handled the situation; and the panic fear that had been with us during our retreat disappeared. We stood near him, watching the enemy's movement. I had never worked for Comrade Lin at close range, but his tranquility at all times, his thoroughness and his ability as a commander were known to all. With Comrade Lin Piao at our side to command us, I was thinking at that time, it would be strange indeed if we couldn't annihilate the enemy. Comrade Lin allowed some time to pass before he took down his field glasses and looked us in the face. We looked back at him, as if to say: "Give us your order, and we will carry it out." Knowing what was on our mind, he pointed at a hill nearest to the highway, and said: "Take that hill, and victory will be ours." So saying, he beckoned us to follow him. He ran toward that hill, and we all ran after him.

"Hurry up, comrades," I shouted, running all the time as fast as I could in order to catch up with Comrade Lin Piao, "we are lagging behind our commander!"

The mountain paths were so difficult to negotiate that our hands and feet were pricked by thistles. But no one paid any attention to his personal comfort, and all shared one thought: Comrade Lin was ahead of us, we must not let him exposed to danger and get hurt. Everyone raced forward to keep pace with Comrade Lin and we reached the hilltop at about the same time with him. The enemy had also seen the strategic im-

portance of this particular hill, and sent men to capture it. But we were one jump ahead of them. By the time we reached the top of the hill, the enemy were still at the mid-level. Under the orders of Comrade Lin, we opened fire and mowed them down in one sweep. Those who had survived rolled down the slope and escaped by the skin of their teeth.

"Lie down where you are and prepare for action!" ordered Comrade Lin. Then he sent off a mounted guard as messenger to call the Red Seventh and the Red Ninth Divisions into action.

But the Red Seventh and the Red Ninth were more than 10 *li* away from us. It was highly doubtful whether they could rush to our rescue on time. Taking advantage of their superiority in numbers and fire power, the enemy mounted one attack after another against us, although each time they were turned back with heavy losses. Then they organized increasingly more men for the offensives, until they used a full battalion in one single operation. Under the cover of concentrated fire power, these lightly equipped men rushed on us in waves of fierce assaults. At this time we were running out of ammunition, each had only a few bullets in the cartridge belt, and the only machine gun we had in working condition had some 10 rounds of bullets left. My No. 5 pistol carbine had exactly six bullets and its barrel was burning hot. To prevent it from possible busting, I poured all the machine oil I had into it, with a full determination, which was shared by all, to fight to the bitter end. At the same time, we looked imploringly in the direction of Comrade Lin Piao, hoping that he would decide to leave this trouble spot.

"It is time for you to go, Sir," said I, in a pleading tone.

"It is time for you to leave, Sir," echoed the men. "We will take care of them. Certainly we can."

Comrade Lin looked at us for a while, then he said peremptorily: "Don't mind me. Your job is to smash the enemy. But you are not to shoot until I tell you to!" He looked around after he had glanced at the setting sun. "The reinforcements should be here soon. Victory belongs to those who choose to stick it out!"

Our army corps commander didn't for a moment forsake us in this life-and-death struggle when time itself seemed to be standing still. We watched the approaching enemy with venom in our heart, and we could hardly contain ourselves when we saw the enemy baring its fangs and showing its claws. If we had had our will, we would have pounced on the enemy and sunk our teeth into them. By this time most of the men were too impatient to wait, and aiming their guns at the enemy, they turned to Comrade Lin Piao as if to say: "Sir, we are anxiously waiting for your order."

"Hold your fire. Don't shoot until the enemy is real close." His words had the soothing effect of a tranquilizer, and we all calmed down.

Keeping our eyes peeled on the enemy, we measured the distance that separated us from the enemy, 50 yards, 40 yards... 10 yards... eight yards...

"Shoot!" commanded Comrade Lin. A sudden outburst of hot lead from our machine gun and pistol carbines, like flood water that overran the dam, surged toward the enemy. Our bullets, as if they had eyes to see, had all found their targets in the enemy's vital parts. The attackers were cut down in great numbers like grain with a scythe, and rows of enemy bodies fell on the hillside, either dead or seriously wounded. Our ammunition, which was already exceedingly low, was now totally exhausted.

"Comrades! charge!" the much awaited order had finally come from Comrade Lin Piao.

All at once we jumped from our positions and rushed forward to engage a new wave of enemy in hand-to-hand fighting.

Bugles sounded the charge from afar. Before we knew it, comrades from the Red Seventh and the Red Ninth Divisions were already joining us in battle. In violent onsets they came upon the enemy, who fell like tree leaves in stormy weather and melted like snow before boiling water. The proud enemy that had so much fight in them was severely punished, and the broad-brimmed rain hats with the inscription of "Iron Army" on them littered the hillside. We gathered together our main

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force for a final assault on the enemy. Soon they were routed. Those who were not killed raised their hands and surrendered to us.

Such was the way in which we, fighting shoulder to shoulder with our army corps commander, smashed Wu Ch'i-wei's "Iron Army" into pieces. When he saw war booties being brought in by the fighters, there was a smile of victory on Comrade Lin Piao's resolute but kind face.

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BEFORE CROSSING THE YELLOW RIVER

*Recollections of a Reconnaissance Trip in the Presence of
the Enemy Conducted by Army Group Commander Lin Piao*

by Tseng Sze-yu

After the Battle of Chihlochong, the First Red Army Group was resting and regrouping themselves in areas near Kankuyi, Yenchuan. At that time I was a staff officer in charge of reconnaissance affairs at the Army Group Headquarters.

One day in mid-December, 1935, Tso Chuan, Chief of Staff of the Army Group, ordered me to take a pistol squad from the Mounted Reconnaissance Company and escort Army Group Commander Lin Piao to Wayaopao, where he was to attend a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party's Central Committee. Tso Chuan added, "Don't forget to take maps of the area around Chingchien, Yenchuan and Yenchang with you."

I was secretly delighted. From my experience working at the Headquarters, I knew that Lin Piao was a commander noted for his thoroughness and attention to details. He invariably directed the troops at the crucial point of the battle. He always emphasized the need for the commanders to personally investigate every detail and to study every possibility before the outbreak of a battle. Whenever we arrived at a new place, it was his custom to look around the billets and talk with the local people. It often happened that he was acquainted with the situation of the enemy, the topography of the locality, the mood of the people, and the local customs, long before we professional scouts could get the information. As he listened to our reports, he would make a correction here and supplement something there and invariably surprise us with his knowledge. I had accompanied him on a reconnaissance trip just before

the recent battle of Chihlocheng, and was sure that when I was told to take maps this meant we were about to strike another blow.

I was right. For it was at the Wayaopao meeting that the Party centre laid down the policy of the formation of a national defence government, the setting up of an anti-Japanese allied army and the establishment of a national united front, to repulse the Japanese aggressors and save China from being overrun by the enemy. The Party centre decided that the Red Army in northern Shensi was to be reorganized into the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Vanguard Army to mobilize the whole of the people against Japan and smash the "encirclement and annihilation" campaigns of the reactionaries. The Red Army was to cross the Yellow River, march east to the Hopei-Chahar front and become the vanguard of the resistance movement of the Chinese people.

I learned all this afterwards. When the Wayaopao meeting concluded, I only knew that we had the special job of going around the Chingchien and Yenchang area to survey the topography along the banks of the Yellow River.

A dozen of us were charged with this task. We proceeded on horseback and covered more than a hundred *li* on the first day. When we arrived at the seat of the district soviet government, we asked the government functionaries for information about the physical features of the locality. Commander Lin Piao made a special request for a set of the local topographical maps. This was his regular practice. He liked to make a comparative study of the local topographical and the military maps. The former was often more detailed than our own maps. The following night we arrived at a small village about a dozen *li* from the river. There was heavy snow, so we decided to delay the trip to the river until after breakfast next morning.

It snowed heavily all night. It was past midnight when I finished my round of sentries. I saw a light was still glowing in Commander Lin Piao's cave-dwelling and quietly entered. He was sitting on one end of the brick platform bed and was poring over a number of military maps, which almost covered the bed. He had pieced the maps together and was pressing

them down with both of his hands. He smiled when he saw me. "It's getting late. Why haven't you gone to sleep? Are the others all in bed yet?" he asked as though we, his escorts, should go to sleep, but not himself.

I told him that all, except those on watch, were in bed, reported that it was snowing hard and asked him whether he still intended to go to the river in the morning.

He said that there would be no problem if we could find a good guide. "Better get two guides," he said after second thought. "A shepherd and a boatman. Better two of the old timers, you know."

I went to the village soviet and asked for some civilian clothes with which to disguise ourselves and the two guides. I could not help wondering why we needed two guides, a shepherd and a boatman, when it was only about a dozen *li* from the village to the river bank.

It snowed all night and was knee-deep the next morning, with snow still falling. The weather was to our advantage as we were going to reconnoitre the enemy positions at close quarters.

The village soviet chairman arrived with the two guides just after breakfast. They were sturdily built men with weather-beaten faces and deep lines at the corners of the eyes. The two guides both looked about forty years old. The shepherd was probably the senior of the two. They looked honest, hard-working people. I told Lu Ti, leader of the reconnaissance squad, to detail five soldiers. We all changed into the borrowed civilian clothes. Some of us wore white unlined sheepskin coats with white towels tied around our heads. Others wore cotton-padded coats turned inside out. In our white garments it was difficult to distinguish us at a distance of several dozen paces from the snow. Commander Lin had turned his old overcoat inside out and tied a piece of rope around his waist.

We set out for the river bank with snow reaching up to our knees and more was still falling. It was the end of December and the weather was bitterly cold. A northeaster was blowing into us from the direction of the river. We shivered and had difficulty in breathing. When we were well out of the village we gradually became more used to it. As we were all from southern

China, the magnificent snow scene fascinated us. The entire Northwestern Plateau was white.

The two guides must have thought that our behaviour was peculiar, for they asked, "Comrades, why are you going to the river in a big snowstorm like this?"

I answered, "The saying goes, 'One's heart will not rest content until one reaches the Yellow River,' we southerners have heard that the Yellow River is a great muddy yellow waterway, but we've never seen it with our own eyes. Since we have come so far we are determined to see the Yellow River under whatever circumstances." As I spoke, I looked at Commander Lin. He smiled and nodded approval. He was walking in big, slow strides, now raising his eyes to look around, now putting out his hand to let the snow fall on it. He looked as if he were completely at ease, as though he had no other thought but to see the river and enjoy the snow.

Before long we heard the roar of flowing water. "Do you hear it? This is the Yellow River," one of the guides told us. We arrived at the vicinity of Hokou on the western bank of the river opposite to the Hsinkuan Ferry about ten o'clock. The snow had stopped falling. The half-frozen Yellow River presented a spectacular sight. Large blocks of ice-floes, like small silvery mountains, floated slowly down stream. The onslaught of big waves brought them into collision with one another, sending up big showers of water and chips of ice into the air. The rumbling noise startled flocks of long-beaked white birds, which went skidding across the surface of the ice.

The old shepherd tugged at the commander's coat and pointed towards the ferry point on the opposite bank. "Comrades, you have to be careful," he said. "The river is the border between the Red and White territories. The White soldiers under warlord Yen Hsi-shan sometimes fire at us from across the river."

Commander Lin Piao nodded, moved behind a crag, lay flat on the snow and looked through his field-glasses. His leisurely look was now completely gone and he watched with concentrated attention. I also levelled my glasses and had a clear view of the opposite shore. The ferry was located at the

entrance to a gorge. Sheer cliffs rose on both sides of the gorge. On the hilltops and at the entrance of the gorge were some snow-covered knolls with sinister-looking, dark openings. These were the enemy blockhouses. Enemy patrols were moving among the closely packed blockhouses. Some were clearing the snow. The ferry itself was more closely guarded.

The Army Group Commander watched for a while and then walked northwards towards the upper reaches of the river. The snow was deeper there, reaching as high as our waists in places. He took no notice of the snowdrifts and trudged along, pausing now and then to look through his field-glasses.

When we were a long way from our starting point, he looked at the opposite bank for a few moments, patted the snow off his overcoat and walked to the old shepherd. "Friend, have you been around these hills very much?" he asked, pointing to the opposite bank, as his finger described a circle.

"Yes," the shepherd answered. "I have been a hired shepherd for thirty years, and there's not a single hill on both sides of the river that I haven't been over."

"But the cliffs are rather steep. How could you get there?"

"Follow the sheep is my job, you know. Where a sheep can go, a man can follow. In some places, I even have to help the sheep." The shepherd pointed to the snow-draped ridges and continued, "Look at the mouths of the branching streams over there. The hills all have fairly good slopes. One can get to the top of them."

Commander Lin Piao nodded and repeated, "Yes, where a sheep can go, a man can follow."

As I listened to their conversation, I noted the shepherd's words. I followed his description and made a rough sketch of the hills and dales. Now I knew why Commander Lin Piao wanted a shepherd as our guide. The northwestern region abounded in sheep, and the shepherds followed their flocks from one hilltop to another. They were the people who travelled the most unfrequented gullies and vales. It was a very clever idea to take a shepherd as guide. The boatman too no doubt could have given us a great deal of information about the river.

Commander Lin Piao talked with the shepherd about a lot of other things and asked whether there was any grass on the hills and how the hills could be scaled from the branching streams. From the answers to these seemingly trifling questions we were able to get a perfectly clear picture of the places not open to our view.

Then he began to talk with the boatman about the Yellow River.

"The river is pretty wide. How long will it take to make a trip to the opposite bank and back?" he asked.

"It takes about one and a half hours in ordinary times, maybe longer when the river rises. It all depends on the state of the waters," the boatman told him.

"Where do you moor your boat in the evening?"

"At Hokou. It's calm there," the boatman answered pointing to the north.

As we walked and talked, we made a careful reconnaissance of the topographical layout of the section between Hokou and Yenshuikuan, spending the whole day among ice and snow on the bank of the Yellow River.

As dusk fell, the snow again started, and we made our way back to the village in a drifting snowstorm. Commander Lin Piao did not appear fatigued after trudging all day in the snow. He walked behind the two guides in good spirits, but was in no mood to enjoy the snow, being deep in thought. I knew from past experience that a great and brilliant plan of action was taking shape in the mind of our commander.

More than a month after this, the stretch of land where we had trudged in snow and reconnoitred became the scene of forced crossing of the Yellow River. Our ferry boats were hidden in the mouth of the Wuting River at places pointed out by the old boatman, and warriors of our shock troops dotted the hillsides the old shepherd said he had often climbed.

It was exactly where our First Army Group, the powerful vanguards in the war of resistance against Japan, crossed the mighty Yellow River under Commander Lin Piao.

(From "Red Flags Flutter", Third

PART V: LIN PIAO AS I REMEMBERED HIM

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Note: Tseng Sze-yu, a native of Szechuan, is now commanding officer of the Wuhan Military District, Chief of Hupeh Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and member of CCP 9th Central Committee.

FIRST ENCOUNTER AT PINGHSING PASS

by Li Tien-yu

After the Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident, which the Japanese precipitated on July 7, 1937, Japan arrogantly expected to conquer China in three months. Hordes of Japanese troops captured Peking, Tientsin, Nankow, Changchiao-kou (Kalgan), and later, Tehchow and Paoting, like a flood let loose by broken dykes. The Kuomintang troops in North China, numbering about eight hundred thousand, speedily collapsed and ran pell-mell when attacked by the Japanese.

The Eighth Route Army, then numbering only forty to fifty thousand men, rushed to the front lines along two routes to intercept the enemy; one to northwestern Shansi, the other, northeastern Shansi. The force which went to northeastern Shansi was the 115 Division to which we belonged. Our regiment, the 686th, was an advance detachment of the division.

As we were hard pressed for time, we travelled by train and lorries, whenever possible. Everywhere we were met by large numbers of people who came out to give us a hearty greeting. We were often surrounded by old men and women peasants and young mothers carrying babies in their arms, all asking, with tears in their eyes, if we were going to the front to fight the Japanese bandits. Refugee students, who had been forced by the Japanese to leave their families in the Northeast, would hover round the station, singing songs of sorrow and protest.

Who could witness his motherland trodden underfoot, his fellow countrymen subjected to the most trying ordeals wandering homeless, without having his heart fill with bitter hatred and fury?

With clenched fists and fighting spirits our soldiers would

shout: "We'd rather have our heads cut off and let our blood flow than become slaves in a conquered country!" The crucial moment of life and death had come. The grief and hatred of the Eighth Route Army and the people were interwoven.

The sights that greeted us when we got off the train at Kaoping were shocking. There was an atmosphere of disaster and confusion. The Kuomintang troops and people carrying their belongings jammed the roads in a frenzied stampede. Whole villages were deserted except for Kuomintang soldiers laden with bedding, hens, or anything they could carry as they beat a disorderly retreat. Their horses were burdened with boxes and crates of all sizes. Some of them were cursing the Japanese, others blamed their commanders. Most of them were crying with sheer fright: "Terrible, terrible! The Japanese are invincible!" The Kuomintang high command was rife with men who were terrified of the Japanese and believed that they would conquer China. Many of the rank and file shared these feelings. We often heard them say: "Let's quit. It's hopeless to fight them." When they met us they expressed their surprise and consternation by sarcastic comments such as, "Are you going to fight the Japanese with your broken rifles and swords? Are you mad or are you tired of living and want to die?"

To be perfectly frank, our equipment was far inferior to that of the Kuomintang army. Many a soldier was not even equipped with a home-made rifle, but instead had a sabre slung across his shoulder. To a coward, this could be mistaken for impudence or underestimation of the enemy. However, we were well aware of the fact that the Japanese ruffians were very dangerous foes, but none of us showed any sign of timidity or apprehension. Our soldiers had vowed to be resolute. Many a fighter had written his last letter to bid his parents, wife or child farewell. Some had set aside money for the last payment of Party dues. Thousands and thousands of soldiers had only one implacable determination — to go to the battlefield as soon as possible!

PART V: LIN PIAO AS I REMEMBERED HIM

On the morning of September 23, Comrade Yang Yung, the deputy regiment commander, and I went to division headquarters for a meeting. We had had practically no rest for the last several days; there were too many problems waiting to be solved. Of course we did not consider whether to fight or not, but only how to fight well. There is a saying that goes: "Know yourself and know your foe if you want to win a battle." But we had never fought the Japanese before, and the flight of the panic-stricken Kuomintang troops had indeed stricken a chill in us.

"The retreating Kuomintang troops have a very bad effect on us," I said.

"Yes, they say that the enemy is very powerful, very tough, and we won't be able to make a dent in them."

"We'll make a dent for sure, no matter how difficult it is."

"Of course we will! We'll let the people all over the country know that we can rout the Japanese bandits and we'll let the enemy know that the Chinese people are unconquerable!"

When we arrived at division headquarters we found that Lin Piao, the division commander, had been waiting for us. His perfectly serene demeanour, calm and poise combined with grim determination, made all the tension in me vanish suddenly. I had a feeling of complete confidence in our ultimate victory. The commander had never fought a battle which he was not sure of winning. Once he decided to fight, he would make a good showing. When the Japanese raided Lingchiu, he jumped into a staff car and rushed to the front to personally evaluate the situation and inspect the terrain of the battlefield. Now he was standing before all the officers of units above battalion, giving them last-minute pre-battle instructions. He was a very thin man. He looked as if a mere gust of wind could fell him, but he was in high spirits. His voice was vibrant with agitation, every word had the strength of steel. Raising his clenched fist, he spoke with unswerving determination:

"We will fight a great battle at Pinghsingkuan, deal a heavy blow to the Japanese troops, co-ordinate with the Kuomintang forces, and give inspiration to the people!"

At that moment Division Commander Lin Piao received a wire from the Kuomintang high command which said that advance enemy units had reached the neighbourhood of Pinghsingkuan. This news did not startle him. He sent out a reconnoitring party and continued the meeting. He told us about the current overall situation and then said resolutely and firmly:

"When the enemy troops attack Pinghsingkuan, we will attack them from the flank and the rear and give them a crushing blow!"

We started at dusk. Through the night we rushed to reach Janchuang, a village some thirty *li* from Pinghsingkuan. There we made the necessary preparations for the battle. A Party committee meeting was summoned; pre-battle agitation was carried out; officers were sent ahead to survey the terrain; scouts were posted at every important crossing and all communications with the outside were cut off to prevent any possible leakage of the news of our activities to the enemy.

The men busied themselves cleaning their weapons. They cleaned the inside of their rifles and polished their bayonets. They were allotted only about a hundred bullets and two grenades apiece. Everyone knew why this battle was to be fought and why it should be fought well. If any one of the soldiers were asked, "How will you fight in this operation?" he would answer, "I'll be the first to charge forward and the last to pull out." This was the request the Party put to every member and it had become the firm resolution of all the soldiers.

On the morning of the 24th, the roaring of guns could be heard coming from Pinghsingkuan. A scout came running back, all out of breath, to report that a concentration of enemy troops with equipment was moving towards the pass. When dusk fell, division headquarters received a note from the Kuomintang high command telling of their plan to make a frontal attack at the pass, and requesting us to assault the

enemy's flank from the southeast. Having carefully studied the situation, Division Commander Lin decided to destroy the Japanese approaching the pass along a twenty-li stretch of ridges from Pinghsingkuan to Laoyehmiao, and he ordered us to set out at twelve o'clock that night.

We first thought of catching a few winks of sleep before setting out, for we knew that once the fighting started it would be several days before we could have any rest at all, but as zero hour drew nearer and nearer, mounting agitation made me lose my composure.

"You're an old-timer now, why are you so nervous?" asked Comrade Yang Yung, sensing that I was out of sorts.

"I don't know. You're not quite your usual self either."

"I'm worried about this battle. We simply can't afford a slip. We've got to win."

"You're right. People all over the country are waiting for the news of our victory."

It was about nine o'clock at night. I tossed and turned and couldn't keep my eyes shut even for a minute. Since we were bivouacked in the same village as the division headquarters, I decided to go directly to Division Commander Lin for instructions and to find out if there were any new developments.

I entered the division commander's room, and saw that he was resting on an earthen bed. He looked frail in the dim candle light. He was in the habit of sitting before the maps for hours on end, thinking through the most minute details of a battle. I noticed that the military map was still hanging on the wall. A quick glance showed me that the battle plan was elaborate and meticulously thought out. Red and blue pencil marks sealed the doom of the enemy. The terrain from Pinghsingkuan to the town of Tunghonan consisted of a stretch of rising and falling ridges. Along the valley there lay a highway leading from Lingchiu to Pinghsingkuan. The 343rd Brigade would be waiting in ambush on the ridges south of the highway. Our regiment would be stationed near Paiyitai. On our left flank would be the 685th Regiment, and the 687th Regiment would be on our right, all pointing north of the highway, to form a tight encirclement. The Kuomintang

troops were to make a frontal attack from Pinghsingkuan itself. The plan was worked out with marvellous thoroughness and foresight. Even enemy reinforcements had been anticipated and the division commander had made plans for the 344th Brigade to intercept possible enemy reinforcements. In a word, the enemy advancing on Pinghsingkuan was going to be completely encircled. They would be unable to do anything to protect themselves from punishment.

Possibly because of my clumsy steps, the division commander was awakened. He sat up and asked what I had come for. After listening to me silently he thought a while and finally said briefly but precisely:

"Carry out the original plan. If anything new should happen I will certainly let you know."

His quiet, unruffled, level voice calmed me. However I was very sorry to have interrupted his sleep. How many days and nights had passed since he had had any rest!

Division Commander Lin asked me to stay around for a while to talk with him, but I left, quite ill at ease.

We set off at midnight.

In order not to expose ourselves, we twisted along the most difficult, winding, narrow trails and ditches in the valleys. Dark clouds were gathering in the sky. Fearing that our advance might be hampered by possible rain, the men in the rear were constantly calling out to those in front to go faster. Heavy clouds were threatening, it was getting darker and darker. We were quite worried and impatient.

The first drops began to fall, then the rain became heavier and heavier. By two or three o'clock in the morning, the drizzle had grown into torrential sheets of rain, forming a grey curtain of glistening water. We had no raincoats, no umbrellas, nothing to shield us from the rain. Our thin uniforms were soaked through and through. We were shivering with cold. The sky was as black as a tinker's pot. We shuffled cautiously along at half pace, slowing down our march. I was burning with impatience. I couldn't see the worried looks on the soldiers' faces, but I could hear men falling and picking themselves up, calling out in trembling voices:

"W-w-wait. . ." "S-s-slower. . ." "O-old Chang, wh-ere a-are you?"

At this very moment, our mothers might be looking out of their windows into the dark night, yearning for their sons who were so far away from home. If they would know that their beloved ones were shivering in the cold rain, their hearts would ache. But just because we wanted our mothers to live peacefully in warm, happy homes on such nights as this, we must march forward. A voice asked me in the darkness:

"A little impatient. They said. . ."

"Keep on! We will keep going even if it rains daggers."

The rain kept pouring down. Large drops beat against our faces. Each man clutched the coat-tail of the man ahead and shuffled along unsteadily, stumbling and falling, on his feet one second, down on his knees the next. We hoped that there would be more lightning flashes, so that we could take advantage of the momentary illumination and run ahead quickly. In the pitch darkness it was impossible to see how the men were getting along. I sent for a government cadre who was attached to a company, and asked:

"Any complaints from the rank and file in the company?"

"Regiment Commander, it's raining so hard, shall we still go on?"

"What did they say?"

"Just give them a chance to fight. They can stand hardships and they'll not complain."

"If there won't be a fight, they'll curse the leaders, won't they?"

He didn't reply, but I knew he was smiling in the dark. Yes, people's fighters were like that. For the survival of the people, they were ready to brave every peril and they willingly plunged into the fiercest battle. But if they did not have a chance to fight they would complain that their superiors were neglecting them. What worried them most now was the fear that they might miss the battle. Nature seemed to be bent on doing us an ill turn. It rained unceasingly. I was furious. I felt like shooting at the sky to drive away those abominable dark clouds.

Torrents of water hurtling down the mountain made our march even more difficult. Here and there we had to ford a stream. Standing on the brink of the stream it was impossible to see the tumultuous and turbulent water as it washed down the mountains, but you could hear its roar from afar, it drowning out the splashing of the rain. In some sections the streams had risen waist-high. The torrents were rapid, the waves were high. Some rash soldiers, impatient to get across, jumped into the water and were carried struggling downstream, never to appear again. What was to be done? The howling and foaming streams were in our way. It seemed as though we had no alternative but to stop. Yet the men were urging one another on in whispers:

"Come on, let's ford it."

"Even the snow-covered mountains and the marshlands didn't stop us in the Long March. What do these little streams amount to? I don't give a damn."

This was no ordinary military march when we could wait for the most convenient moment to cross a stream. Time was important. With the enemy advancing on Pinghsingkuan it was essential for us to get to our destination quickly so that we could occupy favourable positions at the pass from which we would be able to give the Japanese bandits a fatal blow.

We remembered the confusion of the retreating Kuomintang troops and we were afraid that the enemy might get there before we did and quickly capture the pass. There was no time to hesitate.

"Brace yourselves! Let's cross."

The men slung their rifles and bullet pouches on their shoulders. The stream was quickly filled with soldiers who formed a strong chain clutching each other tightly. Many held on to the horses' tails. It was September and frost had already set in. The water was biting cold. I felt a shudder go through my horse as it entered the water. The men, their drenched uniforms clinging to their bodies, were silently braving the torrents. All in all we forded more than twenty streams. We were soaked through and through, our teeth were chattering and my body was numb.

When at last we arrived at our destination, the rain had stopped. The first hint of dawn filtered through the clouds. Then I noticed the effect the rainstorm had wrought on the soldiers. They all had pale, greyish faces and purplish lips. Some were covered with mud from head to foot, making it impossible to clearly distinguish their features. The troops rested in the valley south of the highway. The sky was still overcast and although the wind was biting cold, fires were strictly prohibited. Our men could do nothing but grit their teeth and endure all the suffering.

The next morning gun-fire from the direction of Pinghsing-kuan became fiercer and louder. Deputy Regiment Commander Yang Yung and I went to have a look at things at the front-line command post which was installed behind a slope on the edge of a wheat field. The highway ran in front of it and there were ridges on either side. Looking through our binoculars, we noticed that the leaves on the mountains on both sides were quivering slightly. It might be the autumn wind rustling the leaves, or it might be that our soldiers, hiding there in camouflage, were shivering with cold as they crouched on the wet ground or behind cold rocks. We couldn't distinguish the men from the plants. We knew that hundreds of men were there, eager to make contact with the enemy. For that purpose they would withstand any hardship and make no complaints. They were now enduring cold and hunger, waiting for the battle to start. I put down my field glasses and said to Comrade Yang Yung:

"Things are in pretty good shape. Our men are well concealed."

"Hunting is difficult. Although the enemy is cunning, we are not fools either," Comrade Yang Yung remarked humorously.

At the foot of the mountain where our soliders were hiding were several patches of wheat fields. The wheat had turned yellow and now waved in the wind. A little farther on was the highway which was littered with dung and marked with the footprints of troops who had passed. North of the highway was a mountain three or four hundred metres high, bare of

any vegetation except a patch of grass covering its crest. Halfway up the mountain a small temple was perched, the old Laoyehmiao. This mountain occupied a strategic position north of the highway, dominating it from both ends. It was a pity that we had neither the time nor possibility of putting a force there. We would have to wait for the fighting to begin before we could take it. If the enemy should get there before we did it would put us in a very disadvantageous position.

The telephone lines connecting us with battalion headquarters were ready. I phoned and asked if the battalions were well covered. They said everything was fine and in answer to my question about the morale of the soldiers, they replied: "It couldn't be better! They've had their bayonets fixed for a long time." The commander of the Fifth Company was Tseng Hsien-sheng. I don't quite remember his face, but I could never forget his resoluteness. He clicked his bayonet into place and said to his men: "We've got to win this battle even if it means making the supreme sacrifice. First of all, I myself am determined to fight and die for the just cause. I know each and every one of you shares this determination." The soldiers answered in chorus: "Company Commander, don't worry. To die in action is glorious; to be a slave of the Japanese is infamy!"

The distant drone of motors was heard from the canyon. A fleet of vehicles carrying Japanese troops and military supplies was moving up toward Pinghsingkuan. Someone was counting in a low voice: "One, two . . . fifty . . . sixty . . . a hundred." Following the lorries were more than two hundred animal-drawn carts and mules and horses were drawing large-calibre guns. Behind them was the cavalry. Vehicles and animals were stretched in an unbroken line. With cars honking and hoofs clanging they were a very imposing sight indeed. The Japanese troops riding on horseback or sitting in the lorries wore leather boots, steel helmets and woollen overcoats. They had rifles slung diagonally across their shoulders. They were quite at ease, talking and laughing. Some were eating while others were whipping the pressganged porters. The sight of those arrogant villains passing so close to us made our men burn

with anger and hatred. They kept their eyes fixed on the enemy and their jaws were clenched as they held their grenades ready.

The slimy, black mire was ankle-deep at some places on the highway. Some lorries were coming from the direction of Pinghsingkuan, possibly because of difficulties on the road. The section between Hsingchuang and Laoyehmiao became clogged with scores of lorries. The oncoming troops were soon bogged down. Men and horses and lorries were all held up by the congestion. It was an ideal moment for us to attack. I grabbed the phone and asked the look-out post:

"Hello, are all the enemy troops in the trap?"

"No more are visible on the highway to Lingchiu."

In that case this was the tail end of the Itagaki Division. I put the phone back on the hook and immediately sent a messenger to get instructions from Division Commander Lin.

Just after he left, the enemy suddenly opened fire on the ridges on either side of the road. Comrade Yang Yung and I exchanged a glance of surprise. What had happened? Could the enemy have discovered us? They had been advancing without hesitation, but since they were using their weapons to search for us they must know we were there. What should we do? The messenger had not returned yet. In order not to give the enemy time to prepare, nor to let the opportunity slip by, I decided to attack at once. I again inquired of the lookout post to make certain:

"Are you sure there are no more troops behind?"

"No more."

The messenger came running back from division headquarters. Panting with excitement, he transmitted the division commander's order. Before he finished, I hurriedly picked up the phone and issued an order to the First Battalion, which had been assigned as the advance unit:

"Attack, comrades! Fire!"

The moment the fighters had long awaited had come at last. The ridges south of the highway roared and rocked under the impact of the explosion of hand-grenades, trench mortars, and the rat-tat-tat of machine-guns. The enemy who cluttered

the highway went down in large numbers. One lorry coming from Pinghsingkuan caught fire, others collided. I was staring intently at the scene on the highway through my field glasses when the messenger who had come back from division headquarters called out loudly:

"Regiment Commander! Regiment Commander!"

"What is it?"

"The division commander wants to see you."

"The division commander? All right, I'm coming."

If the division commander had asked me to come at such a moment he must have very important instructions. Division headquarters was on the slope of the hill, behind our right flank, not far away. I ran through the wheat field quickly. I found the division commander, a raincoat slung over his shoulders, intently watching the battle. I saluted, rapped out my report and told him briefly about the present condition of our regiment. He gave me the overall situation, again emphasizing the important task assigned to my regiment. Then pointing to the highway he said:

"You see the enemy is very stubborn."

The enemy troops were trying to entrench themselves in favourable positions. Some sought cover under the lorries. They were putting up a stubborn resistance.

The division commander continued, "We have encircled one enemy brigade of over four thousand men, but one big group is hard to tackle. We have to cut it up into several sections. Your men should cross the highway and divide the enemy at that point, then use one battalion to take Laoyehmiao. Once we have taken that commanding point, we can easily annihilate the enemy down there."

"Look! The Japanese bandits are crawling up toward Laoyehmiao!" I exclaimed, pointing to the gully.

"They don't need the knoll. They are just moving out of desperation, however, you have to act promptly. We can't afford to waste time." The division commander gave me brief instructions. Looking at me intently, he asked, "Is that clear?"

"Yes, very clear."

"All right, go now." He swept his hand round sharply and

added, "Give it to them hard! This must be a fatal blow!"

When I got back to the command post, all ten *li* of the gully were rattling and crackling with gun-fire. The 685th Regiment on the left flank had started an assault. In order to strengthen the company command and to ensure correct and effective execution of the orders, it was arranged that Deputy Regiment Commander Yang Yung and other commanders should go down to the companies while I would stay at the regiment command post to take charge of the overall fighting. When they left, I immediately ordered the Third Battalion, which was stationed on a ridge on the right flank, to storm Laoyehmiao.

Suddenly the earth trembled and shook. The air was rent with battle cries. Our soldiers were bravely charging down the highway and the enemy scattered and ran wildly. Frightened horses neighed madly.

But the Japanese proved to be a formidable foe. They showed no inclination to quit. Their shooting was quite accurate. Despite heavy casualties, they remained in the ditches and depressions of the road, or behind lorries, making a stubborn stand. Their bullets kept whizzing over our heads. I was furious. I looked through my field glasses and saw that the wheat stalks were being mowed down by the enemy's fire. It was clear that their fire-power was superior to ours. The fighters who had sprinted forward fell one after another. Yet the great battle cries of "Charge!" "Kill!" were constantly heard. They charged forward, following in the steps of their fallen comrades. Although no officer complained over the phone, I could clearly see that the enemy was very ferocious, very stubborn. No wonder the Kuomintang troops had become so frightened.

Our casualties were mounting continually, but we had yet to reach the highway. Some of the enemy soldiers had progressed half way up the ridge. They had taken Laoyehmiao! We would be placed in a very unfavourable position if we didn't act fast.

How sad for a commander to see his men going down one after another. But I knew that the people throughout the nation were watching us. "To die in action is glorious; to be a

slave of the Japanese is infamy!" — this honourable and sacred oath of our fighters was echoing in my ears. Yes, we had to make sacrifices for the survival of the people. I bit my lips and ordered:

"Third Battalion Commander, charge at all costs! Once you reach the highway, things will take a different turn."

"Yes, we will accomplish the task at all costs."

"What is your guarantee?"

"My own life. I won't come back to see you if I fail to carry out the mission!"

"No. I want you to take Laoyehmiao!"

I immediately ordered the companies on the flanks to intensify their attack to draw the enemy fire so as to give the troops at the front a chance to charge down the road.

The valley was shrouded in smoke and the din of gunfire and explosions was deafening. Our men were dashing through the dust and smoke, running, crawling and rolling forward. In the wheat fields our men had paved the way for the final thrust with their blood. At last they made it, and a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy ensued. Rifle butts swinging, swords flashing, bayonets red with blood . . . Shouts, shots and explosions created a confused din.

In about half an hour, the Japanese soldiers were driven to take shelter beneath the lorries. We didn't know that the right thing for us to do at that time was to burn the lorries to deprive them of their shelter. We took the Japanese bandits for the enemy we had fought in the civil war. We thought that if we pressed them hard, they would surrender. Our men shouted to the Japanese soldiers:

"Put down your arms! We won't kill you!"

Not only did they not understand what we said for of course we shouted in Chinese, but they were a batch of beasts who had been trained in the code of the Bushido. They were instilled with the idea of conquering China, slaughtering the Chinese people and exploiting them.

As our soldiers had had no previous experience fighting the Japanese, many were killed or wounded by those desperate fiends. I remember a telephone operator of the First Battalion

who was going along the highway examining the telephone lines when he saw a dying Japanese soldier lying beside a lorry. He ran up to him and said: "Give up your weapon; we won't kill you. We give magnanimous treatment to prisoners of . . ."

Before he had finished, the Japanese raised his hand and thrust the bayonet into the telephone operator's chest.

One comrade carrying back a seriously wounded Japanese soldier had his ear bitten off. Some comrades were killed or wounded while trying to bandage wounded Japanese soldiers.

Because of the savagery and haughtiness of the enemy, the fighting had, from the very beginning, been extremely fierce. Even the wounded fought each other like devils until one was killed or both were locked in a death embrace.

The casualties of the Third Battalion were very heavy. I was told that after the enemy's motorized infantry and cavalry were cut into sections, almost all the officers of the Ninth Company died; only a dozen people or so survived. I asked the commander of the Third Battalion:

"How are you doing? Can you carry on?"

"Sure. We didn't suffer too many casualties. We definitely can carry out our mission."

No commander ever wanted to mention casualties in his report for fear the leadership might not entrust him with difficult tasks.

Fierce fighting continued.

Exactly as Division Commander Lin had predicted, the enemy didn't understand the tactics of mountain warfare. Save for a small group of Japanese still holding out at Laoyehmiao, all the rest remained on the highway where there was no place to take cover. After getting past the highway, we rushed straight toward Laoyehmiao. Despite the fact that we were attacked both from above and below and the mountain-side was steep, our soldiers managed to climb up. Nevertheless they were continually getting wounded or killed, rolling down the mountainside. The commander of the Third Battalion was also wounded. But with the help of the Second Battalion, the Third Battalion finally succeeded in occupying the strategic height at Laoyehmiao.

We attacked the highway from the Laoyehmiao which dominated it from both sides. The enemy troops were fully exposed to our raking fire. They finally understood what mountain warfare meant. Their commanders, realizing their mistake, waved their sabres and shouted curses and orders, directing their men to scale the barren summit. Now the enemy's guns and cavalry were climbing up helter-skelter. We trained our guns on them and waited. When they were quite close gasping heavily for breath, the order of "Fire!" was given.

The beasts who had just climbed up were driven down. In a short while, the enemy regrouped for renewed action. The command post of our regiment had already moved to a slope north of the highway. From there I could see at least five or six hundred enemy soldiers. Enemy planes were hovering right over our heads. The situation was still very serious. Comrade Yang Yung had also been wounded. If the other regiment posted on our left flank couldn't get up quickly, we would have another hand-to-hand struggle with the Japanese.

"Regiment Commander, look, aeroplanes!" One of the staff members was getting a little nervous.

"Calm down! Their own troops are too close to us. They won't dare drop bombs."

More and more enemy troops were edging closer to us, firing desperately as they went.

"What shall we do?" I reflected for a moment. "We'll fight to the last man!"

Despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy troops, they could not avoid the fate prepared for them by Division Commander Lin. I firmly believed our troops on the left flank would come up soon, so I told my men: "We must hold out at all costs until the last bullet and the last man!"

We stood firm before the enemy onslaughts until about one o'clock in the afternoon. The 687th Regiment arrived at last. I noticed a faltering in the rear of the enemy line. I instantly knew the time had come. I ordered my troops to close in for the kill. We set upon the Japanese from both directions and succeeded in completely annihilating them along the mountain ravine from Hsing-chuang to Laoyehmiao.

When the whole valley was under our control, I carried out Division Commander Lin's instructions, ordering some of my men to initiate an assault in the direction of Tungpaochih, where about two or three thousand enemy troops were stationed. As originally arranged, they should be the target of attack for the Kuomintang forces. The enemy was now holding the Tungpaochih height. We and the 685th Regiment on the left closed the encirclement of the enemy troops there. The Great Wall and Pinghsingkuan, like a tiger squatting in the mountains, could be seen clearly without the aid of field glasses. There was intermittent gunfire, and the Kuomintang troops were vaguely visible. We were enraged when we saw that they had not carried out the attack to co-ordinate with our action as planned. Our ranks had rapidly thinned. Tseng Hsien-sheng, commander of the Fifth Company, had been killed in action; the political instructor was wounded. Only thirty-odd men were left in that company. All our platoons and squads were very badly depleted. We reorganized the combat units, but we did not stop our drive. We fought the enemy for another night. The soldiers had had nothing to eat or drink. Some of the wounded went into battle again as soon as they received first-aid treatment. We succeeded in exhausting the enemy by our persistent attacks. They rushed here and there, trying to break through our encirclement to get away, but the Kuomintang troops, whom we could see clearly, were still not in action. They didn't lift a finger.

That day the enemy planes continually strafed and bombed our positions. The enemy's attempt to break through the encirclement became more vigorous. In the afternoon new enemy reinforcements were sent up. We were ordered to burn the lorries on the highway, withdraw from the battlefields and shift our position to the south of the highway.

Scanning the battlefields, you could see that the gully stretching for about ten *li* in length was littered with "Imperial Army" bodies, dead horses, carts and lorries. The road was spattered with blood and several thousand disfigured Japanese bodies were lying about. They had got what they richly deserved. The Twenty-first Japanese Brigade had suffered a

fatal defeat. The Japanese aggressors experienced the might of the Chinese people for the first time.

The villagers in the vicinity, hearing that we had defeated the Japanese, came to lend a hand. They helped take the wounded down on stretchers and carry the trophy away. They worked with gusto for more than two days.

Blazing fires were burning high into the sky for many li along the highway. The lorries were burning. In the east firing could still be heard. Our units were there holding up enemy reinforcements. When we passed the highway, our soldiers were muttering, unable to hide their anger.

"Those confounded Kuomintang soldiers never came."

"Don't talk about them! The Imperial Army has scared the daylight out of them."

When I trod on the battered rifles and the torn flags with the "rising sun" and stepped over Japanese corpses strewn about the fields, I thought: "So this is the so-called invincible 'Imperial Army!'"

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UNDER THE COMMAND OF COMRADE LIN PIAO

*—A Battle of Annihilation Fought
in the Northeast Theatre of War*

by Li Tso-p'eng

On October 1, 1946, the Nationalist and Communist sides signed an armistice agreement and it appeared that the civil war would come to a standstill.

At that time we had just arrived in the Northeast and still had no base area. After the battle of interception fought along the Shanhaikuan-Heishan section of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, we had moved to an area north of Shenyang. The field command of the Northeast Democratic Allied Force had been moved to Fak'u.

Taking advantage of the fact that our forces had not firmly established themselves in the Northeast, Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang vainly attempted to compel our forces to stay clear of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway so that he could press forward to occupy the Northeast. After the enemy forces occupied Chinchow and Heishan, they continued with their attack along the Peiping-Liaoning line and occupied Changwu, Fouhsin, T'aian, Liaochung and other places one after another.

The situation at that time was grave and complicated. The enemy forces were Chiang Kai-shek's crack troops equipped with American arms. With an army as the unit, they pushed forward step by step, and took and occupied strongholds and lines as well as the town and cities on their two flanks. Our forces came from different places far away. Having fought continuously, they were very tired. The decimated forces had not been reinforced and there was no improvement in the supply of arms. It was very cold, but there was no warm clothing nor were there base areas. Everywhere were bandits and the

"underground forces" of the Kuomintang. People of all walks of life in society also adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward us, and under the heavy pressure of all kinds of reactionary forces, the basic masses were unable to rise.

In the light of this situation and in accordance with the instructions of the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao, Commander-in-Chief Lin clearly proposed with foresight the three-point strategic policy known to everybody — "waiting, exercising forbearance and be fierce." What were we "waiting for?" We waited for the enemy forces to stretch their battle line, to disperse their forces and to expose their vulnerable spots. We waited for the mobilization of the masses, the extermination of the bandits and the establishment of organs of political power and base areas. We forbore the temporary loss of some communication lines, big cities and areas. The enemy wanted the communication lines but we wanted the broad countryside. While the enemy occupied the big cities, we occupied the medium and small cities. The enemies were allowed to take on as many burdens as possible, and the more places they occupied, the more dispersed their forces would be, and there would be plenty of empty space like a child in the garment of an adult. By the time the vulnerable spots of the enemy were exposed, our forces would also have grown strong. Backed by our base areas, it would be time for us to become "fierce." We would fiercely attack and annihilate the enemy forces with concentrated forces.

Guided by this strategy, apart from keeping some of our main forces at the front to engage the enemy, we dispersed the rest of our forces at that time to East Manchuria, West Manchuria and North Manchuria to carry out the tasks of exterminating the bandits, mobilizing the masses and establishing base areas.

Commander-in-Chief Lin sat day and night in front of the military map to judge conditions and ponder over the disposition of troops for battle and the establishment of base areas. As his Chief of the General Staff Office at the front, I stayed constantly by his side. He worked meditatively and in deep concentration. Sometimes, when I went to ask him for

PART V: LIN PIAO AS I REMEMBERED HIM

instruction, although I stood in his room for tens of minutes, he seemed to be unaware of my presence. I did not disturb him, but just withdrew quietly or left him a memorandum.

Having discovered the dispersal of our main forces, the enemies became even more frenzied, and they even dared to leave their strongholds with the regiment as unit to expand outward.

When the enemy forces moved to occupy Changwu and T'aian, Commander-in-Chief Lin decided to concentrate the mobile forces in front to strike in the direction of Hsinmin and Tahushan to attack the flanks and rear of the enemy. He told us: "Chiang Kai-shek conspires to talk peace inside Shanhaikuan and fight on a large scale outside it. He wants to occupy the Northeast first and China Proper later. We must have no illusion for any peace or armistice."

The enemy forces frenziedly advanced for days in succession. One battalion of the 265th Regiment of the 89th Division of the 13th Army of the enemy thrust forth from Changwu, occupied Hsiushuihotzu west of Fak'u and also attempted to invade Fak'u. On the 11th, the 266th Regiment of the 13th Army of the enemy also moved far away from the main forces and advanced from Tahushan to Hsiushuihotzu. On that day, a villager from Hsiushuihotzu came to see us. He was a robust young peasant wearing an old green cotton-padded coat. His information was very accurate and he told us many things about the Chiang troops at Hsiushuihotzu. It appeared that he had taken some trouble to observe and analyse things. Stirring with indignation, he spoke with sparkling eyes and saliva flying in every direction. It was more correct to say that he was filing a complaint against the enemy.

"Those of the Central Army are rotten to the core! They are as unreasonable as the devils. They are presently laying their hands on men, carts, grain. . ."

"How many?"

"Every household in the whole village is packed with them."

"Have you seen anything else?"

"Yes, there are more than twenty strange things and I don't know what they are." He tried to describe them.

"Probably they are tanks."

"They don't look like tanks. I have seen tanks."

"Motor vehicles?"

"They don't look like motor vehicles either. They are much bigger. They roar like aeroplanes and have more wheels than motor vehicles."

"What are they then?" I was truly confused. Later, we knew that they were the U.S.-made trucks with ten wheels.

It appeared that the enemies were truly most audacious and that their troops were about to come to Fak'u. We brought the information about the enemy to Commander-in-Chief Lin. He stood by the side of the map, pondered for a while and said joyfully:

"This is too good! The meat has been put on the chopping board. This good opportunity is the desired object which we have failed to get so far!"

He looked extraordinarily calm, and the anxiety and fatigue which had weighed him down in the past few days completely disappeared because of the excitement. Seeing that I stared at him in bewilderment, he pointed at the map and said:

"Look! The enemy has stretched out his fist and is dispersed. This enemy group is more than one day's march from the main force. Furthermore, the forces that are delivered to us are neither too big nor too small. They comprise about five battalions which are ideal for our appetite. I am confident that we can wipe them out!"

He arrested his excitement, stared at the map and pondered for a while. He looked at me and said emotionally:

"We cannot turn down a gift which the enemy has delivered to our door. Write a telegram and tell the troops to get ready for action!"

He immediately changed the plan to launch an attack in the direction of Hsinmin and Tahushan. He jubilantly flung a small bag of soya beans on the table, pointed at it and said: "Like to have some soya beans?"

Commander-in-Chief Lin neither smoked nor drank. When those under him called on him, he always showed his hospitality

by offering them some soya beans. He was physically weak at that time and was susceptible to colds. It was said that soya beans were good for this illness. Because of this, he always kept some soya beans by his side. In order not to offend him, I took a few soya beans as usual and chewed them.

Commander-in-Chief Lin paced the floor with excitement and was deep in thought. After that he turned his back to the map and instructed me:

"If the enemy forces continue with their reckless advance toward Fak'u, we may use a small force to put up a frontal interception, but our main forces should attack from the flanks and rear of the enemy forces before encircling them." Pointing with a pencil at the pre-determined point of action on the map, he said: "Another method is to encircle the enemy forces first and attack them afterward should they hold at Hsiushuihotzu." Following this, he pointed out: "The enemy forces are better equipped than we are. When we attack, we must be brave and must also be mindful of our tactics. The cadres of the lower ranks should especially be told to employ the 'one-point-two-areas and three-three tactics!' " *

With everything properly arranged, I accompanied him to the 7th Brigade. There he personally addressed the cadres of the battalion level and above, preparing them for battle. He also decided that I should stay behind to direct operations in conjunction with the commanders of the 7th Brigade and 1st Division. Before he departed for the headquarters, he again and again enjoined me:

"Don't underestimate the enemy. You must resort to the right tactics and be well prepared to the fullest extent. You must never let the enemies escape, nor should you fight a battle to scatter the enemies."

Our troops went into action that day.

At that time, the vanguard forces of the enemy had advanced to T'uanshantsuitzu 30 *li* east of Hsiushuihotzu and 40 *li* away from Fak'u. On the same day our 7th Brigade also had advanced to Tahsiaofangshen, Wut'aitzu and other places in between T'uanshantsuitzu and Fak'u, and was right in front of the spearhead of the advancing enemy. The 1st Division also

drew close to the north of Hsiushuihotzu. We planned to fight according to Commander-in-Chief Lin's first plan. However, according to the finding of our scouts, the main forces of the enemy remained at Hsiushuihotzu and were building works there. It appeared unlikely that the enemy forces would make a venturesome advance toward Fak'u. The enemy forces that had made adventuresome advance to T'uanshantsuitzu also appeared to intend to flee. We planned to swallow up this group of enemies first and at the same time to encircle Hsiushuihotzu. That evening, the 7th Brigade was ordered to pounce upon the enemies at T'uanshantsuitzu, but after a slight contact in battle, the enemies pulled back. The 7th Brigade gave pursuit, and after one night of fighting, it joined forces with the 1st Division and encircled all of the enemies at Hsiushuihotzu.

Hsiushuihotzu was a village-town with several hundred households located along the Changwu-Fak'u highway which divided the town's street into two halves. The area was flat to the southeast but undulatory to the northwest. The northern and western hills were the heights at Hsiushuihotzu. To the east of Hsiushuihotzu was a small river which was ice-bound and covered with snow. Having examined the topography, we decided that the 7th Brigade should attack from the southeast and the south, while the 1st Division should attack from the northwest and the north. The tactics of diagonal attack was adopted, and it was planned to launch the attack with a bang that evening.

Seeing that they had been heavily encircled, however, the enemies suddenly struck out from Pachiatzu at about 1 p.m. in an attempt to undermine our disposition for attack. The 7th Brigade counter-attacked tenaciously and after four hours of fighting, the enemies were driven back.

With the approach of darkness the time set for the attack also arrived. But we discovered that the striking power of the enemies was quite strong. From a few prisoners of war captured by the 1st Division, we gained some concrete information in regard to the firing power, equipment and works of the enemies. We felt that our preparations were still rather skimpy and

there was no certainty that the enemies could be entirely wiped out. It was decided to change the date of attack to the 13th, and Commander-in-Chief Lin was informed of this decision by telephone. He instructed us saying:

"The enemies must be encircled but must not be pressed too hard. If they are pressed too hard, they could break through the encirclement and run away, and their reinforcements might also come faster."

This instruction of Commander-in-Chief Lin's was extremely wise. Although the topography along the two banks of the river was very favourable for us to launch the attack, yet in order to make the enemies stay, the 1st Division pulled back three to five *li* and the 7th Brigade pulled out from the undulatory ground east of the river.

At about 3 p.m. on the 13th, Commander-in-Chief Lin came to the front command post. As soon as he arrived, he inquired about our preparedness for combat. Without stopping for a while to take a rest, he wanted to go and see for himself the topography of the spot for the breakthrough to take place. At that time, the two sides were continuously shooting at each other, and this was obviously fraught with danger. However, he always insisted on making a personal survey of the topography. In each battle, he always stressed that cadres must see the topography themselves, and he sternly criticised those commanders who studied the maps only without going right to the spot to make observation. He regarded this as fighting a "bureaucratic battle." Therefore, we were not free to stop him.

When I and the commander of the 7th Brigade accompanied Commander-in-Chief Lin through the positions of the 7th Brigade, the fighters on guard were squatting in temporary works constructed with snow. Braving the cold wind, they stayed by their guns and machine guns and fixed their sharp eyes on every movement of the enemies. Some were constructing works with snow. Some were smoking and chatting with each other. Some were stamping their feet to keep warm.

We walked to and fro from one position to another along the front. In exposed places, we had to creep along. We saw

before us a wide stretch of white snow. Bullets often splattered the snow beside us. Commander-in-Chief Lin calmly walked or crept along with us. Braving a few stray bullets, we crept to the southeast corner of the Hsiushui River and told Commander-in-Chief Lin:

"The 7th Brigade plans to make a breakthrough here."

Commander-in-Chief Lin sprawled on a broken wall, raised his field-glasses to scan the horizon, and was deep in thought. He said nothing, and we led him to the south to take a look. The place was higher there. Sprawling behind some graves, he again raised his field-glasses and concentrated. We watched him and quietly waited for his instruction. Suddenly, his face cleared and he said jubilantly: "This side is better than that side! The other side is too exposed." He put down his field-glasses and went on to say: "The main force of the 7th Brigade should move from the south to the north with a part moving from the southeast to the northeast. The main force of the 1st Division should move from the northwest to the southeast." He paused for a while and resumed: "In the disposition of the battle, it is definitely necessary to pay attention to keeping a sharp head and a long tail and concentrating our fire. At the beginning of the battle, we should fire violently and after that charge violently. This certainly will lead to success."

We revised our original operational plan according to his instruction.

On our way back, some fighters recognized Commander-in-Chief Lin. The news that "Commander-in-Chief Lin is here" immediately spread to all positions. Those fighters who had not seen him clearly asked each other in surprise:

"Ah, was the one who just came to look at the topography Commander-in-Chief Lin?"

"Aha! I have not seen him clearly!"

"Aiya! I have missed an opportunity!"

"Hey, I say we should fight better because we are under the command of Commander-in-Chief Lin himself!"

There was great excitement among the troops. The fighters challenged each other to make better use of Commander-in-

Chief Lin's "three-three tactics" to capture more prisoners and more guns.

Gradually darkness fell. At 5:30, we launched our attack. The mountain guns roared and the violent chattering of the machine guns was crisper to the ears. Hsiushuihotzu was bedecked with red and green signal flares. The enemies also violently exchanged fire with us. The whole of Hsiushuihotzu was enveloped in the smoke of gunfire.

Commander-in-Chief Lin and the personnel of the front command post squatted on top of a hillock to the south of Hsiushuihotzu. Time and again, the bullets whizzed by close to us, and sometimes, they hit right before us. From the closely-clustered glints of muzzle blasts rising from the enemy side, it could be seen that the enemies, who were equipped with U.S.-made arms and had never been hit, were jauntily ferocious in the extreme. They relied on their emplacements and superior firepower to offer tenacious resistance.

The fighters flitted busily on the snow-covered ground, and the stretcher-bearers also carried a stream of wounded personnel past us. A hard-fought battle was underway.

In the unsullied moonlight, the snow-covered fields gleamed as though plated with silver. The flickering shadows tens of metres away could be seen. Such a moonlit night was our best time for fighting. Commander-in-Chief Lin remarked with feeling: "It is more favourable for us to attack at night than in day time since the enemies we are fighting against are equipped with U.S.-made arms and have so strong a fire-power. It is especially convenient to give command and to bring the power of fighting at close quarters into play in a moonlit night."

It was very cold deep in the night. The cold wind whipped at our faces and noses, and our hands and feet seemed to have been cut by a knife. Commander-in-Chief Lin occasionally wrapped his black overcoat tighter around his body and stamped his feet to keep warm. He fixed his gaze on the whole battlefield.

Numerous illuminating flares rose into the sky and the place was as bright as in daylight. We could see our fighters

leaping forward on the snow-covered ground in scattered formations of the "three-three system." They sometimes lay low and sometimes leaped forward. The sparks danced around them. Suddenly, the guns roared spurting flames all over the positions. The houses in the peripheral village of Hsiushuihotzu suddenly burned fiercely, and we vaguely saw some fighters falling in the fire and rolling on the snow-covered ground. The personnel of the command post were tense and Commander-in-Chief Lin asked anxiously:

"What sort of gun was that?"

"Can it be a bazooka?"

We had heard of the bazooka of the United States but had never seen one. Nobody could therefore give a definite answer. Commander-in-Chief Lin was particular about comprehending and handling problems at the right time. He told me:

"Tso-p'eng! Fetch a prisoner and ask him."

The prisoner was an infantryman. His face was covered with dirt. Dressed in the American type of uniform, he wore a cap askew and a leather jacket. He looked every inch like a monkey. We could tell that he was a veteran from the way he looked. Somewhat arrogant, he stood in front of us with shoulders hunched and looked questioningly at us. I asked:

"Which unit do you belong to?"

"The 266th Regiment."

"What guns are you equipped with?"

"60-mm guns, bazookas, strategic defense guns, heavy mortars. . ."

At that time, the enemies fired again, and a fire was started more than 100 metres away. The prisoner smugly pointed at the fire and said:

"That was an incendiary shell fired from a heavy mortar."

Some people might perhaps laugh at our ignorance for knowing not even the incendiary shell. We now also deem this to be ludicrous, but we really did not know at that time. Shells flew like shuttles across the sky above Hsiushuihotzu. The red and green flares dance like coloured meteors, and with the illuminating flares and incendiary shells added, it simply looked

like a display of fireworks in the evening of National Day.

Having cleared things up and learned that they were incendiary shells, we were more at ease. The troops were told not to make use of houses to avoid getting burned.

The breakthrough was carried out more smoothly by the 7th Brigade, and it was heading toward the street. We anxiously waited for the 1st Division to signal the success of their breakthrough.

Commander-in-Chief Lin repeatedly ordered the 7th Brigade to step up its attack and exert greater pressure on the enemies so as to disperse their troops and fire-power in aid of the attack of the 1st Division from the northern side.

The 1st Division heroically captured the northern hill, but because the 1st Regiment storming the western hill was careless with the survey of the topography and unleashed its fire too early, the enemies defending the western hill had made preparations for defense, thus increasing the resistance to the breakthrough. They fought tenaciously and consecutively organized five shock attacks. At 10 p.m., the 7th Brigade fought its way to the centre of the street and came close to the regimental headquarters of the enemies. The whole battle entered the stage of fierce street fighting.

Fighting was most violent at about one o'clock. Suddenly, violent firing was heard from the southwest side of Hsiushuihotzu. Our scouts reported that the enemies' 2nd Division of the 52nd Army was rushing reinforcements from Tahushan, and these reinforcements had advanced to T'aip'ingchuang and were no more than ten *li* from Hsiushuihotzu. The situation became tense, and Commander-in-Chief Lin promptly ordered the 7th Brigade and the 1st Defense Brigade each to release one regiment to intercept the reinforcements.

Hearing that reinforcements were on the way, the enemies fighting in the street struggled even more ferociously. The enemy reinforcements also knew that the troops of their side at Hsiushuihotzu were fighting tenaciously, and they intensified their attack. This made us somewhat anxious. Some commanders kept asking over the telephone: "Seeing that fighting is so violent in the rear, how far are the reinforcements actually?"

Commander-in-Chief Lin quietly and calmly told them:

"You don't have to worry about the rear, and all units should speed up their attack!"

Commander-in-Chief was much brighter than we were. He had calculated that we had enough forces for annihilating the enemies and blocking their reinforcements. But he knew that if the battle were not over before dawn, the enemy reinforcements would draw close. He therefore ordered:

"The issue must be settled before dawn!"

The front command post was located between Hsiushui-hotzu and the enemy reinforcements, and we were sandwiched in between firing and the fires on the two sides. The bullets often whizzed over our heads. We had some anxiety for the safety of Commander-in-Chief Lin, but he worried not a bit, and he strolled slowly on the snow-covered ground. We all hoped to shift the command post to some other place, but he said repeatedly: "Never mind, wait and see."

Commander-in-Chief Lin knew the danger of the place, and furthermore, it was bitterly cold on the hill-top. But he had more things to consider and he had a greater sense of responsibility. Fearing that we would pester him further, he bluntly told us: "Should we move at this juncture, the determination of the troops to press on with the attack would be affected."

This was truly most important, and we could only remain reticent.

Commander-in-Chief Lin squatted constantly on the snow-covered hill, and he insisted on directing the battle amidst whizzing bullets. He did not move over to a small village until complete victory was assured. When he walked into the house, we could not help from laughing when we looked at him because frost had formed on his hair, eye-brows and beard.

The battle gradually drew to the end, and after the last enemy attempt to make a breakthrough was crushed by the 3rd Regiment of the 1st Division, fighting concluded at dawn.

I accompanied Commander-in-Chief Lin to the street. The accumulated snow had been blackened by gunfire and stained red with blood. Smoke still belched forth from the

burning houses. Strewn everywhere were U.S.-made shells, ammunition boxes bearing the mark of USA, U.S.-made rifles, uniforms, caps, automobiles, big guns, enemy corpses . . .

Commander-in-Chief Lin greeted the fighters who had fought the pitched battle in the night saying: "Comrades, you have fought hard!" "You fought tenaciously and brilliantly! You have done another deed of merit for the people!"

The fighters formed a ring around him. They warmly fixed their eyes on Commander-in-Chief Lin who stayed with them under whatever circumstances and enthusiastically applauded and cheered him.

At that time, the reports of guns still came from all directions. Since so many nice new weapons were captured, the fighters all wanted to fire a few rounds from them. Seeing this, Commander-in-Chief Lin sternly instructed: "Notify all units at once that firing at random is prohibited." At that time, the enemy reinforcements in the south were still fighting violently. The reason that Commander-in-Chief Lin ordered his troops to desist from testing their guns was that when the enemy reinforcements found out everything was quiet on this side, they would wisely pull back.

We came to a small house and found that all the leading cadres of the 7th Brigade and the 1st Division were there. Commander-in-Chief Lin was very pleased to see them. He produced a few small bags of soya beans and said: "Have some soya beans?" He then analysed the Hsiushuihotzu battle of annihilation: "This battle is of very great significance. It has dealt a heavy blow to the frenzied arrogance of the enemies and boosted the confidence of our troops in victory over the enemies equipped with U.S. weapons. It has set an example to fighting a battle of annihilation without fighting one to rout the enemies."

At that time, someone came to report that "the enemy reinforcements still continue with their attack at T'aip'ing-chuang."

Commander-in-Chief Lin thereupon told a staff officer: "Take a message for me."

The gist of the message was: We have captured all the men

and equipment of your vanguard force. If you want to continue with the advance, you will meet with the same fate. After the staff officer wrote the message, we asked Commander-in-Chief Lin for instruction: "Who should be sent to deliver this letter?"

"Send some prisoners back. They are the best eye-witnesses."

The sun rose gradually in the east, and the fighters were busy with cleaning up the battlefield and taking an inventory of the arms captured. Group after group of prisoners were sent off under escort. When the enemy reinforcements learned that their men at Hsiushuihotzu had truly been wiped out, they also called off their attack.

(From Peking *"Chung Kuo Ching Nien,"* No. 20, 1959)

Note:

"One-Point-Two-Areas Tactics" means using concentrated strength to break through the enemy battle front at one point at the time of attack, and after this, swiftly expanding the fruits of the battle by coordinating the frontal attack with roundabout encirclement, cutting apart and thrusting from the flanks. The "One Point Two Areas Tactics" is essentially tactics used in the battle of annihilation.

The "Three-Three system" is a tactics used in the organization of manpower for assault in a scattered way so as to cut down casualties. In the Chinese Communist army, one company is composed of three platoons, each platoon consists of three squads. Before a squad is committed to the field, it is divided into three combat groups with three to four men in each group. At the time of attack, the groups are taken as units, thus deploying the formation to reduce casualties. The attack will be carried by waves of fighters, who will rush forward to engage the enemy in hand-to-hand fightings.

Li Tso-p'eng, now serving as Political Commissar of the Chinese Communist Navy, is member of the Politburo as well as member of the 9th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

COMRADE LIN PIAO DURING THE WAR FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE NORTHEAST

by Chou Ch'ih-p'ing

During the great Liberation War, the Northeast theatre of war was one of the principal theatres of war in the whole country. In the period of more than two years, the Northeast People's Liberation Army (later called the 4th Field Army) liberated the whole of the Northeast, shattered Chiang Kai-shek's troops to pieces, and caused the latter to change commanders three times and lose one million men. Following this, the army marched southward, and together with its fraternal units, it liberated Peiping and Tientsin, crossed the Yangtze River, carried all before it and finally planted the red flag on Hainan Island. This army performed immortal feats of arms in the cause of liberating the fatherland. The performance of such immortal feats of arms was inseparable from the wise leadership of Chairman Mao and Party Central Committee and was also inseparable from the correct command of its commander Comrade Lin Piao.

History convincingly shows that our Commander-in-Chief Lin (people are accustomed to address Comrade Lin Piao intimately in this way) is Chairman Mao's best pupil as well as the outstanding political activist and military activist of Marxism-Leninism. In the stormy war years for the liberation of the Northeast, together with other leading comrades of the Northeast People's Liberation Army, he held high the great red banner of the thought of Mao Tse-tung and steadfastly led the people to victory. He strengthened the confidence of people in overcoming the storm with his steadfastness and he led people to land triumphantly on

the other shore with his wisdom.

During the Liberation War which lasted almost four years, I assumed leadership work first in the 1st Column and later in the 10th Column under the direct leadership of Commander-in-Chief Lin. As I had learned much from Commander-in-Chief Lin, I also had an opportunity to comprehend in a broad sense his character. Although a poor writer, I now extract some snips from my memory and put them together for the young comrades.

A TALK AT KIRIN

Those were stormy years.

In May 1946, Chiang Kai-shek was at his peak in frenziedly attacking the Northeast People's Liberation Army. After fighting heroically 33 days in defense of Szup'ingchieh, a strategic stronghold, our 1st Column was ordered to withdraw, and the armed force units on all fronts were also on the retreat. We retreated to the T'unghua-Linchiang area in South Manchuria, a narrow area close to Korea. We retreated a long way to the northern bank of the Sungari River....

Winter was long in the Northeast. It was already May, but the few leaves on the trees still shivered in the cold wind. The sky was gray in colour, and it was like a big stone slab resting on our heads. The fighters marched in formation through the street in a northeastern direction. The carts drawn by mules and horses were laden with goods. People were in a hurry and wore a grave look. I knew that we would soon pull out from Kirin. As I walked, my heart grew heavier.

Commander-in-Chief Lin was living in an old-style small house. Walking into his office, I saw numerous maps hanging

on the walls. Commander-in-Chief Lin, in khaki uniform, was concentrating on these maps. Everything looked very calm.

"You must be tired after the trip. Be seated and take a rest." Commander-in-Chief Lin stood up and greeted me with a smile. After inviting me to sit down, he walked to the wall to take down a cloth bag, and poured out some fried soya beans on a plate. He laughed and said: "I have nothing better to offer. Come and have some soya beans." I was impressed by Commander-in-Chief Lin's unhurried manner and the tranquility in the house, and without knowing why, I felt relaxed and less tense. I began to brief him on the movement of our troops. Our troops had retreated from Szup'ingchieh according to order and were on their way to the designated place. The withdrawal was very orderly, and the enemy got only an empty city but could not capture one of our wounded personnel.

Commander-in-Chief Lin carefully listened to my report and nodded occasionally to show his satisfaction. When I finished, he asked a few questions, and I answered them one by one. "The battle in defense of Szup'ingchieh was very well fought this time. We killed and wounded a large number of enemies. By finding out the strength of the Kuomintang forces on the one hand and delaying their time-table of attack on the other hand, we have completed our disposition." Commander-in-Chief Lin analyzed for me the current situation in a low voice but clearly and forcefully. "Following our withdrawal from Szup'ingchieh, Chiang Kai-shek will occupy the big cities. This is of no importance, and we can hand over all the cities south of the Sungari River to him." Startled, I raised my head. Seeing my expression, a smile flitted across his face. "Yes, he will be given all of them. The more cities he occupies, the heavier will be his burden. He has to defend all the cities under his occupation. With so many cities to defend, his forces will be decentralized and we can crush them one by one. Now since the cities are dragging his hind

legs, what are they if not burdens? Since he is willing to take them, we should hand him those burdens. The more the better, the heavier the better. When he is unable to move because of their weight, we'll come to swallow up his forces one by one." Commander-in-Chief Lin quickly put his two palms together and indicated that he was getting down to brass tacks.

"Oh, I see!" With the question completely cleared up, I suddenly saw the light and smiled understandingly.

Commander-in-Chief Lin meditated for a while, and under his heavy eye-brows his eyes were stern. He slowly said: "Our task is very arduous. The enemy is now much stronger than we are. We must be prepared for several years of strenuous struggle before we can defeat the enemy. We must teach our troops to overcome the lethargic thought of peace. We must be prepared to surmount difficulties and for a protracted struggle. There is plenty of electric power in the Northeast, but we must not rely on it. We must not polish rice with electric power, but should rely on mortar and pestle. We must not rely on the big industries of the Northeast, but must develop handicraft industries. We must be prepared to eat and sleep in the open and overcome the hard frost of the Northeast. But the most important thing is that there must be confidence in victory. The superiority of the enemy is a temporary one, and we certainly can change our weakness into strength. Not long afterward, we certainly can beat Chiang Kai-shek."

Commander-in-Chief Lin slightly raised his voice and sternly pointed out: "The most important task at present is to build stable base areas. We can never drift along. We must successfully consolidate our base areas north of the Sungari River. First wipe out the bandits and send tens of thousands of cadres to the countryside to carry out agrarian reform and swiftly mobilize the masses. The faster and more penetratingly the masses are mobilized, the better. In this way, we'll be

in a stronger position to fight against the Kuomintang." He repeatedly emphasized: "To wipe out the Kuomintang, there must be base areas. In order to build stable base areas, the masses must be mobilized to the full extent. Without the masses, we have nothing. The key to our success or failure lies in the mobilization of the masses." He also said: "Simultaneously with mobilizing the masses, it is necessary to strengthen ideological education in the army and go on to raise the fighting strength of our forces. Guerrilla warfare must be extensively developed in the rear of the enemy so as to create the situation of encircling the cities with the countryside. In the future, the guerrilla forces will fight in coordination with the main forces to counterattack the enemy and capture the cities."

Commander-in-Chief Lin's talk gave me unlimited confidence and strength. All of a sudden I seemed to have stood on a higher place and was therefore able to see farther. I felt that the several hundred thousand troops under the Chiang gang of bandits were nothing more than a crowd of wriggling ants. As I walked along the road by the side of the river, I found the evening breeze blowing from the river refreshing and invigorating beyond description.

At the conference of the Northeast Bureau held in August 1946, Commander-in-Chief Lin went further to make a clearcut judgment in respect of the development of the situation. He said: "The development of the war situation in the Northeast will mainly go through three stages. The first stage will see the enemy attacking and us assuming the mobile defensive and taking the initiative to pull out from some areas. The second stage will see the enemy slowing down his attack after capturing the cities, and us waiting for opportunities to wipe out the effective strength of the enemy in mobile warfare and beginning to launch a partial counter-offensive. The third stage will see us launching an all-out counter-attack, wiping out the effective strength of the enemy on a large scale, isolating the enemy remnants

in a few spots and lines and finally wiping them out.”

It was precisely as a result of his making concrete application of the ever-victorious great weapon — Mao Tse-tung thought — that Commander-in-Chief Lin was able to make such a clearcut judgment in respect of the situation in the Northeast and was convinced of victory.

About the situation in the whole country, Chairman Mao wisely pointed out: “We said then that Chiang Kai-shek’s superiority in military forces was only transient, a factor which could play only a temporary role, that U.S. imperialist aid was likewise a factor which could play only a temporary role, while the anti-popular character of Chiang Kai-shek’s war and the feelings of the people were factors that would play a constant role, and that in this respect the People’s Liberation Army was in a superior position. Patriotic, just and revolutionary in character, the war waged by the People’s Liberation Army was bound to win the support of the people of the whole country. That was the political foundation for victory over Chiang Kai-shek.”

It was also precisely in accordance with the military principle laid down by Chairman Mao—“Our chief target is to wipe out the effective strength of the enemy, but not to defend or capture places”—that our army made a strategic retreat. Facts proved that the development of the war situation in the Northeast entirely moved in the direction pointed out by Chairman Mao and was completely in accord with Commander-in-Chief Lin’s estimation. Although Chiang Kai-shek did all he could in the Northeast, yet at no time could he get away from the destiny Commander-in-Chief Lin pointed out for him. Up to the liberation of Shenyang on November 2, 1948, the trilogy “offensive, defensive and destruction” which he had played for two years was formally brought to an end.

It was also precisely because of his profound understanding of the thought of establishing base areas which

Chairman Mao emphasized all the time that Commander-in-Chief Lin paid great attention to the building of base areas. Facts also fully showed that this was the most fundamental question in subduing the enemy and winning victory. At a time the Kuomintang were laying siege to cities and seizing territory on a large scale, we devoted our main forces to building base areas in North Manchuria. Meanwhile, we persisted in waging guerrilla warfare in South Manchuria. By means of integrating mass mobilization with military suppression, we wiped out more than 200,000 bandits of the Chiang clique in about a year's time. Because of this, peace and order was never so stable before in North Manchuria and the people there lived and worked in peace. In this way, we didn't have to worry about our rear. We were free from the enemy on three sides and had the enemy to face on one side. We could advance and attack or pull back and assume the defensive.

Simultaneously with suppressing the bandits, we sent 15,000 cadres to the countryside. They responded to the call of the Northeast Bureau and Commander-in-Chief Lin by "removing their leather shoes, putting away their briefcases, wearing peasants' clothing and feeding on sorghum." They sincerely kept in close touch with the masses and whipped up a stormy agrarian reform movement. The peasant masses raised their class consciousness as never before. They smashed the orthodox thought and their illusions for Chiang Kai-shek, and more and more of them looked toward us with each passing day. They saw clearly the true look of Chiang Kai-shek and called him "Manchuria II." They warmly supported the Communist Party, and called Chairman Mao their saviour.

After the agrarian reform, under the slogan of "defending their homes and fields," the masses of the people whipped up a wave of enthusiasm for supporting the front, and the young people joined the army of their own accord. They regarded it a glory to join the Liberation Army, and the

wave of enthusiasm for putting on red clothing and riding on horses to send their sons to the army spread over the countryside, thus continuously transfusing new blood to the armed forces. The armed force units were constantly fully manned, and new units were continuously formed. By the fall of 1947, the Northeast People's Liberation Army was more than one million strong comprising 12 columns. As Commander-in-Chief Lin said: "We are waxing in strength."

On the contrary, the Kuomintang troops were on the wane like a burning candle. In 1948, the Chiang Kai-shek troops defending Changchun were not reinforced with men or supplies, and their "Commander-in-Chief" could only send them 100,00 vitamin pills—one pill for each man—as a token of "support." This was for a time regarded as a laughing-stock in our armed forces.

With the march of time, every step in the development of the situation testified to the complete correctness of Commander-in-Chief Lin's foresight. As I recalled what Commander-in-Chief Lin said in 1946, I could not help thinking with admiration: How farsighted our Commander-in-Chief Lin was!

WISE AND MANFUL GUIDANCE

Chairman Mao says: "The stage of the activities of military experts is built on objective material conditions, but on the strength of this stage, the military experts can direct many colourful, martial and heroic live shows." Commander-in-Chief Lin is precisely such a commander. In accordance with the instructions of the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao, in the course of fighting against the strong and powerful enemy, he has manifested his superb ability in controlling the changing development of war; he has manifested his proficiency in the art of guiding war.

The Liaohsi Campaign which was of decisive significance to the liberation of the Northeast was a most graphic demon-

stration. After our army launched the summer and autumn offensive in 1947 and the powerful offensive in the winter of 1947 and the spring of 1948, the Chiang troops were forced to fall back and defend a few big cities — Changchun, Shenyang and Chinchow — and more than ten small cities. There were 90,000 enemy defenders in Changchun, 100,000 enemy defenders in Chinchow and 100,000 enemy defenders in Shenyang — the den of the enemy. At that time, the main forces of our army were concentrated along the Changchun-Szup'ing line. The question before us was how to fight the next battle. People were generally of the view that it was more appropriate to attack Changchun first. This was because the main forces of our army were close to Changchun, and since the enemies in Changchun had been under siege for a long time, they had exhausted their supplies of food and ammunition, and were low in morale. By attacking Changchun, we were sure of victory. But what about attacking Chinchow first? At that time, it was generally thought that by taking this course of action, since the main forces of our army had to make a long march to the south and the enemy was waiting at his ease for a fatigued army, we could not be assured of victory. With the main forces marching to the south, our rear would be left unguarded, and the enemy defenders of Changchun and Shenyang would be able to break out from the siege. At the same time, with our army making a thrust into the middle section of the enemy's defense line, it was possible for us to be attacked from the front and the rear by the enemies inside and outside Shanhai-kuan. Therefore, it was much more difficult and complex as well as risky to attack first Chinchow than Changchun. But if Chinchow could be captured, the enemy would be placed in a bankrupt position. The whole of the Chiang army in the Northeast would fall apart and there was a possibility to wipe them out in toto and liberate the whole of the Northeast.

What decision did the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao make in respect of this key campaign bearing on the whole situation of the war in the Northeast? And how was this campaign directed by Commander-in-Chief Lin? Now,

the Party Central Committee, Chairman Mao and Commander-in-Chief Lin were deeply aware that the fighting power of the Chiang army on the verge of collapse was no longer as strong as it was in the past, and it was entirely possible for our forces, given effort, to capture Chinchow. By devoting a few units to tie down the enemy, we also certainly could prevent the enemy in Changchun and Shenyang from breaking out of the siege and could intercept the enemy reinforcements from beyond Shanhaikuan. Although to attack Chinchow first appeared to be a risky course, yet we were actually sure of victory and there was no danger in taking this risky course. Therefore, in accordance with the strategic plan and concrete instructions of the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao, Commander-in-Chief Lin concentrated his main forces to attack Chinchow first. From October 1, 1948 onward, the Liaohsi Campaign of historic significance was launched.

In the history of the Chinese revolutionary wars, the Liaohsi Campaign was a case in point as well as a miracle in the war history of China and other countries. The Liaohsi Campaign embraced three stages. The first stage comprised the battle to storm fortified Chinchow. The second stage was the Battle of Liaohsi. The third stage was the capture of Shenyang. The battle to storm fortified Chinchow began on October 14, 1948. After half a month of fierce fighting, we liberated Chinchow and wiped out in toto the 120,000 enemy defenders. As a result, we took the Northeast by the throat and completely cut off the road leading to beyond Shanhaikuan. The several hundred thousand enemies at Changchun and Shenyang thus became turtles in the urn. Cheng Tung-kuo surrendered unconditionally; Tseng Tse-sheng staged an uprising, and Changchun was liberated. A great victory was won at Liaohsi, and more than 100,000 men of Liao's Army Corps were completely wiped out. We gave pursuit in the flush of victory, carried all before us and captured Shenyang. Only seventeen days after the liberation of Chinchow, the whole of the Northeast was liberated.

PART V: LIN PIAO AS I REMEMBERED HIM

When fierce fighting was going on at Chinchow, Chiang Kai-shek was like an ant running on a heated pan. He went running around Peiping, Tientsin, Shenyang, Chinchow, Takuk'ou, Chinhuang Island and Hulu Island, and assumed command himself. It was said when our army liberated Chinchow, the old bandit was so plagued by over-anxiety that he spat blood.

It could be seen that by concentrating his forces to attack Chinchow first in accordance with the instruction of the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao, Commander-in-Chief Lin was dealing the enemy a mortal blow. This was a key battle that accelerated the liberation of the Northeast.

It was by no means fortuitous that Commander-in-Chief Lin was constantly able to win victory in fighting. His greatest virtue was that he knew the enemy as well as himself. As is known to everybody, "One who knows the enemy as well as himself can fight a hundred battle without disaster." But it is by no means easy to put this virtue in effect in the true sense. This is the principal dividing line between a wise commander and a commonplace commander. Because Commander-in-Chief Lin knew the enemy as well as himself, he knew when he should act and when he should stop. He saw through the enemy, and was so well informed that he even had concrete knowledge of the activities of an enemy battalion.

After the great victory of Kungchut'un in 1947, I went to the Harbin headquarters to attend a meeting. Commander-in-Chief Lin told me: "According to information from commanders at the front, one enemy battalion has slipped away and is holding out at the Hochia oil mill in Fak'u. Since the 28th Division of the 10th Column is close to this battalion, the former can be sent to wipe out the latter. I estimate that this will not take too long a time. What do you think?" Following this, he moved toward the map, pointed out the actual location of that battalion, and immediately issued an order for the encirclement and annihilation of the enemy.

battalion in question.

This was but an ordinary example. In point of fact, Commander-in-Chief Lin was always very careful. He knew where the enemies were, the number of the enemies, their fighting power, what they attempted to do, the big and small mountains and rivers, the terrains, customs and habits of a place as clearly as the palm of his hand. Every time he made a military move, he often transmitted such detailed and accurate information direct to the divisions, thus providing them with great facilities.

Commander-in-Chief Lin paid great attention to investigation and study, and he defined his own movement according to his deep understanding of the conditions of the enemy. He often said: "We must firmly oppose fighting a subjectivist battle, fighting a bureaucratic battle, fighting a rash battle. Fighting on the strength of subjective wish, one will inevitably bang and bruise one's head and suffer defeat in battle." However, he also explained things more specifically in this way: "There is 30 percent risk in fighting. Generally speaking, with 70 percent of the cards in one's hand, given subjective effort, one can throw oneself into a battle and emerge as the victor. If one insists on having all the cards in one's hand before going to battle, then there will not be many battles that can be fought. This is the way of the lords in fighting a battle and will inevitably lead to the loss of opportunity in battle." This is a kind of materialistic dialectics in guiding military affairs. Anyone who accepted this guiding thought generally emerged as the victor in battle. The opposite course would bring about defeat or lead to loss of opportunity in battle.

Commander-in-Chief Lin understood his troops best. He was well acquainted with the voice and look of his cadres as well as the military and political movement of his troops. He was clearly aware of the strong points and weak points of his troops, and he knew how heavy a burden they could carry. He trusted his troops, and the troops also trusted their own

commander. There prevailed among the fighters this saying: "Wherever Commander-in-Chief Lin goes, there is fighting. Carrying out Commander-in-Chief Lin's order means victory." Sometimes, when we accepted a task, although we clearly knew that it was difficult and dangerous, yet the conviction of victory inspired us to move forward.

After the liberation of Chinchow, Chiang Kai-shek personally came to Shenyang to assume command over the five armies of the Liao Yao-hsiang Army Corps, totalling more than 100,000 men, in the vicinity of Shenyang. His troops struck westward along the Peiping-Liaoning Railway in a vain attempt to recapture Chinchow. Failing this, they attempted to change course for Ying'ou and escape by sea to China Proper. The Liao Yao-hsiang Army Corps was Chiang Kai-shek's lineal troops, and the New First Army and the New Sixth Army in this Army Corps were two of the so-called "five great leading forces." Obviously, the annihilation of this group of enemies was of great significance.

At that time, our main forces were still concentrated at the Chinchow area. In order to prevent the enemies from fleeing southward to Ying'ou and escaping to China Proper, it was necessary to intercept the enemies in the vicinity of Shenyang. Commander-in-Chief Lin entrusted the task of intercepting the enemies to our 10th Column (we formerly operated at the Hsinlit'un area in the vicinity of Shenyang and adopted the mobile defensive tactics to intercept enemy reinforcements from Shenyang during the Chinchow Campaign.)

On October 20, we received a telegram from Commander-in-Chief Lin ordering us to make a forced march that night from Peichen to the Heishan and Tahushan area to build defense works as fast as possible. It was pointed out to us that the Liao Yao-hsiang Army Corps would pass through the place. We were ordered to stand by our positions without letting the enemies move one step forward, and provided we could hold out for three days, the complete annihilation of the enemies by our

main forces could be assured.

Soon after our arrival at our positions, as expected by Commander-in-Chief Lin, the Liao Yao-hsiang Army Corps came in powerful waves on October 24. They violently attacked our positions with planes, tanks and heavy guns. There were only 40,000 men in our column. After fighting a mobile defensive battle, we immediately made a stand to defend our positions. There was no time for regrouping, and although it was winter, the troops had no time to put on their winter clothing. The 100,000 strong enemies equipped with U.S. weapons were desperadoes fighting for life, and the violence of the fighting could well be imagined. The positions were lost and recaptured over and over again. Our fighters pitched one against a hundred men. The battlefield was strewn with enemy corpses and stained with blood, but our positions were left intact. Our firm conviction was that since Commander-in-Chief Lin had said that the enemies would be wiped out in three days, the enemies certainly could not live for four days. Although our column could not wipe out the enemies, yet we could harass them.

When fighting was most violent on October 25, we received a second telegram from Commander-in-Chief Lin, Political Commissar Lo and Chief of Staff Liu commending the troops for their heroism and tenacity and instructing us to hold out one more day. After Commander-in-Chief Lin's telegram was delayed, the feeling of the troops ran higher. The fighters declared: "Be resolute and fulfil the task entrusted us by Commander-in-Chief Lin. Liao Yao-hsiang certainly must not be allowed to escape." The longer they fought, the braver they became.

Sure enough, on the morning of October 26, our main forces arrived at the set time, and the enemies were encircled. Beginning on the morning of October 26, the battle of annihilation was launched on a large scale, and none of the 100,000 men under Liao Yao-hsiang was able to slip away. After the conclusion of fighting, Commander-in-Chief Lin,

Political Commissar Lo Jung-huan, Director T'an and Chief of Staff Liu sent a telegram citing the 10th Column for its successful interception of the enemies. They held that this played an important role in wiping out completely the Liao Yao-hsiang Army Corps.

Later, it was heard that when the decision was made to send the 10th Column to intercept the Liao Yao-hsiang Army Corps at the Heishan area, some comrades voiced the anxiety that "the 10th Column could be smashed at one stroke." However, Commander-in-Chief Lin said: "No, the 10th Column can make a stand." How profound the content of these words was! How great was his understanding of and his trust for his own troops! He said: "The 10th Column can make a stand." The fighters of the 10th Column declared: "We certainly will not allow Liao Yao-hsiang to run away." The commander and the fighters shared the same understanding and spoke the same language. Such troops could of course be ever-victorious.

"ONE POINT, TWO AREAS" AND OTHER THINGS

The ten great military principles laid down by Chairman Mao were the sharp weapons which enabled us to defeat the enemies at home and abroad. Commander-in-Chief Lin was best able to apply these military principles of Chairman Mao's in practice, and he also was good at educating his troops to apply these military principles.

One outstanding achievement of Commander-in-Chief Lin in applying the ten great military principles lay in his advancing the tactics of "one point, two areas," "three-three system," "three violences" and "be swift in four respects and slow in one respect." "One point, two areas" means using concentrated strength to break through the enemy battle front at one point at the time of attack, and after this, swiftly expanding the fruits of the battle by coordinating the frontal attack with roundabout encirclement, cutting apart and thrusting from

the flanks. The "three-three system" means dividing every squad into three combat groups with three to four fighters in each group. At the time of attack, the groups are taken as units, thus deploying the formation to reduce casualties. "Three violences" mean violent attack, violent charging and violent pursuit. These tactics were defined and summed up by Commander-in-Chief Lin according to Chairman Mao's military principles and the practical experiences of his troops. They comply with the general objective of "preserving ourselves and wiping out the enemies," and they also embody at the same time the basic principle of "concentrating our forces to vanquish the enemy one by one." As a result of their making practical application of these tactics, our troops often completely and thoroughly wiped out the enemies, and the enemies — ranging from commanding officers to the rank and file — were often destroyed in one clean sweep.

At the time of wiping out the Liao Yao-hsiang Army Corps, we captured almost all the high-ranking generals alive. When I asked Li T'ao, Commander of the New Sixth Army, one of the so-called "five great leading forces", whether he was convinced of his defeat, he said resentfully: "You communists are crafty in battle." What the enemy called "crafty" showed precisely the wise strategy and tactics of our army.

The application of these tactics not only enabled us to gain the upper hand all the time in fighting with Chiang Kai-shek's regular troops. In 1949, our column also won a great victory through applying these tactics to suppress the bandits in West Hunan.

There were actually 100,000 bandits in the West Hunan area comprising 22 hsien. The higher level demanded their suppression in three years. A "noted public figure" of the place told us: "There have been bandits in West Hunan all the time since the Ming Dynasty, and it is difficult to suppress them even in five years, not to say three years." We told him: "The Communist Party is different, and according to our view,

the suppression of bandits in two years can be guaranteed.” This man smiled and withdrew.

In the course of suppressing the bandits, we boldly aroused and relied on the masses and vigorously intensified the political offensive on the one hand. In military suppression, we implemented the principle of concentrating our forces to smash the bandit groups one by one. For example, there were 3,000 bandits in Kuchang hsien, a small hsien 100 *li* square, and by concentrating four regiments, we wiped them out in one and a half months. Simultaneously with this, we brought into play the spirit of “three violences,” and the bandits and armed forces of the landlords were so hard-pressed that they could do nothing else but to surrender in the end.

Under our heavy military blows, the bandits crumbled and perished. The more than 2,000 bandits of Fenghuang hsien, for example, collectively laid down their arms of their own accord. As a result, the bandits were thoroughly suppressed not in two years but in one year and two months. With great admiration, the “noted public figure” said: “The Liberation Army is both wise and brave, and the equal of it can seldom be found at all times. You truly have a clear knowledge of the situation!”

Commander-in-Chief Lin was good at grasping the interval between two campaigns to train and consolidate his troops. In the training and consolidation of army units, he began with politics to rectify thought and promote class education. With political ideology raised, he then organized military training, summed up and studied experience in actual combat, regarded the training ground as the battlefield, and educated the troops to study diligently and undergo hard training. The saying that “more perspiration at ordinary times will lead to less bloodshed in time of war” became a mass slogan. Consequently, excellent results were registered in training. Simultaneously with this, soldiers were recruited for replenishment, and organization and adjustment work was carried out. After one or two months of

training and consolidation, the political consciousness and military skills of the troops were greatly raised. With the troops yearning for fighting, once they came to the battlefield, they were as energetic as dragons and tigers, and they always emerged as the victors.

The 28th Division of our 10th Column was a veteran unit, but it had not fought a good battle for quite a period of time. In April 1948, after the conclusion of the conference of military and political cadres, Commander-in-Chief Lin sent for me and discussed with me the question of training and consolidating the 28th Division. The talk lasted from 11 p.m. to 1 a.m. He incisively pointed out that the 28th Division was haunted by conservative ideas and absence of strong political and ideological work. He said: "Fighting has something to do with politics, and a unit without politics cannot fight well." He suggested that in training and consolidation, the concrete method and step should be to arouse the masses to unfold criticism and self-criticism to the full extent through class education. The problems of the unit should be thoroughly exposed around the few battles which were not well fought, so that every cadre and fighter might see the shortcomings of his unit. The masses should be allowed to air their views and find ways and means to rectify the shortcomings. The central link in such work was to strengthen the work of the Party branch, and once the consciousness of the Party members was raised and aroused, the masses would also be set in motion under their leadership.

In accordance with Commander-in-Chief Lin's instruction, we brought together the 28th Division at K'aiyuan to undergo one month of training and consolidation, and the unit took on an altogether new look. That division assumed the role of defending important positions in the battle of interception at Heishan, and fought a colourful battle. Violently attacked in rotation by the New First Army, the 49th Army and the 207th Division, the main forces of the enemy, although the positions changed hands a number of times, yet this division still tenaciously held their positions in the end.

PART V: LIN PIAO AS I REMEMBERED HIM

Clinging to the strategic thought of leading the whole people's liberation war of the Northeast, the guiding thought of concentrating his forces to wipe out the enemy, and the thought of boldly arousing the masses and building base areas, Commander-in-Chief Lin finally defeated the enemy. All this was the outcome of his incisive and all-round study of Mao Tse-tung thought. He regarded Mao Tse-tung thought as the compass of action. He was most successful in the application of Mao Tse-tung thought in the light of the concrete conditions of the Northeast at that time. The great victory of the people's liberation war of the Northeast led by Commander-in-Chief Lin was a great victory for Marxism, Leninism, and the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

This fact tells us that anyone who firmly carries out Mao Tse-tung thought can win victory and that anyone who is able to apply correctly Marxism, Leninism, Mao Tse-tung thought is ever-victorious. History shows that Commander-in-Chief Lin is such a person. He is the most resolute and loyal executant of the Party's correct line and Mao Tse-tung thought.

WAR AND PEACE

The enemy is a wolf by nature, but he sometimes disguises himself as a "lamb" for the purpose of benumbing people. Once you are off guard, he would pounce on you and break your neck. It is easy to see a wolf baring his teeth and claws, but it is difficult to distinguish a wolf in sheep's clothing.

After the conclusion of the war of resistance against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to start a civil war. However, for the sake of covering up his intention to go to war and of winning time to reshuffle his forces, he flirted with "peace" on a number of occasions. For example, he hypocritically signed the "peace agreement," proclaimed the "cease-fire order," "reiterated the validity of the cease-fire order," and even called for "peace talks" on the eve of his fall. Actually,

it was not difficult to see through Chiang Kai-shek's tricks. However, there really were some people who were so naive as to harbour the illusion that his "forbearance" could bring about peace.

Commander-in-Chief Lin was of the view that the lethargic thought of peace was a grave danger to the struggle against the enemy. He held that all army-men and civilians must be educated to discard their illusions for peace. In 1946, he sharply pointed out: "The word of peace basically has no place in Chiang Kai-shek's mind, and he only uses it occasionally when he wants to hoodwink people." "The people of the Northeast should exhibit a high degree of vigilance and must not be fooled again and again. They should closely guard against Chiang Kai-shek's surprise attack under the smokescreen of 'peace.' Today, only by persisting in resistance with body and soul can we deny the Chiang troops of an opportunity to reorganize, replenish and transfer their forces, can we harass them to exhaustion, can we deal blows to them and annihilate them. Only in this way can we check and smash Chiang Kai-shek's fresh attack."

At the time of educating his troops, in accordance with Mao Tse-tung thought, Commander-in-Chief Lin repeatedly stressed: "The struggle between us and Chiang Kai-shek is a struggle between two antagonistic classes. The contradiction is absolute. War is inevitable and compromise is transient. Without destroying the Communist Party, Chiang Kai-shek 'will not die with his eyes closed.'" His so-called 'peace' is actually a means for exterminating us. To seek peace under Chiang Kai-shek's gun is no different from 'asking the tiger for its skin' and can only bring losses to the Party cause. Our only course is to fight, fight to the end and topple Chiang Kai-shek in order to bring peace to China. We must fight until there is no imperialism in the world before there can be perpetual peace in the world. Armed struggle is the profession of our army. We must establish the thought of hostility toward the enemy, sharpen our swords until they shine, but can never

allow them to gather rust.”

Commander-in-Chief Lin's thought of winning peace through struggle deeply embodied Chairman Mao's great thought of “using revolutionary war to oppose counter-revolutionary war.” It was a powerful weapon for us to educate the people and the armed forces. Because we carried out ideological education work on a large scale, and because Chiang Kai-shek again and again tore off his worthless “peace” mask, the facts themselves taught people a lesson. The lethargic thought of peace was quickly overcome, and the thought of carrying the revolutionary struggle through to the end was solidly established.

I think this thought of winning peace through struggle is still of educational significance today. The essence of imperialism is aggression and war, and regardless of what subtle trick it may play, it can never change this essence. The reason that the imperialist countries dare not go to war today is that the strength of socialism is very great. The nationalist countries that advocate peace and neutrality also oppose war. However, a wolf remains to be a wolf and it never can truly become a lamb. The imperialists have not laid down the butcher knife. They are still gathering forces for armaments expansion and war preparations and are developing rockets and guided missiles. Once an opportunity arises, they will launch aggression and attack the socialist countries in an attempt to destroy the socialist countries. Therefore, we must preserve a high degree of vigilance at all times, and at whatever time, we must discard the lethargic thought of peace and continuously strengthen our forces — especially our armed forces. The safety and inviolability of our socialist fatherland can be defended only when we are unrivalled in strength. The stronger we are, the less imperialism dares to go to war. If imperialism is so crazy as to start a war, we have the strength to abolish war with war, uproot imperialism from the earth and win perpetual peace for the world.

STRICT WITH SELF, LENIENT TO OTHERS

I once thought: Why is Commander-in-Chief Lin always correct? In what way is he different from ordinary people? As a result of my careful observation, I discovered his conspicuous characteristics: He is one who studies diligently and thinks deeply, one who is in close touch with the masses, one who is especially strict with self, one good at learning from Chairman Mao.

I saw Commander-in-Chief Lin on dozens of occasions. On every occasion, unless he was attending a meeting, I always found him reading a book. His house was stacked with books, and it was true that he seldom parted with his books. On one occasion, I had some business to attend to and went to Commander-in-Chief Lin for instruction. When I entered his room, I saw him sitting astride a bench with his body leaning forward toward a book. I learned that the usual sitting position tired him and he had therefore changed his position.

During the Battle of the P'ingsing Pass, he went to the front himself and was seriously wounded. For many years, however, he not only worked selflessly but also tenaciously persisted in study. According to those comrades close to him, Commander-in-Chief Lin always read late into the night. He was so absorbed in study that he neglected his sleep and meals.

Commander-in-Chief Lin did not read for the sake of reading. Most books he read were Marxist-Leninist ones, Chairman Mao's works, and ancient or modern political and military writings of Chinese or foreign origin. He was "studying for application," and he employed theories to solve practical problems. He converted all useful experience of other people into his own. No wonder he is so learned and his understanding so brilliant.

Commander-in-Chief Lin is very practical in style of work, and he pays great attention to investigation and study. He

always did all he could to understand the conditions of the enemy, and in important campaigns and battles, he often went to the front himself to find out how the enemy stood, to inspect the battle front and to study the combat plan together with the armed force leaders. Commander-in-Chief Lin consistently kept in close touch with the masses and listened to their views. Always very modest, he never put on airs. When he engaged in conversation with those under his command, he always carefully listened to what the other side said and seldom cut in when another person was talking. When there was something wrong, he always adopted the tone of discussion to point it out, and after that, he systematically proceeded from ideology and principle to the concrete aspect to make a detailed and incisive analysis of the question until you understood clearly the issue.

A minor event impressed me very deeply. Strictly speaking, he knew us quite well, but every time he received me, no matter how busy he was, he always saw me to the door. Sometimes, I felt embarrassed and asked him not to, but he always insisted on accompanying me to the door. He acted in this way to me as well as to other people. Was this general courtesy? This fully showed Commander-in-Chief Lin's spirit of equality with people.

Commander-in-Chief Lin's way of living was amazingly simple and plain. His refreshment was fried soya beans, and he also offered fried soya beans to his guests. He also served his guests with plain dishes. Over a number of years, I always found him wearing a gray cloth uniform and a coarse woollen uniform. When I saw Commander-in-Chief Lin at Kunming in 1958, he was still wearing a common-place old black woollen suit with patched sleeves.

Commander-in-Chief Lin shared joys and sorrows with the fighters. He worked strenuously with extraordinary fortitude, and when a battle was in progress, he often stayed awake throughout the night at the command post and seldom took a

rest. Commander-in-Chief Lin is one who works selflessly for public interests. Fan Chung-yen of the Sung Dynasty once said: "He is the first to grieve over the sorrow of the country and the last to enjoy pleasure in the country." Our Commander-in-Chief Lin is such a person.

Commander-in-Chief Lin is especially strict with self. This is principally manifested in his way of dealing with people and things and his way of life. What impresses me most profoundly is his spirit of self-criticism.

During the summer offensive in 1947, our column and other columns were ordered to attack and take a strongly defended city. In the course of fighting, we killed, disabled and captured more than 10,000 enemies. Later, fighting was called off due to the arrival of enemy reinforcements. The failure to fight a good battle in this campaign was principally due to certain defects on the part of the command post at the front and the command posts at the column level — principally in the aspects of disposition of troops and tactics. For example, the troops and fire power were not adequately concentrated, and not enough efforts were made to intercept the enemy reinforcements.

At the conference of cadres convened by the headquarters after the battle, Commander-in-Chief Lin assumed the responsibility in toto. He stood up three times and sincerely criticized himself saying: "You are not held responsible for failing to take that city this time, because the whole responsibility is mine. The most important reason was that I failed to understand adequately the circumstances and that I made up my mind too fast. It would be best if instead of launching an attack at once we just laid siege to the city and fought off the enemy reinforcements. Had we wiped out the enemy reinforcements before we attacked the city, I am sure we could have taken it. Apart from this, our attack on the city this time has also exposed the inferiority of our tactics for storming heavily fortified point. This is also principally due to the

inadequacy of my study at ordinary times.”

Commander-in-Chief Lin's strictness with himself deeply moved us. I felt that the responsibility for direct command rested not with Commander-in-Chief Lin, but with us. But for the sake of learning a lesson from this experience, he stood forth to assume the responsibility precisely for the purpose of impelling the study of the tactics for storming heavily fortified cities to a new stage. The importance attached by Commander-in-Chief Lin to this question spelled the beginning of the solution of a series of tactics for storming heavily fortified points and heralded the approach of the enemy to the brink of collapse. This example set by Commander-in-Chief Lin gave me and the army cadres a profound course of education in self-criticism.

After I relayed what he said to the troops on my return, one cadre after another took the initiative to make self-examination and courageously assumed the responsibility. From then on, self-criticism became a common practice among the army cadres, and the review, discussion and study of tactics truly blossomed everywhere like flowers after a shower. All set their minds at ease.

From then on, Commander-in-Chief Lin devoted himself to the study of the tactics for storming heavily fortified points, and the tactics of “fast in four respects and slow in one respect,” “four groups, one detachment,” etc., were gradually brought forward. Finally a complete set of tactics for storming heavily fortified points came into shape. Only eight months afterward, the city mentioned above was attacked and captured within 23 hours, and none of the ten thousand strong enemies was able to slip away. From then on, all the big cities occupied by the enemies in the Northeast were attacked and captured one by one under the guidance of Commander-in-Chief Lin's tactics for storming heavily fortified points.

Commander-in-Chief is an extraordinary genius with

profound knowledge. His modesty, plainness, simplicity, strictness with self, leniency to others, and broad-mindedness enabled him to enjoy high prestige among the armed forces and the people of the Northeast.

All cadres and fighters in the army were willing to see him and draw close to him. The cadres of our column often competed to be the first to go to the headquarters to attend meetings so that they might see Commander-in-Chief Lin. The reason was that once they came to the headquarters and saw Commander-in-Chief Lin, they could understand more of the instructions of the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao. Furthermore, the words and deeds of Commander-in-Chief Lin also could enable them to learn many new and valuable things, and going to the headquarters to attend meetings and see Commander-in-Chief Lin meant the "procurement of experience and treasures."

An ancient figure said: "At thirty I stood firm." During the four years under the leadership of Commander-in-Chief Lin, I was just over 30 and at the noon of life. Commander-in-Chief Lin's repeated inculcation gave us a great education in the basic matters of class stand, viewpoint and method and hence enabled us to consolidate and enhance ourselves further. Up to now, these teachings of his still continue to play a very great role in my thought. Commander-in-Chief Lin is not just our consistently correct and wise leader but also our good teacher and useful friend. I often recall with excitement the uncommon four years in the forties.

(From Peking "Chung Kuo Ch'ing Nien," No. 8, 1960)

Note: Chou Ch'ih-p'ing, Chinese Communist Vice-Minister of Metallurgical Industry, is member of the CCP 9th Central Committee.

MY IMPRESSION OF GENERAL LIN PIAO

by Su Yee

The majestic name of General Lin Piao first became known to me through the Shanghai newspapers some 20 years ago. Through such world-shaking events as the Long March, the War of Resistance against Japan, the liberation of the Northeast and the subsequent battles fought in areas of China Proper, General Lin won resounding fame throughout the country by his military exploits.

Lin Piao was a graduate of the Whampoa Military academy, 4th Class. Although I worked for the military academy at its New Cadets Department at the time when he was there, I couldn't recall what he looked like. When I first saw his name in the newspapers, in my mind's eye I would see a stalwart man with a sonorous voice, strong in will power but careless about his physical appearance, growing a whisker that was never trimmed. Perhaps the figure I conjured up in my imagination was the result of association with his name, for *piao* means big and strong. My imagination was belied last year when I saw his picture. But I was not at all clear about him as a man.

Last August I was stranded in Peking following the disruption of the ocean route. In my anxiety to return to Hong Kong, I joined three other cultural workers including Shu Hsiu-wen, Chang Chuen-hsiang and Ku Chung-yee, who were going down to Wuhan to visit with General Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army. By the time we arrived, General Lin Piao was busy with military operations, and the schedule arranged for us by the Political Department of the Fourth Field Army was a heavy one. First we were to meet the heroes of the army and

interview them, then we were to visit with military commanders at all levels.

In our meetings with the heroes and the military commanders, we heard many things and many stories told about General Lin. They told us that beginning November 1945, the Kuomintang reactionaries, with the full support of the American imperialists, sent strong contingents into the Northeast, landing at Chinhwangtao, pushing northward and capturing Chinchow, Tiehling and Changchun in rapid succession. Fighting against immense odds, Lin Piao and his troops retreated all the way to Szup'ingchieh, fought a pitched battle there and then kept on retreating, until he had withdrawn his troops to the north of the Sungari River, declaring: "We are ready to hand over all the cities, Tsitsihar and Harbin not excepting, if Chiang Kai-shek's troops want them." Many of the commanders serving under him were horrified. They let their fancy get the better of them and read a lot of meaning into General Lin's attitude. Some said that General Lin Piao must have been frightened out of his wits, after he was seriously wounded at the battle of Pinghsingkuan. Others said that General Lin was battle-shy because he was scared of the superiority of the U.S. equipment, the stronger fire power of the Kuomintang troops, and the threat of the atomic bomb posed by the United States. Still others thought that General Lin had become soft following his long stay and convalescence in the Soviet Union, where he lived in comfort and even luxury. But there were also people who thought that General Lin had learned some master strategy from the Russians, and that he might have a few tricks up his sleeve.

Some of these talks were conducted behind his back, others were given to him as outright advices in his face. When he heard these, he neither took offense and spent long hours in explaining his position, nor looked mysterious as if he had some hidden plans. All he did was smile and say that he was only carrying out Chairman Mao's great strategy.

Then in the spring and summer months of 1946, in line with Chairman Mao's military conceptions, General Lin Piao first sent his troops to the countryside for the suppression of bandits, then he dispatched cadres to mobilize the people for the land reform programme, whereby establishing base areas which guaranteed an adequate supply of manpower and foodstuffs. When this was done, he started to counter attack in a series of operations that proved conclusively that he was not scared of the U.S. imperialists. All the time he was biding his time and carrying out Chairman Mao's strategic plans.

Grave doubts and suspicions were aroused, however, over Lin Piao's decisions, in the subsequent campaigns, to move large numbers of troops, often in tens of thousands, both in day and night, and expose them to possible bombing and artillery fire from the enemy. Also, he would not hesitate to send troops into operations in freezing weather when it was 40 degrees below zero. Immediately after a big battle, before the troops were given a chance to catch their breath and before the battlefield was cleared, orders would be given for new and additional operations equally onerous. The alleged callousness with which General Lin was said to have used his troops occasioned once more a spate of criticisms and grave doubts. But these, too, were dispelled by the signal victories he scored one after another in the campaigns of 1948, which proved once and for all that he was a great strategist.

From what I had heard and from what I had read in the army publications, I became even more attracted to the legendary hero and was very anxious to meet him. But this pleasure was repeatedly denied us. In our eagerness we let our fancy take wing. Just imagine that General Lin Piao was not only a great tactician who advanced the tactics of "One Point, Two Areas," "Three-Three-System," and "be swift in four respects and slow in one respect," but also a remarkable commander who would go through thick and thin with his men and stay with them to the end. It would take a resolute, courageous and humble man to do all these things. The more I thought about

him, the more he took on all the good attributes of famous generals and able ministers at all times and in all countries.

Finally, one day, I got a glimpse of him. It turned out that he was not a stalwart in the first place, he wore no whiskers and his voice was not sonorous. Instead, he looked every inch an accomplished scholar. His uniform was neat and clean, and his military cap sat jauntily on his head. He did not look like Chuko Liang, or Kwan Yun-ch'ang, or George Washington. He was just Lin Piao.

Unfortunately, at that time he was busy with the liberation of south China. Day in and day out, he pored over military maps and directed campaigns, giving him little time to see and talk to us. But I did see him several times, each time leaving a deep impression on me.

The first time I saw him was at Teh Ming Hotel in Hankow, then converted into a hostel under the management of the Central China United Front Department, where we all stayed. General Lin Piao, hitherto thwarted in his wishes to see us, invited us for lunch, following which he was to have a long talk with us. Urgent official business, however, intervened again. General Lin Piao asked Vice-Mayor Chang to act for him at the lunch, and he did not appear until the lunch was over. Several ranking officers came with him.

We were surprised to see that the illustrious general, Commander-in-Chief to the men who served under him, was dressed like a lower-echelon officer. Greeting us with an outburst of enthusiasm, he treated us if we were his old friends. His handshake was firm and powerful, but his footsteps were light, as if he were afraid of trampling upon an ant. His voice was even and measured, everything he said was to the point, and there was nothing superfluous about it. Talking about his military exploits, he attributed all his successes to the leadership of the Party Central Committee, Chairman Mao and Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh, and to the good work put

PART V: LIN PIAO AS I REMEMBERED HIM

in by his subordinates and troops. He himself wouldn't take any credit for it. In him you could find neither the superiority and arrogance of a Kuomintang senior commander, nor the superciliousness of a Kuomintang petty officer. He was so sincere, so modest and so gracious that you succumbed to his charm in spite of yourself. Here I would cite just one example. I took out my autograph album, giving him a full page to write his name, and then I turned to talk to one of his chief lieutenants. Before I knew it, he had already written his name, in very small characters, on a page already crowded with autographs.

The second time I saw him was at a tea party given by him to Central China's delegates to the People's Political Consultative Conference who had just returned from Peking, and a group of visiting Soviet cameramen. Quietly he sat there to listen to the many speeches that were made, and clapped his hands only when he heard something that was really remarkable.

Then I saw him on a more formal occasion when he gave a reception to the same group of people. It was General Lin himself who made the opening remarks at that meeting. He spoke for only three minutes, but that three-minute talk was as laconic as it was meaningful. He neither shouted nor gesticulated. After he had finished speaking, he toasted his guests. Then he sat down and listened to all the speeches. The reception did not break up until midnight, and he stayed till the end without showing the least sign of weariness.

While I was in Wuhan, I only saw him three times. He struck me as a man of unassuming manners, honest and straight-forward. Certainly he has lived up to the fine tradition of a good communist. No wonder he had contributed so much to the revolutionary cause. His is a shining example for everyone of us to follow.

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**FOLLOW THE SPLENDID EXAMPLE OF
VICE CHAIRMAN LIN, BE BOUNDLESSLY
LOYAL TO CHAIRMAN MAO'S
REVOLUTIONARY LINE**

*—Recalling a Paragraph of the History of the Struggle Between
the Two Lines in the Northeast After the Victory of the
War of Resistance Against Japan*

by Yen Chung-ch'uan

After the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Party Central Committee headed by the great leader Chairman Mao sent large numbers of cadres and troops to the Northeast to lead the people there to unfold further the revolutionary struggle. At that time, autocrat and traitor Chiang Kai-shek — who offered passive resistance against Japan, actively opposed communism, fawned on the enemy and resorted to national betrayal during the eight year long War of Resistance — came swaggeringly down the Omei Mountains to pick the peaches in a vain attempt to snatch away the fruits of victory from the people who shed blood and fought fearlessly under the leadership of our Party. Aided by U.S. imperialism, he played a double-game and carried out the counter-revolutionary plot of all-out civil war under the pretext of "peace." He hurriedly sent his troops by air, land and sea to the Northeast to capture Shanhaikuan, Chinchow and other places which had been liberated by us. Taking advantage of the fact that our forces had not secured a firm foothold in the Northeast, he vainly attempted to bank on his superiority in strength and equipment to wipe out our forces at one stroke, occupy the whole of the Northeast and after that to turn the Northeast into an important base for launching a nationwide civil war so that he might attack our base areas in North China

from the South and the North, thus further restoring his reactionary rule in the whole country. Because of this, the struggle in the Northeast at that time also constituted the focal point of the struggle between our Party and army on the one hand and the U.S.-Chiang reactionaries on the other; it was of extraordinarily great significance to the development of the situation in the whole country.

At this grave juncture, our most respected and beloved great leader Chairman Mao opportunely exposed the counter-revolutionary conspiracy of the U.S.-Chiang reactionaries by issuing on December 28, 1945 to the army-men and people of the Northeast the great call: "Build stable base areas in the Northeast." In this directive, Chairman Mao wisely pointed out: "Our Party's present task in the Northeast is to build base areas, stable military and political base areas in eastern, northern and western Manchuria." "Mass work will be the centre of gravity of our Party's work in the Northeast. . . if we rely firmly on the masses, we shall overcome all difficulties and reach our goal step by step." For us he put forward a correct policy and pointed out a bright road respecting a series of important questions — where and how base areas should be built, etc. This great historic document was the general programme for building the Northeast in the political and military fields as well as Chairman Mao's great strategic plan for completely smashing the attack of the Kuomintang reactionaries and for the liberation of whole China.

However, counter-revolutionary revisionist P'eng Chen and his like who usurped important posts in the Northeast at that time frenziedly opposed Chairman Mao's wise instruction and spared no efforts in pushing big traitor Liu Shao-ch'i's counter-revolutionary line, that is, the Right opportunist line. In the political field, they advertised class capitulationism, blind faith in negotiations, and illusions of peace. In the disposition of work, they thought all the time of the cities, discarded the countryside, and did not carry out arduous and careful mass work. In regard to the army building line, they

resorted to the brigandish policy of "enlisting followers," recruited deserters and turncoats, formed factions for the selfish ends, and enlisted bandits, Chinese traitors, and deserters to enlarge their forces. When the Kuomintang reactionaries invaded the Northeast on a large scale, they attempted to replace Chairman Mao's strategic thought and tactical principles with adventurism. Under the conditions that our army was inferior to the enemy and had no rural base areas to fall on, they vainly attempted to stake everything in a throw and take the venture-some course of fighting a decisive battle with the enemy.

At the crucial moment bearing on the future and destiny of the Chinese revolution, Comrade Lin Piao, close comrade-in-arms of our great leader Chairman Mao, firmly and bravely defended Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line and waged a tit-for-tat struggle against the Right opportunist line carried out by renegade, traitor and scab Liu Shao-ch'i and his agents in the Northeast — P'eng Chen and his like. Comrade Lin Piao constantly and repeatedly enjoined the army cadres that they must not give credence to so-called "new stage of peace and democracy" and must not relay it to their men. He profoundly pointed out: "Peace is not possible without a victory for the revolutionary war. We have at present still no base areas in the Northeast, and are therefore without a home. The cities do not belong to us for the time being and we can only regard them as hotels and live in them for a while. Unless we build base areas in the countryside, we have no way to overcome the enemy. We would be driven out by the enemy and might even die of hunger and cold."

Comrade Lin Piao always bore in mind Chairman Mao's instruction: "Build stable base areas in the Northeast." In the long cold nights under an oil lamp in a hut, he constantly sank in deep thought in front of a map and contemplated how to carry out Chairman Mao's great strategic plan. Both on the march and during the intervals of fierce fighting, he always personally organized his troops to carry out mass work and propagate the Party's policies in every place. He mobilized the

masses to wipe out bandits, oppose the despots and set up revolutionary organs of political power.

In the course of directing operations, Comrade Lin Piao firmly followed Chairman Mao's wise teaching "Keep off the high ground but occupy two sides," and resolutely avoided fighting the enemies under unfavourable conditions. In order to look for and create favourable opportunities for wiping out the enemies, he advanced and retreated in big strides, gave up the cities, discarded burdens and concentrated superior forces to wipe out the enemies one by one in mobile warfare. In this way, although we had to fight under the difficult condition of lacking support from the rear at the initial stage, yet we still managed to win continuously in battles and fighting, thus greatly slowing down the enemy attacks and wiping out the effective strength of the enemy on a large scale for our own preservation.

In the winter of 1945 through the spring of 1946, although Comrade Lin Piao consistently and untiringly waged struggle for carrying out and defending Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, yet P'eng Chen and his like, backed by their sinister master Liu Shao-ch'i, still persisted in their mistakes and continued to carry out frenziedly the counter-revolutionary revisionist line. This made it impossible to carry out to the letter Chairman Mao's instruction, "Building stable base areas in the Northeast," for a long time, and the whole situation of the struggle against the enemy was most unfavourable. At that time, the fighters fighting at the front could not find reinforcements, cities were lost one after another, and the countryside were entrenched by the bandits and Chinese traitors enlisted by P'eng Chen and his like. When the Kuomintang attacked, these fellows revealed their true identity by going over to the Kuomintang, thus becoming big and small "Tso Shan Tiao," those who wanted only to preserve their own spheres of influence. They created disturbances and made trouble in the broad rear areas of our army, bullied and oppressed the masses, undermined construction in the base areas and frenziedly

chimed in with the counter-revolutionary attack of the Kuomintang. These pitiless facts declared the complete bankruptcy of the counter-revolutionary capitulationist line of Liu Shao-ch'i, P'eng Chen and their like. At that time, the broad masses of the cadres came to see clearly the unsurpassed wisdom of Chairman Mao's instruction concerning "the building of stable base areas in the Northeast."

Dark clouds cannot cover up the sun, nor can the fog stop a ship from sailing the seas. At the crucial hour in which the struggle between the enemy and ourselves in the Northeast and the struggle between the two lines within the Party were most acute, our great supreme commander Chairman Mao opportunely and decisively made the wise decision to relieve counter-revolutionary revisionist P'eng Chen of his leadership in the Northeast Bureau, thus severing Liu Shao-ch'i's clutch on the Northeast. From then on, the unified leadership of Comrade Lin Piao was established in the Northeast.

Between June and July 1946, Comrade Lin Piao himself presided over the enlarged meeting of the Northeast Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and completely liquidated the Right capitulationist line of Liu Shao-ch'i pushed by P'eng Chen. He used Mao Tse-tung thought to unify understanding, the policy, the will and the pace of the whole Party and the whole army in the Northeast, and gave birth to the "July 7" resolution for truly carrying out to the letter Chairman Mao's instruction concerning "the building of stable base areas in the Northeast." This resolution played a most important role in turning the tide in the Northeast.

Under the direct and correct leadership of Comrade Lin Piao, tens of thousands of cadres were quickly mobilized and sent to the countryside to carry out arduous and deep-going mass work among the masses and set up base areas in the Northeast. In accordance with Chairman Mao's principle of "dispersing forces to mobilize the masses and concentrating forces to cope with the enemy," Comrade Lin Piao dispersed a

considerable part of the Field Army to the military sub-districts for the purposes of mobilizing the masses, wiping out bandits and setting up organs of political power. In this way, over the course of several months, the Northeast took on an altogether new look.

By the end of 1946, the poverty-stricken peasants of the broad countryside in the Northeast were mobilized to carry out agrarian reform, wipe out the armed bandits of the Kuomintang, build people's militia and expand the main forces, thus basically changing the whole situation in the Northeast into one which was favourable to us but unfavourable to the enemy. In the military field, this also swiftly led to the change from strategic defensive to strategic counterattack. Fierce attacks were launched against the enemy one after another, and each offensive was more violent and larger in scope than the one before. The enemies were wiped out on a large scale. Unable to defend all places simultaneously, the enemy troops were rushed from place to place, and they became so exhausted that they were utterly routed.

More than two years later, we scored a great victory in the Liaohsi-Shenyang Campaign which won resounding fame in China and abroad. We thoroughly and wholly wiped out several hundred thousand bandit troops under Chiang Kai-shek in the Northeast and liberated the whole of the Northeast.

The liberation of the whole of the Northeast brought important changes to the military situation in the whole country. As Chairman Mao pointed out on November 14, 1948 in his article "The Momentous Change in China's Military Situation": "The military situation in China has reached a new turning point and the balance of forces between the two sides in the war has undergone a fundamental change. The People's Liberation Army, long superior in quality, has now become superior in numbers as well." A firm foundation was thus laid down for the overthrow of the Chiang Dynasty, and the progress of the liberation of whole China was greatly expedited. The

victory of the war in the Northeast was a great victory for Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, Vice Chairman Lin's outstanding contribution to the Chinese revolution as well as a historical testimony of Vice Chairman Lin's boundless loyalty to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line.

History eloquently testifies that Vice Chairman Lin consistently holds high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung thought. At every critical juncture of the revolution, he most resolutely carried out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. He is the best in learning and creatively applying Mao Tse-tung thought. Vice Chairman Lin is the closest comrade-in-arms and best pupil of the great leader Chairman Mao, and is the splendid example for the whole Party and the people of the whole country to learn from.

(From Peking "Jen-min Jih-pao", December 3, 1968)

Note: Yen Chung-ch'uan, deputy chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee, is alternate member of CCP 9th Central Committee and deputy Chief-of-Staff, People's Liberation Army.

LIN PIAO APPEARS IN PLAY DIRECTED BY LO JUI-CH'ING

Ta Kung Pao

In the Red Army days of the early 1930s, the cultural and recreation activities for the troops were always kept on an even keel.

The First Army Corps of the Red Army was stationed in Lichuan, Kiangsi when the spring festival of 1933 came round. *The Snow of Lushan*, a four-act play, was staged for the occasion. Full of educational value, the play was very well received by the men and the officers.

The Snow of Lushan told the story of the failure of the many offensive campaigns mounted by Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary troops against the revolutionary base area in Kiangsi. Directed by Chiang himself from his headquarters at Lushan, the offensives were repulsed one after the other by the redoubtable Red Army. The overbearing attitude of the Chiang forces melted like the snow of Lushan on a sunny winter day, when they were routed by the revolutionary mailed fist, for sunshine as well as victory belongs always to the people.

Like all other plays, this play was staged in hectic days when the army was either on the march or preparing for battle. The producers and writers could provide only a broad outline, the skeleton of a plot, leaving specific situations and dialogues to be worked out by the actors. The director of that particular play, *The Snow of Lushan*, was Lo Jui-ch'ing, then chief of the Army Corps Security Bureau. Among the

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actors were commanding officer Lin Piao, political commissar Nieh Jung-chen and head of the political department Lo Jung-huan.

Curtains were drawn across a platform in an old temple, which served as a makeshift stage. It happened that we had just captured from the enemy a gaslight, which shed a brilliance that illuminated the entire stage. In that play, General Lin Piao was acting the part of a Red Army general. The men, beaming with joy, said that the general was playing himself. When a military commander reported to General Lin Piao: "The enemy has been wiped out," a thunderous applause exploded and cheers and peals of laughter came from the audience. The merriment continued a long time.

(From Hong Kong "Ta Kung Pao," February 11, 1957)

